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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

NEW STATE FORMATION: INDONESIA AND THE POLITICS OF THE EXCEPTION

BY

STEWART KENNETH SUTLEY ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.**

DEPARTMENT OF **POLITICAL SCIENCE**

Edmonton, Alberta
Spring 1996

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ISBN 0-612-10643-8

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DEGREE: Doctor of Philosophy

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled **NEW STATE FORMATION: INDONESIA AND THE POLITICS OF THE EXCEPTION** submitted by **STEWART K. SUTLEY** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

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R R Gilsdorf
Professor R.R. Gilsdorf (Chair/Examiner)

December 14, 1995

QUOTE PAGE

The base, the rendezvous, so long desired has now been laid. A large part of the most fertile land and most prolific sea in India is now yours.

Governor-General Jan Pieterzohn Coen reporting to the Heeren XVII
on his first successes in securing monopolistic trading privileges
in the East Indies archipelago

Behold and consider what a good courage may accomplish! . . . Great things can be done in the Indies.

Jan Pieterzohn Coen

It is good, after long odysseys around the systems' archipelagoes, again to stand on well known soil, to remove from the hands of pretenders the bow of one's fathers, to set to it the arrow accustomed, and therewith pierce all the iron hoops. Once again this old dogma, again that old belief . . . here this, here that . . .. The ensemble of olden things, breathing younger by evolution, is useful perhaps to science and country, but there can be no doubt that it bolsters the heart.

Maurice Hauriou (1896)

DEDICATION

To the memory of Sibbele (Siep) G. J. Jaspers
(1931–93)

ABSTRACT

This study advances an alternate methodological perspective on the formation of new states in Asia and Africa. Taking the case of the Indonesian "New Order" state, this study attempts through the exceptional perspective to harmonize the analytical depiction of the creation of its subject with the actual creation of its subject by adopting the form of a definition by analysis. Within this form, the analysis concentrates upon collective political actors' accumulation of political resources and the plural, but reinforcing, accumulation of definition of distinctly "Indonesian" standards to which such actors gave expression in what was, historically, a novel political context from 1945. Attention is thus focused principally on how the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and the Indonesian National Army (TNI) attempted to cope with each other and with the paradox of novelty. Where novelty knows no standards, actors in the context of novelty know no other impulse than to terminate this condition by attempting to create authoritative standards whose very authoritativeness entails the creation of sovereignty and its attendant monopolies of decision and coercion. In their separate efforts to cope with and terminate the indeterminacy of their political existence, the Party and the Army jointly fostered the emergence of a transcendent Indonesian identity on the bases of their accumulated popular and territorial resources. The Army's assertion of sovereignty in late 1965 ended the language and living of indeterminacy that had characterized Indonesian

politics for twenty years. The formation of the New Order registered as a new state because the circumscription of population and territory that it entailed—the integrity of the division—uniquely reflected the principle and reality of sovereign authority and the incipient "Indonesian" standards to which both the Army and the Party had earlier attempted to give expression. The Indonesian New Order may be treated analytically and empirically as a new state because it embodies the coincidence of the substantively and conceptually exceptional.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

While the fundamental motive of this work is to carve out as distinct the concept of the new state, such a discriminating motive has no place in acknowledging those who helped and encouraged me to bring this work to a successful conclusion. To those who gave any form or degree of help and encouragement—limited, unlimited, early, late, enduring, fleeting—I owe acknowledgement.

There are a number of corporate actors who helped me in invaluable ways. I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for granting me a Doctoral Fellowship; the Social Sciences Research Council of the United States for inviting me to London for a Dissertation Workshop; the University of Alberta for granting me a Dissertation Fellowship; and the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta, and especially three of its Chairs, Professor Allan Tupper, Professor Tom Keating, and Professor Saleem M. M. Qureshi, for their long-term financial, moral, and administrative support.

Close to this enterprise are those who are far away in Indonesia. I gratefully acknowledge those who helped to acquire information from the collected resources of the Department of Information, Ny. N. I. Puspitawaty; the Indonesian Social Sciences Academy (LIPI), Blasius Sudarsono; the Jakarta office of the Royal (Netherlands) Institute for Language, History, and Anthropology, Drs. P. Sutikno; and the Indonesian Armed Forces Center for History and Tradition, Letkol Inf. Drs. Thomas Aquinas Awy Widoyo and Kapten Caj. Drs. Yoseph Ratu.

Closer yet to this work are those who are, or were until recently, associated with the University of Alberta. These individuals include Professor Saleem M. M. Qureshi and Professor Jeremy T. Paltiel, both of whom played a formative part in the early stages of the preparation of this work, Professor Hugh Wilson; Professor Regula Qureshi; Marc Poulin; Audrey Bell-Hiller; Alice Lau; and Sharon Moroschan.

Closest to my work were the members of my Dissertation Committee, which consisted of my supervisor, Professor Fred Judson, Professor R. R. Gilsdorf, and Professor Larry Pratt. Above all, I want to thank these individuals for exercising their patience and allowing me the opportunity to conduct this work. All were merciful, abided their own perspective, and accorded me the privilege of being able to espouse ideas freely. To Professor Judson, in particular, I say thank you, *jefe*, thank you for the freedom of expression.

I wish to acknowledge the role played by Professors Sinh Vinh, Tom Keating, and Harold Crouch in joining with the members of my Dissertation Committee to constitute the membership of the Oral Defence Committee, which was ably and vigorously led by Professor R. R. Gilsdorf in the capacity of principal examiner. Regretably, illness prevented Professor Wenran Jiang from being present at this defence; Professor Tom Keating graciously and generously assumed the responsibility in this circumstance. To all, I owe enormous gratitude, for years upon years of patience and vigilance, for months upon months of reading, for days upon days of assessing the text, for hours upon hours of careful deliberation, for the precious minutes at the end that signified the end and the achievement.

As only family members can be, they were closest to this work, and are an inseparable part of it. To Andrea and to Jonathan, whose lives were bound up in this work, there are not enough ways or times to say thank you. To Jitske Jaspers, Rene Jaspers, and Diane Jaspers, my thanks for the constant encouragement, the bottomless well of goodwill, the sanctuary you represent together. To my relatives in The Netherlands, Ans and Krijn Biersteker, my thanks for your gracious and long support for my family and me. To L. Lynn Sutley, my father, my gratitude for affording me and my family the chance to see and feel the warmth that is Indonesia. To Greg Poelzer, a "brother-in-arms," thanks for the chance to battle alongside and to win together.

Aside from the irony of being the farthest away physically of all who have helped me, but having the decisive say on bringing the work to an end, Dr. Harold Crouch has played a unique role for which I will always owe thanks. In consenting both to serve as my external examiner and to accept this work, Dr. Crouch has given it life, for which all the rest of us had only been preparing. In this circumstance, I have dedicated this work to the memory of my father-in-law, Sibbele (Siep) G. J. Jaspers, who also prepared, but who did not live to see this work to its conclusion. The circle, now completely drawn, has its integrity and encompasses all who helped, near and far. Thank you all.

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LIST OF ACROSTICS AND ACRONYMS

ABRI	*Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia*	Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
AISA	*Akademi Ilmu Sosial Aliarcham*	Aliarcham Social Science Academy
AMPAI		American Motion Picture Association of Indonesia
APRA	*Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil*	Army of the *Ratu Adil*
APRIS	*Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat*	Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Indonesia
B.B.	*Binnenlands Bestuur*	Interior Administration Department
Bappenas	*Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional*	National Development Planning Body
BKPD	*Badan Koordinasi Pembangunan Daerah*	Regional Development Coordinating Bodies
BKPKPN	*Badan Koordinasi Pusat Persatuan2 Karyawan Perusahaan2 Negara*	Central Coordinating Body of *Karyawan* Associations of State Enterprises
BKS-PM	*Badan Kerjasama Pemuda dan Militer*	Youth-Military Working Body
BKSBUMIL	*Badan Kerjasama Buruh-Militer*	Labour-Military Cooperation Body
BKSTAMIL	*Badan Kerjasama Tani-Militer*	Peasant-Military Cooperation Body
BKSWAMIL	*Badan Kerjasama Wanita-Militer*	Women-Military Cooperation Body

BP	*Badan Pekerja*	Working Body
BPKI	*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*	Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence
BPPK	*Badan Pembina Potensi Karya*	Bodies for the Fostering of Functional Potentials
BPS	*Badan Pendukung/Penyebar Sukarnoisme*	Body for the Support/Spreading of Sukarnoism
BPUPKI	*Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*	Body for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence
BTI	*Barisan Tani Indonesia*	Indonesian Peasant's Front
CC		Central Committee
CGMI	*Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*	Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements
Depernas	*Dewan Perancang Nasional*	National Planning Board
DI	*Darul Islam*	Realm of Islam movement
DPA	*Dewan Pertimbangan Agung*	Supreme Advisory Council
DPR	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat*	People's Representative Council
DPR-GR	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Gotong-Royong*	People's Mutual Assistance Representative Council
DPRD	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah*	Regional People's Representative Council
Dwikora	*Dwi Komando Rakjat*	People's Double Command
FBTPM	*Front Buruh Tani Pemuda dan Militer*	Labour-Peasant-Youth-Military Front
FDR	*Front Demokrasi Rakjat*	People's Democratic Front
FN	*Front Nasional*	National Front

FNPIB	*Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat*	National Front for the Liberation of West Irian
Gerinda	*Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia*	Indonesian People's Movement
Gerwani	*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*	Indonesian Women's Movement
Hansip	*Petahanan Sipil*	Civil Defence
HMI	*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*	Islamic University Students' Association
HSI	*Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia*	Indonesian Scholar's Association
I.B.	*Inlands Bestuur*	Native Civil Service
IKPS	*Ikatan Keluarga Pegawai Sosial*	Association of Families of Social Welfare Officials
IPKI	*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia*	League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence
IPPI	*Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia*	League of Indonesian High School Youth
IPRI	*Ikatan Perwira Republik Indonesia*	Officers' League of the Republik of Indonesia
ISDV	*Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging*	Indies Social Democratic Association
Kabir	*Kapitalis Birokrat*	Capitalist Bureaucrats
KBKI	*Kesatuan Buruh Kerakjataan Indonesia*	Populist Workers' Union of Indonesia
KNIL	*Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger*	Royal Netherlands Indies Army
KNIP	*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*	Indonesian Central National Committee
Koanda	*Komando Antara Daerah*	Interregional Commands
Kodam	*Komando Daerah Militer*	Military Area Commands

Kodim	*Komando Distrik Militer*	Military District Commands
Koga	*Komando Siaga*	Alert Command
Kolaga	*Komando Mandala Siaga*	*Mandala* Alert Command
Koramil	*Komando Rayon Militer*	Military Rayon Commands
Korem	*Komando Resort Militer*	Military Resort Commands
Kostrad	*Komando Tjadagan Strategis Angkatan Darat*	Army Strategic Reserve Command
Kotoe	*Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi*	Supreme Command for Economic Operations
Kotrar	*Komando Operasi Tertinggi Retooling Aparatur Revolusi*	Supreme Operation Command for the Retooling of the Apparatus of the Revolution
KP	*Khursus*^{2} *Kader Plan*	Cadre Plan Courses
KPM	*Koningklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*	Royal Mail Lines
KSAD	*Komando Staf Angkatan Darat*	Army Chief-of-Staff
KSSR	*Konfernas Sastra dan Seni Revolusioner*	National Conference of Revolutionary Literature and Art
Lekra	*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakjat*	Institute of People's Culture
Lestra	*Lembaga Sastra*	Literary Institute
LVRI	*Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia*	Legion of Veterans of the Republic of Indonesia
Manikebu	*Manifes Kebudayaan*	Cultural Manifesto
Manipol	*Manifes Politik*	Political Manifesto
Mapilindo		Malaya-Pilipinas-Indonesia
Masjumi	*Madjelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*	Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims

MPPR	*Musjawarah Pembantu Pimpinan Revolusi*	Consultative Body Assisting the Leadership of the Revolution
MPR	*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakjat*	People's Consultative Assembly
MPRS	*Dewan Permusyawaratan Rakjat Sementara*	Provisional People's Consultative Assembly
Muppenas	*Musjawarah Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional*	Consultative Council for National Development Planning
Nefos		New Emerging Forces
NEI		Netherlands East Indies
NII	*Negara Islam Indonesia*	Islamic State of Indonesia
NIT	*Negara Indonesia Timur*	State of East Indonesia
NU	*Nahdatul Ulama*	Association of Muslim Scholars
OKD	*Organisasi Keamanan Desa*	Village Defence Organizations
Oldefos		Old Established Forces
OPPI	*Organisasi Persatuan Pekerja Indonesia*	United Organization of Indonesian Workers
Papfias	*Panitia Aksi Pemboikotan Film Imperialis Amerika Serikat*	Action Committee for the Boycott of American Imperialist Films
Paran	*Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara*	Committee for the Retooling of the State Apparatus
PBI	*Partai Buruh Indonesia*	Indonesian Labour Party
Pelni	*Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia*	National Shipping Lines
Peperda	*Penguasa Perang Daerah*	Regional War Authority
Peperpu	*Penguasa Perang Pusat*	Central War Administrator
Perbepsi	*Persatuan Bekas Pedjuang Seluruh Indonesia*	All-Indonesia Veterans Association

Perti	*Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah*	Association of Islamic Education
Peta	*Pembela Tanah Air*	Defenders of the Fatherland
PGRI	*Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia*	Indonesian Republic Teachers Association
PIR	*Persatuan Indonesia Raya*	Greater Indonesia Association
PKI	*Partai Komunis Indonesia*	Communist Party of Indonesia
PNI	*Partai Nasional Indonesia*	Indonesian Nationalist Party
PPKI	*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*	Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence
PPPKI	*Permufakatan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia*	Agreement of Indonesian People's Political Associations
PRI	*Persatuan Republik Indonesia*	Unitary Indonesian Republic
PRRI	*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*	Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia
PS	*Partai Sosialis*	Socialist Party
PSI	*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*	Socialist Party of Indonesia
PSII	*Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia*	Federated Islamic Party of Indonesia
PSPN	*Persatuan Sarekat Pegawai Negeri*	Union of Civil Servants Association
PTK	*Persatuan Tenaga Karyawan*	Unions of *Karyawan* Forces
PWI	*Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia*	Indonesian Journalists' Association
RI	*Republik Indonesia*	Republic of Indonesia
RIS	*Republik Indonesia Serikat*	Federal Republic of Indonesia

RPKAD	*Resimen Pendidikan Komando Angkatan Darat*	Army Commando Training Regiment
RTC		Round Table Conference
RTI	*Rukun Tani Indonesia*	Indonesian Farmers Brotherhood
Sarbupri	*Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia*	Indonesian Estate Workers' Trade Union
Sekber Golkar	*Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi-organisasi Golongan Karya Anggota Front Nasional*	Joint Secretariat of Member Golkar Organizations in the National Front
Seskoad	*Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat*	Army Staff and Command School
Seskoal	*Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Laut*	Navy Staff and Command School
SOB	*Staat van Oorlog en Beleg*	State of War and Siege
SOBRI	*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Republik Indonesia*	Central Organization of Labourers of the Indonesian Republic
SOBSI	*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*	All-Indonesia Central Labour Organization
SOKSI	*Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia*	Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist *Karyawan*
SUAD VI	*Seksi Khusus Urusan Karya Angkatan Darat*	Special Section for the Army's Extra-Military Functions
T & T	*Tentara dan Territorium*	Military Territories
TII	*Tentara Islam Indonesia*	Islamic Army of Indonesia
Tjaduad	*Tjadagan Angkatan Darat*	Army General Reserve
TNI	*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*	Indonesian National Army
TRI	*Tentara Rakjat Indonesia*	Indonesian People's Army

Trikora	*Trikomando Rakjat*	People's Triple Command
UNTEA		United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
USDEK	*Undang-undang Dasar 1945; Sosialisme Indonesia; Demokrasi Terpimpin; Ekonomi Terpimpin; Kepribadian Nasional*	1945 Constitution; Indonesian Socialism; Guided Democracy; Guided Economy; National Identity
USIS		United States Information Service
UUPA	*Undang-undang No. 5 tahun 1960 Peraturan Dasar Pokok-pokok Agraria*	Law on Basic Regulations of Agrarian Principles of September 1960
UUPBH	*Undang-undang No. 2 tahun 1960 Perjanjian Bagi Hasil*	Share-cropping Law of January 1960
VOC	*Vereenigde Oost-Indishe Compagnie*	United East India Company

INTRODUCTION

PEOPLE, TERRITORY, AND THE CREATION OF STATES

People, territory, and power exist in every political order. In the universe of political orders, divisions of people, territory, and power reflect specific ordering principles. The "genus" of political orders is, thus, divisible into principle-specific "species". Historically, the number of such principles has been great. From a political perspective, however, I believe that there are only two fundamental types of principles: those informing non-states and states. The first type of principle exists or is evident before a popular-territorial expression or division is actually attained, that is, before claims are successfully made on space through elite or collective political action. The second appears with the successful creation of a popular-territorial base, that is, the ordering principle is coincident with and confined to the novel circumscription of people and territory. A state exists where a popular-territorial division is the ordering principle and the principle uniquely serves the popular-territorial division. My purpose in this study is to argue the foregoing proposition; all but implicitly, I leave unexplored the logical deduction that the other type of principle typifies non-states. I also limit my argument to a discussion of Asian and African states, which I call "new" because of their creation during this century.

My argument about the state is not distinct from the way in which I make my argument. As such, a definition by analysis forms the basis for this study.[1] This approach is necessary because the way in which I have already distinguished states from non-states entails a certain notion of the appropriate correlation between analytical and empirical boundaries in the case of the former. By briefly elaborating the bounded quality of both definitions and states, the preceding relationship can be stated plainly. To define is "to determine the boundary or spatial extent"[2] of the subject under consideration. To define the state is to delineate the analytical limits (or space) within which one can speak of every instance of a state to the exclusion of all else. The definition of the state, in effect, analytically circumscribes or categorizes this phenomenon as distinct from all other phenomena, including all other political orders. In this sense, a definition is a circumscription, a category, a statement of boundedness. Based on the distinction that I drew between states and non-states, a state is also a circumscription—an empirical separation of people and territory from other peoples and territories. The state's essence or reality depends on the creation of a specific condition of popular and territorial boundedness. Thus, only a definite set of empirical developments whose outcome is recognized as creating such a specific condition will allow us to speak of those conditions categorically, that is, as being of the state type. Accordingly, the category or concept of the state cannot describe or explain a situation before the particular type of popular-territorial boundaries (that define a state) have themselves been created. Just as a definition is coincident with the completion of the act of defining, the apprehension of a state is coincident with the act of the formation of its boundaries. On this basis, the study of the creation of any one state is logically its definition by analysis.

This study defines the state by analysing the creation of a particular state, the "New Order" (*Orde Baru* or Orba) state formed in Indonesia in 1965–66. Before examining either the concept of the state or the Indonesian situation, however, I examine existing perspectives on the state. I do so because the extent and nature of the difficulties that I perceive in these approaches lead me directly to an alternate perspective. Addressing the main approaches to the state, even briefly, helps create a context in which we can make an informed departure from existing conventions and initiate this alternate perspective. In this introduction, I achieve this logical transition in two leaps and a small step. First, I briefly review the main approaches to the state from the perspective of the achievement of the popular-territorial divisions that inform all states. On this basis, I suggest how the debate about the state, especially in the case of Weberian/neo-Weberian understandings of the state, has skirted this issue and gone on for Western European states to foster a generalized but misleading understanding of the popular-territorial divisions of all states. Second, I outline an alternate approach to states, an approach whose analytical attentiveness to the creation of popular-territorial divisions may help us to better understand the uniqueness of states among political orders. Here, I argue at greater length about the unique political significance that attaches to the simultaneous appearance of order and ordering principles, the beginning of sovereignty, and the creation and development of social identities. Third, and finally, I sketch how I intend to use the "exceptional perspective" in offering a definition by analysis of the Indonesian New Order. Here, I outline the way in which I intend to address the key issues posed by the exceptional perspective: directing ideas of state, political resources, the moment of exception, sovereignty, the monopoly of decision, and the institutionalization of exceptional power.

States Without Beginnings and Beginnings Without Account

The common perception of the state shares in a conceptual idiom but seems to do so without a rigorous regard for the relations between any one state, say France, and its people and territory. On one hand, most informed commentators on the state would presumably cite both the impersonality of the state's laws and the underlying monopoly of coercion that its respective governments formally exercise over its citizens and territory as among the most important reasons to think of a particular case, like Germany, as a state. On the other hand, the same commentators would probably easily and explicitly concede that in reality the impersonality of law and the monopoly of control over people and territory are imperfect and incomplete, respectively. Furthermore, many observers would probably admit that the conceptual claims entailed by their notion of the state, claims of which they avail themselves as the very bases of their discussion of any one state, do not correspond exactly to the empirical conditions of states. Presumably, in discussing their respective cases, most analysts would argue that reality is a matter of degrees of control and impersonality in law, not of absolutes.

This line of defence creates its own logical breach by suggesting a point in reality at which low degrees of control and personalized law become explicable with a concept (or, perhaps more accurately, concepts) other than the state. This makes for a paradoxical situation. The same analysts who implicitly base their discussions on the kind of exclusive divisions that the concept of the state entails willingly jump to a fluid reality when illuminating a particular "state" while ignoring the possibility that this leap may cause them to plunge into a discussion of an empirical political order that is, simply, not a state. The following discussion shows why, in conventional discussions of or about states, it is difficult to resist making this leap. To make my argument, I first demonstrate how the proponents of the main perspectives on the state and, following them, the self-conscious contributors to the "debate about the state" have ignored the issue of the creation of popular-territorial divisions. Then, I show how the preliminary analysis of actual states, namely Western European states, both forced Weberian/neo-Weberian analysts to confront this issue and offered them an opportunity to conceive a generalized explanatory approach to "state formation." Finally, I show how students of Asian and African states have succeeded only in producing highly distorted and anachronistic accounts of "states" in adopting the historical mode of analysis pioneered by the authors of *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*.

The Debate on the State: Comparing versus Defining

The pattern of evolution in the debate about the state suggests that its participants have consciously, unconsciously, or merely cumulatively chosen to explore their subject more by comparing states than by defining the state.[3] Generally, a preference to engage in one of these activities preponderantly more than the other is hardly unusual in the social sciences. The limited success that an analyst or group of analysts may encounter in one activity, say defining, may itself be the reason for a shift in attention more decisively in favour of the other activity. Since defining and comparing may be regarded as dialectical partners, that is, as parts of the wider intellectual endeavour simply to understand, any preference, such as defining a subject, can be expected in the end to be eroded by greater attention to comparing cases of that subject. With the state, however, the following overview of its academic discussion suggests that there are powerful and reinforcing analytical tendencies preventing the redirection of intellectual energies toward the achievement of a better understanding of the concept.

The current emphasis on comparing states reflects the enduring intellectual trajectory that was set with the initial articulation of the three major perspectives on the state. These include the neo-Marxian, functionalist, and Weberian/neo-Weberian perspectives. In hindsight, these approaches neither identify nor explain the initial divisions among people and territory that would permit the conceptual and empirical distinction between a state and a non-state, between a species and a whole genus.

For Marxists/neo-Marxians[4], states have generally been seen as the means to the ulterior economic ends of classes in history. These theorists have paid little explicit heed to either people (identifying themselves as such) or territory (identified by its inhabitants as such). This is true for both the orthodox and world-systems variants of this approach. One can even argue that by selecting the globe as the basic unit of analysis, the latter variant's proponents effectively dissolved the empirical and analytical importance of territory per se.

Functionalists, for their part, have perceived the state as a spontaneous, supra-human entity serving to organize and stabilize a polity.[5] Unfortunately, theirs is a systems approach, and a systems approach, by definition, assumes the existence of its subject as a system. Thus, functionalists have left the questions about the state's origins among people and its territorial foundation unasked and, therefore, unanswered.

For the purposes of this study, I find the Weberian/neo-Weberian approach[6] more illuminating and worthy of greater critical attention than the previous two perspectives. Its advocates, alone among the theoretical discussants on the state, have attached an explicit empirical and analytical importance to distinct groups of people and territory. We can readily see this attachment in Weber's definition of the state: "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory."[7] In giving priority to distinct groups and territories as subjects of empirical and theoretical inquiry, Weber's definition affords a tantalizing rationale for their consideration in discussions of the state. Despite this, the effect of using this definition in analysis has been little different from that of the systems approach. Both approaches really only reflect upon and describe, but do not explain the creation of, their subject.

Following the preliminary articulation and dissemination of the main statist perspectives during the 1970s and early 1980s, the participants in what quickly and self-consciously became "the debate about the state" showed an overwhelming concern for examining attributes of the state that are conceivable only from a comparative starting point. In taking up the discussion of attributes such as "stateness," "autonomy," and "statehood," however, the proponents in the debate went down a path that took them away from the concept of the state itself.[8] We can see this to be the case by recognizing at least three implicit assumptions underpinning the comparative portion of the debate. First, based on their working definitions of the state, the participants assumed that there are comparable referents one can use. Second, they assumed that analytical priority attaches (by the very fact of their own studies) to defining or measuring the attributes themselves. Third, because of the other two assumptions, the analysts must have made the further assumption that societies not only exist, but that it is in relation to these societies that states act. For instance, neither stateness nor autonomy is a self-referential term: a state cannot possess either stateness or autonomy except in relation to its society. Similarly, a state cannot possess statehood unless it exists in a wider society of states recognizing this condition.

Focusing attention on the relational attributes of states invited comparison and, thus, opened the analysis to a vast range of empirical circumstances, all of which the debaters implicitly assumed belong to the species of states. As such, it is partially upon the backs of the distinct concepts of stateness and autonomy, as it were, that the protracted debate about "strengths" and "weaknesses" and "capabilities" (of both states and societies) has been carried. Yet, to engage in such a debate is to debate the concepts of stateness and autonomy rather than the concept of the state. Part of the burden of the debate on the state has also been borne by the concept of statehood. Under Jackson's direction, the concept has been ingeniously loaded with the argument that many non-European "states" should still be considered states because they possess "juridical statehood" rather than "empirical statehood."[9] In this way, all of Africa is rendered understandable from a statist perspective! Together, the trilogy of concepts ensconced within the debate about the state, permits the whole world to be discussed in terms of the state without telling us directly about the concept itself. In each instance, a misleading fusion occurs between these concepts and the concept of the state. In this context, it is not surprising that the relations between states and their people and territory, are obscure and not directly illuminated by the otherwise brilliant intensity of the debate on the state.

To be fair, it appears that the present shadowy understanding of the relations between states and their people and territory has less to do with the analytical preferences of those who seek first to compare states than with the very perspectives on the state of those who essentially initiated the debate on the state. I explore this point further by examining how Weberian/neo-Weberian analysts have attempted to explain the formation of actual states. Despite their lack of a generalized analytical account of the creation of a particular state (as distinct from all other political orders), this group, alone among the three major theoretical groups, attempted relatively early to create a generalized account of the creation of Western European states. One product of their efforts has since become a classic, and it is to the exploration of this work—*The Formation of National States in Western Europe*—and three other studies that it inspired, that I now turn.

Into History: *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*

I think that *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* stands out among works on the state not because it is either a great success or failure, but because it is both and because its apparent success conceals its failure. By the success of this book, I mean the positive response that it has elicited from some other scholars. In their eyes, the volume was and is an authoritative work and has been seen as containing a concise understanding of states that is both immediately useful and highly suggestive in furthering the study of other, non-Western European, states. Judging from the specific way in which other scholars have used this work, the locus of its success lies clearly in the historical state formation checklist that its authors have created.[10] It is only when we recognize the checklist—and the method used to produce it—as misleading, that we can also understand the source of this volume's success as the source of its failure.

Despite the name that they gave it, Tilly and his collaborators did not use their volume to explain the phenomenon of state creation in the Western European context. Indeed, it would have been surprising had they succeeded in doing so as this would have involved explaining initial popular-territorial divisions that have been obscured in the European context. Aside from the difficulty associated with this aspect of their analytical problem, I submit that by proceeding with an explicitly Weberian perspective on the state, Tilly and his associates actually made it impossible to explain the "formation of national states." Not only did they attempt to explain a reality whose historical origins (the initial popular-territorial divisions of Western European states) are unfathomably obscure, but they set about their task using a conceptual language that took the fact of these divisions (the Western European states) as its analytical starting point. Thus, they tried to reconcile a reality without discernible beginnings and a language that can only perceive that reality on the assumption of these beginnings. In doing so, Tilly and his collaborators offered the only kind of account of state formation that is possible from their Weberian perspective: the substitution of the evidence of creation for an explanation of creation. An explicitly Weberian perspective's reality-language combination in the analysis of a specific set of referents (Western European states) has not yielded an explanation, but rather a historical excursion and perspective epitomized in the checklist of state formation.

In making their substitution, the authors of *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* were compelled to seek the evidence of creation in the historical record. The problem with seeking this evidence is that Western European states have particularly long lineages, and the actual "location" of the evidence of their formation is not at all clear in the record.[11] Under these circumstances, explaining the "formation of national states" invariably became a matter of trying to explain the formation of surviving national states, that is, states possessing distinct, separate, and recognizable histories. It was based on these histories, then, that Tilly and his fellow writers extrapolated backwards, across an indeterminately long period, and tried to locate the beginnings of states. By extrapolating backwards, Tilly and his associates placed themselves in a paradoxical situation: whereas they began their historical excursion with certainty (bred of the knowledge that the states under discussion exist), the closer they came to identifying moments of formation, that is, the further back in history they moved, the less certain the whole venture became.

While the hard questions about different peoples' origins, identity, survival, and political form are difficult to confront, the authors *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* seem to have crafted a solution that suggests answers to these questions. That solution, which frees them from having to suggest precise times and places of state formation, seems to have been borrowed from the perspective that Weber employed in his historical explorations. Indeed, according to Duzsa, it was

Weber's conception of history as "the neutral medium in which the empirical manifoldness of social life develops" that shaped his "grandiose disregard for 'dates,' his practice of specifying time and place by vague expressions . . . and particularly his practice of relating to each other events centuries apart." However, Duzsa also suggests that these tendencies

> are not symptoms of his lack of historical sense, but stem from his sociological perspective. From 'actual history' Weber abstracts in such a way that only those aspects of it are noted and drawn into analysis that contribute to the emergence and consolidation of specific contents and structural forms of social action.[12]

The analytical consequence of adopting this historical perspective is clear and goes a long way to explaining why Weber's own formulation of the state effectively buries in the tissue of its many historical assumptions the difficult and unclear matters of political struggle and collective action associated with the formation of states. Against the hazy backdrop of the many European and non-European histories that Weber considered, his formulation seems to embody his realistic assessment that no satisfactory account can be given of the precise, temporal, and spatial origins of states in the European context. Yet, this is precisely the authors' objective in writing *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*.

Intentions and appearances aside, the authors of *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* do not succeed in shedding the blanket of historical uncertainty in which their Weberian perspective is wrapped. Tilly may claim that the originality of *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* consists of its authors' desire to view

> how the builders of states actually performed, or tried to perform, the extractive, coercive, and coordinative side of their work . . . .. At many points, our authors are writing as if the years after 1750 or 1800 had not yet occurred, as if the choices were still open.

And he may summarize the assumptions of this perspective—that "as seen from 1600 or so, the development of the state was very contingent; many aspiring states crumpled and fell along the way"—and identify them together as the "most important historical insight the book has to offer." And when matters are perceived in this way, the authors' essential challenge in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* seems to consist of a demonstration of the shift from the state as a historical contingency to a historical reality. It seems that the authors believe that when they have achieved this demonstration, they will have also succeeded in accounting for the "formation of national states."

Yet, there are four respects in which I think the contradictory nature of the authors' central task, which is to locate the lost historical beginnings of Western European states with an analytical perspective whose very use is predicated on their prior incorporation into its conceptual compass or formulation of the state, overwhelms the possibility of rendering a coherent historical demonstration and, as a result, utterly confuses both our understanding of state formation and the concept of the state. Problems first arise for the authors when they conceive and then attempt to solve the problem that is bound up in their own historical perspective on the contingency of states: if a state undergoes a transition from being historically contingent at one point in time to being historically existent at another (and evidently later) point in time, how is this transition to be shown? It is revealing of the authors' dilemma that achieving this difficult demonstration has the appearance of being easy. The demonstration is difficult because there are no unequivocal and temporally discrete measures of this transition; the demonstration is also easy because the existence of historically surviving states encourages substituting this knowledge, using it to select historical information, and then producing an argument that gives the appearance of including "measures" of this transition. In *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, the authors have effected just such a substitution and by that produced their checklist of state formation.

There are additional difficulties posed to our understanding of state formation and the concept of the state when the authors distil the essence of their argument in a checklist. Plainly stated, when Tilly and the others constructed their checklist, the distinction between the process of state formation in relation to Western European history and state formation in relation to time, was lost. The general impression promoted when using this checklist is that state formation is a processual phenomenon that unfolds gradually. Yet, if we are to believe the interpretation given by the authors of *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, this impression is merely a reflection of one set of historical experiences. As far as other students of the state use the checklist as a tool, however, alternate relationships between the state or state formation and time are likely to be excluded from the outset, if they are considered at all. In any event, the checklist is no more than the generalized expression of Western European experiences as perceived from the present.

The contradictory nature of the authors' task manifests itself in their historical analysis in a second respect. Here, the contradiction drives the authors to make remarkably arbitrary qualifications about the amount of time involved in state formation. Neither Tilly nor Finer seems certain how wide a swath of history to cut for the examination of the Western European phenomenon. While some difference of years between their analyses is understandable, Tilly's preference to view matters as unfolding over "five hundred years" contrasts inexplicably with Finer's inclination to consider a "period of over nine hundred years."[13] Since it appears that the contributors to *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* have a great deal of latitude in interpreting the temporal dimensions of state formation, it is not surprising to see Tilly, in particular, exercising a similar (and similarly unexplained) degree of latitude with respect to the spatial dimensions of state formation. In declaring that European states faced a multitude of power contenders, for example, Tilly suddenly contrasts this experience with that of "Chinese and Roman state-builders of earlier times."[14] Although Tilly did not delineate the implications of this comparison, two of its most important ramifications are that states, and the process of state building, are neither definitively modern in nature nor occidental in origin. These implications seem far too important in shaping at least Tilly's understanding of the state and state formation to be ignored, yet they have not received the attention they are due.

These implications warrant greater attention now if only to demonstrate how misleading the Weberian perspective can be when its students offer substantive interpretations of the state. Here, I find bothersome neither the particular amounts of time nor the particular referents that each author specifies, but rather the fact that each author attempts, no doubt in a reasonable and serious way, to subsume under the rubric of the state or state making whatever period or referents they choose. The Weberian perspective allows these acts of subsumption because it cannot disallow its adherents the act of analytical imputation. Thus, the reason that ancient Rome and China have been cited as examples of states has nothing to do with any substantive demonstration that they are comprehensible within these terms; these two cases are cited because of the historical latitude of the Weberian perspective itself. Since the firm base of the Weberian perspective consists in its knowledge of extant popular and territorial divisions, any account that its students offer of the formation of these divisions depends upon their ability to impute behaviour and effects in history. Accordingly, we can expect Weberian historical analyses to assume the form of free-ranging excursions and, as Tilly and Finer have shown, they can be expected to be unique and uniquely crafted in the detailed accounts they offer.

The uncertainty in the temporal and spatial dimensions of the state and state formation clearly contributes to the loss on the authors' part of any conception of the state as distinctive among political orders. Here, the authors' analysis seems to founder on the notion of sovereignty. While Tilly rightly warns against using sovereignty in its international aspects to sustain a discussion of the state, he does not take the opportunity to discuss how sovereignty matters to the "internal" or "domestic" politics that inform state formation. As such, no focus is given to the coercive and juridical monopoly that the attainment of sovereignty accords leaders. Thus, sovereignty and how its attainment contributes to the decisive establishment of authoritative popular-territorial divisions, are phenomena whose significance is understated.

Tilly's casual references to the opponents of states demonstrates that he does not identify statehood with the attainment of sovereignty:

> building substantial states in much of Europe meant absorbing numerous political units which already exercised significant claims to sovereignty—free cities, principalities, bishoprics, and a variety of other entities. The European state-makers engaged in the work of combining, consolidating, neutralizing, manipulating a tough, complicated, and well-set web of political relations. They sought to fashion something larger and stronger than had existed before.[15]

This passage suggests that Western European state builders were not attempting to create political phenomena (states) that were different from pre-existing forms; their motivations seemed to be confined to strengthening and enlarging that which already existed. The measures suggested as differentiating states from other political entities—size and strength—do not admit of sovereignty as a separate or distinctive accomplishment. Rather, sovereignty seems a common burden that was merely "carried" by a variety of political entities in the stream of history. This blurring of even the idea of the state as distinctive from other political orders is a third respect in which the authors' contradictory analytical task overwhelms the coherence of their historical narrative.

The extended discussion of national cultures in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* is the final and perverse manifestation of the authors' attempt to reconcile the lost beginnings of Western European states with an analytical language that takes these beginnings for granted. As with the state itself, Tilly and Finer settle on the origins of culture by ultimately making reference not to the creation of cultures but to the historical litter of the Roman Empire. They identify as an analytical priority the need to examine states that formed a single *regnum* or those that were only fractions of such a *regnum*. In attempting to meet this need, however, Tilly issues contradictory assessments of national culture in the context of state building. At one point, for example, Tilly argues that in the analysis of Western Europe

> [t]he homogeneity of the subject population was . . . no more than a contributing factor [to the state-making process]. The presence of a culturally homogeneous population no doubt lowered the cost of state-making by making uniform administrative arrangements feasible, by promoting loyalty and solidarity of the subject population (so long as the managers of the state belonged to the same culture), and by putting ready-made communication systems at the disposal of the rulers.[16]

Elsewhere, he asserts that the analyst of European states witnesses "a huge range of characteristics of . . . populations, governmental structures, and relations between them."[17] The reader is left to wonder whether the authors' consideration of culture is helping or hindering the attempt to understand the subject of state formation. Meanwhile, the authors forge ahead and allow the general analysis of the state and culture to branch out into studies of separate, national pathways, all without furnishing an explanation about how the specific nation or culture came to be recognized as separate or distinct.

Although the discussion of national cultures is unsatisfactory in this respect, it appears that the purpose of the discussion was to provide a moving backdrop to Western European states against which their relief as states could be recognized. Clearly, the authors did not write their volume in the belief that identifying the formation of any one state qua state was a straightforward historical matter, that is, achievable merely by referring to specific dates or events. Instead, to recognize the French state, the authors apparently deemed that it was also necessary to take cognizance of French culture; only by taking account of the latter would the activity of the former more fully register. In this sense, the authors have presented a historical analysis in which culture and the state echo each other. The shortcoming of stressing the relationship of mutuality between state and culture is that it dulls any real effort to show which came first, the state or culture. In any event, it probably will not escape the critical reader that the authors, by presenting their discussion of culture in this way, effectively reconcile themselves to recording not the voices of states, but rather their echoes.

The difficulty facing Tilly and his collaborators with respect to culture seems to inhere in their Weberian perspective: Weber himself had difficulty with the notion of the creation of culture. Even though he accommodated such innovation in his analyses, with the introduction and elaboration of the concept of charisma, for instance, "he offers no theory of the circumstances under which charismatic movements arise,"[18] and such movements always become routinized within a pre-existing cultural milieu.[19] Clearly the Weberian perspective does not pose the question of the creation of culture as part of the state's perpetuation or institutionalization.[20] In the end, neo-Weberian adherents must assume the "reality" of culture (while only conceding the fact of its creation), as Tilly does when he proclaims "homogeneity (and homogenization) of the subject population" as the fifth of six elements allowing us to "predict survival and state-making."[21] That a seemingly problem-free cultural component was included in the authors' checklist, summarizes the incomplete conception of the state and state formation in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* and, simultaneously, serves in its generalized form to explain the worth of this work for other students of the state.

In determining the worth of *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, we should be careful to distinguish between the authors' perception of their work in relation to the study of other states, and that which other students of the state have taken from it. Essentially, the authors' perception of their work involves another paradox. In one instance, Tilly and Finer suggest that there are few "lessons" for non-Western European states in the study of the Western European experience. In particular, they were sceptical of applying the analytical focus on the monopoly of armed force within a territory, a hallmark of the Weberian definition of the state. "Among other things," Tilly remarked, the "prior existence of a state system has fundamentally altered the role of the military forces in the smaller states, since their strength or weakness no longer makes the major difference in the territory controlled by the state."[22] Elsewhere, we find Tilly insisting that "to really detect the standard features of the West European development, one would want to compare Western Europe with the state-making experience of Eastern Europe, of Asia, of the contemporary world."[23] This is an inviting proposition, but by what means are his two statements to be reconciled, especially in light of the regrettable fact that some political actors—including very popular ones—have conceived of, and used, armed force as if it were the only means by which to order people and territory in some post-colonial Asian and African settings? Indeed, if we eschew even a partial analytical focus on force, how are we to compare and what attributes are we to compare within the terms of reference provided by the now discounted Weberian perspective on the state?

By forsaking even partial analytical attention to armed force or other coercive collective behaviour, including revolution, especially concerning the developing world, Tilly has ensured that detecting standard features of states will be exceedingly difficult. His assertion that this broader comparative task was "not done with any zeal" in his edited volume is as much an acknowledgement of the difficulty of his analytical stance as any. Yet if this was the extent or the only implication of their comments, it would be easy for all concerned, including the authors, to treat *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* as having limited value in relation to the study of other states.

Tilly and his collaborators have made it difficult to conceive of their work as a mere case study for two reasons. First, the authors' decision to represent their key findings in a checklist unavoidably provokes its use as such in other circumstances; the checklist serves as the equivalent of a handbill, giving rise to specific (analytical) practices. Second, in appealing for a wider geographical examination of states, they essentially endorse their own findings and historical mode of analysis as a guide to that examination. Moreover, we are told that we can use any understanding of the state gained in this way to further improve the comprehension of the Western European experience. This is a peculiar logical circuit, for it attempts to overcome its initial inadequacies (with respect to the original subject of its examination—Western Europe) by enveloping the whole universe of states. By proposing this course of action, Tilly and his collaborators must surely also have recognized that they were suggesting a shift in the approach to the state away from an examination of their formation toward their comparison.

In this connection, they seemed to be endorsing Nettl's 1968 argument that "a case for bringing [the concept of the state] back in" to the discipline of political science could only be made if it were an "operating variable," and if it "[pointed] up significant differences and discontinuities between societies, making possible systematically qualitative or even quantitative distinctions."[24] Acknowledging their incomplete understanding of the Western European experience is not problematic for Tilly and his team since they can turn this limitation into the virtuous motivation for wider comparisons. Here, their call to abandon the analytical focus on armed force can be seen as strengthening the movement away from defining the state because it is now no longer necessary to offer an account of the formation of each state or group of states. Instead, as Nettl's notion of the concept of the state makes plain, we can approach the state indirectly, through the medium of societies and by the practice of comparing societies. On balance, Tilly and the others appear to be suggesting that there are analytical options to understanding the state besides accounting for their formation. When these options are realized, they entail looking beyond the Western European experience to better understand this and non-Western European experiences with the state.

We should be careful to note that in articulating relational attributes or differences among states (as equivalent units of analysis) in the manner suggested by Nettl, one is proceeding without a precise conception of the state, that is, of the general characteristics of one state. Strictly speaking, taking the variance of experiences among non-European states and including it in some general analysis of the state, as Nettl suggests, is not possible when an adequate conceptualization of the substance of the state is lacking. Thus, his premises do not really discriminate among political experiences. Instead, they invite an unlimited range of political units and phenomena into the analysis. And herein lies the unspoken limitation for students of the state, students who are encouraged by Tilly and his team to compare societies and states but discouraged from paying attention to armed force and such associated phenomena as revolution in large parts of the world.

History and the Verification of New States
Three Neo-Weberian Studies

By offering this presentation of their own failure to resolve the weakness of Weber's famous definition, in which "every single key word begs the historical question of when, at what particular date, the 'state' can be said to have emerged,"[25] Tilly and his team have made it deceptively easy for students of Asian and African states to embrace their checklist of state formation, indeed, the whole thrust of their historical perspective. The result, quite simply, is that students following this path induct everything political and historical into their case studies. "Applying the term 'state' generically" and in this fashion, Dusza has warned,

> presents . . . the danger that either the characteristics of the current form of political rule are carried over into other historical epochs, or . . . the analysis remains on such a level of generality that concrete differences will not count. The result is the . . . same in both cases: the specific, inherent reality of phenomena under investigation remains hidden.[26]

Several recent neo-Weberian studies of Asian and African states have been executed with a decisive confidence in the long historical records of their selected subjects, and by this measure alone we should view them with scepticism. The penchant to look for deep historical roots to so-called contemporary Asian and African states bears an uncanny, bespeaking uncritical, resemblance to the analytical technique of Tilly and his team, who may not have had a choice about adopting this mode of analysis in relation to Western European referents. Simultaneously, the penchant to reach back into history for accounts of contemporary Asian and African states really makes the analyst's task more difficult, for it removes from consideration perhaps the most significant political challenge confronting all former colonies: the recent and ongoing challenge of political independence. Considering that the territorial and popular attributes of most, if not all, colonies were haphazardly decided by European elites and, bearing in mind that when they were wholly products of this alien influence, there was no possibility of an "indigenous" rationalization for their scope or substance, historical accounts that "explain" these "states" by reaching back into the pre-colonial period are groundless.[27] The challenge to new states is in the present because that is where their premise as states exists.

Unfortunately, the three neo-Weberian studies briefly sketched here do not inform us about the future of new states, or their present, so much as they do about their (imagined) past. Recent new states studies using a neo-Weberian approach do not succeed in escaping the problems that are intrinsic to this perspective. The works by Callaghy,[28] Anderson,[29] and Taylor,[30] for instance, exhibit particular weaknesses that inhere in their neo-Weberian perspective; the specific conceptual or methodological problem in each work can be traced to the analytical scheme of state building outlined in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe,* upon which these authors rely to varying extents.

Simply stated, Callaghy's analysis is of the Zairian state and its struggle with Zairian society, and his investigation would have benefited greatly from a clearer conceptualization of what he meant by the "Zairian society" and the "Zairian state." Yet Callaghy merely assumed their existence, as would anyone who accepted Nettl's conception of the state, while undertaking what appears to be a theoretically rich discussion of each concept's peripheral aspects. For instance, when he discusses the legitimizing principles that allegedly anchor Mobutu's state in Zairian society, Callaghy characterizes that state as

> an early modern variant of an organic-statist regime—an African absolutist state with corporatist tendencies manifested in the pseudomodern ideological and structural forms of a single party. [It is] *neo*traditional because it is not the persistence of precolonial traditional rule, although it draws heavily on precolonial notions of kingly, chiefly, and "big man" authority . . . the latter are used to help consolidate a presidential monarchy, which emerged slowly out of a military coup d'etat that took place in a situation of near total breakdown following the end of colonial rule. Pseudomodern authoritarian forms of rule only partially mask the solid neotraditional core of a patrimonialized colonial state structure that must contend with traditional and quasi-traditional politics, powerful forms of particularism, and emerging class consciousness and structures in the periphery.[31]

This account is of an amalgam of forms of rulership that we can say exist between Mobutu and the people who live in Zaire. It is neither an account that attempts seriously to conceive of the state as one species of political order among others, nor one that clarifies the ordering principles that even allow us to speak of a Zairian society.

When Callaghy does speak of the state, either in a general sense or in relation to its survival, he uses the framework of state building originally formulated in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. The adoption of this approach, especially its peculiar historical orientation, seems to shape his assumptions about the nature of Zairian society and "its" traditional political character. The structure of Callaghy's theoretical argument makes greater use of references to Louis XIV's France than it does of analyses of what Mobutu and his followers actually did in Zaire to cause and sustain a state, assuming it even exists. Following Tilly's and Finer's lead, Callaghy vaguely regards sovereignty as something for which state builders must "search." Perhaps it is an overstatement of the theoretical and conceptual limitations of Callaghy's study, but his discussions of Zaire do strain the boundaries of rigorous political understanding. At base, the stress is related to the recurrent neo-Weberian tendency to take key dimensions of political and historical phenomena for granted, safe in the assumption of their present facticity.

Anderson's study of Tunisia and Libya shows how history, without a clear conception of the state, may be abused as the major source of explanation in state building. The author considers the factors making Tunisia and Libya unique among states while only assuming the elements common to states. Anderson appears satisfied in invoking the statist formulations of Weber, Nettl, Tilly, Skocpol, and Trimberger. She seems unperturbed by the need to state in her own words how this diverse set of perspectives contributes to a single, coherent analytical vision. By failing to make such a declaration as she embarks on her historical consideration of the emergence of each of the two Arab states and their relations with their respective peripheries, Anderson is at liberty to employ haphazardly the many insights of this group of theorists. Lacking what seems to be a sufficient measure of analytical rigour, and perhaps aware of this shortcoming, Anderson declares that her study is

> not simply a call for more empiricism and less ostensibly theoretical generalization in studies of the Third World . . . .. It is . . . an argument for taking the variation in the periphery as a starting point for investigation and, most importantly, for examining the historical interaction of indigenous and foreign notions of political authority, structures of domination, and mechanisms for appropriation as they combine to create the unprecedented circumstances and institutions of politics in the modern periphery.[32]

This is to turn the vices of analytical imprecision into the virtues associated with comparativism for its own sake. Anderson has cast off in an indeterminate theoretical direction and must begin to look backward to history to achieve her interpretation of the Libyan and Tunisian states. She assumes, for example, that the territorial confines of modern-day Libya and Tunisia were clearly conceived as constituting such states centuries ago. Historical arbitrariness is clearly apparent in her references to the "ability of Europeans to sustain the efforts at state formation [in Libya and Tunisia] begun before their occupation."[33] Taking account of such statements, it is fair to say that Anderson's study is a well-meant but distorted presentation of Libyan and Tunisian history; the conceptual basis that is necessary to sustain the author's broader comparative endeavours vis-à-vis new states is lacking, not least because her neo-Weberian premises lead her to use history to verify and perhaps even embellish aspects of present realities rather than to explain their formation.

Taylor's study of Burma (Myanmar) has succumbed to the easiest temptation in extending the Eurocentric, neo-Weberian statist framework to new states. He has uncritically substituted history for analysis, conceptualizing, and theorizing; history is used strictly in an illustrative capacity. His analyses of the peculiar forms of rules that the Burmese state imposed upon its members and of how the state structured society lead him to see the state usually and everywhere in Burmese history. Only "those rare historical periods when the state is not the dominant institution in society" threaten the easy continuity of this analysis of the Burmese state, which, we are informed, "has a historical lineage that goes back 600 to 1,000 years."[34] In the bulk of the study, Taylor's task is merely to match periods of Burmese history (beginning in 849 A.D.) to the checklist of "the most general conditions" of state formation and survival that Tilly outlined in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe.* This procedure is quite unsatisfactory in that its disclosures of historical minutiae are really just that, opportunities to talk about history in what is now Myanmar without really demonstrating the exclusive links between these details and an actually existing state.

More so than other examples of this approach to new states, therefore, Taylor's study shows how easily efforts to improve an incomplete understanding through comparison sometimes duplicate rather than correct the deficiencies in that understanding. Taylor's work shows that when the historical mode of analysis is used to verify rather than account for instances of creation (state formation), the deficiencies in the original understanding (as found in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*) are duplicated in each new case considered. By this I mean to suggest that sovereignty, armed force, territory, and community, when considered as discrete attributes, do not register as significant particulars in Taylor's or in the other authors' accounts. Yet in each case of a state, it is the particular sovereignty, armed force, territory, and community that make that state recognizable or, at least, distinguishable from all other states and all other non-states. Since no two states share the same tangible attributes, our perception of distinct states depends on our recognizing their specific sovereign, coercive, territorial, and popular qualities. The accounts offered of Myanmar, Libya, Tunisia, and Zaire do not include discussion of these particulars, and so we should be sceptical of the authors' claims to be discussing states.

Plainly stated, neo-Weberian students of Asian and African states deny themselves their own definitional regard for the attributes of the state. They do this by employing a methodology that refers all matters back to the record of historical accomplishments, to times and places when even the notion of a European state would be inappropriate. "The contingency of history-as-action is [in this way] mitigated by the backward gaze of history-as-representation which orders and explains, which introduces a teleology hardly evident at the time of the original events."[35] If it is hardly to be believed that the English or French state existed in the twelfth century, imagine then the difficulty in accepting the claim that any former Asian or African colony existed as a new state before the twentieth century. Yet, as we have seen, neo-Weberian students of developing areas make precisely these claims.

Their problem consists exactly in the fallacy that looking at the historical record truly explains a state or its formation. One has to wonder whether looking at the historical record explains anything, for the truth is that we never truly look at *the* historical record, we always look at *a* historical record and always in a particular way. The latter, which usually covers only a narrow band of all the events in time, exists as such solely from its author's or compiler's preconception of what is worthy of inclusion. Thus, the predeterminations of historical recorders, especially if they are few, essentially and insidiously undermine the task of achieving accurate and valid explanations. Thus, we can now more clearly understand that what neo-Weberian students of Asian and African states have done, is merely squeeze the tube, if you will, of national history and confirm that its contents correspond to the label already affixed to it, like the history of Zaire. In such instances, discussions of so-called states are little more than exercises in tautology or, to be consistent with the broad distinction I drew earlier, verifications of the state.

But even this latter characterization may be too generous. When analysts allow themselves to use history-as-representation, there is no prerequisite that the correlations that they draw between history and the chosen historical subject include statements of how particular events or series of events represent a subject's particular attribute or sets of attributes. Indeed, we can see that with the relaxation of analytical standards, it is easy for history-as-representation to deteriorate to history-as-substitute, where a complete conflation occurs between a historical record and its subject. It is as if all of history was destined to create its subject, here, the state. About this, neo-Weberian discussions of Asian and African states are essentially Hegelian in their conception and execution. Clearly, it is time to rethink how we understand the state and state formation.

The Exceptional Perspective on New States

Recognizing new Asian and African states as such depends neither on their international status as "states" nor on their alleged antiquity. Although all former Asian and African colonies were recognized as "states" when they gained independence, or shortly after that, this status tells us very little about the particular political quality of the state that concerns us here.[36] For often, their leaders' claims to territory, sovereignty, and a popular base were essentially formal or official in character. The dissolution that followed in the wake of the unstately conduct of these same leaders, who based themselves on ordering principles other than sovereignty, necessarily depended upon the prior illusion that they had created: that the ensemble of these attributes marked a political order of the state type. Considering the alien and highly capricious constitution of what would eventually become the formally defining attributes of these pretender states, it is simply unreasonable to expect that these lines of division would have evoked either automatic or genuine support from those hemmed in by them anyhow.

If consideration of their international status as "states" is only superficially helpful in recognizing and understanding new Asian and African states, then historical arguments purporting to demonstrate their antiquity are positively misleading. Such arguments tend to conceal this weakness and go on to examine such derivative attributes of state formation as stateness and statehood. Our confidence in speaking of any one Western European state is well grounded in the accumulated historical record of indisputable instances of stateness and statehood, despite the inability to account for state formation per se. Here, the antiquity of the states under consideration speaks as loudly as any account of their actual formation (assuming for the moment that such an account is possible in the Western European context) to their status as states. In moving toward the recognition and understanding of Asian and African states, however, this second-best means of comprehension is not portable. When the assumption of portability is made, the analysis necessarily turns into a futile effort to locate instances of stateness or statehood. Clearly, a historical mode of analysis that seeks to compensate for the imperceptible beginnings of Western European states by incidentally dispensing with an analytical focus on armed force and by diluting the notion of sovereignty necessarily confuses our understanding when it is used to "explain" new states.

While Western European states may possess shadowy histories, this is not a sufficient reason for analysts of new Asian and African states to believe that they must create equally shadowy pasts to understand their subjects. It is my assertion that new Asian and African states may be more directly and clearly understood than their Western European counterparts precisely because they admit a poverty of history as states. That is to say, because they lack a history both of stateness and of statehood, it is easier to recognize the moment of the initial division of people and territory into and as a state than it is in Western European cases. In this sense, I am suggesting that the study of politics in some Asian and African cases brings us directly to the concept of the state. To insist that the concept of the state is approachable through other concepts first, such as stateness or statehood, or by gaining familiarity with a long historical lineage, at best diverts our attention and forestalls understanding. These latter analytical practices obscure because the distinctly Western European context from which they are drawn and to which they speak is itself obscure. Our understanding of Asian and African states, therefore, does not need to depend upon the analytical practices used to study Western European states, that is, practices that compensate for the objective inability to recognize the initial act of political division.

The Distinction of Revolution: Non-States versus New States

What is needed to understand new Asian and African states is a perspective acknowledging the political basis of popular-territorial divisions, rather than perspectives whose understanding of states relates either to the standard of international diplomatic acceptability or to the standard of historical longevity. Making the distinction between non-states and states helps us to achieve this distinctly political understanding by reminding us of two observations. First, it reminds us that a state is only one among many possible political orders. And second, this distinction reminds us that the ordering principle of the state (and indeed the ordering principle of every species of order) entails a unique ordering of people and territory, which are otherwise elemental to all political orders. Both reminders serve to underscore the present assertion that in a world made up of people and territory, the source of variety between and among orders lies in the tangible divisions that actors effect or perpetuate in space and among people. It is doubtful that there are any "natural" divisions given that the number of ways in which divisions or differences can be drawn between people and in space is potentially infinite. Hence, just as there is no generic history, only histories defined as such by their compilers and interpreters, there are no generic political differences or divisions, only divisions whose tangibility has been achieved or perpetuated by virtue of some actor's (or actors') political efforts. Thus, where political orders are visibly recognizable through their divisions, and divisions are made visible by political behaviour, the test of the actuality of an order consists of detecting specific types of political behaviour. It is in relation to these political efforts of actors to achieve or perpetuate the actual division of people and territory, then, that I mean a political perspective. In contrast to the standards of diplomacy and historical longevity, therefore, the political perspective on the state that is being advanced here demonstrates actual and specific political behaviour.

The emphasis on political behaviour in newly independent Asian and African countries helps us to recognize, first, the political situation created by the very act of, or struggle for, independence and, second, the two broad responses that it elicited and how these relate to state building and state formation. Politically speaking, the issue of independence fostered the creation of what can only be conceived as novel configurations of people and territory. Now, while it is true that the eventual territorial and popular endowments of many of these countries paralleled colonial administrative divisions, and thus were not strictly unprecedented in their appearance, the aspect of novelty associated with independence lay in the fact that the political power necessary to defend these divisions had disappeared. This is no small matter since the divisions effected by European colonizers divided non-European peoples and territory in historically unprecedented ways—into areas that were either smaller than those covered by former pre-colonial "indigenous" empires or larger than those covered by the "indigenous" political units existing in the wake of the pre-colonial disintegration of said empires or otherwise. Clearly, without the power of the colonial metropole, these divisions possessed little better than a formal existence, the only kind of existence they could enjoy given both their recent and foreign conception. In spite of this prospect, independence was a much sought-after goal and every instance of its achievement brought with it the political challenge of turning the pretence or formality of territorial, popular, and sovereign attributes into real attributes, formal division into real division, the claim of being a state into the actualization of a state.

In essence, the drive to independence virtually compelled a drive to revolution since this is what would be required to prove the immediate objective of a freestanding division conforming to colonial specifications, a division that clearly lacked the substance provided uniquely by popular support and territorial control. For intentionally or otherwise, departing and embattled colonizers alike had not created an ordering principle for the people and territory of their former or soon to be former colonies. If the latter were to continue in the tangible form aspired to through the independence struggle, or assumed with the conferral of independent statehood, then a concomitant and necessarily transcendent ordering principle would of necessity have to be created above the sea of existing "primordial sentiments."[37]

Among the former colonies, without a single, organized power that could or did seek control (either in whole or in part) over other newly independent people and territory, the pressure to create such an ordering principle or exert effective control over people and territory by all geographically contiguous countries would be less compelling, maybe even unnecessary. In such cases, reciprocal acknowledgments of formal popular and territorial claims among the leaders of these "states" could serve as a sufficient safeguard to what would be sets of uncontested formal divisions.

Indeed, the leaders of many former colonies, notably in Africa and in the Middle East, appear to have declined engaging "their" people or peoples in creating an ordering principle that would substantiate the shell of independent statehood. Instead, their preference was for all to live within a generalized, but unarticulated, condition of insecurity. While these entities may still be considered political orders, the persistent failure of the leaders to engage "their" people(s), or the people(s) to engage themselves, means that the operative ordering principles in such places are not of the state type. As far as order is achieved at all, it is narrowly based, both territorially and popularly speaking, and informed by a variety of principles exclusive of sovereignty. This is the first broad response to the challenge of independence, a challenge that, along with the certitude of real popular-territorial divisions, is really ignored.

The second broad response to the challenge of independence occurs in fewer instances than the first and consists initially, like the first response, of political actors recognizing the unreality of independence. However, unlike the first response, which entails a certain acquiescence in the condition of unreality or the status quo, the second reaction entails a determination by political actors to overcome this condition. Analytically, when Asians and Africans attempt to overcome the unreality of independence—by trying to turn the formality of their popular-territorial attributes into real attributes—we must be prepared to recognize that their efforts are inherently revolutionary. We may make this assertion on the basis that the conduct of any particular Asians and Africans can hardly be considered "natural," restorative, or reformist since, before independence, the same Asians and Africans did not form a single, coherent popular-territorial unit. In many of these settings, the indigenous perspective on power, with its associated characteristics of diffuseness and luminescence, excluded the notion of territoriality that is intrinsically connected with the modern concept of the state.[38] As far as colonialism circumscribed people and territory (either within colonies or by surrounding uncolonized people and territory with colonies), it did so without also creating genuine communities, community norms, or community authority other than of the official type. Thus, when Asian and African political actors undertook to engage the people during colonialism, or shortly after its formal end, this phenomenon was both revolutionary and creative in nature.

To recognize the revolutionary and creative character of popular political participation is obviously to speak about mass behaviour. To speak about mass political behaviour is equally to perceive the potentiality that inheres in such behaviour to define differences through their creation, to achieve genuine popular-territorial divisions. Together, these considerations permit us to grasp better the manner of state formation and the reality of the state in Asian and African settings. Indeed, these considerations yield the proposition that a revolutionary situation—which in Asian and African settings would be characterized by unprecedented, ongoing, and directed popular political participation within a space this is or was either directly (as a colony) or indirectly (as surrounded by colonies) defined by the forces of colonialism—is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for the formation of a state.

We say necessary because revolutionary situations involve people, and it is people, behaving in certain ways, who create socially significant political differences or divisions. However, not all instances of popular political participation create differences that amount to orders or are orderly in the sense of being the ordered activities of the same. Thus, not all revolutionary situations lead to revolutionary outcomes or new political orders; sometimes revolutions are destroyed in midstream by superior coercive force, by the decline of militant spirit, and so forth. Likewise, with respect to popular political participation, we must be on guard against the easy tendency to believe that the mere participation of Asians and Africans in elections or mass gatherings evidences an order. Such manifestations are only instances of this when they are ordered activities, and for them to be considered as such depends on a further and more comprehensive account of the order itself, including its origins.

That so few accounts of Asian and African "states" include such discussions testifies to the assertion that revolutionary situations are not only uncommon, but that revolutionary outcomes entailing the creation of an order are even more so. Persuading people to realize a comprehensive order when they possess no prior or effective means for such, when they can only contemplate or are told of their wholeness, is *the* political challenge of independence. It should not surprise us when the challenge is declined in favour of less impressive, but more realistic and practicable, political objectives. Against this challenge of effecting the seemingly "natural," but actually novel, separation of some territory and some people from others through political means, the political behaviour necessary and sufficient to sustain the status quo is as small as it is popularly and territorially superficial. In this light, the phenomenon of revolutionary politics in Asian and African settings is exceptional in its incidence.

If the engagement of Asian and African populations that is necessary to create real orders is exceptional in terms of its infrequency, then the revolutionary activity sufficient to lead to the formation of a state (or state order) is exceptional in another, namely substantive, sense. In an Asian or African context, a moment of exception occurs when the question of the physical and political survival of a specific set of political actors, namely those who are competing for territory, people, arms, and other power resources in overlapping but usually concentric spaces, is both posed and answered in a lethal way. Thus, a moment of exception can take the form of one of two scenarios. For one, it can be the time during which a decision is made and implemented by one actor (or alliance of actors) to politically eliminate its opponents in the mutually contested territorial-popular space. It can also be the time during which one actor (or, again, alliance of actors) resists another actor's (or other actors') decision and its implementation. In this instance, through the course of a successful resistance, the former actor or alliance inadvertently realizes its own decision to eliminate the latter opponents in the mutually contested territorial-popular space. In either event, a moment of exception involves a unilaterally triggered, but commonly binding, test of survival for all those involved in a revolutionary situation and, as such, serves as a bridge to a revolutionary outcome. For a revolutionary situation to yield a revolutionary outcome that is characterized by a popular-territorial division of the state type, there must have been an intervening moment of exception between the two stages of revolution.

New States and the Moment of Exception

The analytical claim that the occurrence of a moment of exception is a necessary and sufficient condition for the formation of a new state is central to the exceptional perspective on new states. This claim ought, therefore, to be explored further. We may do so by making reference discretely to the form of contestation, content, and consequences that are integral to the notion of a moment of exception.

By the form of contestation, I mean to call attention to the particular kind of revolutionary activity that must exist for us to logically consider the subsequent claims about what transpires during a moment of exception (content) and what follows the occurrence of such a moment (consequences). For a moment of exception to develop, the revolutionary activity, which I have already cited as necessary for the creation of real attributes, must be understood as the expression of a contest between at least two political actors. Without this assertion, we lack the means to explain political actors' effective, as opposed to merely rhetorical, popular and territorial drives in a context where there is no existing rationale, ordering principle, or motivation to stimulate such activity. In an Asian or African setting, it is the opposition of at least one actor to another that explains their widening appropriations of territory, people, arms, and other power resources, that is, their separate state-building endeavours.[39] Sometimes, when the competition intensifies without occasioning the swift elimination of any one actor, so too do the extent and depth of their spatial control. The contest may be so intense as to lead to the creation of what may be considered rival "states-within-a-state" (with "independent states"), or "liberated" and "government" or "administered" zones (with colonies).

In each instance of protracted opposition, the revolutionary engagement of the people on all sides is compelled and consummated during the competition itself. By this measure, the control exercised by actors within their spaces, even and especially when geographical space is shared, is real. By this measure, too, the quality of control is novel: the popular-territorial divisions putatively achieved during competition are unprecedented, having no prior standards of conformity or bases upon which to be constituted. It is by dint of this condition of novelty that the concept of the moment of the exception acquires its analytical significance for understanding new state formation. In other words, the creation of a new state is the content of a moment of exception.

To convey the suggestion that the content of a moment of exception is the creation of a new state, we may begin by understanding how and with what immediate effect the preceding form of competition ends. It follows from the preceding discussion that opposing actors or coalitions of actors will have brought people, territory, and other power resources under their control and in equally novel forms. Based on this assertion, we may infer that no one side in the revolutionary competition is ordained to succeed and the other to fail. We may argue, though, that a greater probability of success inheres in the possession (or greater possession) of arms. But being armed in all-round novelty may not be sufficient to bring the competition to an effective and categorical end. For indeed, the exceptional perspective holds that it is the creation of a monopoly of decision, and not the creation of a monopoly of arms, that ends the competition and yields a new state. That is to say, ending the competition in a categorical way—in a way yielding the category of a new state—necessarily entails the creation of an effective authority that self-consciously proclaims the existence of this category.

To put matters differently, I am suggesting that the competition ends when one actor (or unified group of actors) succeeds in declaring a general state of emergency, then exercises the uncircumscribed power arising in every emergency to physically and spiritually eliminate its opponents, and finally ends the emergency condition by proclaiming normalcy. When matters are seen in this light, it should be clear that since there can be no normalcy in novelty, its proclamation in this instance amounts to a creative act, a new order, or, more specifically in the wide spatial case under consideration here, a new state. Thus, for a political order to exist (as a state), a normal situation must exist, and in definitively deciding whether this normal situation exists, the victorious actor is exercising the power, won in the moment of exception, to decide what is normal and what is exceptional. This power is the power to decide; it is a monopoly of decision, the hallmark of sovereignty. When sovereignty is realized by an actor's success in carrying out its decision, the activity of state building culminates as a moment of state formation. Accordingly, the decision taken during a moment of exception brings a long period of conflict to a halt and initiates a new political order.[40] The actor who succeeds in pronouncing and effecting a condition of normalcy is acting on its newly won authority, that is, its sovereignty. The empirical and formal ordering of people and territory are coincident; the new state both is and is perceived as such for the first time.

Creating sovereign authority, which is the essence of the decision taken during a moment of exception, brings all commonly contested resources under one actor's control. If we agree with Hirst that "[i]t is political authority, power arising from struggle, that determines when things can be normal, when settled regimes of law are possible,"[41] then we can expect both the normalization and normization of the situation following an assertion of sovereignty. From this point forward, the political possibility exists for the sovereign political actor to advance the other elements of the idealized Weberian notion of the state: a community with norms of legitimacy and legitimate action. It is difficult to avoid recognizing these activities as a consequence of a moment of exception because sovereignty is both the proximate and enduring answer to the question consistently posed in and by every political emergency: "Who is responsible for that for which competence has not been anticipated?"[42] It is only logical that the consequences of the category (the state) are dependent for their content and form on the behaviour and will of the actor who assumes this responsibility, that is, the sovereign actor. In this way, the nihilistic tendencies associated with the type of revolutionary competition identified in new state building may yield to powerful constructive impulses in Asian and African settings after a monopoly of decision has been created.

Summarily, to speak of the existence of a new Asian or African state is to speak of its formation in popular-territorial terms. These terms are established by at least two separate and opposing political actors who have effectively gathered popular and territorial support based on their mutual opposition, expressed through their own directing ideas of a collective identity covering overlapping (but not necessarily coterminous) circumscriptions of people and territory. The decisive test in this revolutionary process of ever widening appropriations (of territory, people, and political resources) is for one actor to command its accumulated resources and assert its sovereignty to end the process of state building. Thus, when one actor plunges the commonly contested people and territory into an emergency situation and emerges against its opposition with both a monopoly of arms and, more importantly, a monopoly of decision, a new state will have been created. The monopoly of decision affirms the circumscription of people and territory as the norm, that is, as normal.

It follows that unlike the set of essential principles—such as religious convictions, conquest, economic interests, or marital, blood, clan, or race relations—involved in the ordering of people and territory in non-states, the ordering principle of a state derives its validity from an exclusively political decision. This decision involves, first, an act of division that also achieves the creation and assertion of sovereignty over a now circumscribed popular-territorial base. Thus, a new state becomes recognizable as such when a political actor (or alliance of actors) actually effects the ordering of people and territory on the novel basis of such a circumscription. A new state is accordingly unique among political orders precisely because its foundation, content, and scope are decided politically at the same point in time, without reference to other ordering principles. To put matters succinctly, a new state is an empirical and a conceptual coincidence, a conjunction of a real and an officially proclaimed circumscription of people and territory.

With this statement, it should be readily apparent how different are the exceptional and Weberian/neo-Weberian perspectives on the state. While the former conceives of the state as an empirical and categorical outcome of a set of political actions and interactions between or among actors competitively effecting appropriations of people, territory, and other resources, the Weberian/neo-Weberian perspective perceives the state categorically rather than consequentially, that is, as historically extant and historically grounded instead of temporally contingent. In short, the perspectives differ on whether to perceive the state first as a category or as a consequence, as an abstraction or as an established empirical reality.

When the state is perceived categorically, we have seen that the tendency of Weberian/neo-Weberian analysts has been to conduct that type of historical analysis that confirms the category without accounting for the creation of the (subject) state as such. We may now also observe that lacking accounts of individual states, it is understandable why Weberian/neo-Weberian analysts prefer to offer accounts of groups of states (Western European states, states "on the periphery," "former colonies"): they can depend for their explanations on the interactive effects of contending sovereigns without necessarily accounting for those sovereigns. Further, it is also understandable why students of this perspective choose to characterize the state as an actor in its own right. Lacking a historical perspective that can even conceive of an individual or collective actor who can realize sovereignty over people and territory, these analysts have little choice but to ignore the relationship that must exist between actors and behaviour to create a state in the first place.

When the state is perceived consequentially, as in the exceptional perspective, the tendency is to view it as temporally contingent, explicable in its singularity, and the product of recognizable political actors and actions. The contrast with the Weberian/neo-Weberian perspective is marked not merely with respect to these particulars, but also in relation to the logic allowing us to group them as a set. Whereas Weberian analyses offer accounts of states on the basis of a reconstituted play of history where the treatment of history serves as the perspective's logic or method, the exceptional perspective offers an account of a state on the basis of its own underlying logic or method: the articulation of political resources.

The New State and the Articulation of Political Resources

The suggestion that a new state may be understood consequentially, as the outcome of discrete sets of political actions and interactions between and among actors, is equally a statement about the method by which these actors create a new state. It follows logically that by specifying sets of actions and interactions as an analytical category, one is really and simultaneously advancing the underlying notion that it is actors' behaviour that decides whether a new state comes into existence. If the existence of a new state is recognized as contingent in this way, and if the creation of a new state is also understood to be more than a chance affair, then it is the wilful behaviour—a consciously pursued political method or strategy—of actors that matters most, that is, that matters most to them and to students of new states. Thus, before a new state exists, actors must consciously possess an overarching idea of a new state and be equally consciously involved in realizing this idea. Furthermore, as the state, both as an idea and a reality, could not have existed in its occidental form in Asia and Africa before Western colonization or influence had been felt in these areas, "indigenous" conceptions of or efforts to create a new state in the present century would, of necessity, have to possess a revolutionary character. Considering all these factors, clearly the method that actors require to realize their idea of state, entails the accumulation, control, and creation of political resources, which include territory, people, arms, and sovereignty.

Revolution and counterrevolution, political violence and annihilation, "stabilization" and "normalization," as links in a long chain of actions and interactions, are really the more familiar manifestations of what, methodologically, amounts to the continuous articulation of political resources by collective actors. As far as each of these phenomena is interpretable in terms of actors' continuous efforts to accumulate, control, and create political resources as a matter of method, each of these phenomena is also interpretable as a matter of methodology. If this is so, then my earlier assertion, which is that my argument about the state is not separate from the way in which I make my argument, becomes more readily understandable. My purpose here, then, is to outline with greater precision a methodology of the state that centres upon political resources and so unite others' partial insights about the place of political resources in political life and their role in the institutionalization of exceptional power. I will accomplish this task by briefly examining resource-centred perspectives relating to revolution, the origins of sovereignty, and the institutional creation of ideology and identity.

The beginnings of a consistent resource-centred approach to new states can be found in the study of revolution. Here, the political conflict perspective, which has been advanced by Tilly and Aya, may be most germane to the analysis of state building and state formation.[43] Paradoxically, the appropriateness of this perspective for understanding new states lies both in what it does and does not tell us about political resources. Positively speaking, this perspective tells us that revolutionary situations, and ultimately outcomes, are the result of a quest for power resources among actors within a polity in weakened or unstuck central or government power (a condition called "multiple sovereignty"). Although this perspective was intended to explain a collapsing political order—rather than the initial creation of an order in the popular-territorial sense meant here—the underlying emphasis on political resources has not been proven to be useless in understanding those Asian and African circumstances defined by the challenge of independence, which invariably includes the opportunity, if not the imperative, to create an authority or order for the first time. There may be no insurmountable barrier to using the political conflict perspective to try to understand new states, despite its articulators' analytical preference to employ it in situations where there are prior existing political orders.

Thus, for our purposes, the strength of the political conflict perspective consists exactly in the attention it pays to resources that we have identified as definitionally significant in our conception of a new state. As such, these studies focus proximately on the intentions of actors, their capabilities, and their opportunities to either effect a revolutionary "breakthrough" or halt the transition from a revolutionary situation to a revolutionary outcome. Central to the revolutionary-counterrevolutionary dynamic is the struggle to accumulate resources, primarily of people (popular support), land (a recognizable territorial base), arms, and what Tilly loosely calls "sovereignty"; this process of struggle for survival and accumulation may be seen as amounting to the construction of rival states within a territory recognized as a state (or colony) by the international community. Indeed, it is the undivided attention to these resources shown in the political conflict perspective that allows us to conceive of the process of accumulating and controlling such resources as new state building.

A certain weakness or limitation reveals itself in extending the Tilly-Aya conception of revolution to new state formation when their discussion turns to the final stages in the struggle between or among actors. The weakness consists quite simply in their easy and blunt assertion that revolutionary outcomes occur when one contender or group of contenders (who already possess the other resources of popular support, territory, and arms) takes power and does so from, or at the expense of, others. On this view, the creation of "a monopoly of violence, taxation, and justice"[44] is coincident with "sovereignty." Although this conclusion is not inherently problematic in examinations of situations where the contest is primarily over power in an already existing political order, it tells us very little about the reality of a situation in which state building is conceived of and practised as part of new state formation, where the order itself—and not merely power—is being created through contestation. This is the present limitation of the political conflict perspective: it fails, understandably, to shed any light on that which is beyond its own scope of illumination—the post-revolutionary period or, for our purposes, new state formation.

Despite this limitation, which reads in both Tilly's and Aya's work as an abrupt disregard for the substance of revolutionary outcomes, the political conflict perspective has the analytical capacity to illuminate the reality of new states. Paradoxically, this greater-than-appreciated capacity resides within the perspective's fundamental understanding of the importance of resources to political actors; the perspective's own adherents, through their demonstrated preference to limit the use of the perspective to explaining revolutionary changes of power within established orders, have retarded a more thorough discovery and application of its insights. Clearly, when the discussion relates to the seizure of power within predefined popular-territorial frameworks, little analytical importance attaches to a concept of sovereignty addressing such parameters as a matter of priority. It is on this understanding of sovereignty that adherents of the political conflict approach have apparently limited themselves to discussing the substance of revolutionary situations and the minimal conditions that attend passages to revolutionary outcomes.

In a radical sense, that is, in the sense of "being thought out to the end," sovereignty can be brought into the ambit of the political conflict perspective and conceived of as a political resource. This extension of the perspective seems particularly appropriate when we recall that the basic thrust of Tilly's theorizing was related to collective action and group competition, "where the outcome of such competition was determined primarily by the balance of resources available to contending groups."[45] Besides this desire to be methodologically complete, really the pressure of empirical circumstances and the need for actors to be complete in their own revolutionary method necessitate including sovereignty within the political conflict perspective. For indeed, if we exclude sovereignty from our consideration of the range of political resources, conceiving of it instead as a social artifact of unknown and unknowable creation, then, however absurd it may seem, we must make highly arbitrary and ultimately baseless references to "society," "structural changes of society," and so forth, to "explain" the "revolution." It is this absurdity, which is invoked by applying an incompletely thought out version of the political conflict perspective, that compels a widening of both its methodology and empirical application.

In widening the political conflict approach, we can avoid chasing away the problem of the beginnings of political orders begged by oblique references to "society" by considering a notion of sovereignty associated with Schmitt.[46] At the outset, we should note that Schmitt's contribution to the understanding of sovereignty is, on the surface, of a juridical nature. While this quality may give us pause in our consideration of revolution, which seems the antithesis of juridical constancy, Schmitt's concept of sovereignty was vitally informed by his firsthand observations of the *political* conflict between the National Socialists and the Communists in the Weimar Republic and by his experience in establishing the legalistic bases of the Third *Reich,* a *political* order.[47] It is in these connections, therefore, that we may appreciate Schmitt's more than purely abstract theorizing about sovereignty. As his own political role in founding an order attests, the juridical qualities of sovereignty may be applied by actors both to found an order, *de novo,* and to institutionalize it, hypothetically for a millennium. Let us take each of these aspects of sovereignty in turn.

When incorporated within the wider ambit of the political conflict approach, Schmitt's notion of sovereignty helps us to understand how a political order of the state type can be created without reference to any prior order or "society." This notion helps us to achieve such an explanation by dint of its insight about the constructive end of political contestation, an insight that can be applied to revolutionary competitions involving popular and territorial resources. The insight consists quite boldly in the statement that "[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception."[48] As we are already aware, the "exception" is "any kind of severe economic or political disturbance that requires the application of extraordinary measures."[49] In this sense, the "exception" is the equivalent of the most mature form of political conflict envisaged by Tilly and Aya. For our consideration, the important aspect of such conflict consists in the supposition that when the decision is taken (as to whether a moment of exception exists), an actor usually embarks on extreme action (usually coercive or annihilative in quality) that pushes the revolutionary situation into a revolutionary outcome or decisively brakes the revolutionary upsurge. In this regard, when the decision taken "is inherently a decision about an emergency...in which rapidly apprehended necessity and expediency dictate action," "[e]ffectiveness, not legality, is what counts."[50] The effect of a new state-building actor choosing to stake its survival around (usually armed) effectiveness, rather than legality, may include the creation of an order *de novo*—a new state:

> The decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense of the word. Because a general norm, as represented by an ordinary legal prescription, can never encompass a total exception, the decision that a real exception exists cannot therefore be entirely derived from this norm.... The exception...cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law.... [The sovereign] decides whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it.[51]

In short, the actor or individual emerging from the trial of political struggle by succeeding in deciding on the moment of exception possesses a political resource in sovereignty, the use of which allows for the eventual creation of subsequent laws. Thus, the establishment of sovereignty occurs as and at the end of the process of state building; it marks state formation. The state, as the authoritative organizational expression of the directing idea, and sovereignty become intertwined because they appear simultaneously.

The decision on the exception is simultaneously the end of the "trial by battle" and the beginning of the state—its creation. The attainment of sovereignty, realized by an individual acting singly or corporately (but in all cases on the basis of an incipient state), is the first step toward state perpetuation or what may be understood alternately as institutionalization, which embodies notions both of normalization and normization. It was precisely this link between the individual, acting as a sovereign, and the process of institutionalization in Schmitt's theorizing to which Nettl objected in 1968:

> If the notion of state is to be at all meaningful, and not merely a ragbag synonym of government, it must be divorced from and even *opposed* to personal power—not in the legal but in the political sense. The point about [Schmitt's] famous statement [about the sovereign] is not, as some democratic commentators have pointed out, that the statement is destructive of law, but that it negates any useful concept of state as the *institutionalization* of power.[52]

This objection is incomplete, for within the terms of the approach taken here, the exception and sovereignty have as their run-up the phenomenon of political contention and as their denouement the orchestration of resources for the creation of norms, ideology, and even of society. It is not the case, therefore, that a powerful individual acts alone within the present approach. Instead, an individual may be understood as having catalyzed the creation of the state and, in doing so, carrying with him myriads of people and resources both before and after that event. The reciprocal and inclusive nature of the conflict, not the individual leader, compels the choice that must be made:

> Political struggle imposes the morally exacting decision, the either/or. Morality is defined by choice, good or evil by the terms offered. There is no rule above the choice, and discussion cannot resolve the opposing forces.... to choose is to decide, to decide is to act, to act is to face an opponent, and because one faces an opponent the consequences of one's actions are unavoidable.[53]

A new state may be but one of the remorseless results of such an action.

While Schmitt clearly recognized and conceived of sovereignty as integral to the institutionalization of power, we can more readily identify Hauriou's concerns about moments of creation in law and the perpetuation of such changes as the more illuminating on this score.[54] Moreover, Hauriou's concerns can be easily accommodated within a political conflict approach because they extrapolate (or help us to extrapolate) from Schmitt's insight that sovereignty is that political resource of a juridical character that allows for both the legal determination of the existence of a moment of exception and, in the long run, positive juridical rules. Indeed, by insisting that institutions have perceptible political and juridical starting points and by taking the precepts of human actions as his own starting point, Hauriou displaces "the conceptualist adherence to immutability."[55] He offers us a view attuned to the unforeseen and unforeseeable challenges of new state builders by incorporating the element of uncertainty in his own understanding of institutions and their directing ideas. Hauriou can be associated with a widening of the political conflict approach because of what he tells us about the perpetuation of an order, that is, the challenge of its normalization. The challenge of normalization, which tends to be advertised by its participants as "stabilization" or "normalization," includes the discrete but dual goals of achieving peace and quiet ("law and order") and a condition of normalcy.

To understand what is meant by the challenge of normalization as part of the underlying political conflict approach, we should understand Hauriou's notions of the "institution" (including its "foundation") and the "directing idea," both of which are encompassed within his "theory of the institution." Originally, Hauriou's theory of the institution was a view of the legal order and the origin of positive juridical rules. The appropriateness of Hauriou's thought in fashioning a resource-centred approach to the state and state perpetuation is evident particularly in his discussion of the relationship between the creation of juridical rules and social institutions. The starting point of Hauriou's interpretation of juridical rules was to reject Duguit's Durkheimian-inspired legal perspective. Hauriou thus sought to avoid a characterization of juridical rules as either exclusively "subjective" (created solely by the legislator's will) or exclusively "objective" (as a product of the social milieu). For Hauriou, "the institutional character of the positive juridical rule" does not reveal itself as an injunction,

> addressed by a subject who has authority to another subject who owes obedience. Nor does it establish between juridical subjects a juridical relationship that would be directly and exclusively interindividual. It is a complex. It rules and measures the relationships that proceed from a certain juridical subject . . . and which go, as to their term, to a certain other juridical subject, but which pass through an object, whose role is essential. The object specifies the relationships of the subjects . . . the internal structure of positive law . . . is not . . . the rule of the relationships of individual to individual, of person to person, but the rule of the relationships of subjects with an object.[56]

With this conception of law in mind, Hauriou went on to delineate the manner in which law mediates between directing ideas and institutions and declared, famously, that "an institution is an idea of a work or enterprise realized and endures juridically."[57] Hauriou's succinct view fosters an analytical approach to institutions, an approach emphasizing a search for their discrete starting points or moments of "foundation" and an attentiveness to their directing ideas, which may be understood as "themes for development."[58] With this definition, and especially its implicit distinction between a directing idea in its prejuridical and juridical condition, not only can we incorporate Schmitt's ideas regarding the appearance of the sovereign actor and sovereignty, we can recognize that the directing idea itself may be realized in part organizationally—to the degree that an authoritative juridical capacity is itself achieved (a matter of form)—and otherwise—through subsequent juridical enactments (a matter of method and content).

Our understanding of matters of institutional form, method, and content may be further improved by addressing the charge that the analytical practice of focusing on directing ideas in institutions is merely a teleological or functional treatment of the subject. Truth to tell, Hauriou's examination of directing ideas ensured that an idea, so understood, is neither an end nor a function of the state (as one among many examples of institutions), but a device to focus both analysts' and participants' attention on resources. Thus, an end can be comprehended as exterior to the enterprise or state, while a directing idea is interior to both. Moreover, according to Hauriou, "the directing idea includes a program of action and of organization for this action that far transcends the notion of end." Hauriou even warns against confusing a directing idea with the notion of an "end to be achieved," "for the first denotes both the end and the means to be used to achieve it, whereas the idea of end alone does not denote the means." Concerning function, Hauriou asserts that

> The idea of the state far transcends the notion of the functions of the state. The function is only that part of the enterprise that is already realized, or at least already determined. But the directing idea also contains an undetermined and unrealized part that goes beyond the functional part. The separation of these two domains is striking in the state. There is the domain of function: the administration and a determined group of public services. Then there is the domain of the directing idea: the political government, which works in the undetermined area.
>
> The directing idea of the work . . . would be more accurately identified with the notion of object. The idea of the enterprise is the object of the enterprise, for the enterprise has the object of realizing the idea.[59]

On this view, it follows that for any particular state neither its content of form (its specific popular-territorial limits) nor its content per se (its particular laws) is readily predictable within the terms of reference of its associated directing idea. Thus, in its unrealized or prejuridical condition, the directing idea describes its subject people and territory in a general, rather than specific, manner. Only the actor who creates (for itself) an authoritative juridical capacity defines the precise popular-territorial limits of a directing idea of state because the very act of creating juridical authority entails the ordering of people and territory, which, in its first instance, means the formation of a new state. Exceptional power and the order created by the very appearance of that power are irretrievably paired with one another and are inconceivable in their separateness. In this context, law and the form of law are extraordinary because of their substantively exceptional nature.

According to Hauriou, achieving the organizational expression of a directing idea of state eventually leads to the institution of the "nation-state" ("the idea of a work that . . . is realized"). What binds the two aspects of the same directing idea in this instance is the state's own specification, through positive laws and other organizational bonds (which attend an actor's creation of a monopoly of decision and its longer-term accumulation of resources respectively), of the normal relationships between its subjects. More specifically, "the actual ordering of the relationships of the members . . . the creation of procedures, and the putting in place of the instruments"[60] within, between, and among the formal organizations inherited from the struggle for sovereignty and the standard institutions associated with formal government progressively foster the actualization of the institution of the new nation-state.

In this sense, the sovereign enacts or invokes society and social existence. This seems an implausible claim save for the observation that those Asian and African actors who build and form new states not only can use law to realize this objective, but must use law to realize this objective. In the first case, sovereign actors can use law to realize their directing idea because of their monopoly of decision. Relying solely on sovereign power, however, may lead to the creation of a merely legal, rather than legitimate, "new society." What may exist in law, in short, may not exist in reality: a law-ridden or law-rich formal edifice may remain just that. While such an edifice may be perched over a popular-territorial base, we cannot say that this creation is illegitimate since even this judgement presupposes the existence of a society or normal community—the very existence of which is at issue. Thus, the gap between legality and legitimacy is, at least at the outset of a new state order, inevitable. Conceding this point, however, does not warrant the conclusion that the gap between legality and legitimacy is an insuperable barrier to the institutionalization of exceptional power and its associated directing idea of state. Such a conclusion only makes sense if we are also prepared to conclude that no new social identities are possible in postcolonial Asia or Africa.

Despite the great possibility that legal enactments may become mere words, sovereign actors possess in law the resource to institutionalize their power and their directing idea of state. Hauriou has suggested in a preliminary way how he anticipated that the founders of enterprises would succeed in the challenge of institutionalization, and that was by engaging the subjects of an institution-to-be in practices "whose terms [while not initially] operationally relevant [would] be given content in action."[61] In other words, to borrow a notion that is of great theoretical interest to contemporary sociologists, Hauriou was anticipating, perhaps even prescribing, the "institutional creation of ideology." According to one advocate of such a conception of ideology, the institutional creation of ideology means that organizations or institutions create ideology or identity and expend resources in the process. In so doing, "[t]he availability of broad economic, political, and intellectual resources, their organization within [or as] specific social settings, and the acts of producers and recipients are all important considerations."[62] For our present methodological purposes, this notion of ideology or identity, coupled with Hauriou's premise of action-creating meaning, helps to extend the resource-centred approach.

The significance of such an extension is that it helps us to explain how the monopoly of decision may be used by a sovereign actor to bridge the gap between mere legality and legitimacy: law is used resourcefully as both method and content. To understand this conception of law, one has merely to recount that the characteristic weakness of legal commandments is that they may be opposable or, perhaps worse with new states, ignored, especially when they take the form of pronouncements of a new political order, a "national" ideology, or a new social identity. In this form, such laws merely serve to illuminate the profound difference between naming something and ensuring its being. Sovereign actors, precisely because their monopoly of decision is associated with a monopoly of coercion that invites reservation at least as often as opposition, must guard against merely naming or commanding into "existence" their sought-after institution.[63]

Meeting the challenge of institutionalization, therefore, means using legal enactments and official ideological pronouncements alike to formalize, as opposed to directly forming, collective realities and identities. Now this is not to declare that legal enactments and ideological pronouncements are not made early in the life of a new state; it is to contend that the changing pattern of law use and content over time is of great analytical significance. At the beginning of a new state, leaders typically address issues of identity ideologically or lawfully in an open-ended, almost ethereal way. We may understand this to be the case by recalling that without norms, definitive or categorical statements about what is normal are essentially statements of wishful thinking. Consequently, sovereign appeals are made, as Hauriou has suggested, in the guise of "themes for development." Sovereign actors thus shift away from directly addressing the abstract issue of identity to the more practical programme of developing such themes at the popular level, which, to some extent, would have already been exposed to programmatic efforts during contention. Given that popular participation was heretofore oriented to ensuring the survival of a political actor, instead of refining that actor's identity as such, sovereign actors must conceive of a means by which to sustain participation in the absence of a catalyzing antagonism. The means must invite and secure the enduring and massive engagement of people—the only possible basis for a durable synthetic construct such as a new state.

In the twentieth century, the virtually universal convergence around the standard of "national development" does not necessarily suggest its superiority in enduringly and massively engaging "the people," but it does suggest the ubiquity of the challenge of independence that it is meant to overcome.[64] Development, in whichever "national" guise, recommends itself as the favoured means to institutionalize exceptional power because its embrace of the people is indirect, open ended, and suggests through the infinite term of its course the opportunity for personal reward. Moreover, the controversies, such as widening income disparities and longer work hours, it engenders tend to be dispersed by the availability and readiness of economically motivated individuals to continue to compete with one another. Interestingly, at the individual level, this result duplicates a chief effect of dynamic competition between or among collective actors striving to create sovereignty: the underarticulation of the self and the overarticulation of self-preservation. In this sense, development tends to provide an answer to the question of social identities well after it has been posed and invariably in long series of variegated, but comprehensive, massively engaging, and ultimately integrating, activities. Behind this seemingly innocuous activity, the sovereign actor can be seen as promoting organizational growth in a manner that widens and thereby makes possible the eventual normalization of the participation of its own (perhaps heretofore reluctant) subjects in the directing idea. To normalize popular participation in this way is to engage in the institutional creation of ideology, to commit an act of categorizing, to be definitive.

In the course of successful development, the "national identity" will have changed from being an object conceived in a negative atmosphere, thereby deserving the support of laws or ideological declarations targeted against this or that existing (or incipient) particularism, to one of a (quite literally) positive nature, embodied in formal and authoritative public statements of "national identity." The positive qualities of this identity will consist exactly in the empirical realities of the effective elimination of alternate directing ideas and identities within the same circumscribed space and after an extended period of massive engagement, which itself affords additional resources to maintain the masses' participation in larger organizations and governmental institutions. Through time and the extended play of development, the primitive accumulation of the resources necessary and sufficient for the authentication of the "national" self tends to become less primitive in method and content, yielding, as much through hope as expectation, the sanguine institution of the nation-state itself.

New states and the newer social identities that their sovereign overseers attempt to create are built on the site of the present and the future. To the degree that sovereign actors make authoritative references to the past, their typically mythical and chauvinistically promotive quality betrays the nervousness of one conducting an ongoing political experiment.[65] Thus, unlike the state builders who are cast for established historical reasons within a Weberian/neo-Weberian perspective, new Asian and African state builders are perceived from the exceptional perspective precisely because they charge upon the historical stage in an empirically and analytically disruptive fashion, one that is directly associated with the essential political creativity of their respective directing ideas of state.

As they charge forward, sovereign Asian and African actors carry themselves, their subjects, and their students to points beyond Weber, to areas of empirical existence and, thus, analysis that neo-Weberians would not recognize. More specifically, the institutionalization of exceptional power entails two phenomena that both summarize and delimit the essence of exceptional existence and the exceptional perspective. First, the appearance of a new social identity can be explained in terms of resources, rather than assumed to be a matter of long historical lineage. The exceptional perspective recognizes that "instead of being a set of internalized values that influences an individual's moods or motivations," as Weber would argue, "ideology [and the associated "national identity" in new states] appears as a codified set of concepts and categories that is evident in discourse, reinforced by practical commitments, and advanced in institutional settings."[66]

Second, the exceptional perspective carries with it the recognition that the institutionalization of exceptional power entails the establishment of a distinctive form of political domination. Alongside the more familiar forms of legitimate political domination enumerated by Weber—tradition, charisma, and legality—we should be prepared to conceive of a form that is distinctive to the institutionalization of exceptional power: legal domination as the rationalization of order[67] or the rationalization of "substantive policy rather than procedure."[68] This form of domination contrasts with the more familiar variants mainly because it alone fits the existential realities confronting a sovereign Asian or African actor. Such an actor cannot appeal to tradition, for instance, because there is no identifiable, "legitimate," or normal tradition in the space forming the popular-territorial base of a new state. Charisma proves itself to be a temporary phenomenon and therefore unsuitable for the long-term challenges of institutionalization. Legality does not even begin to serve the challenges of sovereign actors; its emphasis on bureaucratic ends-means adjustments implicitly avoids questions about the substantive nature of the tasks to which bureaucratic machinery can be oriented, and it precludes or, more accurately, excludes sovereign actors through its underlying notion of the rule of law.

Unable to base themselves on these legitimate forms of authority, and confronted with the essentially permanent and dual challenges of engaging in meaning-creating (or identity-creating) actions and rationalizing order, sovereign Asian and African actors must be said to behave distinctively. To the degree that the popular-territorial base they shape and are shaped by is not predestined but always appears so in official hindsight or historiography, such actors combine the reality of their power with the unreality or unnaturalness of their creation. The combination of a monopoly of decision, a deadly monopoly of arms, and an otherwise untenable division of people and territory is peculiarly plastic, quintessentially modern. Indeed, it is largely this combination, and the associated need of new state builders to cope with their own political creativity, that helps us to recognize the distinctiveness of "new nations" against the wider historical backdrop of collective human endeavours: while races breed, religions minister or proselytize, empires lord or "civilize," hordes rampage, schools teach, tribes raid, and economic leagues trade, new states develop. As such, new states are unlike other categories of human association, whose rationale and consequences are apparent upon their formation; new states are more a set of political consequences culminating in the category of being a state while awaiting their eventual rationalization as collectivities in and through development.[69]

Perspective and Method in the Study of an Exceptional Political Order

Applying the exceptional perspective to the analysis of an exceptional political order means rendering a definition of a new state. In the following case, the exceptional perspective will be applied broadly to historical and contemporary Indonesian political developments. The main objective will be to account for the formation of the New Order state in 1965-66. Since the exceptional perspective is informed by, and helps to extend, a political conflict approach to collective action, accounting for the formation of a state also means accounting for the possibility and conditions of resource articulation by political actors. Such an account depends, in turn, on an explanation of the circumstances that would engender directing ideas of state and animate actors to accumulate and control resources in the first instance. Finally, at the deepest level, the latter explanation depends on yet another argument, one which asserts that in the area of present geographical interest—the East Indies archipelago—there was neither an Indonesian state nor society before 1965-66. The foregoing set of mested arguments and explanations not only helps us to trace the political process of state building in one case, it engages us in the analytical process of defining one new state through its disclosure of the phenomenon of popular-territorial circumscription.

The political process of state building and the analytical process of defining the state can both be captured by establishing the substantive correspondence between the analytical terms of the exceptional perspective and the empirical terms of an exceptional experience. Thus, we may take in succession the chief analytical issues posed by the exceptional perspective—directing ideas of state, political resources, the context of novelty, the moment of exception, sovereignty, and the monopoly of decision—and identify their substantive Indonesian equivalents. Then we may use the ready structure of their temporal interrelation as a guide in the following examination of the formation of the Indonesian New Order state.

The first issue examined relates to the time and conditions before the appearance of directing ideas of Indonesia; this is the subject of the first chapter. Against the presumptions mainly of Indonesian nationalism, the analysis of Dutch commercialism and colonialism in the East Indies (up to 1942), Japanese wartime rule (1942-45), and the "Indonesian Revolution" (1945-49), reveals the absence of an existing Indonesian state or society. This determination will be made in relation to the three attributes of the state identified by Weber, which serve as our analytical measures: common administration (which relates to territory); common law; and common culture. Notwithstanding this determination, the historical analysis will show that the activities of those now perceived as foreigners (the Dutch, Japanese, and Americans) contributed to the adoption by indigenous leaders, operating in the name of "Indonesia," of occidental ideas of the state. "Indonesia," as a directing idea, will thus be shown to be of extremely recent origin and of limited reality up to 1949.

The second chapter attempts to portray the political situation in Indonesia during the first several years of its independence. I will demonstrate that in the wake of the "Indonesian Revolution" and the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, Indonesia's political parties attempted to solve the lingering political problem of Indonesia and, in so doing, created the conditions for a veritable Indonesian revolution. This analysis will centre on the simultaneously destructive and constructive political forces unleashed by Indonesia's political parties as they sought to accumulate, control, and create the power resources necessary to wield archipelago-wide authority.

In the subsequent chapter, I will examine the consequences mainly of unbridled party competition. In particular, I will relate how two collective actors, the Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*—PKI) and the Indonesian National Army (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*—TNI), recognized the opportunities arising from that competition to conceive of, and begin to implement strategically, their own directing ideas of Indonesia. This analysis leads, in the fourth chapter, to an examination of the separate, but not dissimilar, efforts by the Communists and the Army to organize and categorize their power and resources in definitively "Indonesian" terms. Put differently, this chapter is about these two actors' early attempts to organize the categorization of the consequences attending the organization of power and power resources by lesser (mainly party) actors on insular or particularistic bases during the 1950s.

The fifth chapter centres on the political challenges and activities of the Communist and Army leaderships after they had successfully displaced or destroyed other collective actors in the context of "Guided Democracy." In its essence, this chapter focuses on the main challenge entailed in creating a novel political context. That is to say, the concern here is to examine how the PKI and the TNI tried to make an indeterminate situation determinate through the pursuit of self-conscious and mutually exclusive strategies of sovereignty. In the case of the TNI, its efforts were expressed in terms of the strategy of "national development." In the case of the PKI, its strategy of sovereignty was expressed in terms of the "Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism." The advocacy by both actors of incompatible senses of the scope and content of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution" will be shown to have pushed the actors from competition into conflict. The introduction of the resource of arms at the end of this period marked the point at which a moment of exception became a distinct probability, and not just an indistinct possibility.

The sixth, and final, chapter explores how the TNI and the PKI, with their resolve stiffened by the introduction of arms and sharpened by the diminishing availability of unorganized popular and territorial resources, formulated comprehensive "Indonesian" standards with the aim of making them the sole basis for official "state" policy. In turning their greater attention toward the formal "state," the PKI and TNI imparted to it a greater importance at one level, while actually weakening its pretentious claims to power at another level by substituting the reality of their own power and using it to buttress official claims or policies that coincided with their own strategies of sovereignty. As the PKI and the TNI continued their efforts to accumulate and control political resources, the Indonesian context became increasingly polarized between the two actors. Since the use of arms (in the case of the TNI) or the acquisition of arms (in the case of the PKI) was not legitimate, given the normless (because novel) circumstances of Guided Democracy, both actors had little choice but to direct their energies toward widening and deepening the organization of resources associated with their respective directing ideas of Indonesia. In 1965, when it appeared that the Communists would make armed peasants under their organizational control a standard feature of the "on-going Revolution," a moment of exception became imminent. When the moment of exception occurred between September 1965 and March 1966, the monopoly of decision enjoyed by the Army was a reflection equally of its monopoly of arms and of the breadth and depth of the meaning-creating activity in which both the PKI and TNI were compelled to engage as the co-authors of a context of political creativity and novelty.

In the conclusions to this study, I will attempt to generalize about the significance and study of political creativity based on the Indonesian case. The formation of the New Order can be seen as strikingly similar to the political achievements and challenges of several other significant Asian and African states. By suggesting the parallels between Indonesia and other states, we can begin to appreciate that their commonality arises from congruous sets of political actions and interactions, which may be understood to be responses to the challenge of independence. If there are common responses to similar situations, and the exceptional perspective possesses the analytical capacity to illuminate one such response, then it becomes possible to apply the perspective more widely, comparing exceptional existences. The recommending factor of the exceptional perspective is less its analytical capacity, and more its discriminating approach to political reality, of which it is assumed only a portion consists of responses that have led to or are leading to new states and new societies. Against contemporary statist approaches to Asian and African states, which assume their omnipresence, the exceptional perspective does not assume categories before consequences. In this, the perspective harbours a distrust of synthetic collective constructs and in so doing is better able to relate to contemporary circumstances that feature the collapse of seemingly durable states and societies. It is because new Asian and African states are political creations, responses to living together without any other principled basis for doing so, that they remain works in progress.

CHAPTER I

STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE EAST INDIES ARCHIPELAGO TO THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY (1949)

When viewed from a political perspective that focuses on the state, the legacy of Dutch colonialism in the East Indies archipelago has been interpreted in the sharpest historically contradictory terms. Independent Indonesia has been presented as both a "new state" and an "old state."[1] Further, the "new state" has been paired with an "old society" (or "old societies") while the "old state" has been joined to a "new society." A closer examination of the authors' sense of "new" and "old" reveals the reason for this complete mismatch of viewpoints. For Geertz and his collaborators, new states are defined as such by "the novelty of their sovereignty"[2] gained at the moment of independence. For his part, Anderson undertakes to define what is "old" about the Indonesian state. "The Indonesia we know today," he declares referring to the territories secured by the Dutch, "is the exact product of the extraordinary extension of [their] politico-military power between 1850 and 1910."[3] Ironically, in fashioning an implicit inversion of the views of Geertz and his collaborators, Anderson shares a fundamental premise with them. The common element of the two views is the recognition of Indonesia's territorial basis (see Figure 1).

The analytical appreciation of this common element is lost because both parties insist on juxtaposing "old" and "new." In an attempt to better understand the condition of Indonesia in 1949, and to supersede the conceptual limits that its leading students have created by fashioning a stark choice, I will begin with an examination of Indonesia's (politically perceived) territorial character. For it is upon territory that a state is built, and from its administration, including the interaction of procedures and rationales with existing cultures and sanctioned norms, that a territory-wide society may develop. Accordingly, this analysis seeks to examine three aspects of politics that relate to territory in the East Indies across three historical periods: Dutch rule (from the seventeenth century to 1942); Japanese occupation (1942-45); and the struggle for independence (1945-49). The three aspects selected—the pattern and rationale of territorial aggrandizement, the pattern and rationale of administration over this territory, and the unplanned interactive effects of such policies on extant cultures and systems of law—make for a progressively localized examination of the bases of the state and society. Indeed, it is only through such a progression that questions about the existence of an Indonesian state and society can be posed and answered.

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Competing Territorial Visions in and of the East Indies

Misperceptions of history have sustained the notion that the expansion of Dutch influence in the East Indies determined Indonesia's modern territorial limits.[4] The assumption that modern Indonesia merely filled in the framework created by the Dutch has been widely embraced by Indonesian nationalists and foreign analysts alike. Ironically for the former, adopting this analytical stance means disregarding the element of creative vitality experienced during the "Indonesian Revolution" (1945-49) while substituting the myth of a centuries-long process of Dutch territorial consolidation. Indeed, this perspective overlooks the intensity of the struggle between competing visions of the territorial order in the East Indies. When understood from the perspective of territory and territorial aggrandizement, then, neither the nationalist idea of *Indonesia Merdeka* nor the salvationary Dutch concept of the *Nederlandsh-Indië* that competed in the Indonesian Revolution concurred on this fundamental issue. The territorial status of Dutch, Japanese, and Republican power in the East Indies was historically highly contingent, and did not unambiguously presage the territorial limits of modern Indonesia.[5]

From the moment of their first acquisition of territory in the East Indies in 1605 (see Figure 2), Dutch traders set in motion a clear and general pattern of ever greater formalized territorial divisions in the archipelago through to 1949. Remarkably, this outcome is explained by the disdainful attitude of the United East India Company's agents (*Vereenigde Oost-Indishe Compagnie*—VOC, 1602-1800) toward territorial appropriation and possession, coupled with Dutch officialdom's chagrin at the expense of administering territorial claims (1815-1942).

From the outset of their efforts in the Indies the Dutch were guided by the pursuit of purely economic motives. The paramountcy of this objective was expressed concisely by the VOC motto—"Therefore plough the sea!"[6]—and more substantively by Article 35 of the Company Statutes, which conferred upon it enormous economic, political, military, diplomatic, and juridical powers across a wide swath of the planet, "eastward from the Cape of Good Hope to the Magellan Straits."[7] The VOC was necessarily drawn into territorial obligations through its mercantilist priority of safeguarding monopolies against active competitors (the Iberian powers), rising competitors (the English and French), and indeterminate threats (the so-called "native states"; see Figure 3). The effect of this policy, which was diligently and successfully pursued for the duration of the VOC's mandate, gave rise to a peculiar pattern of territorial management.

The first of four dimensions in VOC policy regarding territory related to the manner in which it was formally brought under Company sovereignty. Here, the mechanism of the "contract" was employed. Aside from being quite literally an exchange mechanism, a contract signed between the VOC and the indigenous counterpart focused attention less (if at all) on the newly created hierarchical relationship and more (if not virtually exclusively) on commercial matters. The direct and immediate concern of Company agents was to ensure the unobstructed delivery of produce from what became essentially new trading partners. To this end, and to

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presage the discussion that follows on administration, territory was not kept under armed occupation.[8] Indeed, in the eyes of the Company, it was unwise to sacrifice commercial profits for garrisoning purposes when the indigenous political structures could be efficaciously co-opted to fulfil the imposed burdens of exchange.

While the subordination of purely territorial considerations to trading imperatives seemed an economical and inconsequential policy on the part of the Company, to the indigenous rulers and groups affected by this policy the eventual outcome was precisely the opposite. With every act of confrontation or cooperation with the Company, indigenous groups came to be defined as such by Company actions. The VOC almost always engaged indigenous allies or dissident elements in its adversary's ranks, for example, in the act of waging war.[9] This act, and indeed the very act of defeating powerful native states in this manner, then recording their fate and obligations in contracts, imputed to all the indigenous participants a greater sense of group identity and territorial attachment than they had previously imagined. In this way once powerful states such as Ternate, Tidore, and Macassar (on Celebes), and the Minangkabau (on Sumatra), gained a greater awareness of their identity as territorially delimited and as inter-connected through the medium of Company activity.

In Java, where Company policy was historically the most intensely practised, the destruction of the Mataram state most clearly revealed the extent of the conflict between competing notions of territory and sovereignty. When the Company first traded with Mataram in the early 1600s, it did so in the mutually acknowledged capacity as the latter's vassal. This relationship coincided neatly with the actual condition of Company weakness and the Javanese conception of power and sovereignty.[10] To the Javanese, politics amounted to consummatory rituals designed to harmonize the mundane realm with cosmic reality, while sovereignty related to the control of people attached to land, and not merely land claims.[11] The Company's influence rose steadily throughout the 1600s and 1700s, largely through its involvement in the three Wars of the Javanese Succession (1705–55).[12] The Company realized that it was unnecessary to field large armed forces when the opponent possessed neither such forces nor a conviction in their instrumental efficacy. Mataram succumbed easily to the Company's exactions (mainly in the form of produce from designated areas), its leaders ever conscious of their diminishing realm and sovereign claims. The final thrust against Mataram in 1755 marked the zenith of VOC control of territory in the Indies and the nadir of Javanese fortunes: Mataram was divided into two rival successor houses, *Mangkunegara* and *Hamengkubuwono,* each adhering to the "fiction" of their sovereign supremacy as the sole mundane reflection of the cosmos.[13] The continued survival of these royal houses to the present day attests to the paradoxically enduring nature of the VOC's non-territorial mercantilism.

Although the continued vitality of the royal houses on Java is a living expression of Company policy, the sheer geographical spread of its activities counters the notion that it was exclusively concerned with areas now encompassed by Indonesia. Rather, the range of subject territory expanded with the horizon of economic benefits. By the mid-1600s, the VOC's

> trading area now reached from Mocha and Aleppo to Timor and from the Cape to Decima in Japan. It had been organised in the manner of the Portuguese and was administered from fortified settlements on the coast or from small islands. Outside the Archipelago, its fortifications existed at Paliakate, at Negapatnam, in Ceylon, on the coast of Malabar, and on the Cape. In the undefended factories of Hoghli, Surat and Gamron, there were garrisons of soldiers, but usually, and especially in very powerful states, the Company maintained its character of a purely trading concern, as it did in Siam, Cambodia, Tonkin, Mocha, and Japan. Where it appeared possible, the company aimed at creating a monopoly, even outside the Archipelago. This was the case in Ceylon; but usually this aim was not deemed possible of fulfilment.[14]

The Company had formalized trade contacts with peoples in territories now covering eleven states and ranged as far as the Kamchatka Peninsula and Australia in search of further opportunities.[15]

While the establishment of control over the waterways into the East Indies Archipelago at a relatively early point in the Company's history made it easy for the VOC to establish monopolies over the Moluccas spice trade, no comprehensive effort was made to build links between the affected and adjacent islands. Instead, by destroying strong coastal states the VOC inadvertently opened the seas to the unwelcome scourge of piracy;[16] combatting this threat drove up Company costs, thereby ensuring the more intensive exploitation of specific areas in the Archipelago, notably Java.[17] More by chance, therefore, than by conscious choice, did Java become the site of the Company's most enduring and intense activities. From the Company's omnipresent business perspective, however, Java was a losing proposition:

> commercially Java was behind Ceylon until far into the eighteenth century and . . . even a factory [at] Decima [in Japan], not to mention the Moluccas or Bengal, was of much more importance in the eyes of the Dutch East India Company in 1700 than the Preanger Lands [in Java].[18]

As the horizon of economic benefits diminished with rising costs and the loss of its monopoly position, the Company's vision likewise contracted. The expanse of territory subject to Company contracts, which was at its height in 1771,[19] thereafter diminished in a pattern that indicated the VOC's indifference to any notion of an Indies state. Beyond Java, some settlements in Sumatra and Kalimantan were abandoned,[20] posts located in Timor, Macassar, Palembang, Padang, and South Borneo were allowed to lapse into "mere symbols of a VOC presence," and within Java the Company staged a general retreat to the coasts of Central and East Java.[21]

On 1 January 1800 the VOC was dissolved by the States General and all of its responsibilities and debts were assumed by the Netherlands Government, which was then under Napoleon's control. Within the wider context of the struggle in Europe, there was little opportunity for the Dutch to act on their defunct Company's possessions, save to try to prevent their complete seizure by English forces. This the British effected by taking advantage of the incoherence and lack of horizontal linkages between and among Dutch possessions, even in the Indies. There, the British implemented a federal arrangement for their administration.[22] The British eventually relieved the Dutch of all of their extra-archipelagic stations, leaving them with little except Java, the Moluccas, and in reality what amounted to only "nominal possessions"[23] in Sumatra (Padang and Palembang), Borneo (Pontianak, Sambas, and Banjarmasin), Celebes (Macassar and the Minahassa), and a number of lesser islands.

The establishment of colonial rule proved to be an enormous challenge to the Dutch in more than one way. The new governors had not convinced themselves, for instance, that the possessions beyond Java warranted attention. Although a royal decree outlining the future form of government placed it within the context of a "Netherlands Indies,"[24] in the Constitutional Regulations of 1818 "the territorial organization was [only] nominally extended to the [sic] Outer Provinces . . . in fact almost the whole of the archipelago outside Java was left practically unadministered."[25] Thus, the new colonial rulers differed little from their mercantilist predecessors in seeking to minimize the costs of governance while maximizing the economic profit of exploitation. Through the very success of Dutch arms in the Java War (1825-30),[26] which emptied the treasury and indicated further difficulties in the creation of a new political order, the imperative was created of focusing all attention on the maximum exploitation of Java.

The administration of the "Culture System" on Java (1830-60) compelled a "complete abstention from active assertion of authority in the other possessions."[27] The Dutch, in fact, seemed intent on deliberately neglecting these areas even before the Culture System was implemented. For instance, the Constitutional Regulation of 1827 declared that land revenue was not to be extended in the outlying areas and where it was deemed unsatisfactory it was to be withdrawn.[28] "Borneo was so neglected," Furnivall relates, "that a native chief, who was responsible for massacring a column of 35 men in 1831, still remained in power twenty years later."[29] On occasion the most senior government officials expressed themselves candidly on the issue: Governor-General Van den Bosch (1830-33) remarked once that "the less one heard of [Celebes] the better,"[30] and Minister of the Colonies Rochussen (1858-61) declared that "every extension of our authority I regard as a step nearer to our ruin."[31]

In the 1870s, a combination of factors stirred greater interest in the colonial capital of Batavia for the extension of Dutch rule over the outlying territories. Java was economically drained, and the outer islands, which offered a number of primary industrial products, were now invested with greater economic importance. The contrast between an economically exhausted and overpopulated Java, newly released from the oppressive grip of the Culture System,[32] and the resource-abundant and underpopulated outer islands, now threatened by other European imperialists, could not be sharper. A nascent "Ethical Policy" was conceived for the archipelago: the welfare interests of all Indies peoples were to be joined with those of capital and in a spirit of righteousness together create "a new world."[33]

At this point, however, the Indies Government lacked both the wherewithal and the conceptual framework with which to fashion a consciously unified archipelagic entity. Against its great success in subjugating diverse parts of the archipelago through the force of arms, the Dutch deliberately limited their territorial reach in a significant number of respects. Against the image of the 1870–1910 period as one of uniform centralization,[34] Resink has called our attention to Dutch conduct from 1873 to 1915 vis-à-vis states it opposed militarily and those "native States of the Eastern Archipelago in Amity with the Netherlands Government."[35]

As in the case of Aceh, which waged war with the Dutch for over thirty years (1871 to approximately 1906), Batavia regarded its indigenous opponents from within the framework of customary international law. This war was declared and conducted with due respect to international norms, including formal notification by the Dutch to adjacent governments of its decision.[36] Aceh reciprocated by inviting American, Italian, and Ottoman support for its sovereign cause. Elsewhere in the archipelago during this time, rulers in Goa and Bone successfully sent emissaries to secure international support for their anti-Dutch struggles, thereby indicating that Batavia possessed not the "merest bit of real sovereignty over the two realms."[37] Further, some native states enjoyed the privilege of recognized territorial waters and independent representatives down to the early part of the twentieth century, that is, until 1910 when official references to them ceased.[38] To the Dutch who participated in the events from 1870 to 1910, it was clear to them that their *Nebenland*

> constituted an *état puissance* amid a world of smaller *états patrimoines* and a few other *états puissances*, Achin [Aceh] being the last example of the latter for the world at large. In the view of prominent Dutch officials of the time, those other *états* had their own land and sea territory, their own nationality, their own flags and ships. They had international representation and forms of international adjudication.[39]

By approximately 1918, the Java-based *Nebenland* had been transformed into one large colony called the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), stretching from Northern Sumatra in the West to the still expanding eastern limits of Dutch influence in New Guinea. The notion of a newly unified and centrally controlled territorial domain, which was suggested by the successful resolution of territorial matters with the British (who evacuated Sumatra as late as 1907), Germans, and Portuguese, conflicted with the reality of internal territorial arrangements.[40]

Between 1870 and 1910, the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (*Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger*—KNIL) had, in fact, subjected less than one half of the territory in the NEI to direct Government occupation (see Figure 4). The greater portion, formally part of the new colony's territory, consisted of "native states." Arrangements between Batavia and these states extended, in some instances, to the days of the Company, and in many cases to the era before the Ethical Policy was conceived. Seeking a uniform format in its relations with such entities, Batavia undertook to negotiate "Short Contracts" with each of the states to replace the more customized arrangements of the past. The Short Contract, unveiled in 1898, included only three articles: "the native ruler admitted that his territory was under Dutch rule, undertook not to enter into political relations with foreign powers, and . . . agreed to comply with all such rules and orders regarding his State as [the] Government should

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prescribe."[41] Despite this effort to express one voice across the vast territorial expanse of the archipelago, the Indies government ultimately relied upon its relations with 282 native states (as of 1927), covering over half of this vast area, to implement its will in their respective areas. The mature NEI possessed only a juridical territorial coherence; in practice, the colony lacked horizontal linkages among its constituent entities. Indeed, in the 1930s the Dutch anticipated the amount of "work" in a "further three hundred years of rule" that was necessary to create a self-conscious "Indies nation" by actually re-creating some vanished native states.[42]

The Japanese occupation of the Indies was formally accomplished within three weeks (by March 1942). Although long aware of a mounting Japanese threat, the colonial officials neither undertook emergency precautions nor enacted centralizing measures to defend the archipelago.[43] The Japanese feat and the resulting three-way territorial division of the islands attested both to the atomistic and elastic nature of prior territorial arrangements and the Dutch aversion, even in a moment of peril, to abandon felicitous conceptions of its colonizing mission. The Japanese were also motivated by a sense of mission.

Unlike the Dutch, whose territorial conception aimed to create a far-distant "organic" Indies unity, the Japanese recognized the easy divisibility of Indies territory and sliced through its tenuous interconnections to create three new entities (see Figure 5). Aside from the overarching colonial structure, the Japanese left earlier administrative divisions undisturbed when they severed Sumatra (and lesser surrounding islands) from the archipelago and joined it with Malaya under the command of the Army in Singapore,[44] placed Java under the 16th Army, and fused the balance of the NEI into the "Great East" under Navy rule. The former area was initially designated part of the "nuclear zone of the Empire's plan for the Southern Area," and destined thereby to become a direct Japanese colony.[45] At the beginning of the war, a policy of "permanent occupation" was secretly adopted in the Great East, and the Japanese endeavoured to orient its resource wealth to servicing Japan's military economy. As the war grimly turned against the Japanese, the Army and Navy continued to govern their areas "as if they were two foreign and sovereign states."[46] In April 1943, Sumatra was constituted as a single jurisdiction under the 25th Army; attempts to foster an "independent Sumatra" "seemed to arouse general sympathy among the population, and to have been quite successful."[47] Only "when the war outlook was extremely pessimistic"[48] did the Japanese at last relent to Java-based nationalists and begin to promote "Indonesian independence" in the Great East. Hitherto, "in no sense was Indonesia seen as a single unit with a single destiny"[49] in Japanese eyes.[50]

The conceptual breakthrough occurred in November 1944, when Tokyo finally acquiesced to the arguments of leading nationalists and declared its intention to grant independence at some future date.[51] The prospects of "Indonesian" independence compelled the key participants—the nationalists, the Japanese, and the Dutch—to react with competing political and territorial projects. In this confrontation, the creation of Indonesia could not possibly occur as a virgin birth. Whatever emerged from the struggle, therefore, was neither entirely new nor completely old.

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Certainly, in territorial terms, the outcome of the struggle to define Indonesia from 1 March 1945[52] to 27 December 1949[53] was a blend of creative vision, immediate convenience, and seasoned force. The widest territorial project was that envisaged by the majority of concerned Indonesian nationalists; its sheer scope underscored the essentially elastic nature of their contemplated nation, even on the eve of its declaration. During the second session of the (Japanese-created) Body for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*—BPUPKI), a vote was taken on 11 July 1945 to select the territorial basis of the new Indonesian Republic. The proposal to include the territory of the former NEI, North Kalimantan, Brunei, Sarawak, Portuguese Timor, Malaya (to the Thai border), New Guinea, and some unspecified surrounding islands was overwhelming accepted.[54] For their part, the Japanese did not immediately discourage the nationalists from contemplating such a grandiose scheme. Indeed, they lacked any meaningful standard against which to judge the dimensions of an *Indonesia Merdeka;* their crushing defeat of Dutch forces three years previously had made it seem at one time that not even within NEI territory was there a paramount unity. In the hurried two days between their surrender (15 August 1945) and the Declaration of Indonesian independence (17 August 1945), however, Japanese officials were mindful of their temporary responsibility to administer occupied territories prior to the return of the Brisbane-based Indies Government. This obligation, and not their commitment to the inchoate idea of Indonesian independence, forced the censure of the nationalists' territorial vision: the proclamation of an *Indonesia Merdeka* would be confined to the territory of the former NEI. The departing Japanese had conveniently limited an idealistic vision to the confines of an inadvertent territorial framework.

To the returning Dutch, who viewed the war as an interruption in their civilizing mission in the Indies, the idea of an independent Indonesia was inimical. By judiciously using the military strength of its allies as part of the overall plan to disarm and evacuate Japanese troops from the archipelago, the Dutch succeeded in restoring a firm territorial base in most areas of the NEI excluding the Republican strongholds in rural Java, Madura, and Sumatra. After military clashes with irregular Republican forces in such urban centres as Jakarta (Batavia) and Surabaya on Java, which the Dutch won with British support, Indonesian and Dutch leaders secretly acknowledged each other's legitimate existence. In March 1946, an agreement was reached "on the basis of *de facto* Republican sovereignty in Java, Madura and Sumatra alone, a recognition of Dutch sovereignty elsewhere, and a cooperative Dutch-Republican effort to create a federal Indonesia within a Dutch-Indonesian union."[55] With the use of allied armed forces and, increasingly, their own seasoned forces, the Dutch had succeeded in both whittling "Indonesia" down to a much smaller size while winning over the Republican leadership to a much diminished territorial vision.

Attempts to implement the rival Dutch and Indonesian politico-territorial projects, whose fundamental contours were evident by March 1946, governed the events of the following three and a half years. The former grew smoothly in size and depth; the latter was racked by internal dissension and faced annihilation at the hands of the Dutch before an international solution was imposed on all parties. Territorially, the Dutch resumed applying their pre-war schemes of "self-governance" and "group-areas," outlined in the 1938 Regulations on Self-Governing Areas, while logically extrapolating these ideas within a federal framework to create new territorial entities. In total, six new states and nine other large constitutional entities were created,[56] the place of self-governing lands was massively affirmed, and "neo-lands" were established throughout areas under Dutch control. With regard to self-governing lands, the Dutch actually created one such new entity, enlarged the territorial jurisdictions of others, yielded control over European-dominated urban areas, permitted the transfer of previously central powers, and effected changes in financial relations of benefit to the lands.[57] Neo-lands, which were designed to encompass the whole of what was previously NEI directly governed territory, took a variety of forms (communities, municipalities, and districts). Between 1946 and 1948, all directly governed territory in Borneo was converted to neo-lands, and in the State of Eastern Indonesia, 28 such neo-lands were created between 1946 and 1949. This extraordinary range of territorial adjustments was premised on the same patient and civilizing principles held by the Dutch in the 1930s as they slowly guided autochthonous peoples toward an "organic unity." It was this basic perception that prompted the Dutch to elevate New Guinea, widely regarded as the least developed of all Dutch possessions and thus needful of more intensive administration, from self-governing status to that of directly governed territory. In this way, the number and kinds of territorial divisions multiplied in Dutch-controlled areas prior to the transfer of sovereignty.

When compared to vitality and inventiveness evident in territorial matters in Dutch-controlled areas, the Republic fared poorly. Almost from its inception in August 1945, its territorial basis shrank. As a result of two Dutch "Police Actions" in June 1947 and December 1948, Republican territory was virtually completely overrun, with Aceh as "the only region which remained under sole control of the Republic";[58] see Figure 6. Moreover, through their latter action, the Dutch captured and interned the entire senior Republican leadership. Also, in the limited and decreasing area of their authority, the Republican leaders faced violent and separatist dissension: in May 1948 leaders of the Realm of Islam movement (*Darul Islam*—DI) proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia*—NII) and fielded the Islamic Army of Indonesia (*Tentara Islam Indonesia*—TII) in West Java,[59] and in September 1948, the Communist Party of Indonesia openly repudiated the Republican vision of the "Indonesian Revolution" and staged an unsuccessful military revolt at Madiun, East Java.

The very success of Dutch force brought welcome international attention to the exhausted Republican forces in 1949. During the course of the year, external actors, such as the United Nations Security Council and the United States, prevailed upon the Dutch to halt their anti-Republican activities in the archipelago. The Round Table Conference (RTC; 23 August–2 November 1949) that set forth the conditions of settlement resolved virtually nothing between the two contenders. Instead of bridging basic differences such as those relating to territory, the Conference accepted the prevailing conditions of early 1949 as determinative of the shape of a new entity: the

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Federal Republic of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*—RIS). Sixteen states co-existing in a federal structure were further bound together in the Netherlands-Indonesia Union. The Republic of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia*—RI), as heir to the Revolution, stood alone (in three disconnected pieces of territory on Java and Sumatra), circumscribed by the rest as collective heirs to the Dutch legacy of territorial thinking. The federal solution made a virtue of the sheer number and variety of territorial divisions.

From the perspective of creating an Indonesian state or Indonesian society, the conferral of sovereignty on 27 December 1949 to a federal entity was merely to outfit the archipelago with a loosely fitting juridical blanket. Indeed, when viewed from the inside, the transfer of sovereignty merely diffused this power harmlessly among an unprecedented myriad of territorial and constitutional contrivances. Clearly, RIS was created by cobbling together both old and new territorial entities. This fact, however, is less important than recognizing that in 1949 Indonesia was neither one state nor one society. For below its loose blanket of sovereignty, there existed not only disparate and self-conscious territories, but corresponding societies or groups, the product equally of older and newer administrative experiences.

Unevenness and Duality in Administrative Policy: The Changing Standards of "Native Style"

The piecemeal territorial expansion of Dutch authority in the East Indies preserved and produced not one all-encompassing administration, but rather a multitude of administrations arranged along a variable hierarchical axis. An analysis of this process of administrative development is significant because it shifts the inquiry in an important direction, away from the object of rule (Java, for example), to the subjects of rule. Determining whether the subjects of rule were "princely subjects," "Javanese," or "Indonesians" focuses on the conscious choices that were made in the administration of people and of their administrative inter-relations. The pattern and rationale behind Dutch, Japanese, and, to an important extent, Republican administrative policies suggest the immediacy they all assigned to addressing regional and local concerns, that is, to effecting administration that was consonant with "native style." This focus in administrative policy did not come at the expense of articulating a wider social existence or "national" identity because the social horizon necessary for the latter was only conceived of in the twentieth century.

The VOC viewed administration in the same disdainful light in which it held territory. Administration, like territory, was not an end in itself and always threatened to become an expensive encumbrance in the pursuit of the Company's supreme objective: monopolistic trading privileges. The Company recognized the unavoidability of administering its trading arrangements, at least to some degree, but acted consistently to transform every administrative obligation into a revenue-related activity. The diversity of trading interests, and not administrative coherence, was expressed foremost in the establishment of Governments for each of the key trading areas. The constitutive premise behind the development of administration—trade supremacy—was revealed by the absence of territorial and chronological contiguity in the formation of Company Governments. Ternate, Coromandel, Amboyna, and Banda were established in 1617, followed by Ceylon (1640), Malacca (1641), the Cape of Good Hope (1652), Macassar (1667), and North-East Java (1668).

The administration of these diverse Governments, so far as applicable to Europeans, was ordered in accordance with mercantile standards. For instance, all ranks below the Governor-General were of a mercantile character: Upper Merchants, Merchants, Junior Merchants, Bookkeepers, Assistants and so forth. Even as these Company agents steadily transformed their position from vassals to become the dominant actors in well-defined areas of the East Indies, particularly in Java, they formally heeded the administrative constant of minimizing costs. Company agents dubiously attained this goal by transferring the administrative burden entailed in their trade and extraction relations to the Javanese administrative structures.

The fundamental outcome of the Company's strategy of administrative frugality was to "harden the cake of [Javanese] custom."[60] In this instance, Javanese functionaries (the *priyayi* or aristocratic and bureaucratic class) acted to fulfil their realms' obligations to the Company, and, later, the Indies Government.[61] As originally conceived, this policy was quite conservative in Company eyes, for it left the costs of conducting business virtually unaltered and made use of pre-existing power relationships among the natives. Rising corruption and nepotism, the loss of its trading advantages, and mounting resistance throughout the eighteenth century caused the Company to rely ever more heavily upon the native administration for its own survival. The Dutch-*priyayi* relationship grew into one of mutual dependency. The strength of this relationship withstood the ambitious centralizing and rationalizing administrative plans of Daendels and Raffles,[62] while success in the Java War confirmed to the Dutch the original wisdom behind its creation and maintenance. Thus, during the time when administration was viewed predominantly as a revenue activity, that is until 1854, the Dutch undertook to preserve the indigenous administrative systems in addition to empowering its representatives with privileges and status.

The promulgation of new Constitutional Regulations in 1854 transformed administration into an activity of a general nature, centred around governmental responsibilities towards its subjects and responding to the liberal spirit prevailing in the Netherlands. Between 1854 and the turn of the century, this change was limited both in territorial scope and application. Since the Dutch confined their activities to Java and Madura, the implications of this policy shift were limited to these isles, although Batavia had formally included the Outer Possessions in its plans. The conservative arguments that served as the rationale for the previous conception of administration, moreover, were not repudiated. Instead, ideas and ideals about "native style" were adjusted to take cognizance of the inordinate power that colonial authorities had granted the *priyayi*. On the new view, powers and privileges that had been extended or enhanced were to be withdrawn. The Dutch hoped that by adopting this measure native society would return to its original, balanced condition, that is, the condition they imagined prevailed before their arrival.

As the colonial authorities lifted the onerous weight of the *priyayi* from Javanese society through the late 1800s,[63] without destroying the *priyayi,* they strengthened their own relations with that society by ever closer contact within a widening and more differentiated administrative framework whose cardinal principle was dualism. Administrative dualism was a convention dating from the Company era that brought European representatives and native officers together on common matters while preserving the autonomy of action of each within their respective spheres of competence. The 1874 reform of administration clarified this division of tasks while underscoring Dutch expectations of the native administrators. As the senior European administrator, the Resident was to apply "gentle pressure" in his capacity as the "older brother" to the senior Javanese administrator, the Regent. In practice, the Dutch often exceeded their own definition of "pressure" to make the Regents comply with their wishes, and there was little doubt in Java and Madura that the European Civil Service exercised extensive influence over and in native affairs.

Remarkably, strategic interventions on behalf of native interests were part of the wider restorative policy conducted through the Regents that also placed limits on European intercession into native affairs. For instance, in Article 71 of the 1854 Constitutional Regulations, European administrative intervention in village life was prohibited, and changes made in 1859 to the Resident's and Regent's Instructions confirmed that the former was "so far as possible to work through 'the appointed or recognized native heads'."[64] For his part, the Regent, "was expected to foster activities which, in a purely native society, would flourish without artificial encouragement, but, in a native society exposed to Western influences, are only too liable to decay."[65]

As the colony underwent economic development, the European half of the administration attended increasingly and literally to the business of its subjects, the resident Europeans. While the Government's specialized services expanded to meet the demand for technically oriented administration, the Resident saw the diminution of his responsibilities and activities in these spheres, thereby becoming "an official exclusively devoted to carrying out the instructions of the Central Government."[66] The dual nature of the administration thereby became more pronounced, with each group of subjects regarding the Resident and the Regent respectively as the representative of Government. The consolidation of the dual system in "the great days of Liberalism," however, only achieved its promise for Europeans, as "much was done to make Java [their] home . . . but practically nothing for the Natives."[67]

The Ethical Era, which began in 1901, signalled a dramatic shift in Indies government policy by making natives' welfare the paramount objective of administration. This policy adjustment seemed to herald the creation of a unified administration that would address all its Indies subjects with one voice. The consolidation of the dual administrative system, and the greater cognizance on the natives' part of their relationship to the Dutch, however, was to prove in hindsight to be the point of minimal differentiation between the Dutch rulers and Indies subjects prior to 1949. That is to say, from an administrative point of view, the conditions in Java and Madura just prior to the twentieth century were optimal for (and did begin) fostering an identity that was defined by the omnipresence of clearly recognizable masters within an area that acquired meaning as such to its inhabitants. In the new century's first decade, the NEI crossed a critical juncture where the possibilities of a unitarian policy coincided with the realization of a form of archipelagic territorial unity. Rather than advancing an Indies identity on these bases though, the possibility was turned aside by Batavia's (or, rather, Queen Wilhelmina's) recognition of the inordinate effort necessary for its realization. The process of territorial expansion at the time had so widened the scope of Dutch obligations as to cause an overall compensatory thinning of their presence at the local level: "the central organisation, after having showered its blessings over an immense territory, [had] begun to find the burden too heavy."[68]

The retreat from a prohibitively expensive administrative policy was not carefully thought out by Dutch officials. Instead, between 1901 and 1942 they attempted to fulfil the vision of gradually civilizing and developing the Indies in three ways.[69] The Dutch acted on their vision for the Indies by relating this to their own politico-administrative experiences in Holland, by observing the time-worn principle of leaving native peoples as much as possible under their own leaders, and, lastly, by recognizing the historically staggered nature of their domination in the archipelago so as to permit the Outer Territories a period of administrative "catch-up" and development separate from that experienced in Java and Madura.

In the Outer Territories, then, "indirect rule" was adopted as the principal form of administration.[70] De Kat Angelino attested that this form of rule,

> a system of administration which leaves in existence the administrative machinery which had been created by the natives themselves, which recognises the existence of Emirs, chiefs and native Councils, native Courts of Justice, Mohammedan Courts, Pagan Courts, native Police controlled by a native executive, as real living forces, and *not* as curious and interesting pageantry, by which European influence is brought to bear on the native indirectly through his chiefs, and not directly through European officers-political.[71]

Whereas prior to and during the period of conquest (1898–1910) the lands that were brought into submission were directly administered and their heads, but not the communities themselves, were recognized, afterwards new territories and communities that were encountered enjoyed quite different treatment, even to the point of constituting new "native" realities: "Since the years 1898/1910 . . . communities themselves and not only their chiefs were the first to be recognized whilst further in the indirectly administered territory the middle or highest types of native communities were recognized as native states."[72] In short, the application of new principles meant that "the task of the government [was] more limited and . . . the contact between the West and the people [was] lessened; the distance between the government and the people [had] been widened."[73]

The adoption of the Ethical policy virtually ensured that the Indies government could do little either in principle or in practice to uniformly bridge the distance that existed between itself and the bulk of the Indies populace. In vast expanses of the archipelago where native states existed, that is, in over one half of the area of the

Outer Territories and seven percent of Java, the terms of Indies Government legislation and laws originating from the People's Council after 1927 (when co-legislative power was obtained) were inapplicable down to the end of Dutch rule. Administratively speaking, the native states needed only to observe the terms or modifications thereto of their contracts with Batavia. An even greater limitation on formal government power related to the recognition it accorded native jurisdiction: "in the whole of the Netherlands Indies with one or two exceptions, the material civil law of the native population [consisted] of the unwritten native law, so that Western rules [were] not valid in this sphere."[74]

In practice, the European administration of the newly conquered Outer Territories was limited in regard to the quality of its personnel and the functions entrusted to them. The transformation from nominal to actual claims of possession in the Outer Territories did not mean that a higher calibre of administrator presided over the new domains. Instead, the Dutch responded in an *ad hoc* manner by appointing "Post-Holders" in "very backward territories . . . not as genuine administrators but merely as representatives of the Dutch authority. Initially they were practically uncontrolled and had to satisfy no other requirement than that of being Dutch subjects."[75] Sharing the new administrative tasks were "Civil Commanders," usually military officers, but also private persons who "received no preliminary administrative training." Only by 1911 was preliminary training given to these Commanders; their numbers surpassed 100 in 1914, the same year an institution was created for their proper administrative training in their new capacities as "Commanders in the Internal Administration."[76] On balance, Batavia saw fit to engage the energies of roughly the same number of administrators in the Outer Territories as there were in Java and Madura, notwithstanding the fact that the area of the latter islands was but one-tenth that of the former lands. Batavia's unwillingness or inability to more intensely staff the Outer Islands was counter-balanced, apparently, by its conferral of greater powers to existing functionaries. Evenso, through time the capacity of the Interior Administration Department (*Binnenlands Bestuur*—B.B.) to effect a uniform administration of Batavia's policies throughout the realm was hampered by a two-fold erosion of its functions. In one instance there was an increasing demand placed on the expertise of the specialized services and, in another instance, there was mounting political pressure to transfer duties to the Native Civil Service (*Inlands Bestuur*—I.B.). The cumulative effect of these two processes was to deprive the B.B. of all but the most obtrusive and popularly objectionable administrative tasks, indeed, those duties—like taxation—that confirmed its "official" and not "representative" nature.[77]

The specific patterns and rationales of administrative practices until 1942 are best understood in relation to the division of the NEI into Government Lands and Self-Governing Areas (Native States under Indirect Rule).[78] The salient administrative differences in these two areas derive from the fact that the European-staffed *Binnenlands Bestuur* co-administered (either directly or indirectly) all territory in the Indies in conjunction with its native administrative counterparts: the *Inlands Bestuur* in Government Lands and the separate native corps in each of the native states. In Java and Madura, the contact European officers made with local populations began at a higher level than was the case in the Outer Territories. Regencies existed in the two former islands and formed the highest level of indigenous administration with which the B.B. interacted; in the Outer Territories, by contrast, high levels of indigenous administration simply did not exist and B.B. officers were compelled to associate with district level native administrators in both Government Lands and in the Native States in their capacity as Controleurs or Assistant Residents. The Dutch acknowledged this fundamental distinction on the ground, and, indeed, employed it as a cardinal guideline in effecting their administrative practices for the duration of their rule in the Indies. Generally, the self-assigned task of the centre was to adjust its all-encompassing ethical policy to "native style" within the two areas and to the degree necessary to fit particular ("local") circumstances. This prescription, entangled in the competing demands of overall administrative coherence and the sheer weight of local circumstances, necessarily entailed defining and re-defining the meaning of "native style."

The beginning of the Ethical Era coincided with the end of Dutch territorial conquests in the Indies, which explains the ambiguous treatment of native states in the early part of the twentieth century. Some native states were destroyed altogether and their territories were annexed to become Government Lands,[79] while others saw their weakened but still intact status and position confirmed through the uniform Short Contract. The number of native states fell from 340 in 1914 to 273 in 1930,[80] mainly through annexation but also due to amalgamation, thus giving the impression that the Dutch were keen on eradicating them altogether. However, it could hardly be expected that Batavia would attempt to extirpate the native states when the policies it was applying in Government Lands aimed at the promotion of native "self-exertion." Thus, the coercive and pacific subjugation of myriads of native states that was formally and mutually recognized in the Short Contracts was perceived from early on as erroneous. "It was soon felt that the process of penetration had gone too far; that the native states should be strengthened in order that they might be used as priceless historical aids in bringing about a sound and a much needed decentralization."[81]

To bring about this general goal, as well as those of emancipation and development, the government proceeded to create and refine a set of Native States Regulations (*zelfbestuursregelen*). These Regulations evolved through three versions, each of which successively placed greater (self-imposed) limitations on the Indies Government. The Regulations of 1919 effected a remarkable re-adjustment of relations. Batavia essentially relinquished its preponderant power over the states by retracting the terms of the Short Contract and substituting in their place those of the uniform Long Contract. This adjustment constituted a clear restriction on Batavia's otherwise unlimited power to act, as it enumerated the subjects under Central Government jurisdiction, and amounted to a virtual constitution for all the native states. The 1927 version of the Regulations included yet further restrictions on the government's liberty to alter subjects under native jurisdiction.

Finally, in an effort to foster stronger and larger regional units, the 1938 variant of the Regulations included terms that promoted (vertical) linkages between the native leaders and subjects, and a limited number and type of horizontal linkages among the states. These steps were consistent with the official view that "political reform [could not] be completed outside the three hundred larger and smaller Indonesian states."[82] Thus, advisory councils were recommended as the preferred forum in which a greater measure of democracy and, therefore, durability could be imparted to the native states, "but only where and whenever the need for this was recognized by the [native] ruler himself."[83] In the instance of greater cooperation between and among the states, the initiative was also left to native leaders to supersede the rudimentary "Councils of Self-Governors" (*Raad van Zelfbestuurders*) and regional treasuries delineated in the Regulations.[84] To further enhance the capacity of the native states to deal with affairs in their territory, the Central Government abandoned powers under a 1930 act that placed the burden on it to safeguard the autonomy of indigenous communities within these states; henceforth, the "task of providing rules respecting the status and functions of indigenous communities within self-governing lands rested with the rulers of such lands."[85] To help complete its mission, the Central Government even resurrected several defunct native states in Celebes and Bali.

Within Government Lands the ethically guided administrative policy aimed to reconcile limited government interference and the promotion of the natives' "self-exertion": "A European and to them a foreign culture, must not be forced upon the natives, but in part with our support their Asiatic qualities ought to be brought to a higher development."[86] The main stages of development, as revealed by the series of key policies enacted after 1903, consisted of the promotion of greater popular participation, local financial responsibility, increased native administration, and the fashioning of new identities.[87]

One of the most significant steps taken by the Dutch under the Ethical aegis was to reverse liberal-inspired policies at the village level. Prior to the enactment of the 1906 Village Regulation, the European Civil Servants, especially the Controleurs, addressed natives as individuals in the provision of government services. This practice was believed to be responsible for unwanted atomism and other corrosive effects on the village, which was now viewed as the "natural" unit of native existence. A new conception of the government-village relationship was thus conceived by 1906 that shifted the welfare and developmental tasks to villages as such. "No longer does the individual need the help of the Government against the village," proclaimed the official notification of the Regulation, "but . . . *the village needs the help of Government to protect its rights against the individual.*"[88] In the "care of public welfare"—the ostensible goal of the Regulation—lower level B.B. officers were to act as "social engineers" in conjunction with newly established Village Governments. In this way, village life took on an artificial vitality, but the intimate connection that had existed between the Controleurs and the inhabitants of Government Lands,[89] especially in Java and Madura, steadily eroded.

Other enactments, in the form of decentralization legislation, were designed to encourage participation and financial responsibility at the Municipal, Regency, and, eventually, Provincial levels. The outcome of the first act, promulgated in 1903, was to create approximately 60 councils of varying constitutions at the Municipal, sub-regional, and Regency levels. These councils, which were conceived in the image of their counterparts in Holland, proved too small, powerless, and dominated by B.B. functionaries to be entrusted with administrative duties. The next significant development was the Administrative Reform Law of 1922, which sought to take into account past deficiencies in decentralization; again, both administrative and political objectives informed Government conduct. The Law's official proponent proclaimed as its main aim "the guarantee of a large measure of autonomy and participation in the execution of the task of Government, in the same way as these rights were given to the Dutch people by the Constitution of 1848."[90] Accordingly, administrative divisions were prepared for the transfer of central powers to a variety of newly created entities. Ultimately, Batavia sought to create Provinces and lesser units covering the entire NEI that would exercise powers previously exercised by the centre. Provinces were to be constituted when political authority was transferred to their representative bodies (Provincial Councils) by the Indies government. Below this secondary level was a range of lesser units, including newly defined Residencies, autonomous Regencies, Municipalities, water boards, and villages (in Java and Madura), and urban and rural local councils (in the Outer Territories).

Aside from promoting greater (but not necessarily more concerted) popular participation in administration, Batavia's drive to satisfy native style took two additional paths in Government Lands after 1922. In Java and Madura, chiefly, the "emancipation" or "de-guardianization" (*ontvoogding*) of the Native Civil Service from B.B. overlordship gained impetus. Small steps were taken in 1912 by transferring some of the Controleurs' functions to native district officers; in 1918 selected Regents were formally "distutelled" from their "older brothers," the Assistant Residents.[91] The Law of 1922, which combined the goal of democratizing the Regencies while advancing the emancipation process, formally compelled the B.B. to withdraw further from native society. In Java and Madura, the Controleurs were abolished, the Assistant Residents lost their independent administrative authority and their numbers diminished, and Regents now assumed the powers and role as the "older brothers" to their European "younger brothers." Between 1922 and 1933, the number of European administrative officers in Java and Madura fell from 222 to 150. Following Communist rebellions in West Java and Sumatra in 1926-27, the Dutch drew the lesson that closer administration was again required in native affairs, thereby reversing some of its earlier measures. In 1931, a "division of tasks" (*taakverdeeling*) was carried out that re-established the original Residencies on Java and Madura, halted the process of Regents' de-guardianization, resurrected the Controleurs (but without their links to the villages), and strengthened the Assistant Residents vis-à-vis the Regency Councils, all the while preserving for the Regents "a degree of independence formerly unknown."[92]

If the unwelcome outcome of adjustments to a new, Ethically inspired conception of "native style" in Java and Madura was an uncertain retrenchment in the interests of safeguarding order, there was little fear of a similar result occurring in the Outer Territories. There the Dutch actually stepped up the promotion of old and new "native" identities. Despite the fact that the first part of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of Dutch domination, generally, the new colonial masters consciously preserved the social orders and organizations that they encountered.

Indeed, in instances where the Dutch destroyed native states, new administrative problems presented themselves: "where large states had been annexed [the] top fell away and one had to climb down to the chiefs of the modest popular communities and to the loose federations which these communities had sometimes formed."[93] Thus, the destruction of existing indigenous structures actually complicated Dutch relations with the natives by multiplying the number of groups that required administrative attention. The B.B. attempted to compensate for this outcome, however, by making administrative units "coincide with ethnical circles or with the territory of former independent states that had disappeared, or with a number of circles based on customary law, which usually was not lacking."[94] This strategy was generally adhered to,[95] although the customary law connection did not always exist and the recognition of heads and popular organs was difficult in the absence of a true acquaintance with local realities. The Indies Constitution, moreover, left the administration and regulation of their own affairs to these native entities, which "formed the bulk of the area under direct rule."[96]

The issues of decentralization and the emancipation of the native civil service took a somewhat different course in Government Lands in the Outer Territories. The decentralization legislation of 1903, for instance, had proven to be of less practical significance beyond Java and Madura than on those islands, even though the need was more acutely felt in the Outer Territories. The new start that was to have been made with the 1922 Administration Reform Act also showed poor results as "it was not feasible . . . to add a considerable measure of co-operating administration to the autonomy of the indigenous communities."[97] While this Law embraced the imperative of yielding greater responsibilities to native administrators, the means to accomplish this were inadequately understood before the 1930s. Thus, only after this series of failures did the Dutch succeed in laying concrete plans to redress simultaneously the preponderant power exercised by B.B. officials in the hinterlands and the challenge of too many autonomous yet administratively immature divisions.

In positing the need for more appropriate native administrative entities, that is to say, units large and meaningful enough to their inhabitants for them to carry out a co-operative form of administration, the Dutch embarked on a project in the Outer Territories from the early 1930s onward that was both restorative and artificial. The restorative aspect of the project was launched in an enactment in 1931 that provided for the "formation of unions or federations of separate indigenous communities along lines conformable to *adat* law principles, e.g., the revival of genealogical ties which had disappeared among a number of territorially contiguous communities."[98] In 1937, this line of thinking crystallized with the Group Communities ordinance (*Groepsgemeenschaps ordonnantie*) whereby numerically large ethnic groups sharing a common culture, language, and *adat* were melded into "territorially coherent regional autonomous areas" whose constitution also took account of economic, historical, and religious factors.[99] The new artificial entities included Minangkabau (1938), Bandjar (1938), and Palembang (1941); additionally, Group Communities were planned for Minahasa and Ambon.[100] To their Dutch overseers, these Communities represented the best chance of success after a long series of administrative adjustments. Accordingly, far greater powers were granted to these Communities than had ever been the case for the Javanese Regencies. Moreover, the Dutch were prepared to face the expected difficulties as the Communities began to function:

> all kinds of shortcomings and contradictions will . . . still be noticeable, which should not be attributed to a mistaken policy on the part of the authorities, but to the difference in tension of the dynamic sphere of the great unity and the multitude of small static spheres still largely medieval in character and function.[101]

Indeed, as their time in the Indies wore on through the 1930s, the Dutch expressed confidence in their abilities to effect their civilizing and unifying mission. While to some Dutchmen the necessity of "readjustments" (*herschikking*) to administrative policy in Java and Madura in 1931 confirmed the inadequacy of the natives' abilities to create any time soon a higher "organic" union without their close assistance, to the vast majority of Dutchmen during the 1930s forging that union and creating truly native democratic and administrative abilities was not an urgent matter. Indeed, in 1936 the Governor-General expressed the generally held notion that "since we [Dutch] have worked in the Indies for some 300 years, another 300 will have to be added before they [the Indies peoples] may perhaps be ready for some kind of autonomy."[102]

The last unhurried act of administration carried out by Batavia before the Japanese onslaught was precisely an indicator of its unfinished, indeed, preparatory, business in the Indies. In 1938, Governments were established for Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East. These entities were to draw together all lower administrative units in their respective territorial spheres, including the native states. In time, they were also expected to become Provinces, exhibiting both administrative and political competencies as was the case of the Javanese Provinces. Achieving a univocal expression of the diversity of interests that existed within their boundaries was the supreme and conscious challenge facing these newly constituted Governments. As real and difficult as that task was, the Dutch nevertheless seriously attempted to effect real self-government in these areas as both a means and an end to the creation of these three new regional identities. In this undertaking, then, the Dutch attempted to combine a measure of democracy with a novel element in their colonial policy: the creation of real horizontal linkages between constitutive Indies units. Hitherto, linkages of a strictly vertical type had flourished between Batavia and all lesser entities. Only in 1938, therefore, did at least the process of territorially based administrative differentiation seem to be coming to a halt, albeit, ironically, in the form of yet three new divisions—the Governments themselves. The appointment of advisory councils to the three new governors was a

> precursor of a period in which the group community, the self-governing land, or other autonomous elements, chose representatives to exercise powers of government in the 'Provinces' of Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East . . .. The stage was set for the development of a decentralized unitary state.[103]

In this enormous undertaking, the Dutch had to widen their own conception of an Indies identity before attempting to inculcate the same all-embracing notion among all its subjects at a local level. The Dutch realized relatively late that the success of this wider project was encumbered by the operative aspects of earlier territorial and administrative policies. Their reluctance to abolish outright pre-existing, existing, re-created, and artificial "native" entities, all the while aiming at their supersession in the distant future, made their overarching management imperative. For even after its administrative re-organization, "the Central Government still had to maintain continuous contact with 23 district heads, 5 in Java and 18 in the Outer Islands. This made adequate leadership and supervision over administration impossible."[104] The problem of administrative control, it was hoped, would solve itself with the greater transfer of responsibilities to natives. "In our time," De Kat Angelino wrote,

> it cannot be repeated sufficiently often that the one thing required is nothing less than a complete self-renewal of the traditional popular spirit . . . without this self-renewal, the Western authorities in the colonial world must remain for ever burdened with the duty of the almost exclusive satisfaction of needs which in the future should be provided by society or by the individual himself, while the State should retain only general regulation and supreme supervision.[105]

In the meantime,

> when definite symptoms reveal the development of new forms of consciousness, it is the task of the authorities to make a clear way for them, in particular by helping to give a good form of organisation and a good shape to the novel attitude which begins by being rather indeterminate.[106]

Only at the very end of effective Dutch rule in the Indies, then, was a state-building project in the offing. The beginning made in the 1930s was fragile. The Dutch acknowledged that two main factors could sustain the possibility of their successfully completing this mission. First, there was the active role of the B.B., without which

> the Government would be unable to govern, the population could not express itself, the special branches of the administration would be unable to specialise government activity . . .. Hide-bound anarchy would take the place of the beautiful regularity that now characterises this great clockwork.[107]

Second, and perhaps most importantly, amidst conditions "of all these unconnected grains of sand, only the Dutch authorities act as a centre of the will towards unity and the action for unity."[108] Thus, the Dutch attitude to endure was perceived as fundamental in making a going "organic" concern of a static and "mechanical state organisation" spanning the Indies.

The presence of a strong attitude, however, proved ineffectual against the destructive military might of Japan. At a stroke, the Japanese smashed the newly conceived Dutch Indies project and began to substitute visions of their own in the administration of the archipelago. Initially, three different administrative styles and rationales were adopted for each of the territorial areas. In Sumatra, Japanese commanders undertook to promote a nascent Sumatran identity by embarking on reforms of the defunct colonial system; changes were brought to the law, land-holding, representative, and educational systems.[109] The new rulers of Java also had bold plans. Their self-assigned task was to make Java a model of administration for the whole archipelago. The Dutch had contemplated this same idea earlier in the century but consciously refused to enact it in the face of markedly primitive administrative circumstances in the Outer Territories. In time, the Japanese would also learn the limits to this plan. At the outset, however, centralizing changes proceeded largely unhindered. The four native states lost their negotiating rights under the terms of the Long Contract,[110] adjustments to the civil administrative structure included abolishing the Provinces and Governorships and creating two new departments (police and information/propaganda),[111] and major programmes were launched in the field of education to "Nipponize" the inhabitants.[112] The most ambitious administrative strategy of all three territorial divisions was prepared for the Great East and aimed, quite simply, to "make eastern Indonesia as bureaucratically efficient as any part of Japan."[113] Teams of civilian specialists were brought in from Japan to administer what was expected to become a future Japanese colony and, as elsewhere in the Indies, Nipponization programmes were zealously launched and enthusiastically received.

Like the Dutch before them, the new Japanese overseers' commanding outlook would crumble before being fulfilled. In time, and in all three parts of the former NEI, the Japanese compromised their plans both with colonial laws and structures. The first administrative act of the victorious Japanese (Decree No. 1 [7 March 1942] on Military Administration) was to provisionally embrace the colonial administrative system, save the B.B., which was abolished.[114] Colonial laws, so far as they did not conflict with military needs, continued to be observed and enforced. Only in the matter of effecting greater central control did the military authorities make significant alterations to Dutch structures and systems. The Military Administration Department (*Gunseibu*) ended organizational expressions of political decentralization by abolishing the Provincial Councils (in Java and Madura) and suspending Regency and Municipal Councils and, later, stifled all political life.[115] Beyond these limited adjustments, and temporary arrangements with local groups (mainly in Sumatra) designed to ease the struggle against the Dutch, the thrust behind Japanese administrative planning quickly decelerated.

Japanese ideas and plans inevitably encountered the immovable native realities below and behind the colonial structures. In the Great East, the results of this confluence showed that even the most ambitious of undertakings could be blunted by the stasis of local realities. The Japanese aimed "to extend [their] administration to the very extremities of the region," but in doing so, they acknowledged limitations by "respecting as much as possible the natives' moral principles and customs . . . [and] refraining from implementing unnecessary civilian laws which only serve to disrupt the lives of the people."[116] The Japanese were forced, in light of the natives' real but unstated concerns, to admit that "[i]t is an absolutely absurd idea for a *Minseibu* [Naval Civil Administration Department] official to ride around by bike trying to assess the reactions of the people to the Japanese Occupation."[117] Consequently, they reasoned that

> if the rulers immediately thrust upon the natives policies which emanate from the rulers' own distinct history, ideals and morality, then it will cause the natives to be unnecessarily confused and will give rise to unwanted discontent. The changing of customary practices and their replacement with new forms will cause the masses to be displeased with the regime. Such a policy will only lead to insecurity . . .. In the control of different races, it is taboo to rule through impersonal political relationships.[118]

Accordingly, the Japanese generalized this insight by replicating Dutch practices vis-à-vis the indigenous ruling elements,[119] even to the point of restoring the Acehnese uleëbalangs whom their Islamic collaborators had overthrown in the early days of the invasion.[120]

As the war proceeded against Japan, its well-laid plans, having already warped under the pressure of local realities, now yielded to the exigencies of mobilization. From approximately early 1943 onwards, officials embarked upon a two-fold scheme to squeeze greater support from the Indies and its inhabitants; mobilization took distinctly military and political forms. The preparation for the military defence of Java and Sumatra was a strategic Japanese priority while the political component of mobilization appeared to be a tactical afterthought. The Japanese zealously set about organizing a plethora of para-military defence units so as to include major age groups, urban and rural areas, and religious groups.[121] In creating these organizations, the Japanese did not thereby try to promote a wider feeling of nationalist sentiment; achieving military readiness meant embracing existing particularisms, be those expressed in island organizations (*Jawa Hokokai* and *Jibakutai*) or in religious bodies (*Hizbullah*). Indeed, the most critical body for future Indonesian developments, the Defenders of the Fatherland (*Pembela Tanah Air*—Peta), had separate organizations for Java and Sumatra. Nationalist leaders expressed their reluctance to endorse these organizations completely and preferred, and with time won, the opportunity to create explicitly "Indonesian" bodies.

The rise of nationalist organizations and ideas was proportionally related to mounting Japanese pessimism toward the conduct of the war. Accordingly, it was not until matters had become grave before the Japanese reluctantly subscribed to the arguments of collaborating nationalist leaders. Political mobilization around an Indonesian theme took on three aspects: cultural, administrative, and representative. Under the rubric of the "Indonesian restoration," a Commission for the Indonesian Language was established in October 1944 to make real progress on the development of *Bahasa Indonesia,*[122] thereby superseding the impotent Commission for the Study of Customs and Polity (*Komisi Menyelediki Adatistiadat dan Tatanegara*) that was created in late 1942.[123] On the administrative front, higher level positions occupied by the Dutch and, in their turn, by the Japanese, were only slowly opened to natives.

In 1943, only 2 of 17 Residents in Java and Madura was Indonesian,[124] and it was not until November 1944 that Indonesian Assistant-Residents were appointed.[125] Lastly, on the representative front, advisory councils were established at the central (*Chuo Sangi-in*) and regional (*Shu Sangi-kai*) levels, but their composition showed a clear disinterest in nationalist views. The Navy, for its part, waited until March 1944 before appointing its regional councils; the Army in Sumatra acted only in March 1945 to create a Central Advisory Board, allowing it the chance to meet one time. On balance, the greatest catalyst for Japanese support of nationalist sympathies originated in directives from Tokyo, where it was declared on 7 September 1944 that independence would be granted soon to *To-Indo* (the "East Indies"). Consequently, two officially sponsored bodies were charged with the task of bringing about independence, the BPUPKI and the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*—BPKI).[126] The nationalists who commanded these forums at last had their chance to define the Indonesian identity and its territorial limits. The Japanese only embraced the possibility of this outcome of their occupation in April 1945, when the term "Indonesia" was used officially for the first time.[127] Thereafter, from the Japanese perspective, the only certain aspect about Indonesian independence was its imminence.

The certitude of Indonesian independence proved to be illusory as the returning Dutch challenged Republican claims; each set about administratively defining their visions in conditions of struggle and revolution. The 1945 Constitution that was promulgated by the Republicans on 18 August 1945 divided the Republic into eight Provinces that were subdivided into Municipal Communities and Residencies, the latter being guided by Regional National Committees. Through this design, the new leaders indicated their resolve to bring greater coherence to the administration of their country, but not at the expense of accommodating traditional and regional differences.[128] Indeed, the Republicans recognized the value of the administrative corps as a unifying force in the archipelago, thus echoing late Dutch colonial policy, and acted even before the formation of the national Cabinet to resurrect the system in Java and Madura.[129] The apparent centralizing tendency in Republican thinking was thus already evident in the early days of the Revolution but, of course, Dutch success on the ground prevented the application of these plans. Military failures did not prevent extrapolations of Republican thinking or schemes, however, and in July 1948 Law No. 22 was promulgated as an expression of their resolve to eventually recapture and govern the whole of the former NEI. Bold plans were announced to "eliminate the differences between the governmental systems in Java and Madura and the areas beyond," to "make an effort at having a uniform system within regional governments throughout Indonesia," to "eliminate the dualism within regional governments," and to "give rights of autonomy and cooperative duties, as wide as possible, to the regional government bodies formed in a democratic manner on the basis of consultation."[130] At this point, however, the Republicans conceded that an overarching civil service was neither a possibility nor probable in the evolving federal system. Consequently, this same law willed that the "civil service gradually vanish and enter into the field of regional government."[131] This particular set of plans owed its demise during the Revolution not to the Dutch, but to the Communists who struck at Madiun in September 1948. Thereafter, the implementation of Republican plans was suspended up to the transfer of sovereignty to the RIS.

The Dutch acted no less energetically than the Republicans in the administrative realm, and acted with unquestioned determination to rebuild a highly decentralized system from where they had left off before their "mission" was "interrupted" in 1942.[132] Support for this project was forthcoming from many of the indigenous rulers in the Outer Territories, many of who actively opposed the Revolution or sided with the Dutch as an expression of their uncertainty about the Republican cause.[133] Although the Dutch had anticipated completely restoring their rule throughout the former NEI (which from 1946 onward they officially called "Indonesia"), it was clear after the restoration of civilian rule in July 1946 that they intended to concentrate their initial efforts in the areas of Republican weakness, that is, in the Great East, Borneo, and in portions of Sumatra.

Commensurate with the unrelenting creation of neo-lands, regions, and states, the Dutch designed administrative policies that promoted local identity but this time, however, within a more focused and explicitly regional and federal framework. "A significant reform in the civil administration was introduced by the central government in the latter half of 1946," Schiller wrote,

> the top personnel of local offices of the central government was altered in many places with Indonesian civil servants replacing Dutch civil servants. The Director of the Department of Internal Affairs was empowered to transfer the powers, tasks and concerns of the central administration, at the local level, to Indonesian officers of the central government, or to functionaries of the self-governing lands, or to officials of other autonomous communities.[134]

Particularly within the area of State of East Indonesia (*Negara Indonesia Timur*—NIT), which was the first new state to be established (in December 1946), the Dutch made headway with this scheme. At the level of the self-governing regions, for example, "the power and prestige of the rajahs steadily grew as Negara Indonesia Timur moved towards the adoption of its definite constitution."[135] From December 1946 the NIT, as a very wide and experimental enterprise, saw the actual engagement of its administrative organs, thereby suggesting its viability.

The experience of the NIT, which seemed to herald success and confirm the wisdom of the decision to resume pre-war administrative patterns, proved an unobtainable standard for Dutch efforts elsewhere in Indonesia. The Dutch had the advantages of time and intensity of effort to achieve results in the NIT. These same conditions did not generally obtain elsewhere and as a consequence enactments were not realized in re-occupied territories beyond the Great East. Instead, the central authorities intervened with their own personnel whenever and wherever breakdowns occurred at the local level. "The central governments' project to re-establish and augment powers of the rulers of the self-governing lands," Schiller asserts, "actually accomplished very little."[136] In Java, the area of greatest Republican support, restorative administrative efforts at the local level were undertaken only after the two successful Police Actions of 1947 and 1948. Finally, in Sumatra, "the central government took no action whatsoever" on the matter of local government.[137] Only at a higher level did the Dutch act, facilitating the establishment of new states in East and South Sumatra.

By late 1949, the factors of Republican opposition, popular discontent with former indigenous ruling elements (to a far lesser extent in Java), the sheer magnitude of the restoration project, and, increasingly, time constraints imposed by external actors forced the Dutch to discontinue their administrative strategy in mid-stream.[138] The fifteen newly created federal entities in the Dutch sphere, with the possible exception of the NIT, were but unfinished and formalized expressions of ongoing politico-administrative plans. Likewise, the *Republik Indonesia* was an incomplete politico-administrative project, surrounded by numerous and no less indeterminate representations of the Indonesian identity. Neither Republican nor federal adherents within RIS possessed a coherent administrative plan or an operative conception of Indonesia around which to orient the country's affairs. Within their own area, indeed, the Republicans had to face the reality that "the transfer of sovereignty to Republik Indonesia Serikat occurred before the form of civil administration had been decided in much of the territory of Negara Republik Indonesia."[139] The transfer of sovereignty did not then confirm one Indonesian identity, but froze into place a myriad of older and newer "native identities," the newest and least defined being RIS itself.

While the way ahead for RIS was impeded by the contradictions among its constituents' competing politico-administrative policies, the future that it faced was not different in kind from that which the colonial masters had anticipated for the Indies in the 1930s, and its identity was no less ethereal. Then, the official view held that "nothing but the careful exercise of an influence upon . . . freely moving independent units [would] further and further [drag] them within the magnetic field of the Great East Indian planetary system."[140] This remained the task of the RIS precisely because the Dutch, Japanese, and Republican planners generally abjured from destroying existing administrative, territorial, and culturally particularistic sources of identity.

Unplanned Aspects of Territorial and Administrative Policies in the Indies

If Indonesia in 1949 was an evolving "planetary system," and was delivered into this condition by a succession of planned politico-administrative policies, then an equally important succession of unplanned developments added unforeseen dimensions to that system. The unplanned aspects of successive sets of territorial and administrative policies in the Indies had given rise to both greater forces and lesser bodies in the archipelagic constellation.[141] Thus, Indonesian leaders in 1949 and after had to cope not only with the complicating outcomes of their predecessors' intentional horizontal and vertical designs, but along a third dimension with the unintended outcomes of the same policies. It could hardly be expected, after all, that Indies lands and peoples, subjected to official constitution and re-constitution by each successive leadership group, would either conform to or withstand unremitting change in any uniform or predictable manner. Hence, important departures from policy expectations occurred in the native states, at the village level, in *adat* areas, and on the larger islands. Over and against these unexpected territorial-qua-administrative anomalies arose forces and actors attempting to create wider platforms of identity in the archipelago. Here, the unexpected consequences of official actions included the nurturing of Communist, Islamist, and Nationalist forces, with each aspiring to define and deliver new realities in the Indies.

Significantly, the serious nature of policy degeneration appeared in the very building blocks of De Kat Angelino's "Great East Indian" system—the "planets"—by which he meant the native states. Against the many enactments outlined above that expressed the genuine intentions of the Dutch to preserve and promote the territorial, administrative, and, eventually, communal identity of native states, there stood the practicalities of colonial administration. Specifically, the division of powers and competencies between the states and the central government was behind the policy failures. In successive versions of the Native States Regulations, the central government had come to reserve jurisdiction over 18 areas. There areas of control were defined with the knowledge that the low level of native administrative competence meant theirs was only a "co-operating administration" (*medebewind*)[142] operating indeterminately with the "guidance of the European administration." Although this policy was obviously sensitive to the demands of local variations, it foundered on this very point as B.B. functionaries undertook to "guide" the natives far more than the spirit of the rules implied. Unfortunately for clarity's sake, the overall growth of European officialdom's influence in native state affairs did not necessarily bring greater coherence to the Indies or even to the affected states. Greater European control was, in fact, contradicted in places when officials of the native states exceeded their powers and dealt with central government concerns. Commenting on conditions in the 1930s, Vandenbosch observed that

> the situation has become so confused, avers a leading East Indian official, that not even the most expert bureau is in a position to state with exactness which regulations are applicable in the territory of the self-governing state, or how far. The executive and administrative branches often give different answers, giving the rulers of the native states an impression of arbitrariness.[143]

Of course, some native states were untouched by this confusion and thus reflected De Kat Angelino's image of the time that they "still gyrate round their own centre; they are still in a state of medieval self-containedness."[144] When the native states are taken together then and reset within the context of a "planetary system," it is clear that their character was non-uniform on non-substantive grounds. That is to say, aside from substantive differences that the Dutch could not possibly alter, the native states differed on matters pertaining to their status as (ostensibly equivalent) administrative and territorial units. To use De Kat Angelino's felicitous imagery, some of the "planets" were as he described with their social rotation and velocity undisturbed, while others had these constants changed to the point of being stilled by too great a European presence or uncontrollably amplified through contrived "self-exertion." In short, the native states comprised a very unstable and contingent "planetary system."

The Indies villages, while perhaps regarded as the most basic and "natural" of indigenous social forms, were to a large degree defined by colonial policy.[145] In this sense, villages constituted artificial "satellites" that were launched mainly by Dutch social engineers throughout the larger "planetary" system. Far from the anticipated policy outcome of a uniform uplifting of native life and consciousness, each village satellite assumed a unique orbit, rotation, and direction. During the first century of official interference in Javanese and Madurese rural communal life, administrators approached these native forms as undifferentiated and amenable to well-meant improvements. This process began in 1813 under the enterprising administrative leadership of Raffles when village heads were appointed government agents and villages were transformed into rural townships, which were created by either breaking down larger villages, merging smaller settlements, or accepting existing entities as such. Achieving a measure of administrative coherence led to the introduction of new structures Europeans believed enhanced existing communal proclivities: communal lands (*sawa desa*) and communal seed stocks or rice stores (*lumbung bibit*) were created and, when the latter of these schemes failed, re-created.[146]

The promotion of the interests of the village unit over that of its individual inhabitants was official policy after 1906 and coincided with a widening awareness on the part of the Dutch that their presence throughout the Indies had damaged native social formations, indeed, formations at this level that were already largely of Dutch making. On the new view, villages were to generate their own means to propel themselves to higher levels of development and welfare and, "before long every village had its Village Treasury, to provide funds for everything that the Controleur or Assistant Resident thought the village ought to want."[147] Such European-directed efforts at "native self-exertion" showed results similar to those in the native states; some village units showed a tendency to grow into "organic" units according to plans, while others simply disintegrated under the weight of their new welfare responsibilities. In Java, where the Dutch appeared to make progress on broadening the social cohesion and horizon of natives through the amalgamation of villages, from 30,500 (with an average population of 800) in 1897 to 18,584 (with an average population of 1800) in 1927,[148] there were reversals in their attempts to further the communal nature of these same villages as the number of communal rice stores shrank from 12,000 in the period 1910 to 1914 to 5,500 in 1933.[149] On balance, Furnivall has observed that

> in some villages which had been amalgamated for more than 20 years, each of its constituent elements still lived a separate life, and sometimes a headman, who might be as strong as ever in his original village, dared not show his face in the hamlet which had been given to him in order to raise his income and increase his influence. In 1900, it has been said, the natural and official units of social life were identical; by 1930 the official unit had become an artificial construction.[150]

Thus, important characteristics of Javanese and Madurese villages that appeared fairly early during colonial rule (especially during the Culture Era) and obtained down to the last decades of Dutch rule were colonially induced, including their closed nature, corporate quality, and territorial-boundedness.[151] Their good intentions aside, it was clear that the Dutch had failed at this most basic and intimate level to fashion village units that corresponded either to their own or to native expectations. The outcome was a rather more crowded, unnatural, and chaotic "system" than the Dutch were prepared to concede.

More significant than the creation of village satellites, perhaps, was the damage that the Dutch had increasingly and inadvertently inflicted on the governing force of village life—the *adat*. By *adat* is meant the body of customary socially or culturally formed norms delimited by kinship and/or amorphous territorial boundaries and governing all aspects of village life within those bounds. The central concern of the varieties of *adat* related to land use and the clarification of related collective and individual rights and services. Rigorous distinctions among these (analytical) elements were not drawn on an operational basis as "right, its holder and service [were] inextricably tied up with each other."[152] These elements combined through the medium of (often violent) conflict to periodically effect new balances between individual and collective rights and new distributions of services. Since individual and community rights were considered irrevocable, and together "exhaustively covered" all land and what grew on it, while the land itself admitted of "being enjoyed by more than one person at a time," it is unsurprising that conflict was rife within adat communities.[153] The highly situational and, therefore, changing nature of *adat* communities meant that they were quite amorphous, possessing no clear and enduring territorial boundaries or steady memberships that would define the community.

As the Dutch increasingly impinged upon the village domain throughout the nineteenth century and implemented the administrative measures described above, a corresponding and unanticipated circumscription of *adat* communities occurred. The official definition of the village as such strictly delimited the territorial and human boundaries of the *adat* communities, thereby undermining their vital dynamism. Ironically, by ending the interminable village wars that vouchsafed *adat* continuity and flexibility, the Dutch believed they were acting in the natives' own interests. Equally intrusive from an *adat* point of view were measures relating to "state land" that were unveiled in the 1870 Agrarian Law. By proclaiming governmental domain in non-village waste lands, the authorities needed to precisely define village boundaries and the content of their prevailing *adat* relations. The practical means to accomplish this task were proposed but never enacted as the colonial authorities recognized both the disintegrative effects of their actions upon the *adat* and the limitations on their knowledge of *adat*.

According to the Dutch, correcting the former depended on a rigorous and "scientific" understanding of *adat*. This very solution was essentially futile as the *adat*s accommodated no such systematic approach. The impressions that were gathered by Dutch scholars, and subsequently employed by colonial functionaries in moving to codify the bases of *adat*, transmogrified the "living force" of *adat* into "*adat* law." Acting on the basis of rather extensive research, and motivated to find a solution in the *adat* to mounting Islamist pressures, particularly in Aceh, the Dutch fashioned nineteen *adat* law circles (*Rechtskring*) throughout the Indies.[154] These and related measures designed to clarify the legitimacy of *adat* neither forestalled the disruptive effects of the fledgling Dutch administration in the Outer Territories nor reversed the damage that had already occurred in Java and Madura.

Throughout the Indies, but particularly in Java and Madura, the weakening of the *adat* through the ever clearer administrative and territorial definition of the village in the twentieth century ensured that essentially uncontrolled social entities became uncontrollable from a practical point of view. In this connection, the fate of the village headman is revealing. The Dutch believed that they were guiding local native affairs by appointing headmen. In fact, the reaction of the subject communities rendered many a headman superfluous for the life of the community: "the headman recognised by the government is the man of authority as regards the task of the Government, whilst the native authority looks after the native task or the real interests of the community."[155] In other respe,cts the headman profoundly affected the fabric of the community even though the above bifurcation of spheres had occurred. Headmen became distant and autocratic rulers who conducted themselves on the basis of government standards—in marked contrast to the earlier style of governance that emphasized consensus and intimacy—when charged with their administrative responsibilities. Even efforts designed to check these abuses further weakened the community: elections were instituted that carried with them the misconception of the atomistic native, free and willing to choose and then to abide by the election outcome. Finally, governmental interference in the remuneration of headmen that was designed to effect greater control actually caused a diminution in their power and prestige "as the labour of their people at their disposal became limited."[156] The partial disintegration of *adat* ties had helped to complicate the task of effecting unified central control over the Indies peoples but, as the Dutch confidently assumed, there was plenty of time to resolve such problems.

Colonial conduct regarding the problem of local control was to reaffirm *adat*'s role, to revivify a declining force.[157] The earnestness behind this disposition, which grew out of wider decentralization measures, outweighed clear thinking in its implementation. For instance, in the police courts (*Landgerecht*), the presiding civil servants were expected to be mindful of the *adat* "even if they did not understand it."[158] In the Outer Territor,ies new respect was shown toward *adat* communities, with potentially far-reaching consequences. The new administrative structures were based on the premise that

> the Dutch-trained native official was doomed to disappear altogether, ceding his place to the traditional *adat*-head. Since ethnicity and not territoriality formed the basis of the "new look," the government . . . no longer wished to inject "alien" Indonesians, notably Javanese, into the structure of Outer Island administration.[159]

These measures showed a conceptual disinclination, at least for the foreseeable future of Dutch rule, to redress the prevailing conditions of *adat* weakness and thereby reconstitute some measure of wider control at the local level. Instead, these plans proceeded blindly and vainly in the hope that *adat* actors and ties would reform.

As the local forces of *adat* receded, new forces emerged during the balance of Dutch rule that aimed at creating wider unities and identities. Of uppermost importance in this connection is recognition of the fact that a true pan-Indies or Indonesian nationalism was a latecomer to an already wide and established field of competing forces of identity. In this sense, a consciously Indonesian nationalism grew almost as slowly as the notion of a single, "organic" "Great East Indies" under the Dutch aegis. The appearance of both of these maximum expressions of horizontal solidarity in the Indies constellation was importantly predated by the activities of leading intellectuals who articulated the enduring bases for island-centred, denominational, and internationally inspired identities.

Among the first cultural groups to define themselves on the novel grounds of an insular-based (territorial) identity were the Javanese. Throughout the first quarter of the twentieth century, organized expressions of this Javanese identity increased both in variety and popular appeal as its proponents moved away from mere static cultural invocations to more dynamic political programmes. Thus, the first true organization of this type, Beautiful Endeavour (*Budi Utama* or *Budi Utomo*, founded in 1908), officially represented the interests of the peoples on Java and Madura (which were administratively linked), including Javanese, Sundanese, and Madurese. Departing from the comforts of established cultural identities was difficult for members of the *Budi Utama* as "the Javanese sense of cultural superiority was rarely far from the surface; in Bandung there were even separate chapters for Javanese and Sundanese members."[160] Within the space of a decade, following World War I, cultural differences yielded to a more politically aware—and ambitious—notion of Javanese nationalism.

Then, members of the "Committee for Javanese nationalism" started from the premise that an "Indisch national unity" would never endure in the Indies:

> An Indisch nation—could this be attained—would again fly into fragments . . . Anyone who is sympathetic to a natural, gradual development . . . can not demand that the Javanese nation sacrifice itself to an Indisch nation . . . The sacrifice is too great.[161]

Committee members averred, moreover, that any wider unity would be in conflict not only with Javanese nationalism, but with nationalist strains in other parts of the Indies:

> So you stay in Sumatra, and you there in Ambon. Only in this way will our friendship be long preserved. If we live in the same house and conduct our housekeeping jointly, no good can be expected from that. Our tastes now differ; our culture is absolutely different.[162]

The Javanese nationalists' observation appeared to be substantiated by the myriad of island-based organizations that had grown up since 1909, including Young Java (*Jong Java*, 1915), Sumatra Union (*Sarekat Sumatra* or *Sumatranen Bond*, 1918), Young Minahasa (*Jong Minahasa*, 1918), Ambonese Union *(Sarekat Ambon*, 1920), and the Timorese Alliance (*Timorsch Verbond*, 1921).

An intense penchant among the faithful to organize and re-organize meant that in the denominational sphere, too, new unifying forces were being created. The will to organize and to consolidate a religio-political identity affected all major religious groups in the Indies. The competition for members was as intense among as it was within the major religious groupings. Among Muslims, for instance, a variety of bodies competed for and defined the allegiance of orthodox (Islamic League—*Sarekat Islam*, 1912), modernist (The Way of Muhammad—*Muhammadiyah*, 1912), mystical (Saminist movement, 1914), leftist (People's League—*Sarekat Rakjat*, 1923), and conservative (Association of Muslim Scholars—*Nahdatul Ulama*, 1926) devotees. For its part, the smaller Christian community congealed into Catholic and Protestant formations.

As the third and final defining force of importance at this time, socialism owed its popular and organizational success not to prevailing territorial or cultural conditions as such, but rather to its leaders' ability to create political opportunities out of such conditions. In this sense, socialist (and particularly communist) ideas were, of all the forces encountered during this time, the least conceptually limited by the multiplying divisions and lesser identities in the Indies. It was relatively easy for proponents and adherents espousing socialist ideas to supersede the multifarious forces of localism because their ideas were derived from beyond the Indies. Indeed, the first socialist party in the Indies, the Indies Social Democratic Association (*Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging*—ISDV), was founded by a Dutch socialist. Moreover, in the wake of the revolutionary events in Russia and Germany after World War I, the Comintern directed its agents in the Indies to act in accordance with Moscow-conceived instructions and ideas. Although the inspiration for socialist political action was foreign, the success with which it met in the Indies was impressive. Soviets were established for a time in Surabaya, "Islamic Communism" attracted followers in Java and Sumatra, large portions of the *Sarekat Islam* organizational structure succumbed to communist control, and the first explicitly communist organization in Asia was established in the Indies (the *Perserikatan Kommunist di India,* 1920).

The proliferation of separate and organized cultural, ethnic, and, increasingly, ideological identities, did not result in an overall increase of orderliness in the Indies. The will to organize social life in this context necessarily entailed social conflict and notwithstanding finely tuned colonial plans of orderly growth, chaos was the outcome. In particular, Communist and Islamist organizations clashed in their mutual efforts to weld greater followerships throughout the Indies. As rural violence grew in Java and the Communists faced the challenge of either reaffirming their greater (proletariat) identity or abandoning their organizational efforts among Javanese Muslims, the leadership of the newly renamed Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*—PKI) opted for rebellion in December 1924. The opportunity that the insurrection presented to actually define a wider Indonesian and Communist identity passed, however, as the PKI failed to coordinate its efforts. As confusion increased throughout the period 1925-27, the PKI

> appeared in an exotic array of local styles, few of which had much to do with theoretical Communism. In Banten it became hyper-Islamic. As it grew more and more attractive to the anarchic elements of rural society, PKI grew rapidly in Sumatra and Java, with little central coordination.[163]

The Dutch easily crushed the PKI and brought to an end a period of extraordinary effervescence.

The Dutch did not abandon their overall strategy of governance in the Indies in the face of these obvious strains. Officials continued to encourage the intellectual tendency to think in particularistic terms, and Batavia consistently maintained that only a concerted effort from the bottom up that employed such lesser, and often overlapping forms, would consolidate an East Indies identity. Indeed, if ever there was a time in which the colonial strategy was destined to succeed the period immediately after the failed Communist insurrection seemed unparalleled. A condition of inward reflection preoccupied the population:

> Instead of a vague sense of a shared Islamic identity, it now mattered what kind of Muslim one was or, indeed, whether one wished to be a Muslim at all. Instead of an unspecified opposition to Dutch rule, it was now a question of what kind of anti-colonial doctrine one supported or, indeed, whether one's interests really lay with the colonial regime. Instead of a general belief that Indonesians had something or other in common, regional identities were even clearer as a result of the growth of ethnically based organisations. Instead of an assumption that various classes in each region were brothers of a sort, the bureaucratic elites and their subjects were very clearly warned of the interests that divided them.[164]

Thus informed, the official view of colonial political progress throughout the 1930s insisted that "organic evolution, which historical development that cannot be undone has granted to Java in a lesser degree, guarantees to the indigenous system of the states a fair chance of expressing its inner potentialities in greater forms of its own."[165] In this way, the supposition was accepted that, for the time being, Java and the Outer Territories would proceed on separate paths of development that would connect in an ethereal East Indies unity at some unspecified future time.

There was a new element in this scheme, however. This consisted of the lesson that the colonial masters had drawn from the PKI's debacle: in response to this first discretely political (as opposed to merely cultural or insular) effort to define the Indies, it was time for the Dutch themselves to act politically to defend their grand strategy. This alteration meant that whereas before 1925-27 Batavia was cautious and tolerated all but violent expressions of organized segments of the Indies population, afterward it would act to thwart most manifestations of solidarity save those fashioned by its own hands.[166]

The transformation in Dutch policy from being passive and tolerant to preemptive and predatory encouraged the unplanned: Indonesian nationalism.[167] Political action taken by the colonial authorities against the PKI underscored the point that a common future for all Indies peoples would be imposed, forcefully if need be. As awareness of this point spread, the realization set in among leaders of various youth, cultural, and ethnic organizations that if the Indies peoples were to have any say in the decision (made by the Dutch) to share a common future, a more acceptable political conception that was backed by political action would be required. The first manifestations of this resolve were, importantly, expressed by a select group of individuals: the impetus to define and sustain a truly Indonesian nationalism came from students returning from and inspired by the organizational experience they had gained in the Netherlands. It was in Holland, and not in the Indies, where the first explicitly Indonesian organization—the *Perhimpunan Indonesia* (Indonesian Association)—was located. In time, Association members became important nationalist leaders who facilitated the dissemination of the new concept upon their return to the Indies.

While these students may have possessed a clearer conception of Indonesian nationalism and more ideas about achieving it, the success of their efforts depended on the availability of political opportunities in the Indies. Just such a juncture presented itself as the Dutch crushed the PKI insurrection and proclaimed their intention to stay put in the Indies. In the hands of one guiding individual, Sukarno, the idea of "Indonesia" attained for the first time in the Indies an organizational and political expression with the founding of the Indonesian Nationalist Association (*Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia*) in July 1927. This body, renamed the Indonesian Nationalist Party in May 1928 (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*—PNI), drew former Association members and expressions of support from a multiplicity of organizations that had, in the recent past, explicitly stressed their differences. The capacious political sphere that was being defined by Sukarno was instantiated by the creation of the Agreement of Indonesian People's Political Associations (*Permufakatan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia*—PPPKI) in late 1927. The creation of the PPPKI reflected equally its constituents' desire for an Indonesian identity and, at a deeper level, their insidious quest for self-preservation:

> The idea of an all-Indonesian nationalism as a common denominator was now growing. The intellectual leaders of ethnic and regionalist groups were adopting the concept partly as a means of defence against potential Javanese domination, and Christian groups saw it partly as a defence against Islamic domination. Some sections of the Chinese and Arab communities also endorsed Indonesian nationalism on a multi-racial basis.[168]

By 1928, the nationalist tendency had shown its potential by beginning to draw Indies Muslims away from the pull of the wider "community of believers" (*ummat Islam*) and into the orbit of a distinctly Indonesian system.[169] Moreover, the youth of the Indies, acting in the organizational framework of the Indonesian Youth (*Pemuda Indonesia,* 1927) declared in October 1928 that "We sons and daughters of our country have one fatherland, Indonesia; we are one people; we accept one language, the *Bahasa Indonesia.*"[170] The common goal of all claiming to be Indonesian nationalists had thus been set. However, before Indonesian nationalism could become a true going concern, that is, a movement enjoying popular support around a crystallizing cause, the authorities acted.

Colonial action against nationalist forces efficaciously exploited their point of greatest weakness. Instead of confronting the body of the organizations directly, the Dutch deprived them of their leaders, sending them into internal exile in remote parts of the archipelago. In this way, in and after 1929, Sukarno and other leaders, familiar only with Java and Sumatra, experienced the foreignness of what was termed the "other Indonesia" (*Indonesia lainnya*). In the meantime, now acephalus organizations either withered, disintegrated, or had their spirit of vitality stilled. Even Sukarno's own party split into two rival entities, each emphasizing different means to attain their respective notions of an "independent Indonesia." Increasingly, Indonesian nationalism became an intellectual activity that was confined to the efforts of its representatives in "safe" colonial institutions, circumscribed by political indecision regarding its correct collective expression, or barely surviving at the margins of official permissiveness.

The short and stultified existence that Indonesian nationalism had led in the 1920s and 1930s at the organizational and popular levels induced an inadvertent compensatory intellectual effort. Nationalist intellectuals who would have otherwise been engaged in organizational work had their attention drawn, fortuitously, to newer historical studies on the Indies that were written by European scholars. The historical findings of Fruin-Mees,[171] and Eijkman and Stapel,[172] for instance, had already furnished important insights about the Majapahit Kingdom based in Java. Nationalist historians seized upon this work to exalt Majapahit's past glory and reaffirm it as a sacrosanct basis for "restoring" archipelagic unity.[173] Likewise, Krom's synthesis of his own and Coedès' and Ferrand's research on the Sumatra-based Sriwijaya Kingdom quickly became the basis for reinforcing nationalist claims of the need to restore unity throughout the archipelago.[174] Finally, during the 1930s, the nationalist conception of the anti-colonial hero appeared. As with the wider historical studies that were bent to political purposes, the heroes selected for nationalist attention were those "who had excited enough interest on the part of Dutch writers."[175] Although the nationalist myths were dubiously constituted in this way, the appropriated historical fragments amounted to a potent historical and political vision not only of an "Indonesian" past, but, perhaps more importantly, of an "Indonesian" future.

The nationalist act of re-directing historical events and figures in support of the future was not different than Dutch behaviour as their future in the Indies grew to be menaced by the Japanese. The fleeing Dutch did not believe that their rule over the Indies would be irrevocably broken by the Japanese, and so, in a departing affirmation of the continuity of their mission, arranged for the heads of the four Javanese native states to join them in exile.[176] As living historical expressions, indeed, creations of Dutch policy, the four exemplified the spirit and means of achieving the cherished "Great East Indian" system. Throughout the Japanese occupation, belief in the efficacy of the rival nationalist and restorative visions and the means for their realization were sustained and even strengthened. This fact showed that the plans being contemplated for the shape and content of the Indies reflected its "all-too-plastic," and thus unformed, nature.

Through their belated promotion of Indonesian nationalism, their mobilization and arming of segments of the population, and their unpremeditated grant of independence in conditions of surrender, the Japanese did not so much set the stage for the Indonesian Revolution as free its participants from all limitations, including that represented by a shared stage.[177] In short, the Japanese had conferred an equal opportunity to act on all contenders seeking to define the Indonesian reality. With no constraints above them, organizationally speaking, or below them, in terms of subscribing to a common set of principles, the multitude of forces in the Indies could only constrain each other and did so without any overall decisive resolution. Quite simply, the course of the Indonesian Revolution confirmed the political pliability of the Indies as the leaders of the rival projects took meaningful steps on territorial and popular bases to realize their respective Indonesian identities. Further, with the precise site of this contest itself in question, the Revolution produced no clarification of the limits or substance of any one Indonesian identity.

The Conditions and Questions of State in Independent Indonesia

From the perspective of building a new state, a nationalist revolution that failed to clearly define and therefore attain its territorial base could not be considered a political success. Likewise, a nationalist revolution that had as its outcome a structure as ideationally inchoate and internally divided as RIS could hardly be perceived as an administrative success. Moreover, the development in the context of a nationalist revolution of determined, popular, and armed organizations on mutually antagonistic sectional, ideational, and religious grounds does not speak to a social success. Therefore, politically, territorially, administratively, and socially Indonesia in 1949 was not a state; only the conventions of international law and organization conferred such a status.

If the course and outcome of the Indonesian Revolution had created no state, and thereby no clear winners, then it also did not create clear losers. The Dutch, for instance, retained their privileged economic and trade links with their former colony through the Netherlands-Indonesia Union, they retained West New Guinea, and the basic thrust of their colonial politico-administrative strategy lived on in the federal arrangements. Indigenous supporters of the Dutch, comforted by the fact that their interests were formally recognized in the federal structures, looked hopefully to the future as the operation of the NIT seemed to herald success for the viability of their vision. Within the Nationalist movement, and notwithstanding the military defeat of the PKI in 1948 and the ongoing struggle against the TII from 1949, no major force had lost (or lost irrevocably in) the Revolution. The Communists retained their representation in official bodies, including the provisional Parliament, and still enjoyed widespread respect. Islamist forces commanded extensive popular and organizational support in the Republic and throughout RIS, and the notion of pushing the country to formalize its embrace of Islam still guided a large section of the religious community. Finally, the Indonesian National Army was acclaimed for its unwavering determination to fight and overcome both the Communist treachery at Madiun and the crushing military and political effects of the second "Police Action."

The incomplete nature of the Nationalist and counter-Nationalist projects in the archipelago was confirmed with the establishment of RIS, the embodiment of irresolution. Importantly, the accession by all major actors to this very unsettled condition presumed and shaped the questions facing them and presaged their collective response in answering them after 1949. Lacking a state in the past and the present, the major Indonesian actors directed their attention to the future and to building a state through political contention and competition. In short, RIS was viewed domestically as the optimal and provisional structure within which the major actors could contend to yield an enduring state. The existence of an Indonesian society, moreover, was knowingly denied by the major forces through their very sectionalized quest for and preservation of secure support. The challenge of creating a base of support that was wider than what the Dutch had already practically recognized or organized was also deferred to the future. Lacking both a state and a society in 1949, therefore, Indonesia was neither old nor new; it had yet to be created.

CHAPTER II

"A GRAND SYMPHONY OF DESTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION"

OPPORTUNITY, POWER, AND THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE AFTER 1949[1]

The "Indonesian Revolution" formally ended with the transfer of sovereignty to Jakarta on 27 December 1949. Since that time, the achievement of Indonesian independence has been regarded by observers within and without Indonesia as a profound development. The radical significance attributed by both common and scholarly interpretation to the achievement of Indonesian independence was, perhaps, natural. It seemed unavoidable, for instance, that the transfer would prompt foreign observers and, to a significant extent, Indonesian participants to cross the fundamental conceptual threshold and shift their attention away from the *political problem of Indonesia* to the *political, economic, and social problems in Indonesia*. After all, from late 1949 on Indonesia's new leaders, and especially the Republicans among them, perceived the task of liberation as virtually complete. The one major outstanding issue—sovereignty over West New Guinea (whose Indonesian name, to be used hereafter, was Irian Barat)—was to be settled amicably under the terms of the transfer within a year's time. On other issues, and under the same terms, the Indonesians appeared to be satisfied with the basic framework that had been established for the construction of a national economy and a national culture. On all accounts, therefore, it seemed realistic for both participants and observers to believe that the links with the recent and dark colonial past had been severed and that it was appropriate to set out, with eyes set on the present and near-future, confidently charting Indonesia's political, economic, and social destiny.

The appropriateness of the conceptual determination made by Indonesia's leaders to focus narrowly on problems in the country was reinforced by the tendency of Western observers to assign priority to examining how the "national" issues raised by Indonesian independence were addressed, including, chiefly, the promotion and preservation of "democracy." As such, the mutually reinforcing practice and study of Indonesian politics in the period after 1949 tended to focus mainly on formal aspects of political structures, including the behaviour of the country's many political parties. When, in the late 1950s, these structures and the Indonesian political system began to falter, attention began to shift to three actors, which were usually treated separately and in great detail: President Sukarno, the PKI, and the TNI. While greater attention was devoted to the study of these actors, their actions and (less seldom) interactions, such studies were nevertheless consistently framed with reference to formal power structures and by the attempts of all, and especially the Communists, to gain greater access to positions within these structures. The overall view of Indonesian politics that emerged from this period was therefore one that reinforced the perception of an Indonesian state and society, albeit a state and society whose existence was imperilled alternately by political party irresponsibility during the period of "free-fight liberalism" (1950-59), regional separatism (throughout the period, but especially between 1956-61), and, later, the apparently reckless domestic and foreign "adventurism" in which the Communists and Sukarno co-jointly engaged (in the mid-1960s). Summarily speaking, the standard perception of Indonesian politics for the period under consideration held that the revolutionary legacy of an existing Indonesian state and society, while both badly traumatized by the events of these years, nevertheless survived.

In contrast to the categories and conventions employed to sustain the orthodox view of Indonesian politics since 1949, the argument of this chapter is that it was not the interaction between an ethereal and embattled "Indonesian state" and elements in "Indonesian society" that shaped the type and content of political action "in Indonesia" after December 1949. Simply put, the conventional view of Indonesian politics between 1949 and 1965-66 confuses the outcome of these years of political competition and conflict with its perceived (or presumed) parameters. The view advanced here is that political action was deliberately enacted (by both political parties and regionally based actors) so as to lead to the formation of an Indonesian state, categorically speaking, and within it, potentially, the creation of an Indonesian society. In according analytical priority to the continuing *problem of Indonesia* in this way, it is necessary to demonstrate how actors attempted to reconcile their directing ideas and prevailing political realities. Closing the gap between the condition of openness and fundamental "national" incompletion and the aspirations actors entertained of creating an Indonesian state and society as envisaged in the 1945 Constitution meant that actors had to seek out and create political power resources. This imperative to acquire tangible power resources, made evident by the demonstrable powerlessness of the Central Government, was affected by foreseen and unforeseen opportunities, actions, and the consequences for all actors of their competitive and conflictive interaction. Advancing this thesis entails recognizing the immediate and long-term political significance not only of the failures experienced by all the participants in the Indonesian Revolution, but also, and perhaps more importantly, of their successes within the context of governmental powerlessness immediately after independence. Reconsidering the moment of Indonesian independence leads to the deflating realization that, by the standard of revolution, the Republican accomplishment at The Hague was hollow. Indonesian independence was incompletely negotiated far from the site of the struggle, without the active participation of the mass of people then being defined as Indonesians, and formally among only three small groups of leading officials and intellectuals. The nationalist leaders who waged and won their revolution did so on the world stage; they had yet to undertake the same struggle in the space of their newly defined country.

From "Revolution" to Revolution

Because it disturbs the ex post facto assumptions of much of the literature on the topic, it is a surprising claim to make that all the major participants in the Indonesian Revolution experienced conspicuous failures *and* successes. Yet making this claim is necessary, and necessarily the starting point, if we are to understand how and why the political effects of this Revolution were overtaken by the politically more significant revolution that occurred after 1949. Indeed, such an assertion is also necessary if we are to understand the shape and content of the New Order state after 1965-66. On the conventional view of the Indonesian Revolution, there was but one victor—the Republicans—and a whole array of vanquished actors—ranging from the Japanese, through the Communists, to the Dutch. Typically, it would be argued that Japanese schemes had long met with failure by the time sovereignty was transferred in 1949 and, by this very act, the Dutch seemed to acknowledge their own failure. As for the Communists, one would be reminded that there was little doubt that they were crushed for their treachery at Madiun. The problem with this view of the course and outcome of the Indonesian Revolution, however, is precisely its failure to appreciate the nature and ambiguity of all the participants' political experiences in the context of struggle.

The sharp imagery of a comprehensive and effective Republican victory (and its corollary of utter Dutch failure) cuts too neatly into the historical contingencies of the Indonesian Revolution and depends, moreover, on an after-the-fact calculation of political fortune and misfortune. The struggle was not filled with sure formulas for success or unfolding historical inevitabilities, but rather with the disquieting thoughts and uncertainties that must have filled the minds of all the participants when they inevitably asked the reasons behind their own or others' latest victory or defeat. In particular, the Indonesian participants must have experienced the disconcerting realization during the turning points of their "Revolution" that the nature of these moments as turning points was chiefly determined by factors beyond the Indies, rather than within the Indies. That is to say, the Indies did not serve as the decisive battleground of the Indonesian Revolution or among its participants. The Japanese, for instance, were compelled to surrender in the Indies because they lost badly against Allied forces elsewhere in the Pacific and at home. For their part, the Dutch were halted mainly by American pressure and (politico-economic) threats (as in the case of the Japanese) to their homeland. In its turn, the Republican project was stilled by the military successes earned by the Dutch and it was the latter's own devastated condition in Europe that seemed to be the one factor preventing the Dutch from completely extinguishing the nationalist movement, as opposed to "merely" overrunning virtually all Republican territory and capturing the movement's principal leaders. In conceding that the Indonesian Revolution was significantly moulded by the eventual capitulation of the Japanese and Dutch, however, it would clearly be unfair to ascribe the determining cause of such developments to the power of the nationalists. Indeed, it may be observed that the nationalists were spectacularly unsuccessful inside the Indies, but spectacularly successful in friendly countries' foreign offices and at the United Nations. The pattern apparent in the historical record is that the Indonesian Revolution was shaped by what actors based outside the Indies could do more effectively in the Indies and by what those actors inside the Indies could do less effectively in the Indies—give shape, content, and organization to their political strategies to build an Indonesian state, or, as the case may be, lesser proto-states in the East Indies.

If much of the history of the Indonesian Revolution is therefore a narration on events that unfolded between and among these different state-building projects, and the major turning points in that record were effected by actors and events from "without Indonesia," then the foreigners' departure left not only their state-building projects fundamentally incomplete, but the Republican one as well. The territorial configuration of the new country, for instance, attested to its fragmentary nature by including distinct elements of all three major state-building projects: the immediate territorial divisions created by the Republicans and Dutch, and the "Great East" (formally embodied in the NIT), which reflected the Japanese vision of a divisible Indies. Adding to the sense of fragmentation was the exclusion of the vast former NEI possession of West New Guinea.

Amalgamating these territorial components into one structure should have been a great cause for worry to the new Indonesian overseers. This was because Jakarta's claim to rule the wide expanse of territory, water, and humanity that constituted the RIS in 1949 really existed only in formal terms. Indeed, having these claims respected at the popular level meant demanding from most people a virtual political impossibility: that Indonesians of Javanese origin (who constituted the majority of "Indonesians") cope with their conscious sense of the alienating "otherness" of "Indonesia" and "Indonesians" beyond Java while simultaneously suffering along with the latter—and the Papuans—the sense of the alienation of West New Guinea from "Mother Indonesia." Unfortunately for Indonesia's new leaders, the arbitrary territorial arrangements of the RIS, which offered the possibility of being easily rectified, were not the cause of this emotive paradox—they were only its symptoms.

The reason behind the haphazard and unsettled territorial base of the Republic (and the contrived mental gymnastics it compelled in Indonesian nationalists) lay quite simply in the condition of powerlessness in which Indonesia's leaders found themselves after 1949. By negotiating the departure of the Dutch without effecting victory on the ground and at a mass level, Indonesia's new Republican leaders achieved independence without also achieving power. As such, they had no real means to move their new "state" and "society" further along or closer together, and they certainly did not possess the necessary wherewithal to overcome the feelings of unnaturalness in the extended "Indonesian family" of peoples and lands. Yet power was precisely the element that was needed by the central leadership to resolve Indonesia's outstanding problems: to define the scope of Indonesian territory, to determine the nature of and establish coherence in its administration, and to arrive at a popular cultural identity. The prospects of Indonesia's Republican leaders successfully acquiring this power, however, were threatened by the ground swell of power contenders that emerged from the Revolution unencumbered by both foreigners' and official Indonesian control and organizational direction.

In this sense, by negotiating the transfer of sovereignty to the RIS, the Indonesian leadership unknowingly became a victim of the nature of its own success. By seeking to focus their attention on the withdrawal of the Dutch from the East Indies, the leadership overlooked a demonstrably clear insight of the recent Japanese and Dutch experiences in the archipelago: the success that they both achieved for their schemes showed the pliant nature of the Indies lands and peoples when sufficient organization was brought to bear upon them. That is to say, the Revolution showed that even outside actors could create going political entities in the archipelago, provided the source of political resources was secure. The Indonesian leadership itself possessed no such political resources and therefore no effective means to counter domestic actors seeking to emulate the foreigners' lesson of success.

The new rulers in Jakarta held that the departure of foreigners permitted a problem-free revivification of "the Indonesian reality" instead of recognizing that significant elements of "Indonesian society" in considerable portions of "Indonesian territory" fought for, continued to fight for, and envisaged political projects other than the Republican scheme that were also ostensibly constitutive of "Indonesia." The transfer of sovereignty eased the leaders into the misleading perception that the end of the hitherto predominant role played by "external" actors in the Indies meant they were masters of their newly won domain. Unfortunately for them, this outlook took no account of the dawning reality that actors and forces native to "Indonesia" had really only begun to act positively in their new role, rather than acting in a negative sense, that is, behind, because of, or solely to block the plans of foreign actors.

In such conditions of governmental powerlessness and greater popular latitude, even unpopular actors could transform the political imperative of solving the "national" issues related to territory, the administrative order, and national identity into a revolutionary impetus whose direction could be strategically manipulated around these same issues to effect a programme of state-building from the inside. In such an eventful context typical of any newly independent country, however, the furious sequence of events in Indonesia outpaced the analysis of many observers and participants attempting to make sense of the numerous changes. Accordingly, the comprehension of Indonesian politics lagged behind the true magnitude of the revolutionary changes and, when it finally became clear that a conflict situation was developing between the PKI and TNI in the 1960s, its all-round revolutionary character was overlooked.

Between the Past and the Future: Political Survival in Post-Independent Indonesia (1949-57)

In June 1950, the Indonesian Minister of Justice issued a decree that was peculiarly incongruous with the spirit of national certitude usually ascribed to the Indonesian government and people of the time. The subject of the decree related to the status of private law and addressed the specific issue of the character of Netherlanders and their rights in the RIS. "Having to settle the problem whether or not the Dutchman was a foreigner in Indonesia," Resink has observed, the Minister "found it necessary to state twice in a decree of three articles that the term aliens included Netherlanders."[2] In this way, the Minister undertook to define what the meaning of the "Indonesian identity" was not, as opposed to advancing what it was with equal energy and attention. The decree is interesting for two very suggestive reasons. First, it is revealing of prevailing conditions in Indonesia that the decree was formulated to solve an issue that had already been presumed to have been settled. Second, the manner in which the Government sought to cope with the disquieting realization that its own peoples' identity was not clear to them combined perceptible agitation with formal confidence and, equally, confidence in formality. On balance, since the decree was issued at such an early date in the life of the new country, the fact of its timing serves as an important indicator of the lack of real power in the formal structures of the Indonesian government. In this regard, the decree served as one (albeit inadvertent) testimonial to the disconcerting differences between formal appearances and assumptions, and the greater and lesser realities expressed informally in Indonesian political and social life during the period from 1949 to 1957.

Studies of Indonesian politics between 1949 and 1957 have a recurrent tendency to mentally situate the analysis between the perceived brilliance of the Indonesian Revolution and the luminescence of a presumed future Indonesian greatness while wistfully lamenting the course of events during those years. To a great extent, Indonesia's leaders shared in this convention. They were aware that the very accomplishment of independence was an invigorating experience in a world still largely consisting of colonies and colonizers, that it marked the threshold between the past and the future. Between December 1949 and August 1950, moreover, three developments helped to strengthen the belief that Indonesia's political present aside, the country would successfully blend its past revolutionary ideals and putative greatness. First, the federal structures rapidly disintegrated, thereby paving the way for the establishment of the unitarian *Republik Indonesia* on 17 August 1950. Second, the Korean War had an immediate and beneficial effect on Indonesia's economic prospects by allowing Jakarta to capitalize on the country's natural endowment of rubber and tin. Finally, Indonesia's leaders pledged themselves to holding national elections as early as possible. To Western analysts and many Indonesians alike, the commitment to a functioning democracy was an essential component in sustaining the overall equation of political, economic, and social success. One observer, reflecting the prevailing attitude, stressed that

> [t]he problems that lie ahead for Indonesia are to recapture and harness some of the revolutionary spirit to the more humdrum but challenging tasks of constructing a progressive new order, to bring new blood into the ranks of the established leadership, and to make of representative institutions an instrument for the welding together of elite and mass.[3]

By late 1950, it truly appeared that Indonesia not only possessed a promising future, but that it was possible with its gains to date to begin to realize its revolutionary aspirations.

The beginnings of a widely shared view of Indonesian politics took shape around these events and at the hands of scholars, usually American.[4] The propensity of the adherents of this (rapidly hardening) view was to seek evidence of the transition from Indonesia's past greatness to its future greatness. In their search, they seemed to depend more on the explanatory endurance of their ex post facto premises than on identifying the creativity exhibited by existing or "marginal" political actors and movements, which went largely unrecognized.[5] Such a view, moreover, inherently opposed or ignored creative actors and tendencies because of its own essentially conservative spirit.[6] The latter characteristic, additionally, led to a tenaciously high regard for those actors and tendencies that seemed to hold out the greatest promise of successfully traversing the transitional period, which in the Indonesian context meant the Socialist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*—PSI) and the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (*Madjelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*—Masjumi). Occidental scholarly and journalistic analyses of Indonesia's experience with "liberal democracy," therefore, exhibit each of these characteristics to greater or lesser extents, particularly in their portrayal of the role and place of Parliament and the political parties.

The dominant perspective on Indonesian politics between 1949 and 1957, therefore, focused on Parliament as the nexus of an established political system without seriously taking into account the wider context and uncertain parameters within which the concerned political actors behaved. More specifically, conventional (and, after 1959, official Indonesian) views held that the political parties brought the country into crisis and division because they acted out of narrow interests—a political pattern later characterized by President Sukarno as "free-fight liberalism." The image of parties extending themselves and widening their activities into Indonesian society was replaced toward the end of this period, but without displacing the normative premises that informed the focus on parties in the first place. The deep-seated nature of most Western observers' commitment to seeing a democratic and representative form of government in Indonesia, which stemmed mainly from their pro-Republican sympathies during the Indonesian Revolution, caused them to condemn the political developments subsequent to 1957 and interpret them as authoritarian.

This line of analysis, while internally consistent and genuinely hopeful about Indonesia's long-term prospects, equally consistently refused to embrace the magnitude that the wider and unsettled Indonesian context as such had on these parties and on other actors. Most critically, the conventional perspective failed to take account of the fact that from 1949 it was not the demands and opportunities of political parties that stood between a harmonious union of Indonesia's revolutionary ideals and future possibilities, or even the unlimited nature of those demands and opportunities, but rather that the Central Government could set no limits because it lacked the power. In short, even in 1950, with the formation of the unitarian republic, Parliament and the parties showed all the signs of potential failure because of, and not despite, the auspicious chances of succeeding and the chance these parties now faced—unopposed by other organized governmental institutions—to set the limits on and actualize Parliament's formal powers.

The collapse of Indonesia's formal political structures began because the gains ostensibly made in the name of Indonesia—its unitarian character, its sudden economic upturn, and its democratic prospects—could hardly have been prevented from being viewed as prizes by political actors. They had long anticipated the benefits of independence and were free to act selfishly in search of power resources. From the parties' perspective, each of these gains could be easily turned to their own advantage. It may been said that Indonesia's very adoption of parliamentary forms was both a reflection of the inability of its leaders to set political limits, and necessary for this to occur: precisely because parliamentary participants were expected to gather and exercise power—mainly in preparation for general elections—did they give expression to and exacerbate hitherto nascent or putative political differences in beginning the arduous process of power accumulation.

In the following examination of the place of Parliament and the behaviour of politicians and parties within it between 1950 and 1957, therefore, I will address the saliency of the quest for power and resources among the ostensibly powerful and the implications arising from this pursuit. As the imperative to secure power and power resources increasingly began to override the formalities of parliamentary democracy, the competitive political dynamic set into motion by the parties in 1950 began to draw in non-party and seemingly marginal party actors and raise the latter's chances of political success in a widening and ever more revolutionary storm.

The Political Parties to 1955

The new unitarian Republic began to slowly decompose from the moment of its formal constitution and in the most sensitive of areas—the Central Government, and within it, Parliament. While the direct cause of this deterioration related to the character both of the institutions of the formal state and to those manning its offices, it is important to recognize how these two conditions point beyond themselves to the overall and more fundamental circumstance of powerlessness in the Indonesian context. The powerlessness of the Central Government, as has been outlined above, stemmed from the course and conduct of the Indonesian Revolution; the lack of Parliamentary power stemmed from the fact that the much acclaimed Republican familiarity with, and respect for, this form of governance was extremely limited.

The Republican exposure to parliamentary forms and procedures grew chiefly out of the activities of the Working Body (*Badan Pekerja*—BP) of the Indonesian Central National Committee (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*—KNIP), the successor organ to the Japanese-sponsored Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*—PPKI). According to the transitional provisions of the 1945 Constitution, the powers of the People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat*—DPR), People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakjat*—MPR), and Supreme Advisory Council (*Dewan Pertimbangan Agung*—DPA) were to be exercised by the President "with the assistance of the National Committee." Notwithstanding the formal delineation of responsibilities among the organs of the Indonesian government, the prevailing political realities of fighting and winning the struggle against the Dutch compromised all preconceived notions of what to expect from "Indonesian democracy." The very conscious attempt by key Republican leaders to win Western support against the Dutch meant setting aside the Presidentially centred system outlined in the 1945 Constitution, especially since its incumbent, Sukarno, had collaborated with the Japanese. In departing from the accepted constitutional scheme, the Republicans as much proceeded into unknown political territory as were carried there by the rising social efflorescence and the emergent and loosely organized political parties created in late 1945/early 1946.

The outcome of this uncertain political experimentation manifested itself in the composition and activities of the KNIP and BP-KNIP between 1945 and 1949. From the very outset, it is revealing of the overall lack of central control and direction throughout the course of the Indonesian Revolution that the exact composition of the KNIP was not known. Widjaja notes, for instance, that the membership of the first KNIP

> was not set by a decree of appointment or an official announcement. Because of that, it is not known with certainty who, and how many, made up the membership of the KNIP. One unofficial source writes that the membership of the first session of the KNIP was 60 and another source writes that it was 103 people.[7]

What is known with certainty is that the membership of the KNIP swelled to unmanageable proportions during its existence, notwithstanding the fact that the effective territorial and popular base it claimed to represent was drastically reduced during the same period of time. Thus, from an initial complement of between 60 and 103 members, the KNIP grew from 132 in November 1945 to 407 in early 1947, and reached its ceiling of 503 members by December 1949.[8]

A further indication of the KNIP's ambiguous nature was its curious inability to establish membership criteria. In 1946, political parties, functional groups, the regions, and citizens of foreign derivation were represented; by 1949, non-party representatives were formally recognized as a fifth legitimate category of representation. Accordingly, throughout this period the KNIP upheld the claims of the *Republik Indonesia* to represent the former NEI by seating representatives from Sumatra, Kalimantan (the Indonesian name for Borneo, to be used hereafter), Sulawesi (the Indonesian name for Celebes, to be used hereafter), Maluku, and Sunda Kecil (but not, inexplicably, West New Guinea), in addition to the main organized political elements present through the period from late 1945 to early 1946. The experience of the PKI in the Republic's paramount representative body defied political sensibilities but evidenced the lack of power and determination in, and of, the KNIP. For instance, the PKI retained its representation after its failed rebellion at Madiun in 1948 not only in the Committee itself (35 members in 1946; 32 in 1949), but also in the BP (5 members in 1949), where it held equal standing as one of the four largest parties (the others being Masjumi, PNI, and PSI).[9]

The unwillingness, or, perhaps, inability of the KNIP's leaders either to limit the entry of ever more revolutionary confreres or to expel its enemies necessarily meant that they were incapable of coping with greater concerns, such as effectively directing the broader affairs of the new country. Thus, the KNIP itself became an obstacle, its sheer size hindering meaningful expressions of general interest and firm action. For instance, between 1945 and the transfer of sovereignty, the RI endured confused leadership under 10 Cabinets, of which only five were parliamentary. "All five cabinets," van der Kroef has noted, "fell because of extra-parliamentary pressures and political changes; not once did a government fall because a parliamentary majority voted its lack of confidence."[10] Although the principle of Presidential power was supplanted by Parliamentary power, including responsibility for Cabinet formation, in November 1945, during the chaotic course of the Revolution parliamentary leaders felt it imperative to return to the President the task of reconstituting and actually leading the Cabinet on three separate occasions. The opportunities that were thus lost to demonstrate the perceived strengths of parliamentary democracy resulted in part from the lack of opportunity and capacity to inculcate parliamentary virtues among KNIP members themselves: during the period from August 1945 to December 1949 the KNIP met in session for a mere 29 days.[11]

Independence did not bring about a strengthening of parliamentary forms or procedures, despite the auspicious place that was accorded to Parliament in the (provisional) 1949 Constitution of the RIS. The creation of the RIS weakened Parliament in two key respects. First, the body of (at least partially) experienced parliamentarians, that is, the contingent of representatives from the RI, were inundated by the larger numbers of members from outside the Republic, where parliamentary practices were largely non-existent or newly existent. In the Senate, for example, each of the 16 constituent units appointed two representatives, while in the lower house the RI (through the framework of the KNIP) elected 50 of its 168 members, the balance representing the other units (100 members) and racial minorities appointed by the Federal Government (18 members).

In a second respect, the political differences that the Republicans drew between themselves and the representatives of the other states obstructed their ostensibly common regard for the integrity of Parliament. To the Republicans, the other representatives were stained both by their collaboration with the Dutch and by their corruption; as a matter of convenience, perhaps, the Republicans overlooked their own desultory behaviour in the KNIP where some had shown themselves to be no better and, in certain respects, worse than those they accused. Indeed, "among the 'federals' who had collaborated with the Dutch in the federal states were many with long experience in various phases of public administration, something that could not be said of many members of the K.N.I.P. or its Working Committee."[12]

The swift collapse of the federal structures never allowed the imperfections of the federal parliament to become apparent, but the parliamentarians seated in its successor body did not waste the chance to turn the DPR into an institution of opportunity—that is, a clearing-house of opportunities for parties and individuals to appropriate resources and privileges, and spread influence. Paradoxically, this tendency was apparent both in the rapid expansion of parties in the DPR and in the spirit of egalitarianism that infused Parliament during its first months in existence. According to figures supplied by Kahin, the Republicans could command the loyalty of (at most) 111 of 237 actual members, and theoretically 117 of 265 members in the first DPR of the unitarian republican.[13] The size of Republican representation had increased both quantitatively and relatively over its standing in the defunct institutions of the RIS, but nevertheless Republican members still did not command a majority in the new DPR. This drawback did not prevent the curious extension to virtually all DPR members of membership in a Republican political party. Before long, all save a handful of DPR members assumed party labels, with the older Republican parties claiming the greater share of new members.

This remarkable extension of party structure gave the misleading impression that the parties were organizationally robust and representative of existing social tendencies.[14] If this was the case, then assuming at the outset the veracity of party claims to represent social interests leaves little room for explaining later instances of party behaviour that were contrary to the integrity entailed in such representation. Indeed, it seems more explanatorily complete to view the rapid extension of party representation as being caused by, and reflecting, the anxiety among parliamentarians about their personal fate in an unsettled and almost wholly formal setting. Thus, the seating of small parties and the common assent to their equal role in Parliamentary business is evidence of the widespread and persistent pursuit of narrow self-interest in the DPR. The extensive participation that was permitted of the smaller parties, especially in key parliamentary committees where each had a representative, was less a measure of Republican egalitarianism than it was of the unwillingness of all parties to alienate a potentially powerful political ally following elections. Such is a measure of the political uncertainty at the time that it would be inappropriate to claim that the smaller parties exercised "an influence out of all proportion to their actual strength" in the DPR: this most vital of political qualities—"actual strength"—was of an unknown quantity for all seated in the Parliament.[15] Hence, the transparency of self-interest in the case of the small parties should not lead one to believe that the larger parties, whose respective leaderships claimed to express some wider constituency's interests, were so disciplined as to have overcome their own or their members' provincialism.

While party differences have been cited as the immediate explanation for the political difficulties in the DPR,[16] it was the personal differences among members of Indonesia's tiny elite—a good portion of which was ensconced in the DPR—that helped to confine Indonesian political activity to Parliament and sustain its intense nature. Within a year of the establishment of the unitarian Republic, for example, Kahin observed the "tendency toward social irresponsibility among the leaders of some political parties, and their obsession with the struggle for personal power for its own sake." The "irresponsibility and the stress on personal power," Kahin explained, "to a considerable extent resulted from the fact that the competition for leadership [was] generally not exacting enough."[17] Where Kahin sees inexactness in the leadership competition, a view that takes account of both the ambiguous nature of power relations at the time and the equal prospects facing elite members sees these individuals scrambling in all directions in the formal realm to secure as much personal power as possible. This development was not unexpected, since even in conditions demanding maximum unity, that is, in the early days of the Revolution, the few hundred individuals who "were for the most part the top leaders of the minute

Indonesian intelligentsia" broke up "into bitterly feuding political cliques which soon headed diverging political parties." Consequently, for members of the elite

> [t]he postindependence period [became] one of unremitting and unrestrained political quarreling, not always so much over basic principles as over personal prerogative, often conducted with an urbane show of personal compatibility, most of it intensified by intimate knowledge of each other's personalities and proclivities.[18]

The proximate cause of the power quest among Indonesian political actors lay in the Constitutional requirement that the appointative DPR work toward national elections that could, given the absence of any other indicators of social support, effectively end the influence and formal power that the represented political parties and individuals already possessed. More fundamentally, the parties were being called upon to overcome the condition of their powerlessness and the selfishness that it bred to collectively and selflessly create enough power between them to stage the elections. Until the task of holding national elections for a new Parliament and a Constituent Assembly could be executed, however, the members of the DPR were expected to also resist the narrow political temptations involved in securing a Cabinet position. Since the Cabinet was dependent upon the confidence extended to it by the appointative DPR, and there was no possibility of altering the composition of the latter body until the elections were held, conditions were optimal for the established parties to act in an unrestrained manner vis-à-vis the Cabinet. Indonesian politics were thus characterized by the contrary effects of actors seeking to stealthily conceal their powerlessness by securing their hold over formal offices while compromising the potential effectiveness of those offices by delaying elections and turning aside the difficult task of seeking to create organized popular support. The effects of this paradox rippled ever more destructively through the formal sphere, from the Cabinet and Parliament, to the wider governmental structures, and outward, throughout the Indonesian context. The situation that obtained early in the post-independence period was, therefore, far less clear and comforting than suggested by the views of the parties, by the anticipated workings of the party system, or by officialdom generally.

The formation of Indonesia's first Cabinet in the unitarian era was difficult; this feat set in motion the destructive dynamic that was to plague the party system from that point forward. On 6 September 1950, Mohammad Natsir, the chairman of the Leadership Council of Masjumi, announced the composition of his Cabinet. By appointing Republicans to lead all but one Ministry, Natsir seemed to make a show of Republican strength. In fact, the virtual Republican monopoly over the Cabinet merely served to obscure a serious rift within Republican ranks. More specifically, just prior to the formation of the Cabinet, the two largest parties in the DPR, Masjumi and PNI, bitterly contested the possible allocation of posts between them. When the dispute yielded no satisfactory outcome, the PNI simply refused to enter the Cabinet. Thereafter, Masjumi leaders constructed a broad coalition that was particularly dependent upon the smaller parties for its survival. The PNI was not content to let matters remain thus; it began to actively and spitefully oppose the Cabinet and particularly Masjumi. Early in the life of the new Cabinet

> [f]ive members of Parliament—two non-party members acting in behalf of the PNI and three others from smaller parties—presented a motion calling on the President to name three formateurs for a new cabinet, one from the Masjumi, one from the PNI, and one from another group. Natsir and his cabinet refused to accept the self-liquidation implicit in this demand and called for a vote of confidence. The PNI voted with the various Communist groups against the government. In this it was joined by two other groups which had hitherto been counted in the government's coalition . . . [In addition, one party that had] previously supported the government, abstained from voting.[19]

Natsir and his Cabinet survived this first attempt by the PNI to orchestrate the government's downfall. Largely at the behest of the PNI, though, lesser parties abandoned Natsir and the Masjumi, eventually costing the government its majority in the DPR and forcing it to resign after a mere eight and a half months.[20]

Under the subsequent premiership of Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, who possessed a bloc of followers somewhat beyond Natsir's control within the DPR, Masjumi and PNI forged a working Cabinet that would last for slightly less than a year. As in the previous instance of a Cabinet losing the DPR's confidence, the Sukiman Cabinet collapsed because of the disaffection of its own supporters. Paradoxically, the PNI once again played the determinate role: its own members voted against their government on the issue of United States economic and military support. Notwithstanding the evident split between Masjumi and the PNI, and serious divisions in each party, President Sukarno had little choice but to charge Sidik Djojosukarto (PNI) and Prawoto Mangkususanto (Masjumi) with the task of creating a new Cabinet. When they failed together, Wilopo (PNI) succeeded alone in creating a new Cabinet. That a solitary effort on the part of one party's representative was now necessary to create a Cabinet, while the support of many parties remained an insuperable constant in the life of a Cabinet, was one indicator of the growing politicization and polarization taking place in the DPR.

While the Wilopo Cabinet continued to evidence the trend toward longer Cabinet tenure, effectively governing from 3 April 1952 to 30 April 1953, its greater endurance revealed a consolidation in Parliament of allied and mutually antagonistic blocs of parties, rather than a strengthening of Parliament as such. For instance, the support of the hitherto despised communist and proto-communist members was both sought out by others and made available by the increasingly assertive PKI leadership. The main beneficiary of this support in the DPR was the radical wing of the PNI, and it was this extension of Communist goodwill that the Wilopo Cabinet relied upon for its longevity. The PNI's growing dependence on communist support caused a compensatory effect among other parties, especially in Masjumi and PSI, to resist the Nationalists' plans even more strenuously. Indeed, it was this complication that helped to prolong the arduous process of Cabinet formation in mid-1953, when Indonesia was without an effective Cabinet for 58 days.

Under the premiership of Ali Sastroamidjojo, the PNI assumed the paramount position in the fourth, and most durable (1 August 1953–12 August 1955) Cabinet of the unitarian era. From this hard-won position, Ali led the PNI in seeking to reverse all the formal political gains that Masjumi and PSI had made when they occupied the ministerial seats of power. Thus, Masjumi "lost the greater part of its direct influence in the Indonesian civil service" during this time.[21] A sure sign that Masjumi was losing the struggle to secure and retain the easy political resources offered by formal entitlements came as its leaders resigned themselves to reiterating fantastic claims of a membership of 25 million and consoling themselves and the public with the idle claim that their political fortunes would surely rematerialize with the outcome of general elections.[22] The immediate cause of the collapse of the Ali Cabinet related to flagrant politicking on the part of its Defence Minister, Iwa Kusumasumantri (PNI), over the appointment of the Army Chief-of-Staff. It was not felt that this incident caused any irreparable damage to the PNI's prospects in the upcoming elections, the preparations for which were virtually complete, and so power was relinquished by Ali to Burhanuddin Harahap of Masjumi a mere month and a half before the election.

The Harahap Cabinet was generally perceived to be no more than a caretaker government waiting to return its mandate following the election returns. While this view certainly reflected PNI hopes, neither Harahap nor the other Masjumi members of the Cabinet acted as mere caretakers. With a vengeance, Harahap conducted a humiliating campaign against former PNI ministers. Through the well-publicized arrest on corruption charges of Djody Gondokusumo and Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo (former Ministers of Justice and Economic Affairs, respectively), Harahap presumably aimed to sully the reputation of their party.[23] Furthermore, "PNI appointees in influential positions in the bureaucracy were replaced by supporters of Masjumi, PSI and others parties in the coalition."[24] In this way, it was clear that the selfish drive among those parties and members lucky enough to be in the appointative DPR had not abated and now, on the eve of potentially annihilative national elections, commanded the most myopic and intense political concentration on the formal sphere.

The tendency of Indonesian political actors to concentrate their efforts on seeking out the scarce sites of formal political power and resources—to the virtual exclusion of creating other forms of power—was evidenced in the wider context of the parties and their activities both in and out of Parliament. One of the first manifestations of this virtually unrestrained contest was the damage that its participants inflicted upon themselves, that is to say, on the integrity of their own party organizations. As suggested above, both Masjumi and PNI succumbed to this weakness, although the latter succeeded better than the former in concealing sharp divisions behind the myth of "party discipline." [25]

The extent of internal PNI differences is rather more difficult to detect than the disputes besetting other parties. This is the case because the party itself had no strategic conception of its role in Indonesia, its leaders had few ideological commitments, and even fewer tactics, and not because the Nationalists were reluctant to express their differences formally or due to some compelling sense of party loyalty. In short, because the party line (as embodied in the ethereal *Marhaenist* ideology) delineated few specifics around which to secure party members' adherence, by definition there could be few detectable differences. Above all, the PNI's commitment in the post-revolutionary era was to securing formal offices. Only when the PNI's chances of renewing its hold over such offices appeared to be in jeopardy was any effort put into articulating a firm party position, and even then party leaders acted in an entirely negative manner. Writing in 1954, Bone observed that the PNI's

> Central Committee, and members thereof, constantly issue statements, often highly contradictory, on virtually every issue of public interest. Often in the past, after an individual party leader's statement has met with a cold reception, it has then been announced that he spoke only for himself and that the party remained uncommitted.[26]

Thus, within and without Parliament, the Nationalists' attempts to create a following amounted to little more than "a feverish and opportunistic trimming of [their] ideological sails."[27]

For Masjumi, the experiences of government and the dissention that that this bred over the proper course of action to realize Islamic tenets only helped to make the Natsir and Sukiman wings of the party distinct realities. While the differences between these two cliques could be accommodated within the ambit of Masjumi's capacious and flexible ideological outlook, to the leaders of its largest member organization, the Association of Muslim Scholars (*Nahdatul Ulama*—NU), the party proved worthy only of abandonment. On 8 July 1952, NU bolted from Masjumi, taking eight of its seats in the DPR.[28] Ostensibly, the NU's departure from Masjumi related to the latter's alleged lack of commitment to advancing and acting on Islamic principles. A more complete explanation of NU's action is suggested by the fact that

> the Masjumi central council, the *Madjelis Sjuro*, on which [NU] was strongly represented, had been relegated to advisory capacity only and . . . the Masjumi inner council, in which [NU] had little voice, was making the important decisions, awarding the important prizes, and doing both on the basis of strictly political rather than religious considerations.[29]

The succession of the NU is therefore indicative both of the lengths to which actors would proceed in securing formal resources—destroying party unity—and the effects of this competition—to undertake the competition anew. This latter result was clearly evident when, after its departure, the NU formed the *Liga Muslimin Indonesia* along with the Federated Islamic Party of Indonesia (*Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia*—PSII) and the Association of Islamic Education (*Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah*—Perti) to "draw up common plans for great actions for the benefit of the Moslems in Indonesia in all material and spiritual fields." The very intangibility of this endeavour reflected the prevailing uncertainty of the Indonesian context.

Within the rump Masjumi, new differences of perspective and political method opened up between Natsir and Isa Anshary over the issues of an Islamic state and the ongoing official struggle with the *Darul Islam*. While Anshary advocated a more militant and activist programme so as to realize an Islamic Republic of Indonesia, and Natsir pursued a more moderate, consensual and, therefore, accommodating policy to enhance the Islamic component of Indonesian life, they both shared a disinclination to actively organize their respective visions among the Indonesian masses. Natsir was too pre-occupied with the business of Parliament and setting forth his views in writing to make a determined effort of consolidating his party's organization. Anshary's organizational plans were embodied in the Anti-Communist Front, which was launched in September 1954. The Front appeared to grow out of the negative and inadvertently convenient stimulus that the Communists' own organizational activities furnished.[30] In contrast to the character of the PKI's organizational efforts, however, Anshary's labours were belated and deliberately narrow from the outset. Anshary described his Front not as a political group, but as a "spiritual movement":

> Since it is not a political group or party, it can in no sense be considered a part of the Masjumi Party or a competitor to the Masjumi. It is an elite organization of leaders, and it has no desire to attract a mass membership. Its entire organization consists of a five-man headquarters in Bandung, and five-man branch committees in north Sumatra, Central Sumatra, South Sumatra, East Java, and South Sulawesi. It so happens that its leaders are Masjumi members . . .[31]

In this sense, key Masjumi leaders seemed prepared to abandon their organization for another, consciously perceived as distinct from the Masjumi, while relying for the time being on its formal status to support the Front's future potential.

Even though Anshary's attempts to cope with an uncertain future suggested a lack of confidence in the prevailing governmental system, his strategy was conducted under formal auspices and through formal offices and was, in this regard, indistinguishable from the many efforts of other political actors who set their bearings with the aim to arrive at the safe destinations of the formal realm. In particular, the pressure to stage and compete in national elections caused political actors to focus exclusively on securing a seat in either the DPR or the Constituent Assembly without also attempting to create for themselves a more enduring source of popular support for future elections.

This myopic orientation manifested itself in the sudden appearance of political parties and groupings after the general election law obtained preliminary parliamentary endorsement in March 1953 and final approval in April 1954. The earlier experiences of dissention and disintegration that befell the larger parties now affected the entire party scene. Almost as soon as parties formed, groups and individuals within them set themselves adrift as new parties, much like lifeboats fleeing a sinking vessel. In the Indonesian case, however, these sudden departures were more often than not the cause of the mother vessel's doom, rather than its result. Hatta has described how this dynamic operated:

> The party chiefs draw up the list of candidates for Parliament. Indonesians vote for a party, not for individuals: X votes for the top leader on the list, 2X votes elect the first two, 3X votes elect the first three and so on. If the twenty at the

> bottom of a party's list of candidates feel they have no chance of election they form a new party and put themselves at the top of its list. In a big constituency of many millions even a [weak] party can manage to elect the top two or three candidates.[32]

The creation through fission of so many small parties that Hatta outlines should not obscure the fact that many more sincere efforts were made by others to have themselves represented in the DPR. In this way, the eye of the Indonesian storm was widened to include a myriad of interests representing distinct groups and lands in the archipelago.

The parties' quest to obtain resources extended beyond the narrow confines of the Cabinet, the DPR, and party structures to the wider field of government—from the ministries to the bureaucracy. Anderson has observed succinctly that from the perspective of the party leaders of a newly independent Indonesia "building nationwide parties in a nation of roughly 100 million people was naturally an expensive proposition. The leaders found that a cheap way to develop their organizations was to enroll supporters inside the state apparatus."[33] As against the vicissitudes of keeping a Cabinet post, political parties demonstrated a superior ability to secure and retain resources in specific Ministries and branches of the civil service throughout the 1950–57 period. It was clear almost from the moment of the formation of the unitarian Republic that large sections of the governmental structure went over to, or were effectively colonized by, rival parties.[34] For instance, both the Ministry of Information and, to a lesser extent, the *Pamong Praja* (the senior echelon of the civil service) were regarded as PNI strongholds, while both Masjumi and NU (after 1952) laid claim to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and attempted to use it as an alternate bureaucracy. Indeed, it was largely the contest to control this Ministry that led to NU's departure from Masjumi, notwithstanding the pious reasons given by its leaders.[35] While the PSI's acknowledged bureaucratic stronghold was the Ministry of Social Affairs,[36] the party was widely viewed as exercising disproportionate control over other government posts.[37]

As the parties set about building their rival bases of support within the governmental and bureaucratic structures, they also undertook to expand the number of potential supporters—all drawing upon official revenues for their sustenance. Thus, from a pre-revolutionary complement of 140,000 government officials, the bureaucracy had swollen to between 900,000 and 1 million by February 1955.[38] If the parties had aimed for nothing more than larger numbers of loyal supporters who were also trained bureaucrats, the effects of this large increase would not have been as adverse as they turned out; Indonesia's growing numbers of "public servants" proved to be more loyal than trained. As with the behaviour of the parties themselves, the people attracted to them through the bureaucracy sought only the easy rewards of independence and, given its untested quality, could not have been expected to behave differently. Van der Kroef, writing in 1958, observed that

> . . . the national civil service has become a haven for growing numbers with lesser education; indeed, the latter press inexorably on the bureaucratic structure to

> make room for them . . .. Like Java's rural economy, the national bureaucratic structure is by virtue of its labor absorbing character long since past its point of optimum efficiency, so that 'the bureaucracy and the educational system (also enormously expanded) are locked in a self perpetuating circle of distension in which the second produces more and more diplomaed graduates which the latter is forced to absorb.'[39]

Accommodating ever greater numbers of low quality personnel was a heavy financial burden; by December 1956, government workers' salaries cost 38.5 per cent of the national budget.[40] But while the global bill was rising, its ever finer division among so many workers meant their individual immiserization. Compton observed that as early as 1955 "the [monthly] wages of state officials [were] only sufficient for subsistence for two weeks or, at the most, twenty days."[41] The decline in the personal well-being and prospects of the many people who populated the formal structures was an indicator of the limits of formal entitlements. For many state employees, it was now necessary to supplement their livelihoods with resources beyond the formal realm; they began to seek other and additional forms of employment. In this way, by the mid-1950s the haemorrhaging formal realm, already rendered incoherent through the process of party politicking, began to rupture at its base.

While the bulk of the bureaucracy was busy "to the point of monomania to the accumulating, storing and misplacing rather than to the passing of papers,"[42] at its apex, senior party functionaries were busy efficaciously appropriating and distributing whatever formal resources were within reach. "It was generally known" as early as 1952 "that certainly half of the members of the so-called parliament were hunting for personal gain the whole day long, [having] established all sorts of trading companies and corporations of which they themselves were directors or chairmen."[43] These individuals "were running from one government department to the other," Van der Kroef has added, "to solicit government orders from ministers and high officials."[44] The PNI's case is particularly informative of the extent to which parties were prepared to act in channelling formal resources for informal gains. "Under the [PNI] minister of economic affairs, Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, the issuing of licenses" under the government's *Benteng* scheme—which was ostensibly designed to foster indigenous skills in the import-export sector—"became primarily a means of financial support for the Nationalist Party."[45] A measure of the Nationalists' success in this regard was apparent just one year after the Ali Cabinet took office; Tjokrohadisurjo announced in mid-1954 that the amount of scarce foreign exchange received by indigenous Indonesians under the *Benteng* scheme had risen from 30 per cent to 70 per cent.[46] The PNI was not alone in its pursuits as its main rivals—Masjumi and PSI—also undertook to establish "business structures including banks, holding companies and trading companies," all of which were "ready-made vehicles for the channelling of import licences, foreign-exchange credits and other concessions [they had] appropriated."[47]

Occasionally, the parties, or specific individuals within them, also sought to exert direct political influence over component parts of the formal state that were clearly intended to be immune from such partisan abuse. During the period that Masjumi controlled the Ministry of Religious Affairs, for instance, party stalwarts refused to recognize the reality of Hinduism as a living reality in Bali and therefore also declined to accord it official status.[48] By acting so indelicately in the advancement of Muslim interests, Masjumi opened itself to the uncomfortable charge that it was secretly conniving with the leaders of the *Darul Islam* to lead Indonesia into an Islamic thraldom.

Both the PNI and the PKI were intent on preventing these plans from being realized and together (but apparently not in any premeditated fashion) they subjected the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (*Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia*—ABRI) to tremendous pressure to ensure that the DI was militarily crushed. In this connection, the PKI acted indirectly through both the Indonesian Peasant's Front (*Barisan Tani Indonesia*—BTI) and the All-Indonesia Veterans Association (*Persatuan Bekas Pedjuang Seluruh Indonesia*—Perbepsi) which it established in 1953 for former members of Communist or Communist-dominated irregular paramilitary units (*laskar*) that fought during the Revolution. Perbepsi proposed to fight alongside the Army against the TII and offered men, provided the government supplied the weapons. This became a real and revolutionary possibility in the fall of 1953, when the PNI Defence Minister, Iwa Kusumasumantri, "proposed that the government arm private organizations interested in suppressing the Darul Islam insurgents."[49] The Cabinet thwarted the Minister's plans, but in the period from April–October 1954, both Perbepsi and BTI campaigned for (and seemed to have found his favour in) the creation of an officially sanctioned Communist military wing. On this occasion, the Communists suggested the need to police the coming elections and proposed the creation of an armed militia in the context of a "People's Security Congress." Plans for the Congress did not proceed beyond the preparatory stage, when a committee listing the Minister as an advisor was formed, and the NU acted diligently to secure the Cabinet's formal disapproval of the whole scheme.[50] Kusumasumantri continued to interfere in the military sphere, apparently undaunted by his earlier failures. In 1955, he imprudently selected a new Army Chief-of-Staff in defiance of an arrangement that the government had made earlier in the year with the Army to respect the latter's own selection preferences. While the PNI-led government fell on this issue, the Army festered under its new Chief and resentment grew among its officers about the whole unpleasant relationship they possessed with their civilian counterparts in the government.

The sinister implications of these interventions by Masjumi, PKI, and, to a lesser extent, PNI, gives them a far greater analytical saliency than the more numerous but less threatening exploits committed by most, if not all, the parties sitting in Parliament during this period. The main implication was that a new and higher level of power resources had been accumulated or, at least, was contemplated being created by the proponent actor. Even if the leading actor's plans failed (as Kusumasumantri's did for the most part), the perception of their intent caused its political rivals to react either out of the immense distress or the envy that the all-round state of competition had induced.

The 1955 Elections

The epitome of party competition in the Indonesian context was, of course, the elections for Parliament and the Constituent Assembly that were held in the later part of 1955. Although these two events marked the zenith of party activity in and among the islands and peoples of Indonesia up to that time—thereby suggesting the vitality of "Indonesian democracy"—in fact, the parties' reluctance to engage in these tests of their popular standing prior to, and following, the passage of the Elections Law in 1953 hinted at their own unspoken appreciation of the unsettled political parameters of the Indonesian context and their roles in it. Thus, Indonesia's two elections were not about concrete issues or programmes, policies or practices—they were about identifying who would establish the broadest and as yet unrealized limits and conditions of Indonesian political life and, indeed, of Indonesia as such. In short, the elections were about the transformation of the parties' "unreal positions" into real and realistic reflections of popular reality.[51] The parties showed this to be the case both in the manner in which they campaigned and in their reactions to the election returns.

Indonesia's first general election campaign began as soon as the Elections Law was signed by President Sukarno on 4 April 1953. While the length of the campaign, almost two-and-a-half years in duration, was unanticipated, the infighting, indecision, and organizational chaos that grudgingly made it possible was not. The nature of the inter- and intra-party conflict that dominated this period revolved around the issue of controlling the elaborate structures created specifically to register voters. Acting in this way, the parties and their personnel seemed to stress the priority of the immediate rewards that could accrue to them from within this structure over the more enduring benefit associated with large numbers of votes.

The arduous nature of obtaining votes in the Indonesian context evoked a common strategic response and divergent tactical responses from the competing parties; both types of response suggested the parties' overall powerlessness in a context of unreality. By this, I mean to suggest that at these two distinct levels the parties' electioneering behaviour illustrated not only the ambiguity of their individual positions, but the overall condition of powerlessness and political obscurity of the Indonesian context that necessarily caused such uncertainty. In other words, the two-year long campaign period was equally and effectively the country's first organized effort to ascertain its own social and political dimensions and standing as it was the parties' first effort to bring the people occupying that socio-political zone into formal politics. Thus, I mean to assert that the political parties acted in a strategic manner that confirmed not only their (individual and collective) lack of widespread power across Indonesia, but their lack of knowledge about where popular sympathies lay. Further, given whatever popular power Indonesia's parties imagined they possessed as separate representative entities, the different tactics they pursued with regard to that support disguised their common organizational weakness at the national territorial level.

The government's careful and detailed endeavour to register tens of millions of individual Indonesian voters (which was tantamount to conducting the first national census since 1930), was in contrast to the diffuse, if not somewhat simple and presumptive, appeal made to them by the political parties. The leading parties recognized the value of appealing to the village vote, where the vast majority of Indonesians lived, and undertook to frame their message within terms that were comprehensible to these millions. Accordingly, the message they sent was formulated for the most part from the spacious yet vague verbiage of faiths and beliefs of recognized religious and ethnic communities, respectively.[52] Paradoxically, it was the argument made by President Sukarno (whose position was not contested in the up-coming elections), in January 1953 about the necessity of superseding clear but particularistic expressions of faith or ethnic identity in favour of the wider yet less popularly meaningful tenets of *Pancasila* that hastened the promotion of precisely such lesser views. From that point forward, "primary importance attached to issues of a more purely ideological character, and particularly to the Islam versus nationalism issue."[53] By acting in this non-specific and airy fashion, Indonesia's parties showed the absence of a consensus on the political direction for Indonesia, suggesting thereby a more fundamental lack of true national reflection on, and achievement of, the form and content of this new country.

It was even more evident that the very form and content of Indonesia remained in question as the parties developed their electioneering tactics. Since the parties were not inhibited by the limits of shared political fundamentals (save the recognition of each other's existence) that would have informed a common conception of Indonesia's political direction, for the most part they articulated uncommon interests and acted to reinforce the priority of narrow self-interest. Thus, the parties sought out readily available supporters in the bureaucracy and elsewhere in the government, or those clearly pre-subscribing to particularistic beliefs. Such political opportunism appeared in a number of forms. At one end was Masjumi's confident claim to hold the sympathies of the mass of "true believers." In numerical terms, the party believed its supporters numbered between 50 and 75 per cent of the electorate, in which case it was profoundly confident that it would be swept to power and would alone form the government. In any event, during the campaign, Masjumi's confidence became an excuse not to exert itself beyond its self-imposed Islamic parameters and its leaders generally confined their activities to excoriating the Communist threat or Sukarno's alleged slights against Muslims. For the Nationalists, who had already demonstrated their lack of firm and specific ideological commitments in the DPR, the campaign became a chance to consolidate their hold over the bureaucratic niches that their sympathizers already occupied by attempting to rally "nationalist" sentiment around such nodes at the national, provincial, and village levels. The PNI, expecting a serious loss to its power in the new DPR, seemed to concentrate its political energies on keeping these bureaucratic strongholds secure rather than engaging in a wider campaign that could easily dissipate its energy. Other parties based their appeal on narrow (and therefore electorally limiting) religious grounds,[54] bases of ethnic identity,[55] and function.[56] Organized attempts to forge wider, nationalistic bases of identity inspired the leaders of groups on the left,[57] and on the right,[58] but it was generally conceded (even by the PKI which sought in 1953 to delay passage of the elections bill[59]) that not enough popular support could be gained on these grounds among Indonesia's many different peoples and islands to thrust this type of party to prominence, let alone into power, in these elections.

Altogether, at the close of registrations in late 1954, eighty-three organizations and individuals planned to contest 260 Parliamentary seats, which were divided among Indonesia's sixteen electoral divisions. Slight changes in the number and type of contestants from then until election day (29 September 1955) only reaffirmed that the motives of the participants were in the main narrowly conceived and their support even more narrowly based. For instance, following the registration of the Greater Indonesia Association (*Persatuan Indonesia Raya*—PIR), which held 18 seats in the appointative DPR, its leadership split and formed two groups. While the successor groups led by Wongsonegoro and Hazairin advocated Javanese and Outer Island points of view respectively, the element of personal ambition seemed to have played a part at least equal to that of insular perspective in the demise of the PIR. As with the creation of new parties generally, the fission that the PIR underwent seemed necessary to improve some ambitious individuals' chances of being elected. Along the same lines, we may understand the disappearance of several "parties" between the moment of their registration and election day as being due to a lack of individual, not group, stamina.

Whether guided by the vague signposts of faith, the hazy exhortations of nationalism, or the allusions of charismatic individuals, a remarkably high number of Indonesians (91.54 per cent of a total registered electorate of approximately 42.6 million in a national population of 77,987,879) voted for their first elective Parliament. While this vote was a massive and seemingly unifying affirmation of the Indonesian's people's desire to be represented within the nation's highest elected institution, the organized interests and individuals' organizations from among which the voters could select—and did elect in their diversity to the DPR—created the bases for new divisions (as in the case of the PIR), reinforced existing ones, and cast light on potential differences around which to organize and precipitate future political contests.

On first impression, and given that the campaign had spawned the creation of more organized groups and individuals subscribing to ever more competing political visions than had previously existed, its outcome seemed to have reproduced the worst aspects of the appointative DPR. Whereas prior to the elections Indonesians were involuntarily and ineffectively represented by 20 separate groups, afterwards they voluntarily seated members from 28 distinct groups which thereafter organized themselves into 17 competing parliamentary fractions. Reflecting on these results, Vice-President Mohammad Hatta remarked startlingly that Indonesia's new Parliament "included fifteen parties with five members, or less."[60] At the other end of the spectrum, the electorate had returned similarly large numbers of members from PNI, Masjumi, NU, and PKI, thereby giving these parties positions of paramountcy in the new DPR (see Table 1). In so doing, however, the voters had also created the conditions that made yet another coalition government inevitable. The fact that seventy per cent of the new deputies had no previous parliamentary experience, moreover, made solving Indonesia's immediate and chronic political problems even more difficult at the formal level.

TABLE 1

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION BEFORE AND AFTER 1955

Party	Number of Votes	%	Number of Seats	Number of Seats in Appointative Parliament
PNI	8,434,653	22.3	57	42
Masjumi	7,903,886	20.9	57	44
NU	6,955,141	18.4	45	8
PKI	6,176,914	16.4	39	17
PSII	1,091,160	2.9	8	4
Parkindo	1,003,325	2.6	8	5
Partai Katolik	777,740	2.0	6	8
PSI	753,191	2.0	5	14
IPKI	541,306	1.4	4	-
Perti	483,014	1.3	4	1
PRN	242,125	0.6	2	13
Partai Buruh	224,167	0.6	2	6
GPPS	219,985	0.6	2	-
PRI	206,261	0.5	2	-
PPPRI	200,419	0.5	2	-
Partai Murba	199,588	0.5	2	4
Baperki	178,887	0.5	1	-
PIR-Wongsonegoro	178,481	0.5	1	3
Gerinda	154,792	0.4	1	-
Permai	149,287	0.4	1	-
Persatuan Dayak	146,054	0.4	1	-
PIR-Hazairin	114,644	0.3	1	18
PPTI	85,131	0.2	1	-

TABLE 1—Continued

Party	Number of Votes	%	Number of Seats	Number of Seats in Appointative Parliament
AKUI	81,454	0.2	1	-
Partai Rakjat Desa	77,919	0.2	1	-
PRIM	72,523	0.2	1	-
Acoma	64,514	0.2	1	-
R. Sudjono	53,305	0.1	1	-
Other parties	1,022,433	2.7	-	46
Total	37,785,299	100.0	257	233

SOURCE: A. van Marle, "The First Indonesian Parliamentary Elections," *Indonesië* 9 (1956):258.

At this level, Indonesia's new parliamentarians neither subscribed to a fundamental vision of the country's political future nor the many lesser visions suggested by their party or fractional affiliations. Rather, the distribution of the popular vote and the corresponding allotment of seats showed that insularity was the fundamental basis of orientation around which Indonesians both informally aligned and formally divided themselves (see Table 2). Whereas the export-oriented and largely Muslim populations of the Outer Islands, especially in Sumatra, opted to rally behind Masjumi's opaque vision of the country, the people of Java subscribed to a vision of Indonesia that placed their island and its needs at the centre of political and economic life by channelling their votes to parties that drew the overwhelming bulk of their strength from this one island: PNI, NU, and PKI. Finally, in those areas where these four parties together failed to obtain a simple majority, that is, in Maluku, the Lesser Sundas, and in parts of Sulawesi, the populations concerned became practically excluded from the two foregoing conceptions of Indonesia and their corresponding power groups. In this fashion, the peoples of this third portion of Indonesian territory, which for all practical purposes constituted a rejuvenated "Great East," had a separate insular identity imposed upon them as a result of the 1955 elections. The tyranny of insularity was most sharply felt, perhaps, by the people of East Kalimantan, who were unrepresented in the DPR despite guarantees in the Election Law that they were to receive three representatives.

Casting Indonesian political developments in this light helps to correct the misleading sense of despair that surrounded conventional assessments both of the parliamentary elections and of the behaviour of its participants. Soedjatmoko, expressing the typical sense of disillusionment about Indonesian political parties during this period, claimed that

> instead of developing into organs mediating between the needs, problems and wishes of the electorate, and the purposes, limitations and problems at the level of the national government, the parties became mere instruments in the power play of their leader.[61]

Yet to be disillusioned entails a prior condition of being illusioned; Soedjatmoko's and others' disillusionment arises from a flawed perspective and not from the political "failures" of Indonesian political actors. By adopting the premise that the unitarian Indonesian Republic functioned as a party-dominated liberal democracy or as a functioning political system from its inception, observers who shared this view would (and did) have great difficulty recognizing that the quest for power among party actors,[62] indeed, within them, was really only beginning after 1949. The election campaign and its outcome merely intensified the struggle that was necessary if Indonesia's formal governmental system was to (at the very least) build linkages with the informal realm and reflect popular sentiment. The singular and unprecedented achievement of the 1955 parliamentary election was to reflect popular sentiments on a truly Indonesia-wide basis; the many messages of popular support that were both sent and received in the election served as the first certain indicators of strength that would allow for Indonesia's parties to move from beyond the unreal corridors of power into real power.

The Political Parties after 1955
Organizational Expressions of Insularity from Above

Many observers of, and participants in, the parliamentary election expected it to produce a united government that would finally address the country's pressing problems. By presuming in this fashion that an election was all that was necessary to rectify—rather than to help create—an Indonesia-wide political order, Indonesian politics immediately following the election results would necessarily disappoint. While the formal results were not issued until 1 March 1956, the general tendency of the voters was apparent by early October 1955. The fact that PNI, Masjumi, NU, and PKI were favoured to a far greater degree than any other parties seemed overshadowed by the fact that voters supported these four parties to an almost equal extent. The basis was laid for the impression of collective indecision among the voters and, once created, it was allowed to overwhelm the equally significant political reality that these four parties had each created their own "national" (island-centred) followings for the first time. This first, and reluctant induction of the popular element had brought success to only four parties, each of which recognized that this process of popular incorporation was incomplete and incompletely fought. On these grounds, and with their eyes set on future elections, the parties continued to behave in

TABLE 2

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR SUPPORT PER ELECTORAL DISTRICT

Party	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
PNI	14	19	11	1	2	-	3	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	3
Masjumi	7	6	13	2	4	6	6	1	2	-	1	5	1	1	2
NU	20	11	5	1	1	-	1	-	3	-	-	2	-	-	1
PKI	14	15	5	1	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSII	-	1	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-
Parkindo	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	2	1	2	-
Partai Katolik	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
PSI	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
IPKI	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Perti	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PRN	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Partai Buruh	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GPPS	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PRI	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PPPRI	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Partai Murba	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baperki	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PIR-Wongsonegoro	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gerinda	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Permai	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Persatuan Dayak	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 2—Continued

Party	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
PIR-Hazairin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
PPTI	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
AKUI	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Partai Rakjat Desa	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PRIM	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Acoma	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R. Sudjono	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	63	62	49	5	9	11	15	3	5	-	5	11	2	9	8

A=East Java; B=Central Java; C=West Java; D=Greater Djakarta; E=South Sumatra; F=Central Sumatra; G=North Sumatra; H=West Kalimantan; I=South Kalimantan; J=East Kalimantan; K=North and Central Sulawesi; L=South and Southeast Sulawesi; M=Maluku; N=East Nusa Tenggara; O=West Nusa Tenggara.

SOURCE: A. van Marle, "The First Indonesian Parliamentary Elections," *Indonesië* 9 (1956):261.

a manner identical to that before the election: they sought out easy advantages and resources in the formal realm, and were confident that the struggle among them could remain there for the time being. To those sharing the belief that Indonesia's first elections would check these perversions of the "Indonesian political system," the parties' resumption of narrow politicking was perceived as disastrous.

Conversely, by recognizing that the four large parties had accomplished, however reluctantly, the revolutionary feat of seeking out, and winning popular support (on an insular basis), their continued politicking marked their ongoing search for and creation of power in a context whose shape and content was now at least achieving some definition. The present and self-consciously perceived inability of any one political party to define the shape and content of the Indonesian political context was clearly reflected in the parties' comparative inactivity during the December 1955 election for members of the Constituent Assembly—the very body that was to formally establish Indonesia's character in a new and permanent Constitution! Indonesian leaders were thus more concerned with holding Cabinet posts and government positions, and perhaps thereby realizing control over additional resources in the bureaucracy or economy; long-range issues of principle, such as the state's character, invited no serious consideration at this very early point in the wider political competition—the very essence of which was to realize and actualize the bases of an eventual Indonesian state.

The ongoing struggle to accumulate power resources and obstruct one's opponents was displayed as clearly by the behaviour of members of the caretaker Harahap Cabinet as by their elected successors who formed the second Ali Cabinet. The broad effort of the Harahap Cabinet to discredit and weaken the PNI prior to the parliamentary elections widened and intensified dangerously into a scramble to seize any advantage, however temporary, when it became clear that its anticipated electoral sweep was really an exercise in self-delusion. The coalition parties, free from their great expectations and no longer insulated by their pretence to unequalled popular support, now gave expression to the realization that no feasible plan existed to help them overcome the support that would surely be registered for both PNI and PKI in the up-coming Constituent Assembly elections. Aware that the constructive option could not be realized, the Cabinet sought to destroy whatever support existed for PNI in government agencies and the bureaucracy or elsewhere in the formal realm. PNI supporters in the regions and in the *Pamong Praja* were early targets of restrictive Ministerial decisions; far-reaching efforts were undertaken, with significant success, to replace PNI party members in the Ministries of Information, Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and Economic Affairs with members hailing from the parties in Cabinet. The decision by the PIR Minister of Information, Sjamsuddin Sutan Makmur, to help Masjumi, PSI, and PIR-Hazairin members organize their own employees union to rival that of the PNI was the clearest demonstration yet that the political competition was not only widening, but that it had the potential to become surprisingly constructive through its participants' embrace of organization.

The Cabinet's anxious and accelerated quest for resources caused it to venture beyond the usual political playgrounds of the bureaucracy into the same sensitive military issues that had caused its predecessor to collapse. The process of selecting a new Army Chief-of-Staff, which had already proven itself to be politically dangerous, failed to occasion partisan restraint on the Cabinet's part. The Cabinet formally appointed A. H. Nasution to the post on 15 October 1955, by-passing the three officers short-listed by the General Staff. While this choice was not met with hostility from Army officers, mainly because they recognized that those officers on the General Staff's list reflected the military's narrow standard of seniority and not necessarily their broad acceptability, the political effect of choosing an individual known for his earlier pro-PSI leanings was not lost on observers or the Army. In contrast to the unusual finesse shown in Nasution's appointment, the Cabinet acted extremely clumsily in effecting personnel changes in the Air Force. In this instance, the Prime Minister and Vice-President unilaterally and unexpectedly appointed a long-time rival of the Air Force Chief-of-Staff to serve as his new Deputy. Despite both the rejection of this appointment by the Air Force Chief, Vice-Marshal Suryadarma, and then his resignation, the Cabinet announced its unswerving determination to proceed. After open and embarrassing disturbances broke out within the Air Force, the President intervened and, after several months, managed to reverse both Suryadarma's resignation and his rival's appointment.

As if to herald its eventual defeat on its policy toward the Air Force, the Cabinet suffered a more significant loss during the election for the Constituent Assembly, held on 15 December 1955. While voters by the millions selected representatives from parties in the Cabinet, the size of this support and the direction in which the electorate appeared to be heading was distinctly to the disadvantage of Indonesia's last appointative rulers. As Feith remarked, there was

> an over-all trend for all medium- and small-sized parties to lose votes and for the four largest parties to gain them. But one major difference . . . emerged: the PNI gained 635,565 more votes than in September, a gain of 7.5 per cent, while the Masjumi, the sole exception to the general trend for the four large parties to add to their appeal, lost 114,267 votes.[63]

In an Assembly whose membership ultimately numbered 542, the four largest parties (PNI, Masjumi, NU, and PKI) secured 117, 110, 90, and 59 seats respectively.[64] The surge in support for both PNI and PKI, and the NU's bewilderment at its own surprising showing in yet another election, eased the way for the creation of the second Ali Cabinet in March 1956.

The relative civility of the negotiations among Indonesia's parties that led to the creation of its first elected government belied the intense (but increasingly less disguised) competition for resources and power. The addition of the dynamic element borne by the first organized expressions of popular sentiment to the static condition of uncertain and even unrealized formal nationwide power profoundly changed that competition: the political constant of Indonesian actors to seek advantage wherever it lay was popularly and positively altered to become the creation of advantage. Accordingly, the Nationalists began to take what they felt was their just share of posts, privileges, and prizes and, backed by the indisputable measure of popular sanction, proved more determined and vindictive than their predecessors in doing so. In Parliament, the PNI established its control by securing seven of the ten committee chairmanships and the speakership; it also won the chairmanship of the Constituent Assembly. "Elsewhere—whether in the ministries at home or the diplomatic missions abroad—Ali Sastroamidjojo got rid of Masjumi supporters whenever he could."[65] In short, the formal sphere was no longer perceived by Indonesia's most popular party as the accommodating political purgatory it had been to all comers before the elections. It was now consistently and consciously possible for the largest among Indonesia's parties to begin to effect exclusive control over previously shared political spaces. Indeed, had Masjumi emerged as Indonesia's most popular party, it, too, could have been expected to act in this manner as suggested by the warning it issued in early 1956 that it would "create a situation under which communism cannot breathe and under which there is no scope for communism."[66] As the electoral victor, however, it fell to the PNI to exercise its real power where none had truly existed before—in the formal realm.

In securing its hold over the Cabinet and Central Government ministries, the Nationalists effectively pushed Masjumi into the periphery of formal politics. From this unfamiliar position, Masjumi's leaders recognized that their prospects could only be improved in the near future by expanding the formal political realm itself. Since on the view of Masjumi's leaders their party "would be permanently handicapped by the existing rules of the democratic game, they decided to ask for a change in the rules" by proposing the creation of a second, territorially based parliamentary chamber designed to correct for Java's political preponderance.[67] Failing in this endeavour, the Masjumi party leader and former Prime Minister, Natsir, made an appeal for the creation of an extraordinary Cabinet to be headed by Mohammad Hatta, the Sumatran-born, non-party, former Vice-President (he resigned on 1 December 1956). In this way, Masjumi leaders proposed to breach the very limits of the formal political realm and thereby counter the PNI's broadening of its drive to power and resources. Accordingly, Natsir's advocacy of a new national leadership was thus not so much an insistence "that [Hatta's revolutionary] fame was a more valid source of political authority than the mandate of the people," but rather an expression of a growing political competition wherein the fundamental political questions of a new state were the subject and object of consciously radical action.

On 26 December 1956, the League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence (*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia*—IPKI) withdrew its minister from the Ali Cabinet and two days later the majority of delegates to a Masjumi conference called for the end of the second Ali Cabinet; on 9 January 1957 Natsir announced his intention to precipitate the end of the elected Cabinet by withdrawing Masjumi's five ministers. Later that month, further signs of a conflict based on emerging insular identities appeared when "the Sumatran branches of the NU urged Idham Chalid, the party chairman, to follow suit [with Natsir] and threatened a break."[68] Despite having lost its majority, the Ali Cabinet survived on Communist goodwill for two months; the Cabinet's (and PNI's) final reckoning came in March 1957 when the remaining coalition parties decided to return their mandate to President Sukarno.

Organizational Expressions of Insularity from Below

On 14 March 1957 President Sukarno acknowledged the true dimensions of the political problem of Indonesia by declaring a country-wide State of War and Siege (*Staat van Oorlog en Beleg*—SOB). The declaration of martial law may be viewed as a signal of the profoundly important political progress that had been made by Indonesia's parties—at the expense both of their status as parties and to the party-centred parliamentary system—in advancing the prospects of creating a real Indonesian state and society. In contrast to the conventional view that regards the rise of the Sukarno-Army duumvirate as an outgrowth of party and parliamentary chaos, this view of the SOB holds that the extraordinary declaration of martial law marked a new and higher level of political growth: the parties were becoming less identifiable as discrete parliamentary parties and more identifiable as opposing movements loosely articulating and shaping concerns about and organizing the territorial and popular components of an Indonesian state and society. The formal arrangements of a parliamentary democracy could no longer contain the conflict that was inherent within such a revolutionary dynamic and, as such, had to be superseded.

While Indonesian political actors had encountered difficulties in composing a government before without resorting to country-wide martial law, its eventuation in March 1957 spoke to the now apparent results of the simultaneously destructive and constructive tendencies of Indonesian politics since 1949. The first tendency, outlined above and culminating in the elections of 1955, related to the revolutionary effects of the parties' competitive activities. Between 1949 and 1957, the parties had destroyed the pretence of a unified and effective Central Government in the formal sphere and had inducted the popular element into politics, but only incompletely so and with discouragingly insular results. The second tendency developed from 1949 among actors who were without formal political representation but were no less determined than Indonesia's political parties to acquire power and resources in the archipelago. For just as Indonesia's political parties had attempted to create real bases of support and power in the unreal formal structures since 1949, others, similarly animated by the lessons of the rival state-building strategies that unfolded during the Indonesian Revolution, operated beyond or beneath the formal power structures to effect the same destructive-cum-constructive end.

This latter group of political actors undertook to exploit conditions after 1949 in which the Central Government exercised territorial, economic-administrative, and social control in name only over significant portions of "Indonesian" territory. The period of post-independence was thus not only characterized by the competitive partitioning of Indonesia's formal political structures among party actors, it was also filled with numerous attempts by non-party actors to create the missing pieces of the Indonesian context by building new states and societies from below. For as the political parties devoted themselves to parcelling up the spoils of office, actors from below began to supplant the fiction of Central Government control with the reality of their own incipient states in ever widening areas of the archipelago. In this way, the Government's control over Indonesia's territory, economy, and society was shown to be hollow from the outset; with time, even the formal possibility of the centre asserting its authority was diminished as successive Cabinets voluntarily relinquished control over some powers.

Even before the Dutch conferred the status of independence on RIS, the first major effort to define the Indonesian state and society since the 1948 Madiun uprising began in earnest in the hills of West Java. There, on 17 August 1949, Kartosuwirdjo proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia*—NII), an act, it is important to point out, that followed from the easy success the Dutch enjoyed against the Republic during their "Second Police Action." That success had created a "vacuum in people's minds about having a state" and prompted intense measures "by extreme leftist and rightist elements who made use of the confusion to fill in this vacuum."[69] Kartosuwirdjo thus oversaw both the conceptual and practical aspects of building a new Indonesian state and society from his stronghold in West Java.

Enacting the directing idea of an Indonesian Islamic State, he commanded his followers not so much to resist the Republic, but to expose and supersede its pretension to power:

> after the attack by the Dutch on territories of the Republic of Indonesia, group after group of the Army ran away from Jogja, especially those of the Siliwangi Army; they came here to become irregular troops creating chaos in the territories of the Indonesian Islamic State. In no way at all do they appreciate or obey the leadership of the Indonesian Islamic State, and therefore we issue an order with regard to all troops who come from Jogja to the Indonesian Islamic State, that the Islamic Army . . . should be at the ready for action to destroy those irregular troops.
>
> We must not waver and pretend not to know the orders, we only have the Islamic State of Indonesia. The Republic has been wiped out and no longer has any authority or power . . ..
>
> Destroy their power, disarm them as far as possible. This order is directed to the Armed Forces of the Indonesian Islamic State, the Army of the Darul Islam Heroes, the State Security Body, and the people of Indonesia.[70]

By showing no regard for Republican claims, Kartosuwirdjo focused his attention on the unrealized political possibilities apparent in the Indonesian context, roundly asserting "in view of the interests of the State, wherever necessary and as far as is necessary," members of DI's armed organizations would be allowed to "take any measure in keeping with military law in time of revolution."[71] Clearly, the DI represented a distinctive (and distinctively independent) state building project that nevertheless shared a directing idea of "Indonesia" similar to that of its Republican rival.

The claim made by the leadership of DI (or any other entity) to have created or to have been in the process of creating a new state can only be assessed in relation to its record of attaining and controlling the key power resources of territory, popular support, and arms, while creating patterns of government linking all three.[72] For the period under consideration, that is from 1949 to 1957, Kartosuwirdjo demonstrated that indeed the Indonesian Islamic State was both real and growing in its command of resources. From its original territorial base in West Java, the DI's control of territory broadened throughout the archipelago to include disparate and non-contiguous areas. In 1950, large areas of South Sulawesi under the military and political control of Kahar Muzakar and the Indonesian People's Army (*Tentara Rakjat Indonesia*—TRI) declared for the DI. One year later, Ibnu Hadjar and the Union of Oppressed Peoples in South Kalimantan also affirmed a loose connection with Kartosuwirdjo's DI. On 21 September 1953, Tengku Daud Beureueh, basing himself on Kartosuwirdjo's 1949 declaration of the Indonesian Islamic State, declared that the "*daerah* [region] of Atjeh and the surrounding regions" would join with the DI. Additional centres of DI activity included Central Java, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, and Halmahera.[73]

The amount of popular support that the DI garnered is difficult to determine, although the effects of its activities on the people living in the areas of its operations are not. The total number of armed DI supporters—ranging from several thousand with Kartosuwirdjo, to between 2,000-5,000 with Hadjar, and between 10,000-30,000 with Muzakar—was clearly small compared to the widespread support that this leadership could call upon from members of the *ummat Islam*. Thus, it was a reasonable claim to make—and the Communists made it often—that the country's Muslim-oriented political parties actually harboured many DI supporters. On a more sinister note, there was evidence in the early 1950s that the DI had forged a parallel government that included senior leaders of the country's largest Muslim parties; this government was to be activated by its leaders in the instance of a frontal clash with the Communists. While DI's appeal remained largely latent among party members of the Islamic faith, among indisputably Islamic populations and areas, such as Aceh, its call prompted wholesale and relatively well-organized opposition to the Republic, its political forms, and its Armed Forces. Thus, when Daud Beureueh announced his intention to join with the DI, the reasons he cited for his decision—that the Central Government was "anti-Islamic and pro-Communist"—were compelling enough to win the support of large numbers of the general population, the merchant class, and government functionaries. The latter group effectively turned Aceh's administrative apparatus over to Daud's control,[74] thus easing the task of creating a state-within-a-state that was at the base of all DI endeavours.

Success in achieving that end was more apparent in Aceh than in the other areas of DI operations, such as West Java. There, Daud's accomplishments took on the theoretically important characteristic in revolutionary situations of sovereignty, that is, the successful and effective defiance by one popularly supported actor of ostensibly binding decisions issued by another actor over the same subject population. Indeed, one observer, writing in 1957, noted that the DI had precipitated a situation where

> the Atjeh area, save for the cities of Kutaradja and Sabang, remains virtually closed to ordinary commerce and travel. Daud Beureueh and his followers operate little local governments, hold anniversary celebrations of the September 21 proclamation, assess and collect taxes, and conduct rather a flourishing business in smuggling Atjehnese products to Malaya and even Thailand in exchange for foreign currency, foreign goods and foreign arms.[75]

Elsewhere, too, the DI was succeeding in its efforts to establish rudimentary forms of governance. In West Java, for instance, Kartosuwirdjo levied and collected taxes, acted with the same effect as Duad in securing arms, replacements, and supplies, and even offered village protection. Finally, the DI's regional leaders achieved a meaningful and potent level of development by linking their followers to Kartosuwirdjo's over-arching authority and by coordinating their forces through the use of couriers and inter-island *proahs*. In all these respects—territorially, popularly, administratively, and militarily—DI's leaders sought with some success to realize the Indonesian Islamic State and the underlying claim to represent "the Indonesian people."

In the breadth and effectiveness of its challenge to the Republic, the DI had convulsed Indonesia and Indonesians in an unprecedented manner. It is no small distinction to recognize, as Friend has, that "many more Indonesians died as a result of the Dar'ul Islam Rebellion . . . than were killed as a consequence of the Indonesian revolution."[76] The superlative nature of this conflict is itself the clearest indication that the politics that followed the Indonesian Revolution were in fact more revolutionary than those which preceded it. To reiterate, the reason why Indonesian politics after 1949 was (and ought to be perceived as) revolutionary related less to any one actor's "revolutionary" intentions—explicit or otherwise—and more to the widening dynamic that arose from a political competition over territory and people in which the participants themselves recognized the initial absence of exclusive claims of authority and monopolies of decision. It is for this reason of context, therefore, that we may understand not only the political parties' "irresponsible" activities and the DI's murderous enterprise, but the lesser and less appreciated endeavours of other actors who also advanced claims to rule over the same "Indonesia" and "Indonesian people," or merely just a part of the same.

Thus, at the very point in time when the "unitarian movement" was sweeping away the remnants of the Dutch-created federal states, armed elements struck at the tenuous (and sometimes strictly formal) links of their regions with and within the emerging Indonesian entity. In 1950, three portentous blows were delivered against the Republic by Captain Raymond Pierre Westerling and the Army of the *Ratu Adil* (*Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil*—APRA) in West Java, Captain Andi Azis and his troops in South Sulawesi, and Dr. Soumokil and loyal elements of the defunct KNIL in the Moluccas. Westerling drew upon Javanese messianism and the opportunities offered by a political context in which even he, as an intensely despised ex-KNIL commander, could create an organized following which extended even into the Cabinet and use it to frontally assault the Central (RIS) Government. The "eerie coalition of renegade Dutch, fanatical Muslims, feudal Indonesians (or, more properly, Arabs), capitalistic Chinese, plus other ingredients commonly thought to be foreign and imperialistic" that Westerling assembled ultimately failed in its plans, but not without badly damaging both the confidence of Republican leaders and their pretence to established control, even in areas proximate to the capital.

The threat posed by Azis also touched directly upon Republican control of such fundamentals as territory. In this instance, the very question of central control was raised when Azis and his ostensibly pro-Republican guerilla army blocked the arrival of TNI forces in Makassar. Adding to Jakarta's problems was the presence of three other active military forces in the area—Dutch troops, Dutch colonial troops, and Dutch-sponsored indigenous guerrillas. Ultimately, the resistance presented specifically by Azis proved weak, and he capitulated within weeks on 14 April 1950. Under Kahar Muzakar's direction, however, the general beliefs that animated Azis proved sufficiently popular and enduring to serve as the basis for creating the Indonesian People's Army (*Tentara Rakjat Indonesia*—TRI), in effect the Sulawesian contingent of the TII. Thus, the immediate problem facing the Central Government of either absorbing or overwhelming the diverse military forces in the area grew quantitatively and qualitatively to become a struggle over territory, people, and identity when it was apparent that its control over these was merely formal in nature.

The third attempt to challenge the Republic was different from the foregoing cases in that its proponents sought to destroy even the possibility of an archipelago-wide Indonesian state. On 26 April 1950, Dr. Soumokil, the NIT Attorney-General, proclaimed the independent and sovereign Republic of the South Moluccas (*Republik Maluku Selatan*—RMS) on Ambon and Ceram and in so doing barred Jakarta's missions from landing on those islands. Freed from earlier engagements against Westerling in West Java and Azis in Sulawesi, the Indonesian Armed Forces now struck at the defenders of the RMS on 28 September 1950. In contrast to the easy victories earned by the authorities earlier in the year, victory would not come for years against the RMS, which enjoyed high morale, the support of a government-in-exile in the Netherlands, international contacts, and an effective guerrilla fighting force. When taken singly, however, neither the APRA, the TRI, nor the RMS effected any enduring accomplishments. Contrariwise, when taken together, these three movements helped other actors to draw the very significant—indeed revolutionary—lesson that state building was not only possible, but necessary, and necessarily plural in nature given the demonstrable unreality of an existing Indonesian state.

Coping with Unreality: The Formal State

Even at the formal level, either through the practical measures or conceptual positions it adopted after the transfer of sovereignty, the Central Government inadvertently conceded the reality of the rising revolutionary forces around it. This point may be borne out through an examination of the Government's actions and policies on the issues of vital importance to any new state, namely its territory, administration, and economy. On each of these issues, those formally charged with governing Indonesia showed their inability to do so because theirs was rule without power. At the formal level, national policies between 1950 and 1957 evolved to reflect the Government's actual condition of impotence. That is to say, by easily shedding its formal responsibilities and powers, usually to the regions and their governments, the Central Government was ironically harmonizing appearances with realities by deflating the former. What the Government actually accomplished through legislative or regulatory changes, therefore, was quite revealing of the emergent revolutionary situation at both the formal and informal levels in the Indonesian context. Formal enactments served paradoxically both to camouflage and to reveal the Government's weakness.

While the Government and the Indonesian Armed Forces were publicly conducting military operations against the DI and the sundry movements noted above, they were also waging and apparently losing the concurrent but less visible struggle to control territory and people more generally. In 1950, for instance, while Sukarno served as the RIS President, he issued three Presidential Decrees (numbers 160, 169, and 204) that placed the Residency of South Sulawesi, and the *daerah*s (regions) of

Central Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, Minahasa, Sangir and Talaud, North Maluku, and South Maluku in a state of seige (*keadaan darurat perang*). These zones were in addition to those areas already in a state of war (*keadaan perang*), namely two *afdeling* and seven *onderafdeling* in Kalimantan, areas in a state of siege, including the whole of Indonesia, and areas under special provisions, namely one *afdeling* and one residency in Kalimantan, and the five provinces of West Java (including Jakarta), Central Java (including the Special Area of Yogyakarta), East Java (excluding the Residency of Madura), North Sumatra, and Central Sumatra.

Between 1950 and 1952, changes to the status of these and other areas indicated that the government required enhanced powers to control a worsening situation. Whereas Presidential Decree No. 116 of 1952 showed the Government's progress by ending the state of seige in the province of South Sumatra, Presidential Decree No. 174 of 1952 reflected the more sombre fact that control was becoming more difficult to assert in densely populated areas of the archipelago. By the provisions of the latter Decree, areas affected by a state of war (where, notably, such measures were originally enacted not by the Republicans but by the Dutch in 1940, 1946, or 1948) or a state of seige were normalized.[77] Caught between the competing demands of establishing effective control and demonstrating its independent mindedness, the national leadership decided that the provisions of Decree 174 would reflect its determination to place the bulk of the Indonesian people under emergency rule while ironically abrogating the very provisions, of colonial vintage, that would have theoretically enabled them to assert that control. Thus, the status of the provinces of West Java (including Jakarta), Central Java (including the Special Area of Jogjakarta), and East Java (still excluding the Residency of Madura), and South Sulawesi was down-graded from a state of seige to a state of war. Furthermore, areas not previously singled out for emergency rule now fell under a state of war, namely the islands of Seram and Ambon and the Regency of the Riau Islands.

While the Government's provisions subtly but effectively conceded that political conditions in the country were deteriorating, in the face of the pressing issue the parties conducted themselves as if these provisions were merely inadvertent. For alongside the evident lack of wherewithal to combat threats to its territory, the Government and the parties were hindered by a politico-conceptual limitation. The Government and the parties forming it were keen to avoid suggesting that the available measures, which were holdovers from the Dutch, were the appropriate tools to solve the country's problems. Instead, Indonesia's leaders formulated emergency provisions that only half-heartedly met the challenge to the country while whole-heartedly permitting them to carry on their narrow struggle for power and resources.

Evidence for this claim is to be found in the profoundly revealing and portentous measures contained in Presidential Decrees 175 and 176, which were due to come into effect at the same time as those of Decree 174. Decree 175, which addressed the procedural relations between civil and military authorities, sought for the first time since 1927 to recast these links to favour civilian domination, generally, and party influence, specifically. Consistent with the dynamic that animated the parties and which was outlined above, this Decree presaged and prepared the way for civilian interference in military affairs, notwithstanding the growing evidence that

Indonesia's mounting regional and territorial problems compelled a more coherent and more distinctly military response. Decree 176 evidenced the collective inability of Indonesian officials to resolve the country's problems by showing their preference to indulge in deceptive imagery. In this Decree, Indonesia's territorial waters (*perairan teritoor*) were placed in a state of war, thereby reaffirming a portion of the colonial provisions that were rescinded in Decree 174! Yet for all practical purposes, it was not Indonesia's waters that were being contested, but rather its land. The Central Government's willingness to so easily commit itself to enforcing the rigorous and demanding standards of control over its (uncontested) waters conflicted sharply with its legalistically chaste response with regard to its imperilled land base. The contradiction of being enthusiastic without a cause while being dispassionate in the face of a growing danger suggested the Government's true position of being unable for want of power to effect real control over either Indonesian lands or waters.

Try as they did to sustain the facade of normal politics, by the mid-1950s Indonesia's leaders were compelled to take greater account of the territorial threats facing them. Thus, a disquieting provision was added in the concluding section of Indonesia's Elections Law that would permit "the Government to appoint members for both the Parliament and the Constituent Assembly from districts where 'at the present time the elections cannot be carried out'."[78] When the Parliamentary elections were held on 29 September 1955, those areas in which the various anti-Government movements operated were given until 29 November to complete the election.[79] Neither the electoral process nor the outcome helped to improve Indonesia's territorial problems, for as one observer noted in April 1956, "some of [the affected] areas continue to this day to be so seriously disturbed that they cannot be included on itineraries for the President's speaking tours and are not recommended even for military travel."[80] Precisely such poor conditions were behind President Sukarno's declaration, in December 1956, of a state of war and seige in Sumatra.[81] From there, as history has recorded, Indonesia's emergency regulations had to be modified only slightly to take account of the few areas not already covered by such provisions to bring the whole country into a state of emergency by March 1957.

The Central Government's refusal until 1957 to publicly acknowledge the magnitude of its territorial control problems contrasted with its willingness at a much earlier date to admit of the difficulties in the country's administrative system. In many respects, for Indonesia's leaders it was both easier to acknowledge, and preferable to point out, the administrative challenges that lay ahead than it was to concede their problem of controlling territory. This was the case for two salient reasons. First, it was very difficult for the authorities to conceal the immense damage that had been inflicted by the rapacious policy of the Japanese, conditions of war, the anarchical effects of popular intervention in the name of the Revolution (especially at the local level), and the immensely traumatic effect of a protracted (and ultimately permanent) withdrawal of foreign expertise and skills. Second, however appalling the damage may have been, the nationalists made a virtue of it and used it to buttress their point that the Dutch colonial state had been unwieldy and too interfering in the lives of Indonesians. To some extent, the Central Government even sought to reduce its administrative tasks by purposely neglecting them, believing that this was consistent with its anti-colonial orientation. Indeed, it was this peculiar rationalization that permitted the parties to comfortably explain away the further deterioration of the country's administrative system after 1949, while at the same time allowing them a chance to unobtrusively acquire control over those resources formally designated as administrative in nature.

To party actors of the 1950s, administrative success was measured by their own capacity to enrol members in the state's formal bodies or thwart efforts by others to accomplish the same, and notwithstanding the fact that all these activities sped the decline of formal structures and processes. The parties showed their early and eager conviction in this one, narrow, definition of success when the first proposals for administrative reform in the unitarian Republic were presented as part of a wider attempt to stimulate local government. Basing itself on Law 22 of 1948, discussed in the previous chapter, the Natsir Cabinet issued Regulation No. 39 in 1950. This regulation allowed for the appointment, rather than direct election, of representatives on Regional People's Representative Councils (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah*—DPRD), which were to be formed at the provincial, regency, and municipal levels. The criterion for appointing representatives was their organizational affiliation. On this basis, it was possible for political organizations and their theoretically independent affiliates to obtain representation over and above prescribed limits and bearing no relation at all to real (and largely indeterminate) levels of popular support simply by creating "new" members in their organizational families. As the party chiefly responsible for this Regulation—and for a number of controversial appointments made under its provisions—Masjumi was forced to contend with the parliamentary opposition that the PNI initiated. In this instance, the PNI's success in winning the support of two lesser government parties resulted not only in the end of the Natsir government and the abandonment of Regulation No. 39, but of meaningful and effective administrative reform during the life of Indonesian parliamentary democracy as the Nationalists set in motion the formally destructive political mechanisms of that era. Even though the likelihood of effective administrative reform was minimal in the absence of effective power in Indonesia, the Nationalists successfully dispensed with this theoretical possibility and opened the way for party actors to begin their own pursuit of administrative "success."

The perception of party activities in the Indonesian administrative system between 1950 and 1957 has been largely negative. This is so especially when the apparent selfishness of the parties is contrasted to the immensity of the collective administrative needs of the new country. Speaking from the conventional viewpoint, Legge expressed the basic contradiction in 1961 by asserting that "a major task facing any government in Indonesia today is that of extending its authority to the base of society—of securing 'government in general' in a situation where immediate local consciousness is stronger than any feeling of national identity."[82] To his credit, Legge suspended his normative preferences for "democracy" and his methodological preferences for a systems approach to Indonesia's administrative problems to allow one isolated (but subsequently unexplored) observation that I believe reflects the true dimensions of the power problem confronting Indonesia after 1949. Legge has asserted that "[al]though Indonesia had become an independent sovereign state, its task at the local level was not altogether different from that of an alien government attempting to establish and preserve its authority in the 'subject' society, at least in regard to those matters which touched its own interests."[83] Legge's unfortunate failure to explore the implications of this insight was perhaps caused by his unwillingness to contemplate that Indonesia, in the sense of a united and powerful state conveyed here, did not exist at independence. On Legge's view, the only possible reaction to the "intrusions" of the parties into the country's administrative structures would be negative.

To view the parties in this light is misleading and precludes us from recognizing that in the very paradoxical nature of Indonesia's administrative progress from 1950 to 1957, the bases for national administration were being built. The paradox is double in nature. On the one hand, the Central Government and parties granted significant concessions to the regions despite the unitarian demands of Indonesian nationalism and the Republican conception of citizenship that stressed uniformity. On the other hand, the Central Government made good progress despite a lack of effort and energy in overcoming those administrative obstacles (such as self-government) that most impeded the realization of a new state.

In contrast to the belief that the creation of the unitarian Indonesian Republic strengthened the administrative position of its centre, the politically convenient and wholly reactive behaviour of the Central Government and the parties in the administrative field after 1950 showed that the unitarian accomplishment was hollow and that its leaders exercised power that was strictly formal in nature. Although many commentators have generously imputed political success to the unitarian movement, and thereby overlooked the role of extra-archipelagic actors and their willingness to organize people and resources in the East Indies, they have also failed to appreciate that political convenience, and not political power, compelled the same leaders to accept an essentially colonial administrative system over a large portion of Indonesian territory. Indeed, after 17 August 1950, Indonesia's leaders depended upon both the (Jogjakarta) Republic's Law No. 22 of 1948 and the State of East Indonesia's Law No. 44 of 1950 to give some formal continuity to the new country's local administration. Although political necessity prompted the Government to opt for the administrative convenience of at least having two laws in place, their combination after 1950 tended to weaken any control that may have eventuated from their retention by promoting both the principles and forces of localism expressly upheld in each law. In a situation where one law (Law No. 22) had signalled an important Republican retreat from an earlier expressed preference for a highly centralized administrative system, and the other law (NIT Law No. 44) left local governments with a greater range of powers than elsewhere in Indonesia, it was difficult for a government in Jakarta that pretended to administer the whole nation through these laws to forestall the growth of actors precisely on the basis of local or regional interests that were accorded recognition therein.

The rise and accommodation of regionalism that characterized Indonesian's administrative development between 1950 and 1957 was, at one level, an ironic development for a Republican-minded leadership. Originally, the Republican notion of Indonesia heralded an end to the many seemingly artificial and artificially sustained differences that the Dutch had built into their administrative forms and structures throughout the NEI. Whereas Law No. 22 of 1948 comprised a significant and unexplained departure from the original formulation of Indonesia's administrative make-up, the leaders of the unitarian Republic showed an almost unstoppable willingness to accord recognition to many different (and essentially self-defining regions). In this connection, as Legge has noted, "the original establishment under Law 22 of nine units of provincial status between 1950 and 1953 [came to be] altered by subdivision until at the end of 1957 there were fifteen such units in western Indonesia."[84] The initial accession to regional demands for greater autonomy resulted, of course, in a heightening of these demands. For instance, in 1956, when the Central Government formally established the province of Irian Barat, complete with a "well-subsidized government-in-exile,"[85] the single province of Kalimantan that had been created a mere three years earlier crumbled under the weight of its region's demands and was supplanted by three new provinces. At the same time as the Government formalized the changes in Kalimantan, it also acceded to Aceh's longstanding insistence on becoming a province. With this, matters now appeared to be spiralling beyond the control of everyone as regional leaders proposed the creation of new divisions, as in Sulawesi, or new powers, as in South Sumatra. This dynamic proved to be simultaneously destructive of the unitarian pretension to unity and conducive to (if not actually creating) the organized expression of interest at the sub-national level. The effects of this dynamic even touched Banten, "for years a neglected and sleepy mausoleum of Indonesia's pro- and early colonial history," where its leaders "sprung to life with proposals for separate provincial status."[86]

As the Government's veil of competence and unitarian omnipotence was repeatedly pierced, regional actors began to acquire some of the very statelike attributes that the Government imagined it alone possessed or, more accurately, claimed to possess. In this connection, the political development of the Riau Islands is illustrative. In January 1947 the Dutch moved to transform the Riau Islands into a separate and autonomous constitutional unit within the federal framework; in July 1947, the island group became a neo-land based upon the 1938 Self-Governing Regulations. Following the creation of the unitary Republic in August 1950, the status of Riau was not directly addressed, although the islands were within the area covered by the province of Central Sumatra. The Central Government's disinterest in the administrative state of its regions, including Riau, was manifest when, in 1953, it reluctantly dealt with the issue. Then, the Government's response took the lowly form of explanatory statements to incompletely defined enactments that showed "the neo-lands of Daerah Bandjar and Dajak Besar, and presumably also Bangka, Billiton, and Riau, lost their status as neo-lands upon joining Republik Indonesia."[87] While it is indicative of the character of subsequent political developments that the Government dramatically elevated Riau (and Djambi separately) to the status of province in 1957, it is even more revealing that only a few weeks before this event, the Islands had "sent a protest delegation to Djakarta where it received no attention at all."[88] The Central Government was moved to grant Riau its provincehood precisely because the defiant regional authorities of the province of Central Sumatra (who had organized themselves into the Wild Buffalo [*Banteng*] Council) were competing with Jakarta to fulfil Riau's demands in accordance with their conception of Indonesia.

Jakarta's response to the Central Sumatran threat, as with all other challenges emerging from the regions after 1950, was to retreat under formal cover by effecting yet another sub-division. In this instance, the rump of Central Sumatra became the new province of West Sumatra. More important yet than the creation of another province was the fact that political actors were organizing and accumulating the resources and building the power—just as the political parties were doing in their own manner in the formal realm—and succeeding to such a degree as to begin to seek formal recognition of their actual political standing.

At the same time as the Central Government was being effectively challenged from below and from the outside by Indonesia's self-assertive and self-defining regions, the parties continued to gather resources from above and from the inside in what appeared to be a shrinking realm—the national administrative system. With each act of creation or recognition of a new region after 1950, the Central Government also undertook to transfer powers to the new entities and, as such, to lessen the scope of its own administrative reach. Additionally, Jakarta had long reconciled itself to the task of disbanding the *Pamong Praja*. When taken together, these two measures lent the impression that the Centre's threatened administrative apparatus offered few opportunities for growth to ambitious actors. Yet, as with many political developments in independent Indonesia, its destructive aspects were more readily perceived than the underlying imperative of building power or the constructive effects to which this gave rise.

By actively competing with one another, the political parties' great success in enroling numerous supporters in the administrative system became the basis for the widening of their own administrative outlook and reach. In a manner that effectively countervailed the widening gap between Jakarta and the regions, the parties both widened and substantiated their political claims to be acting in the interests of "Indonesia" by seeking out and securing more supporters under the loose authority of their respective organizational structures. The PNI, for instance, used its influence to sustain the *Pamong Praja* in spite of pronouncements calling for its demise and even manipulated the disintegrative effects of regionalism to expand the administrative corps. Thus, as the forces of regionalism gathered strength in 1956 and 1957, ironically, so too did the *Pamong Praja* and with this the chances of realizing an Indonesian administrative system. According to Indonesia's Interior Minister, the *Pamong Praja* numbered 50,498 employees in 1956 and 52,063 in 1957; in the following year the corps was to have been expanded by an additional 1,570 employees.[89]

At this juncture in time, what made the growth of the *Pamong Praja* so remarkable and so relevant from a statist perspective was the fact that the corp's party backers at the top were purposely behaving to secure long-term control over people and places at the same time as local leaders of the same people and places were trying to assert and widen their own claims to control from the bottom. That this was the parties' ultimate goal is apparent from the fact that the terms authorizing the expansion of the *Pamong Praja* were contained in the only piece of legislation on administration to be passed by the parties that was neither merely convenient nor a disguised capitulation to the regions. The passage of Law No. 1 of 1957 on local government amounted to a revolutionary breakthrough by putting an end to Indonesia's bifurcated administrative system, based on Laws No. 22 and No. 44, and opening the way for the parties to build their own bases of support throughout Indonesia on a uniform regional basis. Under the terms of this law, the reduction of central supervision over local government activities, the expansion of the latter's powers, and the actual establishment of the lowest form of government that was provided for were viewed equally by the local actors as they were by the parties as politically useful opportunities to expand their power.[90] As against the disguised encroachments the parties and regional actors had made into (and largely at the expense of) the realm of formal competencies between 1950 and 1957, this Law made such undertakings acceptable and transparent:

> The law as implemented gave scope to the elected councils to become the genuine governments of their areas, free not only from close supervision, but even from the competition, of the territorial administration representing the central government. The centre would operate its own agencies in the regions . . . but for these it would no longer need to possess its own separate "government as such" in each region and at each level.[91]

The broad opportunities that Law No. 1 opened to the parties and regional actors should not be conceived of so much as detracting from the powers of the Central Government—the effectiveness and reality of which have already been shown to have been largely formal—as increasing the tendency for both sets of actors to organize power at a level where statelike qualities could be attained. The emergence in this fashion of the region or island as a politically meaningful entity (as opposed to the nation or locality) in Indonesia's overall political development is profoundly important because it indicates that the contested political realm was expanding. This expansion of the political realm, both conceptually and organizationally, is the key to understanding why many previously important bases of differentiation and division were overcome with relative ease in Indonesia during the 1950s.

Whereas the Dutch had recognized, preserved, "resuscitated," and even invented a large number of native socio-political forms through to the eve of Indonesian independence, thereafter the competitive dynamic among many actors seeking to create power over such an heterogenous area as the East Indies commanded the adoption of ever more catholic strategies to overcome these same particularisms. The willingness of large numbers of people throughout Indonesia in the 1950s to partake of new, larger, and non-particularistic political or transcendant identities—or at least to allow the lapse of previously won or recognized political or legal entitlements—owed its start not only to the Republicans, and before them the Japanese, but, curiously, to the Dutch.

In this connection, the Dutch recognition of the Republican conception of a uniform law for all ethnic groups and a common juridical structure, which was granted at a high point of Dutch power following the first "Police Action" in 1947, was bettered only by the Dutch voluntarily extending these same principles and structures to areas controlled by them before that action.[92] In this way, the Republicans were emboldened to abolish self-governing justice in the areas under its control in August 1947,[93] to declare a uniform administration of justice throughout the country in January 1951, and, at the same time, to plan the end of indigenous justice in (former) directly governed lands and of self-governing justice more generally. If Schiller could conclude with surprise in 1955 that "the unification of the administration of justice . . . is now rapidly coming to pass" and that "different courts for different ethnic groups or any vestige of extraterritoriality are already a thing of the past,"[94] then the subsequent developments with regard to self-government proper would have astounded him.

The creation of the unitarian Republic did not formally alter either the status or the authority of the many self-governments (*swapradja*) still in existence. In practice, and as a politico-administrative form, the pre-war and post-war federations, self-governing lands, neo-lands, municipalities, and neo-municipalities seemed assured of their continued existence. Indeed, under the terms of Law No. 22, these entities in Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan were conferred autonomy (graded in three ranks) consistent with their status as "special regions" (*daerah istimewa*); under the terms of Law No. 44, which was still being observed in the former NIT, the host of newer and older self-governing entities carried on unchanged.

Neither the formal recognition of their special character nor the absence of a policy seeking their elimination, however, helps us to understand the easy dissolution of the self-governing entities during the 1950s. Rather, to comprehend this phenomenon, attention must be paid to the widening political struggle among the parties, on the one hand, and between the centre and the regions and islands after 1950, on the other hand, that deprived these autonomous entities of their (already definitionally limited) attraction and, by extension, their substance as distinct and defensible socio-political entities. Thus, in a struggle in which the form and content of "Indonesia" itself were still indeterminate, but expanding and supersessive of lesser forms, self-governing entities as such were irrelevant. Indonesians turned away from the recognition of such entities and, almost in conformity with Dutch colonial expectations, started to participate in the creation of larger collective identities. Accordingly, the quiet demise of the self-governing entities during the 1950s was reflected in their tendency either to surrender their status as special regions and become ordinary regions or, in the case of federations or *daerah*s in the former NIT, to sub-divide into their constituent units and thereby abandon their collective claim to a real and separate administrative and social existence. The changed perception of special regions may be seen in the case of Bali. As Legge has pointed out, the debate among Bali's self-governing rulers in 1957 on the issue of transforming their *swapradja*s into ordinary regions did not invite "a great deal of public feeling on the question," and, indeed, their decision to proceed with this plan in 1958 "was in line with general informed feeling, which, by this time, had come to regard the concept of the special region as something to be applied in very exceptional circumstances."[95] If Legge is correct here in claiming that by the mid-late 1950s many Indonesians shared in the notion that history and politics had by-passed the special areas, it would be mistake to proceed further by drawing the inference that Indonesians had a clearer conception of their future or even of the probable fate of that vast area of the archipelago—approximately half of the NEI in 1942—previously administered in part by the self-governments.

At the same time as the Central Government made formal advances (that were virtually won by default) in extending its administrative domain over those areas once governed by *swapradjas*, its powerlessness over the economy in these same areas and more generally became ever more striking between 1950 and 1957. Unlike the territorial and administrative threats that were posed to the Central Government, there was no disguising the enormous gap that existed between Jakarta's claim to be building and directing a national economy and the reality of regional actors exercising increasing control in defiance of Jakarta's directives. Accordingly, the government chose to ignore the multiplying signs after 1950 that important parts of the money economy were beyond its control, that the segment under its control was shrinking, and the money economy as such was diminishing in size.[96]

Despite signs from Indonesia's leaders early in the post-independence period that they were pragmatically committed to the difficult task of transforming their colonial-type economy into a national one, the narrowly conceived quest for power in the Indonesian context prompted actors to seize economic advantages wherever they existed. Perhaps as a consequence of the early and general realization among the parties that their struggle was fundamentally revolutionary in character, such practical but altruistic steps as the proposals in 1950 to create a five-year plan for the country or to use the financial and economic provisions of the Round Table Agreements and the terms of the Netherlands-Indonesia Union to gain access to the European Payments Union were ignored.[97] Instead, as we have seen, the parties focused their energy on channelling state funds to their supporters while decrying the deleterious effects of such actions, which were conveniently explained away as manifestations of Dutch "neo-colonialism."

The wholesale assault by the parties on the shattered remnants of the colonial-type economy, which had suffered the ravaging effects of depression, occupation, war, and revolution, served to exacerbate its overall poor performance while simultaneously improving the prospects of regional economic betterment by forcing actors in those areas to create a new order and new patterns of exchange between themselves and the Central Government. The deterioration of the Indonesian economy in the early 1950s showed in the measure of people's incomes, which in 1951 had dropped by some 16 per cent of their 1938 levels, and in their per capita consumption of rice, the dietary mainstay of most Indonesians, which fell by ten per cent compared to pre-war figures.[98] More generally, the over-all level of production for the economy in 1952–53 was estimated to be approximately 65–80 per cent of its prewar level and, in some industries, to be as low as 58 per cent.[99] The responsibility for the upkeep of the existing economic infrastructure, which the Dutch had built only to a modest extent given the size of the colony, proved too great for the government and made all plans for expansion unthinkable. From an original stock of 70,000 kilometres of usable road ways (10,000 kilometres being once paved and the remainder unpaved), one-half of the 35,000 kilometres in the outer islands was almost impassable by the mid-1950s. Further, no expansion plans existed through the mid-1950s for the original stock of 6,000 kilometres of railways and, despite greater demand especially in Java, service was curtailed. Finally, the smooth functioning of Indonesia's ports system that was vital for the economic life of the archipelago was jeopardized by labour disputes, unannounced port closures, and notoriously poor service from the money-losing National Shipping Lines (*Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia*—Pelni).

By 1956, the cumulative effects of the parties' proclivity, amidst general conditions of decline, to appropriate whatever resources were offered under the cover of government reached a point of unacceptable absurdity to regional actors.[100] In that year, the government planned to allocate loans in a fashion very much in accord with the narrowly conceived interests of the governing political parties: of a total 356 million Rupiah available for loans, 202 million was to go to Jakarta, 64 million to Java, 51 million to Sumatra, 18 million for Kalimantan, 18 million to Sulawesi, and a mere three million for the remaining islands.[101] At the same time as these funds was being effectively channelled by the parties into projects meant to boost their political fortunes, the concerns of the regions, whence the Central Government drew a large part of its income, were shown to be beneath official consideration. This official disinterest was evident not only in the tardiness of Indonesia's first five-year economic plan, which appeared only in 1956, but in the minor importance that was attached therein to regional development. Moreover, the abrogation by the political parties of Indonesia's links with Holland—not once, but twice in 1956[102] to make the point, ostensibly, that the nation was resolute in acquiring Irian Barat—seemed particularly injurious from the perspective of the regions that saw the value of continued Dutch investments.

Yet, the actions of the Indonesian government in the economic sphere in 1956, which were and have been interpreted equally often and contradictorily as both destructive (by regional actors) and constructive (by leading political parties), reflected precisely the revolutionary condition into which the country had evolved. In the name of Irian, clearly, Indonesia's economic and political links with the Netherlands were being demolished and with them the government's capacity to develop its people, most of whom were already outside the money economy and appeared irretrievably lost there as political motives increasingly overrode development principles.[103] Less clear, but equally important to understanding the incipient revolutionary situation, however, is the fact that this real and potentially greater destruction of the government's and the region's economic powers within the perceived national framework was occurring at the same time as party actors and regional actors were gathering economic power and asserting control over economic resources at a sub-national level.

The visible progress that was being made by the parties in building their initial bases of support in Java and in expending "the nation's resources" there necessarily intensified regional grievances not only against the parties concerned, but also against the Central Government in whose name the parties acted. In a sense, the parties had succeeded too well in using the idea of an existing Indonesian state to create their own, real power, for by 1956 the reality of competing insular-based movements (of which the parties served as the nuclei) could no longer be contained by the falsehood of an existing state. For indeed, the economic developments of 1956 as much confirmed the revolutionary rise of the parties as they did that of regional actors.

Like Indonesia's parties, which responded to the imperative of creating power where it did not previously exist other than in name, regional actors and especially military leaders shared in the same opportunity to organize the territorial and administrative affairs and economic activities where they could. Throughout the period from 1950 to 1957, therefore, effective claims to power were being made in wide portions of the archipelago not only by the anti-Republican movements discussed above, but by the very military units ostensibly assisting the Central Government in its struggle against these actors. The political ascendancy of regional military units, including to a lesser degree those based in Java, amounted to an incipient warlordism.

The seeds of this regional warlordism were first sown in October-November 1952, when the Army Chief-of-Staff (then Colonel A. H. Nasution), backed by the Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff (Major-General T. B. Simatupang) and the civilian Defence Minister (Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX), failed in his attempt to transform the Army into a professional military service. As a result of this failure, these two figures were forced to resign and their departure left the Army vulnerable to the machinations of their parliamentary (mainly PNI) and other (mainly the President) opponents, whom they had failed to overawe with a show of force in the "October 17 incident." Following this event, and at the behest of the President, junior officers in the military districts of East Java, Eastern Indonesia, and South Sumatra staged coups against their commanders.[104] At a stroke, the links between Army Headquarters and the regional commands were shown to be almost strictly formal in nature. This was a most damaging development for the Indonesian military because the institutional existence that bound the centre and regional units together dated only from 1950, when the first TNI units were deployed outside Java and Sumatra.[105] The new regional commanders were soon confirmed in their positions by the new Army Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Bambang Sugeng, who, by this very act, showed his and Headquarter's powerlessness. Under this official guise, in a manner similar to how the parties operated in the name of the government, regional military leaders began to steadily exert effective control over territory, people, and economic resources while developing putative patterns of governance.

As McVey has observed more clearly than most, the development of warlordism in the regions was not a surprising result given the absence of Republican power and authority over most of the archipelago during the Revolution. Indeed, it was the "extreme weakness of nationalist military strength in East Indonesia" that necessitated the creation after independence of a "special expeditionary force from the Brawidjaja (East Java) Division" to try for the first time to assert central control over the area.[106] No matter what combination of personnel was used, the Army headquarters seemed stymied in its pioneering task of creating a firm basis of central control over the regions for

> when, in the early post-revolutionary years, officers of Outer Island provenance who had experienced the revolution on Java were placed in charge of former

> guerrilla forces in their home area as part of the effort to bring them into line with the center . . . they often found it easier and more profitable to cultivate local allies against a high command which could back its centralizing ambitions neither with adequate patronage nor with effective force. Similarly, officers sent from Java to areas where there had been no effective Republican strength found themselves and the men who came with them painfully isolated expeditionary units, if they were not of local origin, and if they were, they soon changed from representatives of centralism and nationalism to the protectors of local interests against Djakarta's demands.[107]

The key factor that drove the regional Army leaders to shift their position from merely protecting local interests to expanding them related to the political parties' "success" in appropriating government resources for themselves. It was clear at an early date that the political parties were using government monies and policies to enrich themselves and their supporters; this all-consuming dynamic cost the military dearly, especially after the October 17 incident when the Army's income dropped "catastrophically."[108] In such conditions, it was only a matter of time before the military leaders acted covertly, then overtly, to return the economic profits to the source, rather than to the rapacious Central Government. The smuggling operations in which the military commanders increasingly engaged reminded the government that the exporting regions, and especially Sumatra and Sulawesi, played a formidable role in Indonesia's economic wellbeing. Overall, half of the national revenue in 1953 was derived from import and export controls, and 25 to 27 per cent of national income was earned through foreign trade. More specifically, the tin, rubber, and copra that was largely produced in the outer islands accounted for 70 per cent of the value of Indonesia's exports in 1953.[109]

The regional commanders' smuggling operations effectively undermined the government's claim to control Indonesia's resources. In this connection, the Defence Minister made a very revealing statement on a visit to Sulawesi in November 1954, when he claimed that "there are many factors which make the punishment of every breach of the law impossible." The minister conceded two unspoken truths of the Indonesian situation: that the law was being disregarded and that the struggle in Indonesia to realize the power underlying law would widen before being resolved. Iwa Kusumasumantri's words surely had taken account of the fact that in October there were popular demonstrations in Sulawesi in support of Warouw and his decision to take control of the island's copra proceeds. Here, in the clearest terms, was evidence that as the political struggle widened to include more people, so too did its constructive effects.

The relatively quiet accumulation of resources, popular support, territorial control, and administrative skills by the regional army commanders thus became a matter of public and revolutionary import when the organized voice of popular opinion in the regions, Masjumi, began to echo the military's longstanding and growing dissatisfaction with the existing national system towards the end of 1956. This coupling of interests and resources, cemented as it was by dissatisfaction with the "national" political, economic, and administrative system, formed the basis for an alternative to the same. For at this point, both party and military leaders of the regions began to realize that together they were actually engaged in political actions that built power, the power necessary to control and administer territory and people and create a collective identity, in short, the power of a new state. In late December 1956, as Masjumi members deliberated their continued role in the Cabinet and in the existing political system, the military commanders made good on their accomplishments and formalized their power.

On 20 December, the regimental commander in Padang, Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmed Hussein, assumed control over Central Sumatra in the name of the Wild Buffalo (*Banteng*) Council. Hussein notified the Central Government that "he no longer recognized the authority of the Ali Cabinet and that he would retain all local revenues for local purposes. He [also] affirmed his loyalty to the President and to the nation."[110] Two days later, the commander of the North Sumatra military district, Colonel Simbolon, imitated Hussein's declaration in the name of the Elephant (*Gadjah*) Council. Although the government reversed Simbolon's declaration by staging a counter-coup against him on 27 December, the removal of this one spokesman did not solve the Central Government's lack of power in the area or in the outer islands generally. So while South Sumatra's and South Kalimantan's military leaders continued to linger irresolutely on the threshold of declaring themselves in the fashion of Hussein and Simbolon, thereby giving the Central Government the benefit of the doubt, the military leaders in East Indonesia showed no such reluctance. In March 1957, Lieutenant-Colonel Ventje Sumual, the territorial commander of East Indonesia, declared that 70 per cent of Sulawesi's export earning were to be held back for that island's development. The wider significance and intent of Sumual's challenge to the Central Government became evident when he appointed governors for four provinces (Sulawesi, the Moluccas, the Lesser Sundas, and West New Guinea)[111] as part of his scheme to administer East Indonesia through the newly formed Total Council—*Dewan Permesta*.

Political Appearances and Meaning-Creating Actions
Indonesia in a State of Emergency

Sumual's actions were the proximate cause of the declaration of the state of emergency on 14 March 1957 and, as such, they brought a long political process to a very significant point. The conventional Indonesian and Western interpretations of the SOB thus share in the recognition of its importance, but differ profoundly as to its meaning. The received Indonesian view of the SOB holds that the President and Army were acting under its cover to adjust the nation's political system to conform to the "Indonesian identity." The orthodox Western view, contrariwise, regards the President's and Army's behaviour as the unscrupulous use of poor circumstances to usurp power from the parties and pointlessly bring an end to liberal democracy in Indonesia. While both views focus on the President and the Army, and on the seemingly deliberate nature of their actions after March 1957, they both overlook how the consequences of the parties' revolutionary dynamic necessitated an official declaration of a state of emergency even though the two actors empowered by it initially lacked effective power, the prior commitment to ending the parliamentary system, or a firm view of the content of a future Indonesian state or society. It is unfortunate that this sudden "rise" to prominence of Sukarno and the Army has been interpreted in a manner that misses a fundamental point about the link between actions and ideas, a link that I have tried to show existed throughout the period from 1950 to 1957.

If we look back on the territorial, administrative, and economic changes that occurred between 1950 and 1957, they showed that Indonesian politics were becoming more organized, more sophisticated, and, to the degree that the fewer growing actors used their accumulated resources and power to instantiate their interpretation of the directing idea of Indonesia, more actually Indonesian. In the early part of this period, the narrow struggle among parties for Cabinet positions led to a wider pursuit of resources and eventually, following the elections, the organization and expression of insular identities. In this connection, Indonesia's "organizational life" had not only become "more thoroughly political than ever before,"[112] as Feith observed in reference to Indonesia's long election campaign, but, more importantly, political life since 1950 had become more thoroughly organized than ever before.

This greater and more self-conscious organization of people and resources, moreover, did not arise simply because of, or to serve, a "conflict between major symbols representing alternative ideologies, alternative bodies of meaning-creating ideas, [and] alternative categories of personal identification,"[113] as Feith has explained. Political life became more organized and more directly attuned to the issues of Indonesia's territory, people, and identity precisely because these issues were not settled. Actors had indeed engaged in conflict between 1950 and 1957, but it was not a struggle over symbols relating to ideologies, meaning-creating ideas, or categories as much as it was over the tangible resources that could be actively used to define these same ideologies, ideas, and categories as authoritatively "Indonesian." In all of this, the action of one actor to acquire resources prompted a response from others, leading eventually to the ever widening dynamic of formal destruction and informal construction that the SOB effectively acknowledged.

After 1950, Indonesian political actors were clearly not driven by prescribed Indonesian ideas or ideologies; the very plurality of often violently conflicting political perceptions on, and about, Indonesia vitiated any claim to an established collective identity. Indeed, the very ideologically catholic manner in which Indonesia's parties, for instance, stated their interests, made them largely alike and, at least from this starting point, equally capable of creating power in the Indonesian context. This did not happen, of course; not all actors created power and not all actors survived the initial stages of power accumulation. Those that both survived and grew did so because they organized people and resources, and not because they possessed the "appropriate" or "appropriately Indonesian" set of ideas. These actors became powerful by responding to a dynamic situation, and by 1957 those very dynamics forced the Army into a strategy to acquire resources and build power.

In 1957, therefore, the Army and the President took to the political field somewhat reluctantly as relatively weak and uncertain actors to determine Indonesia's very shape and content. Arrayed against them, and one another, were the several large party actors, regional military commanders, and violently anti-Republican movements scattered throughout the archipelago. To achieve their goal, the Army and Sukarno used the same strategy as the parties did before them by engaging in political competition, even conflict, and using its paradoxically constructive effects to exert power over widening circles of territory and people, and thereby establish their identity as "Indonesians."

CHAPTER III

THE DIRECTING IDEAS OF THE PKI AND THE TNI

In explaining the collapse of liberal democracy, Feith has observed that among the tendencies in Indonesian politics of this period, the greater politicization of organized life and the struggle over symbols and ideological ideas warrant privileged analytical consideration. Other Western students of Indonesian politics have largely accepted Feith's conclusion, and used it as a guideline in their studies both of the liberal democratic era and the ensuing era of "Guided Democracy" (approximately 1959-65). Accordingly, there are a number of studies, in addition to Feith's own work, that share the premises that Indonesia's "organizational life" had become "more thoroughly political than ever before," and that this political impulse, in turn, related mainly to "conflict between major symbols representing alternative ideologies, alternative bodies of meaning-creating ideas, [and] alternative categories of personal identification."[1]

Curiously, these trends do not seem to have any direct bearing on either the political situation as it developed in March 1957, or, more particularly, on the paradoxical roles of the Army and the Communists. Then, the President and Army Headquarters essentially assigned themselves extraordinary power without the former possessing an organized and politicized power base or the latter a coherent ideology. At the same time, by contrast, the Communists were highly politicized, possessed a coherent ideology, and had an organized power base, yet remained without a voice in government. Unless one is prepared to proclaim the irrelevance of politicization or organization in achieving power in the Indonesian context (to explain the "rise" of Sukarno and Army Headquarters), or accept the dubious claim that Indonesians in their millions were naturally Communists (to recognize the PKI's indisputably large following), then the utility of focusing on these trends, as such, seems limited. While the focus on these trends helped Feith to sustain his overall thesis that a group of "solidarity makers" ousted "administrators" during the life of Indonesia's liberal democracy,[2] it does not effectively address the very awkward situation in which the officially powerful, but effectively powerless, President and Army were confronted by the effectively powerful, but officially powerless, Communists.

To the degree that Feith's analytical concern is narrowly with the survival of liberal democratic forms and principles *in* Indonesia, it stands within the limits of a discussion on the problems in Indonesia. As such, and notwithstanding his broad recognition of the constructive and destructive aspects of the parties' behaviour on territorial, popular, administrative, and ideological issues, Feith cannot give sustained analytical regard to the more radical political struggle of Indonesian actors to address the unresolved problem *of* Indonesia. The analysis of greater levels of politicization and the ongoing struggle over symbols precludes an examination of the deeper forces and conditions—and their reason for being—that shaped Indonesian politics after 1949. This is so because Feith's perception of these phenomena confuses the parameters of the process of Indonesian politics with its outcome. Political actors in Indonesia were not simply attempting limitlessly to politicize organized life, or engage in protracted struggles over meaning-creating ideas; they were doing virtually the opposite.

The previous chapter has shown that politicization did not become the paramount objective of actors with respect to organized life so much as did the organization of life. Furthermore, actors did not engage in a struggle over symbols that represented (among other things) "alternative bodies of meaning-creating ideas," so much as they engaged in meaning-creating actions of and about "Indonesia." Thus, the territorial, administrative, and economic changes that occurred in the Indonesian context between 1949 and 1957 showed that Indonesian politics were not only becoming more organized, but, to the degree that the few, growing, and large party and non-party actors used their accumulated resources and power to instantiate their interpretation of their directing ideas of Indonesia, more actually Indonesian. The breadth and depth of these changes helped to lift millions of people, hitherto politically uninvolved in any coordinated and transcendant sense, out of their confined social spaces almost without resistance. Political life became more directly attuned to the issues of Indonesia's territory, people, and identity precisely because these issues had not been previously settled. Actors had indeed engaged in conflict between 1950 and 1957, but it was not a struggle over symbols, ideologies, meaning-creating ideas, or categories as much as it was over the tangible resources that could be actively used to define these same ideologies, ideas, and categories as "Indonesian." In all of this, the action of one actor to acquire resources prompted responses from others, leading eventually to the ever widening dynamic of formal destruction and informal construction that the SOB both effectively acknowledged and, in turn, accelerated by eventually bringing the Communists and the Army into direct competition.

The greater significance of the SOB, therefore, is that it captured in one instant the quintessential consequences of political actors seeking to create and wield power over the physical space of the Indonesian archipelago. The Communists, recognizing the absence of this kind of power, organized for years previous, while the Army, which was forced to recognize this same condition by the very organizational success of the renegade and insurgent regional actors and the PKI, began to organize, too, and to articulate an alternate directing idea of Indonesia that depended on the results of actions taken against its opponents over territorial, popular, and administrative issues. By engaging in political competition and conflict and using their constructive effects to exert power over widening circles of territory and people, all the while trying to establish their identity as "Indonesian," the PKI and TNI together laid the basis for an Indonesian state—categorically speaking.

Most studies of Indonesian politics after 1957, especially with regard to their portrayal of the leading actors (the PKI and TNI), are framed within the conventional limits of a discussion of the problems in Indonesia. As such, the existing works on the PKI and TNI typically lack a theoretical orientation and stress unduly each actor's political development in isolation from each other. Thus, while the studies by Crouch[3] and Sundhaussen[4] on the TNI aid in the examination of an actor that, compared to the PKI, has been greatly understudied, their contributions depend on an ex post facto conception of the military's history and use it to explain the Army's triumph over the Communists in 1965. Crouch examines the development of the Army's political interests and orientation since the Revolution, yet does not link this (seemingly autonomous) process to the actor's political survival and growth within a veritable revolutionary setting. Sundhaussen's major work stresses what he perceives as the differences between military and civilian attitudes and perceptions to politics to explain the Army's actions in and after 1965. As with Crouch, Sundhaussen relies uncritically upon the historical record to show how the Army's separate or independent politicization eventually led it to seize undisputed power. In these and ancillary studies of the TNI,[5] the impulse toward political creativity and dynamism displayed by the Army has been misleadingly imputed to the Army itself, rather than to the demonstration effect of the PKI's success and the demands and opportunities of context.

Likewise, observers of the PKI have tended to ascribe its political success (and eventual failure), to some innate characteristic of the Party's tactics, organization, or ideology, instead of assessing the demands of the Indonesian context or the effects of its opponents' political strategies and, as in the case of the TNI, state building. Hindley,[6] for instance, focuses on the Party's pursuit of a "united national front" strategy without accounting for the countervailing effect of the Army's strategy. For his part, Van der Kroef's study of the interconnection of the Party's theoretical principles and organizational structure situates the PKI within its rich setting but does so without theoretical intent or content.[7] Mortimer and Törnquist[8] offer contradictory assessments of the Party's ideology; the former lauds the PKI's ideological "ingenuity and flexibility" while the latter decries the Party's inability to "make a correct analysis." Neither observer attaches much importance to the tangible qualities of the Party's pursuit of power, and Mortimer even goes so far as to claim there was to the PKI leaders a "seeming irrelevance of the size of [their] following to the problem of gaining power under Indonesian conditions."[9] Cayrac-Blanchard's largely descriptive work on the PKI takes greater account of the tangible power resources ignored by Mortimer, but her analysis imputes an accentuated Javanese character to the Party and faulty strategizing on its leaders' part, much in the fashion of Törnquist.[10] Other major studies of the PKI concentrate on the Party's international linkages or attempt to describe its place in the Sino-Soviet struggle; owing to the external orientation of such studies, neither type yields much insight into the PKI's effort and record to define Indonesia from the inside out.[11] To his credit, Pauker's lesser and very descriptive study of the PKI makes the Party's creativity a focal point of discussion.[12]

In contrast to the many studies that treat the PKI and TNI separately, the few that take a wider conceptual account of the power context, or (even implicitly) recognize the actors' dynamic interaction, have the potential to yield more satisfactory explanations of Indonesian politics. In this category, Corsino's and Reeve's works stand alone. At one level, Corsino seeks to demonstrate the claim that the PKI may be understood as an "international state-actor" by showing how it behaved in relation to such commonly acknowledged international actors as states, their representatives, or ruling Communist parties.[13] While the bulk of Corsino's research relates to this task, his rich but underarticulated conceptualization of the Party as a "state-actor," possessing the essential elements of a state (a government, territory, people, and sovereignty), makes this study extremely suggestive. Indeed, the greater worth of Corsino's argument is that it causes one to reflect on the Party's "domestic" organizational accomplishments. In this same manner, Reeve's study is more suggestive than perhaps the author intended because his findings may be used to expand, rather than narrow, the range of explanation. Reeve's examination of the ideological and organizational aspects of the Army's notion of "functional groups" opens the way for a more complete understanding of both the TNI and PKI because he implicitly takes account of Communist counter-activities in the same organizational sphere. In short, his analysis may be used to gain insights into the character of meaning-creating actions and interactions that are reflected in ideological adjustments. When Corsino's and Reeve's themes of organization and meaning-creating actions are transformed into explicit analytical approaches to examine both actors simultaneously, a more dynamic and concrete explanation may be offered of Indonesian politics as dominated by the PKI and TNI; this is, broadly speaking, what I seek to accomplish in this chapter.

In keeping with the general direction of the previous chapter, which aimed to overcome the conventional perception that the political struggle that unfolded in Indonesia after 1949 was within rather than about Indonesian parameters, the focus here will be on the separate assumption of directing ideas of Indonesia by the PKI and TNI between late 1949 and the mid- to late 1950s. In essence, I will attempt to demonstrate how both actors' recognition of the powerlessness of the Central Government in the Indonesian context prompted their state-building organizational activities and how the earliest instances of interaction between their directing ideas widened the tangible scope of their strategies.

The Rise of the PKI and the Margins of Indonesian Politics (1948–57)

Beginning in late 1950, the leadership of the Communist Party of Indonesia embraced a revolutionary strategy whose form and substance reflected, above all, an intensely thoughtful appreciation of the power opportunities associated with the continuing political problem of Indonesia. During the next seven years, the pursuit of this strategy would transform the PKI from being one of the country's smallest and most suspicious political sects, into Indonesia's single largest and most disciplined political organization. At the end of that time, the PKI would stand as one of only four major national political parties and would enjoy the support of millions, especially among members of the country's largest ethnic group, the Javanese, who would give more of their votes to it than to any other single party. Despite the variety of accounts of the Communists' extraordinary success, a common analytical tendency has been to "explain" the PKI's achievements in narrow reference to Java and elements of the Javanese culture. These geographical and cultural explanations dominate most interpretations of the PKI. This dominance concedes no uncertainty (which is a feature of ex post facto perceptions of history generally) to the political ventures of the PKI, which merely proceeded "naturally" to garner *abangan* (versus *santri*, the religiously devout) supporters already there.[14] Accordingly, implicit arguments abound in the literature about the natural support available to the PKI in the Javanese polity: this support had merely to be activated by President Sukarno as the quintessentially Javanese leader, or catalyzed by the ideological and material support that was available to the PKI from sympathetic foreigners, or merely tapped into by the Party itself following its recognition of the ideological resonance (alleged to have existed) between itself and the *abangan* Javanese.

The argument that will be presented here suggests that although the PKI's success was far from inevitable in 1950, its creation then of a "United National Front" strategy most certainly took account of the manifest opportunities that its leaders saw in the Indonesian context and which gave them the rationale to proceed programmatically to acquire and organize political resources wherever possible. This argument may be developed in two parts: first, by reference to the PKI's experiences between late 1948 and late 1950 and the nature of the change in the Party's strategy under the leadership of Aidit's Leninist wing, and, second, to the Party's organizational experiences and accomplishments between late 1950 and 1957 in the framework of the United National Front strategy.

The Periphery as the Site of Strategic Innovation: The PKI at the Margins of Indonesian Politics (1948-51)

Notwithstanding the principled ideological arguments and comradely debates that informed the PKI's bloody attempt to assert control over the direction of the Indonesian Revolution in September 1948[15], it was both the consequences, reactions, and inactions of others seeking to forcibly crush the Communists, together with the lessons that new elements of the Party leadership drew from these responses, that shaped the subsequent political strategy of the PKI. Indeed, the PKI moved relatively quickly between late 1948 and late 1950 to free itself from its narrow and ideologically self-absorbed defeatism to the exploitation of the opportunities suggested to it by the mere fact of its political survival. On this basis, it is possible to argue that the Party only behaved as a dispirited and self-abnegating actor because of what had happened militarily at Madiun and until that time when new leaders recognized the options that suggested themselves by what had not happened politically after Madiun: the PKI had not been pushed beyond the accepted limits of "revolutionary" or "nationalist" politics by being driven underground or into a state of illegality.

To the surviving elements of the PKI leadership, the indeterminacy of its political status in the government's eyes must have seemed of small comfort when the

Party and its allies had been completely quashed as military and organizational entities. This sense of utter defeat arose both from the misleading impression that the Republican government had a well-developed and large military force at its disposal, and from the undeniable damage that was inflicted in the course of the fighting and immediately afterwards. In fact, the military forces that were available to the Hatta-led government in Jogjakarta (located in Central Java), to put down the PKI in near-by Madiun (situated in East Java), had only become a large and compact force shortly before the Party tried to seize power. This sudden gathering of Republican military forces in Central Java between late 1947 and late 1948 stemmed from their evacuation from West Java as part of the Renville Agreement. This Agreement, which brought a formal end to the first Dutch "Police Action" of 1947, was, in fact, a reflection of Republican military and political disintegration, not strength, and it was in this spirit that approximately 35,000 troops reluctantly migrated crossed the "van Mook Line" into what remained of the *Republik Indonesia* on Java. It was these troops, fortuitously assembled, that were dispatched by President Sukarno to quash the "Soviet Republic of Indonesia" that had been proclaimed by PKI leader Muso on 19 September. The size of the military forces upon which the Communists could rely diminished as a direct result of Muso's open challenge to President Sukarno, and ultimately consisted of several renegade TNI battalions and irregular forces numbering between 10,000–25,000 that were located throughout the residency of Madiun and in parts of Central Java.[16] By the end of September the intense, frontal fighting between these forces was over and by mid-December, just prior to the Dutch launching their second "Police Action," the TNI's rural mopping-up operations were apparently nearly complete.[17] As a result of both the direct and indirect military phases of the struggle, the Communists and their supporters in the Indonesian Labour Party (*Partai Buruh Indonesia*—PBI) lost their highest leaders, an indeterminate number of fighters (one estimate is 8,000[18]) were killed, and approximately 35,000–36,000 supporters and sympathizers were imprisoned;[19] the Republican losses have been ambiguously characterized as being "less than 25 per cent of the armed strength of the Indonesian Republic."[20] By any standard, the PKI and its armed allies from within the TNI did not survive Madiun as a military entity.

Significantly, the Dutch decision to attack the beleaguered Republic for a second time, on 18 December 1948, prompted the Republic's political and military leaders to deliver an even more demoralizing and pointedly political blow against the PKI and its allies by executing 11 prominent leaders and tens of other activists whom they had captured earlier. Five leaders of the Politburo were executed in the night of 19–20 December, including the former Republican premier, Sjarifudin, and two leaders of the pro-Communist All-Indonesia Central Labour Organization (*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*—SOBSI). This Republican "gain" was immediately reversed when the attacking Dutch freed the thousands involved and imprisoned for their part in the rebellion. The effectiveness of the TNI's work, however, deprived these activists of all effective organization and leadership; they were reduced to dacoity in the Central and East Javanese countryside until the mid-1950s.

Although the deliberately political step taken against the PKI in late December can be said to have marked the high point of the Republic's persecution of the Communists, there was no conception at the time either among the Communists or their opponents that this was so. Indeed, the Communists had incurred great and enduring animosity in military circles (for their effective infiltration of TNI structures), among Republicans (for their evident treachery and wanton killing of supporters), and among Muslims (for their apparently unprovoked violence against adherents of the faith during the rebellion). The fury against the Communists was probably not spent by any of its opponents before the Dutch action of December 18, which effectively cut short a promised extirpation of Communists in the Republic. Thus, it was out of desperation that the combined Republican political and military leadership took retribution on that day, for thereafter, all their attention and energies were shifted from the internal struggle to meet the more menacing threat posed to the Republic's survival from without.

Despite this fortuitous turn of circumstances, the Communists demonstrated that they had no sense that now was the time to challenge the Republic. Indeed, part of the Communist leadership and followership abandoned the Party in October to form the new Proletarian Party (*Partai Murba*), apparently hoping that their consciously "national" style would be more readily accepted in what were perceived as the newly defined limits of Indonesian politics. In a similar spirit of self-accommodation, the PKI responded to the rapidly changing political situation as if its political fate had already been settled by others by voluntarily reversing its organizational work and relinquishing its claims to broad leadership. After December 1948, for instance, the provisional PKI Central Committee (CC) quietly set about undoing the painstaking organizational work that had been successfully implemented by Sjarifudin (in the framework of the People's Democratic Front [*Front Demokrasi Rakjat—FDR]*) and Muso (as part of his "New Road" strategy) between February and September 1948. In 1950, when the Party was permitted to re-activate its representation in the DPR, and after having briefly re-established a voice in the KNIP-BP in December 1949, it reversed its amalgamation of late August 1948 with the Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis*—PS) and the PBI. Thereafter, the leadership appeared content to limit itself to the political victories that could be achieved in Parliament and, judging from the orthodox Marxist rhetoric with which it described its role there, it was clear that the PKI would not be engaging any Parliamentary or extra-Parliamentary partners in the pursuit of its lonely doctrinal struggle. Finally, the Party— appeared to be preparing for further limitations to its field of political activity by engaging in what Hindley has described as operations of the "illegal PKI."[21] The nature of these operations, which consisted of coordinating the work of the open parties (PKI, PS, and PBI) and maintaining a clandestine Party organization, suggested that the Party was not only prepared to prudently reduce its public profile, it was prepared to abandon its public standing as such.

This downward political spiral had caused the PKI to become practically disengaged from the political currents that brought an end to RIS and renewed life to the unitarian RI. For instance, within the appointative DPR, Communist delegates harmlessly excoriated the nation's leaders for their role in negotiating the Round

Table Agreements. By using this (perhaps very principled) tactic, however, the Communists not only set themselves apart from the majority of parliamentarians and parties, but in so doing, deprived themselves of the opportunity—apparent in the troubled creation of the first unitarian Cabinet—to acquire power resources and exploit political differences. While the Communists set themselves above other parties, to the point of existing in an ideological ether, the latter attended to the practical matters of creating power and appropriating resources and, quite without ideological effort, unleashed the competitive dynamic that would soon involve all the political parties and, ultimately, revolutionize Indonesian politics.

By late 1950, the PKI's detachment from the realities of power and its aversion to power opportunities was virtually complete. On 2 December, the leadership issued a statement that essentially eschewed Indonesia's national claim to Irian Barat by proposing the establishment of a separate "Democratic Republic of Irian." While this position conformed to that of the Communist Party of the Netherlands, it was painfully at odds with the virtually unanimous agreement among Republicans to acquire Irian Barat and differed even from the expressed concerns of parliamentarians, who were mainly worried about jeopardizing the economic and financial parts of the Round Table Conference Agreements and not, initially, about national honour. By ignoring both the issues that could be used to control the direction of Indonesian politics and the emerging competitive practices that were beginning to define them, the Communists, who were already at the political fringes, further marginalized themselves.

The declaration on Irian Barat seemed to some Party members an unacceptable act that reflected the leadership's commitment to making "principled" statements rather than advancing the organization's political prospects. As such, the statement precipitated a struggle for leadership in the PKI between older members, who subscribed to a view that gradual progress could be made from within Parliament and by the use of proxies, and newer members, who believed that the current leadership was imposing limits to the PKI's own political success in an unsettled context that was extremely propitious for revolution. Hence, this was essentially a perceptual conflict between comrades who acted in the belief that they were responding to one of the problems in the Indonesian political system, and comrades who rejected the statement and its political implications for the Party on the basis of their recognition that the PKI still existed in the context of the continuing problem of Indonesia. From the perspective of the latter group, the existing leadership was not only unduly conforming to (political, structural, and procedural) formalities, it was imputing greater power and durability to other political parties, other actors, and Parliament than was warranted on the basis of their actual authority over, and control of, people and territory.

It may be suggested that the starting point for the newer Communists' alternate vision lay in the very marginal character of the position into which the Party had been thrust—and from which its leaders appeared unwilling to extricate themselves—since late 1948. To the newer Communists, the fact that the Party had not been destroyed politically by being excluded from any of the Republic's political bodies, including the KNIP and KNIP-BP, spoke more clearly about the nature of Republican power and the opportunities of power than did the fact of the Party's military destruction. The Dutch intervention of late 1948 may have brought a sudden end to the Republic's plans to legally prosecute those involved in the rebellion, and it may have even thwarted the future prospect of a more thorough-going anti-communist campaign by the Party's enemies, but it did not change the fact that the Republic's political leaders did not treat the PKI as they had treated Kartosuwirdjo and the DI. Thus, while the Republican leaders were overwhelmed by the chaos caused by the second Dutch Police Action, and were therefore unable to effectively address the issue of the PKI's status, they also neither attempted nor formally contemplated taking the relatively easy steps of expelling the PKI from official organs or banning it outright. To the new Communists, who had seen the collapse of RIS, the proclamation of the unitarian Republic, and presently the party in-fighting, the government's unwillingness to take further action against them suggested that it was a lack of power and not a surplus of revolutionary fraternity that explained the Party's continued, albeit marginal, existence in the troubled Indonesian context.

The Irian Barat statement pushed the young Communists across the perceptual threshold to the realization that the government's failure to take more concerted action against the PKI actually stemmed from the overall absence of organized power in the Indonesian context. Thus, at the point when the Party appeared to be hastening its descent into political oblivion, younger Communists were seized by the liberating realization that the Party's nightmarish experiences at the margins of Indonesian politics had actually given them a perspective about those margins that no other formally represented political actor perceived or perceived as clearly. Through the rewarding insight of marginality, the Communists had a more realistic sense of the nature and limits of Republican power, and, consequently, of what had (and had not) been achieved with Indonesia's independence. The PKI recognized more clearly, and certainly at an earlier point in time than other actors (except, perhaps, the DI), that the fundamental political challenge related to the unresolved problem of Indonesia.

The marginal origin of the young Communists' insights quickly yielded a political strategy with marginal intentions. By this, I mean to suggest that the Aidit-led Leninist wing of the Party aspired to set the margins of Indonesia (its scope and content) by being its defining centre. The marginal intention of the PKI's strategy, therefore, refers substantively to Dipa Nusantara Aidit's determination from late 1950 onward to use the unsettled issues of Indonesia's territory, economy and administration, and identity to create new and wider political spaces for the Party's own growth. This appreciation of the sheer magnitude of the unfinished work facing Indonesian state builders served, thus, as the basis for the Party's plans in these areas. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, this comprehension of the political margins of the Indonesian context raised the expectation in the Aidit group that the PKI was capable of becoming a state-within-a-state whose very development would define the form and content of Indonesia as the outstanding "national" issues were addressed and eventually resolved through the planned actions and unplanned interactions of the Party. In undertaking to realize the directing idea of Indonesia, Aidit recognized that the PKI must, above all, build an Indonesian state and society through organization—and specifically through the organization of power resources around the issues of territory, administration and economy, and identity—and by engaging in meaning-creating actions.

To define Indonesia in this way, of course, Aidit and his supporters had to first define the PKI. In this connection, the Aidit wing used the publication of the Irian Barat statement to oust the old Communist leadership by early January 1951 and reset the Party's political objectives immediately thereafter on the basis of initiatives that the group's leading members (D. N. Aidit, M. H. Lukman, and Njoto) had launched months earlier. The direction in which Aidit and Lukman, in particular, sought to take the Party, stemmed not only from their senior leadership experiences with the PKI before and during Madiun (in whose disastrous wake they fled) but also, and perhaps more significantly, from the fresh perspective on the Indonesian situation that they brought with them in returning from abroad (specifically, the People's Republic of China) in July 1950.

As Politburo members since August 1948, Aidit and Lukman returned to Indonesia to work in the Party's Agitation and Propaganda Secretariat. There, in collaboration with their Politburo colleague Njoto, they began to advance and publish (from 15 August 1950) new conceptions of the Party's role and work in the journal Red Star (*Bintang Merah*). By late October 1950, the Aidit group had prevailed upon the leadership of the PBI to re-dissolve itself into the PKI as a concrete measure in the rejuvenation of Muso's "New Road" plan of August 1948. The following month, the Aidit group endeavoured to publicly undermine Wikana by depriving him of his leadership of the Indonesian Socialist Youth, and, in late December, by forcing him to withdraw from a *Partai Murba* study group. In the wake of the Irian Barat statement, the Aidit group used its support in the Central Committee to repudiate both the statement and its author, Ngadiman Hardjosubroto. When it was learned that Ngadiman's actions were condoned by Tan Ling Djie, who headed the PS, he, too, was censured by the Leninist wing at a plenary session of the Central Committee in early January 1951.

At this juncture, the Aidit group used the 1-15 January 1951 issue of *Bintang Merah* to formalize its critique of the old leadership and thereby legitimize its thrust to power in the PKI. In a point not to be lost on the readership, the editors linked the appearance of the periodical to the emergence of the Aidit group, which occurred during a "time when Party members were seeking a way out of the darkness caused by the confusion of the Party leadership, at a time when Party members . . . did not receive clear leadership in the organizational and political spheres."[22] In contrast to this poor performance, the editors went on to suggest that the newer ideas of the Leninist wing had already proven themselves by the wider circulation enjoyed by *Bintang Merah*, which had increased from 3,000, when it re-started, to 10,000 by the end of 1950. Since the latter figure was much greater than the estimated membership of the PKI, which stood at between 3,000 and 5,000 members, the suggestion being made in revealing these figures was that the Party's own political growth was being checked by an overly doctrinaire leadership. To sharpen their point, the *Bintang Merah* editors forced Wikana to recant the "erroneous" ideas that were expressed in the essay "Mass Youth Organization," carried earlier by the periodical. Finally, Tan Ling Djie was assailed both for his notion of an independent Irian and his continued defence of independent organizational status for the PS. The culmination of Aidit's campaign against the old leadership occurred at a plenary session of the Central Committee in early January 1951. There, following Tan's futile defence of his "reformist and legalistic policy concerning West Irian," the Central Committee annulled the December 2 statement and dissolved the PS. On 7 January, a new Politburo was named, consisting of Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, Sudisman, and Alimin. With this and lesser personnel changes in the CC, DPR, and at the offices of *Bintang Merah*, the Aidit-led Leninist wing had consolidated its grasp upon what was then one of the smallest and perhaps most intensely disliked formally represented organizations on the Indonesian political landscape.

Notwithstanding the PKI's tiny size and immense stigma, Aidit and his supporters were undaunted in their ambitious plans. This confidence stemmed from the fact that the operative principles of their plans had already been used, as if preparing for some future dress rehearsal for national power, to oust the old Communists. In five brief months, the Leninist wing had demonstrated that the Party's political progress had been inhibited by the old leadership's application of rigid ideological categories to the analysis of political developments or, more precisely, to the political consequences of Madiun and of Indonesian independence. In the wake of these events, the old leadership had scattered the "progressive forces" among several organizations, capitulated to the notion advanced by the government that the Revolution was over, confined the Party's activities and vision to the limits of Parliament, and had waived the cause of Irian Barat. In contrast to this categorical manner of thinking, which fostered inaction and even an anti-activist attitude, Aidit stressed organization, action, and the fulfilment of forms (specifically, the "August Revolution" of 1945) as such. In this way, consequences could be categorized without the scope of action and the breadth of political achievement being inhibited at the outset by pre-existing, substantively anchored Marxist-Leninist categories. The revolution that the PKI sought to lead, therefore, was more than a quest for proletarian power. What Aidit and his followers sought to accomplish was the creation of an Indonesian state and society.

A Strategy of the Margins: Formulating the United National Front

The Party's adoption of a United National Front approach by 1952 revealed not only the leadership's recognition of the artificial character of its revolutionary objectives, but its understanding that the realization of both an Indonesian state and society depended upon an equally synthetic organizing, resource-centred, and action-oriented strategy. In this sense, the United National Front strategy embodied the leadership's awareness that neither Indonesian independence nor the success of the Unitarian movement had resulted in the exercise of power over the archipelago and its peoples. At the same time, the strategy served as the means for the realization of this end and, in the process, of the directing ideas of Indonesia and the "August Revolution." In other words, the United National Front strategy defined a process of self-realization for the PKI, the outcome of which was clearly intended and understood to be coincident with the authoritative realization of an Indonesian state and society. Above all, the efforts that the PKI leadership stressed as fundamental constants in the Party's long-range work to create an Indonesian state and society were tangibly anchored. That is to say, the ostensible imperative to "complete the August Revolution" actually and judiciously disguised a state-building strategy that focused upon the acquisition or (given the novel character of this particular project) the authoritative creation of the fundamentals of a state: one territory, one people, one identity, and a monopoly of arms.

Since the PKI sought, along with Indonesian nationalists generally, the widest possible basis for their *Republik Negara Indonesia*, the Party's efforts along these lines compelled the early adoption and enduring application of peculiar (and peculiarly transparent) political tactics. The tactics of the United National Front strategy emphasized the inclusion of all organized groups (save the Party's avowed enemies), the widest and deepest geographic and popular organization of the Party and its fronts, and an ideological orientation remarkably free from prior, substantive commitments of the class type normally expected of Marxist-Leninist parties or of the ethnic, religious, or particularistic type to which virtually all Indonesian political parties superficially owed their basis.[23]

Thus, even as the United National Front strategy was being formulated and formalized by the Party leadership between January 1951 and March–April 1952, its leading members already grasped the indispensable utility of these winsome tactics. In August 1951, for instance, Aidit baldly asserted that the nebulous National United Front should comprise

> the workers' front, the peasants' front, the cultural front, the youth front, the students' front, the women's front, the poor urban people's front, the ex-armed fighters' front, the peace front, the Irian struggle front, the parties' united front, and the national industrialists' front.[24]

The articulation of all such groups' interests necessitated their organization, and to the Party leadership, this task afforded a rationale to establish numerous "mass organizations" (*organisasi massa*—ormas). Lukman articulated the conception of a Party ormas a mere month after the Aidit group acquired control of the PKI:

> By mass organization we mean a non-political organization of the masses, of the people. A mass organization binds together several groups of the people according to their social position, for example: a workers' organization (trade-union), peasants' organization, youth organization, women's organization, and so on. Also included in the mass organizations are various social and cultural organizations. The mass organizations arise on the basis and stimulus of the most simple and direct interests of the respective groups of the masses. Thus a trade-union organization arises on the basis and stimulus of the simple and direct interests of its members . . ., and so on.[25]

In contrast to the rigid class perspective associated with the old leadership then, the PKI under Aidit reconciled itself to the prevailing contextual reality and the numerous organizational bases that provided its foundation. Importantly, the Party now recognized that a myriad of groups organized themselves on any number and type of collective bases, including class and function and, in a manner as ideologically uninhibited as Lukman dare say it, on the basis of "the most simple and direct interests."

The leadership's impulse to organize the masses had led it to appreciate pre-existing organizational principles and patterns among them and, to this degree, to refrain from adopting a rigid class orientation that could possibly inhibit the growth of the Party itself. Specifically, in contemplating the organization of the masses through ormas allied to the PKI, the leadership was very careful to ensure that this work did not lead cumulatively to the Party's unwitting accommodation with or capitulation to the status quo. This point is clearly borne out both by the way in which the Party leadership conceived of its links with the ormas and the links among them. Lukman elucidated the leadership's thinking on the first relationship when he declared that the PKI must

> give leadership to the mass organizations in their actions, which means to train and raise the awareness of their members. This is the task, the duty of the Party factions in mass organizations. The broader the mass organization, the more the masses can be united, the broader the masses we can influence and give leadership to. That is why every Communist must fight hard for the unity of each kind of mass organization. Splitting a mass organization is not the work of Communists but of Trotskyites and social democrats (socialists). Communists in mass organizations led by Trotskyites and social democrats . . . may not leave the mass organizations because that would mean allowing the masses to continue under the leadership of persons who are truly the enemies of the people. We Communists must have the slogan: where the masses are, that is our place! Therefore we Communists cannot refuse to work in a mass organization, however reactionary it may be.[26]

Clearly, by embracing distinct and distinctly separate collective groups, the PKI was not thereby acceding to their many constitutive (and usually particularistic) principles of identity. Indeed, Lukman was quick to point out that "those persons are clearly wrong who believe that the mass organizations cannot give "satisfaction" to people who wish to participate in political action" because the PKI aimed precisely for such coordinated action by its very sponsorship of such ormas. In this sense, the Party leadership sought to create an extra-Party constituency that at once drew members from many disparate groupings and, at the same time, was different from and supersessive of all extant social groups by virtue of just such central and authoritative coordination.

The second relationship, which the Party aimed to establish and intermediate among the ormas, was designed to ensure that the Party possessed the widest possible perspective on the social happenings in the Indonesian context. This goal was to be attained by learning from, and directing, the activities of the ormas. Thus, at one level, the ormas operated to keep the PKI apprised of the issues and conditions that actually affected the most people in the most places. In this connection, the ormas collectively presented the Party with a variety of inter-connected organizational platforms from which to monitor social life or sections of it. At a second level, these same platforms also presented the Party with the organizational means to actually direct the affairs of sections of society and, when led in concert, perhaps even the wider populace.

While formal injunctions such as the PKI's constitutionally expressed tenet "to serve the people, to consolidate the Party's connections with them, to study their wishes and correctly report these to the Party in time, and to explain Party policy to them"[27] guided members in all organized settings, the separate organizational status that was nevertheless drawn between the Party and its mass auxiliaries affirmed the state-like character—or at least potential—of the former. First, in the family of communist organizations, the PKI alone based itself on Marxism-Leninism. In this way, and notwithstanding the ideological guidance which it gave to its ormas, the PKI preserved an exclusive ideological competence for itself. The nature of the "August Revolution," its phases, its programmatic expression (the United National Front strategy), and the practical measures for its realization, were all matters that depended upon determinations made exclusively by the Party leadership. It follows that the PKI's use of the ormas in taking coordinated or separate action at its direction formed the active component of its ideological competence. Therefore, such actions, or meaning-creating actions, represented discretely a second way in which the PKI could be said to have created the prospect of exercising or acquiring state-like characteristics. Third, the distinct organizational and political basis of the Party in relation to the ormas allowed it to concentrate more effort on identifying and commanding political resources than in searching for them itself. In this sense, the ormas did the preliminary organizational work by gathering a large personnel pool from which the Party selectively inducted and trained recruits who would later become its own members, sharing and sustaining its trans-ormas perspective, as it were. In a final respect, the deliberate arrangement of PKI-ormas relations reflected the former's state-like capacity by allowing the PKI to instill the widest sense of organization—of the eventuality of fulfilling a greater, concrete unity—among the masses. Lukman stated this objective early in 1951, when he declared that the ormas "must be based on the ties of everyday socio-economic needs and must be broad in nature. In order to meet these conditions, the most simple consciousness of the masses of the need to organize is sufficient to be the condition of membership of the respective mass organizations."[28] As Hindley has succinctly stated the matter, in the calculation of its United National Front strategy and, more specifically, its relationship with its ormas, the "PKI leaders set the Party the task of uniting the masses through the Party's own mass organizations."[29]

With Hindley's insight in mind, it is easy to see how in seeking to succeed in the Indonesian context, the PKI's tactical use of wide appeals and an organizing, activist orientation necessarily affected its ideology by rendering it a post-hoc tactical instrument to summarize and explain revolutionary accomplishments. In other words, the Party's ideology was used to categorize its accomplishments rather than to set in motion actions whose consequences, as such, conformed with classically conceived, substantively anchored Marxist-Leninist categories. Moreover, in the contemplation and execution of revolutionary action, the PKI indicated that its priority lay in directly addressing the situational consequences of earlier action sequences which had initiated either by itself or, more broadly, by the forces of Indonesian nationalism, rather than in the links between such undertakings and the action programme evident in orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Being ever mindful of the opportunities posed in, and by, the Indonesian context, therefore, the PKI turned its formally constituted multi-year plans into supreme ideological messages. Yet clearly, the ideological correctness of these plans could only be grasped upon their completion, when their fate could be evaluated and categorized in the wake of complete actions and, importantly, other actors' reactions. Thus, a defining feature of the Party's ideology, which at any given moment was instantiated in a formal plan, was that it possessed an unfinished or open-ended aspect.

When taken together, then, the United National Front strategy and its tactical triad give the clear impression that the PKI was deliberately engaged in a state-building strategy by early 1952. If the Party's public demands at this point were virtually all negative in thrust and externally oriented,[30] and the size of its "domestic" support was known to be negligible, then these two facts alone showed the enormity both of the Party's vision and of the task ahead: the Party had to conceive and construct the foundation that would supersede the separateness of Indonesia's peoples and islands, authoritatively giving them form and content from the inside out. Such a course of action broadly entailed surmounting the cultural, social, and political particularisms that were in turn stilled, preserved, cultivated or enlivened by all the East Indies' foreign occupiers. Stated succinctly, the pursuit of this course of action entailed a feat of political creation—of achieving political novelty by overcoming existing particularisms and known differences. This is fundamentally what the Party sought to accomplish by "completing the August Revolution," wherein the synthetic vision of the directing idea of Indonesia was paired with a highly plastic United National Front strategy. In this sense, progress in executing the United National Front strategy (which was to serve consistently up to late 1965 as the basic framework within which the Party understood and conceived its political activities and experiences) became tantamount to the realization of both an Indonesian state and society because both lacked prior authoritative substantive and formal definition. And since the PKI was interested in making just such revolutionary progress, it is against this standard—raised by the Party itself beginning in 1951—that the PKI may be usefully understood and its performance assessed in the Indonesian context.

By applying Tilly's approach to revolution (as modified by Aya) to the PKI, it becomes possible to see how the Party sought to realize its directing idea of Indonesia by accumulating political resources. This endeavour may be understood through a more specific, analytical focus on the quest for popular support (organizational and electoral), territory, a military capacity, and a sense of community identity (through the creation of normative resources, including the establishment and cultivation of patterns of governance or administration, education programmes and facilities, publications, and the advancement of new conceptions of culture). This perspective allows us to see how the Party's pursuit of the United National Front strategy grounded the PKI state-within-a-state in each of these respects. Moreover, in viewing the PKI's strategy in a resource-centred fashion, it is possible to appreciate how the Party's deliberate distinction between its efforts "from above" (with other political parties and formal actors) and "from below" (with the peoples of the archipelago) actually entailed bridging the gap between formal pretensions and unofficial realities that was so wantonly ignored by other actors.

In the brief period between the rise of the Aidit group in January 1951, and its formal indication in early 1952 that the United National Front strategy would henceforth be the strategy of Indonesian Communists, senior party leaders gave effect to an incredible number and variety of measures that unmistakably presaged both the wide scope and substantial character of their strategic work. In January, for instance, the new leadership revealed its strategic territorial objectives and its awareness of the link between this issue and others by supporting a joint PNI-PSII parliamentary motion on Irian Barat. This motion called for "the immediate entry of West Irian into Indonesia" as well as the abrogation of the Indonesia-Netherlands Union and the Round Table Conference agreements. In supporting this course of action, the PKI voted against the majority sentiment, since the motion was defeated by a two-to-one margin. It is important in explaining later political developments to recognize that the PKI's minority position, as such, stemmed both from what the PKI alone possessed and from what other actors shared. The PKI alone possessed a marginal political perspective (as argued above), while other parties shared in the commitment to using the economic and financial aspects of the RTC agreements to gather real and beneficial resources for themselves in the unreal and fickle political world of the appointative Parliament. In contrast to other parties, which voted on the basis of their immediate interests as perceived in the RTC agreements, and notwithstanding the fact that these same agreements had failed to yield a promised resolution of the Irian Barat question by the end of 1950, the PKI chose to emphasize long-term and radically state-like (in the sense of fundamental) objectives. Not even the PNI, which voted for the motion, had more in mind at this point in time than delivering an immediate blow against its emerging rival—Masjumi.

Also in January 1951, the PKI took an important strategic decision on the issue of Indonesia's local administration by calling for a suspension of Government Regulation No. 39. One may recall that this regulation conferred discretionary powers on the government (in this case the Masjumi-dominated Natsir Cabinet) to appoint additional local representatives to municipal, regional, and provincial councils on the basis of their organizational affiliations. The abuses committed in the brief life of this regulation had caused alarm in the PNI; it set about seeking allies to halt Masjumi's seizure and creation of political resources. With support from the PKI, among other parties, the PNI succeeded in late January in stalling not only Masjumi's drive to achieve local control, but the prospect in the near future of truly effective, coordinated, and representative local administration throughout the country. It may be suggested that the PKI's motive at this time was merely to forge a closer relationship with the PNI and other parliamentary actors, but, as in the case of the

Irian Barat resolution in the DPR, the possibility cannot be overlooked that the PKI was also interested in thwarting other actors' chances of acquiring political resources. While it is not likely that the PKI purposely set about sabotaging either the economic or administrative mechanisms that were in the governing parties' hands, its actions in January 1951 certainly had the effect of threatening and even jeopardizing other actors' chances of readily accumulating resources and building their own power in these domains.

The opportunities that had been presented to the PKI in the formal realm sharpened its leaders' awareness of the tactical utility of other parties' rivalries and of the destructive aspects of the same to the government's capacity to effect basic administrative and economic functions. The PKI's enhanced appreciation of the fundamentally unsettled nature of the Indonesian context thus prompted it simultaneously to accentuate subtly existing inter-party schisms while shrewdly presenting itself as the nation's deliverer. At the formal level, the PKI's all-Indonesia claims were publicly enunciated in its call, following the resignation of the Natsir Cabinet in March, for a new coalition government that could begin to create a "truly free national, political, economic, cultural and defense system."[31] The wide-sweeping nature of this objective may have made it seem a vacuous and unattainable political ambition, but it did contain a very careful and public delineation of the general types of problems the PKI saw in the Indonesian context. At the end of March, the formation of a Political Parties' Consultative Council (BPP) between the PKI and seven smaller (nationalist and Muslim) political parties gave a quantum boost to the Party's political standing. To the PKI, the BPP marked a new level of cooperation with Indonesia's established party actors and effectively lifted the political stigma that had hitherto restricted its political manoeuvring; shortly after its creation, Aidit declared the formation of the BPP to have been the beginning of the United National Front.

The Party attempted to duplicate its parliamentary success by embarking upon a campaign that was deliberately extra-parliamentary in nature and, notably, enacted in the complete absence of the need to electioneer: the PKI went out among the masses and to the Outer Islands to bring these people, their concerns, and these areas into the Party's orbit. The scope of the Aidit leadership's vision and its underlying determination to organize is strikingly revealed by the geographical spread of the PKI. In September 1950, for instance, the PKI operated in both Java and Sumatra. By this time, the Party's work in Java, which was centred in Djakarta, Banten, Sukabumi, Jogjakarta, Surakarta, north Kedu, Blitar, and Banjumas, already bore the marks of Aidit's political perceptions. The Party's other operations, in Sumatra, were unaffected by the growing contest within senior PKI echelons. Nevertheless, where the Aidit group wielded influence, namely in Java, the Party was intensely active and by October 1950 its branches in Surabaja, Bodjonegoro, Madiun, and Malang had been revived. Following its ascent to supreme Party leadership, the Aidit group moved extraordinarily quickly to re-organize the Sumatran branches and replace their leaders with like-minded comrades. According to Hindley, this latter task was successfully completed in North, Central, and South Sumatra by March 1951. The most important respect in which the PKI sought to grow geographically, however, related to the Party's self-imposed and early goal of expanding beyond the original insular seats of Republican power in Java and Sumatra. Thus, the PKI aspired not merely to fulfil the Unitarian spirit, but to create its own unifying structures across the archipelago. With this in mind, Aidit confidently asserted in May 1951 that the Party had begun its work in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara.

The Party's extensive geographical drive was paralleled by a series of ideological and organizational steps designed to create firmer bonds within the Party and between the Party and the general public. On the first matter, the Party leadership showed its appreciation for the ideational hazards that are present when trying to realize directing ideas as broad as "completing the August Revolution." In this light, Aidit's insistence on the correct understanding of the goals and tactics of the United National Front strategy did not mean an intransigent, a priori, or formalized interpretation of the PKI's power chances so much as it meant that members should avail themselves singly and together of all opportunities to organize the medium itself around the PKI and its organizational family. Accordingly, all deviations from the broad path, including premature attempts to seize power, acquiescing to other actors and their ideas, and narrow sectarianism, were eschewed; what remained was only the broad path and the imperative of organizing and later positively synthesizing the diversities of the Indonesian context.

To assure such clarity and discipline in the Party's revolutionary thinking and actions, the leadership took several steps that would allow them to practically govern the Communist membership and provide some guidance to the wider Communist constituency. First, strict membership rules were implemented as part of the Party's new constitution in April 1951. By implementing rules relating to ideological training, criticism and self-criticism, and assessment periods before members could become cadres, the PKI leadership hoped not only to create a homogeneous core of committed followers, but to develop patterns of governance among them and all other Party and non-Party followers. In the same month, the leadership initiated training courses for its functionaries. Later, in August 1951, organized ideological discussions began throughout the Party.

At the same time as the Party set about preparing its members for the political activities anticipated in the United National Front strategy, it began to create the practical mechanisms to draw the masses into that Front. Here, I am referring to the tools that could uniquely and simultaneously inform the Party and the masses at an ideological level, while also drawing both closer together: PKI publications. The desire to appeal as broadly as possible to the masses was the key motive behind the publication of the Party's daily newspaper, the People's Daily (*Harian Rakjat*), which first appeared in January 1951 with the rise of the Aidit group. Shortly thereafter, in March 1951, the PKI struck a commission to oversee the translation of leading Marxist-Leninist tracts written abroad and their subsequent publication by the Party printing concern, the Renewal Foundation (*Jajasan "Pembaruan"*). In all instances of publishing, of course, the PKI's motives were divided equally between supplying official Party views on daily and theoretical issues, and creating greater demand for the same by making its written word both affordable, widely available, and inviting.

Not all Indonesians, and certainly not all other parties, found the Communist's new political message very inviting. Indeed, among the Party's avowed enemies, who were mainly encamped within Masjumi's broad organization, an urgent but diffuse sense of alarm prompted a sweeping anti-Communist campaign in August 1951. Then, the Sukiman Cabinet struck at the Party and its labour affiliates, especially SOBSI, claiming knowledge of an impending Communist coup d'état. While the effort was sweeping, as thousands were imprisoned and the PKI leadership retreated into a seven-month period of hiding, it was also half-hearted. By April 1952, the Sukiman Cabinet had fallen without proving the culpability of a single imprisoned Communist, let alone effectively addressing the political issues that informed the United National Front strategy.

Indeed, as the Party leadership emerged from what would later be viewed as an intensive period of study, it was prepared not only to formally and publicly declare its intention to proceed with the pursuit of the strategy, it was ready to effect its practical aspects with ever greater, clearer, and diligent organization and action. On this score, given both the Party's unwillingness to be provocative (or provoked) and the character of its ideology, which sought to actively organize the many existing social elements within the Party rather than take a substantively discriminating stance, there was very little that other actors could do to stop the Communists. Truly, in the context of other actors' evolving power pursuits, and in the widening wake of the destructive territorial, popular, administrative, and economic consequences that attended such pursuits, it was less definitely a matter of who would stop the Communists than it was an open question about how far (temporally and spatially) their constructive intent would be organizationally and actively sustained. In analytical terms, the Communists' concern to widen the limits and radicalize the direction of Indonesian politics meant creating and controlling the political resources to build a PKI state-within-a-state, with the hope, thereby, of defining Indonesia.

If the Communists' political progress by early 1952 was at a standstill, then the key to understanding the PKI's superlative expansion thereafter lay, paradoxically, in the PKI's voluntary contraction that *followed* the collapse of the Natsir Cabinet. One of the enduring insights that the Aidit leadership grasped during its long seclusion between August 1951 and March 1952 was that if the Party was to succeed, its own work and that of its ormas had to be conducted on the unquestioned basis of Party paramountcy, that is, on the principles of democratic centralism. This insight actually contained two lessons. First, the PKI leadership learned that the existing Party membership, and especially that of the Party's ormas, was unreliable in important respects in the political sphere; after all, it was SOBSI members' recklessness that precipitated the government's campaign in August 1951. Second, the leadership learned that the policy of opening the Party and its ormas to new members would not guarantee the reliability of in-coming and future members, notwithstanding the constitutional safeguards already in place. In a sense, the PKI was fortunate to have learned these lessons while it was still small, since the government had made Aidit's task easier by inadvertently identifying unreliable SOBSI and Party members and, more importantly, signalling the need to correct unforeseen organizational and ideological weaknesses in the pursuit of the United National Front strategy.

To overcome the PKI's real and apparent weaknesses, the Party leaders convened a national conference in March 1952 to map out new tactics. The leadership settled upon a two-pronged campaign. First, unprecedentedly high ideological standards were imposed upon all members. The practical effect of this step was to

> screen and test all members, old and new. All party members not included in the hierarchy of party committees were lowered to the status of candidate members and obliged to pass through the standard probationary tests for orthodox learning and loyalty. Following this drastic step, the party initiated a full-scale study movement with the aim of exterminating a number of the evils which were said to be seeping into the party.[32]

The second tactic was the natural consequence of a Central Committee decision, dated 8 March 1952, to formally and publicly alter the PKI's organizational basis. Henceforth, the Party would assume a "mass," rather than "elite," character. To help make it so, a six-month membership drive was announced; at its end, the Party hoped to have a total membership of 100,000, well up from its current membership of between 8,000 and 10,000 individuals. Since the PKI was not assured of success in the execution of either tactic, the Party was particularly keen to learn any additional lessons that it could in taking these two steps. Thus, with the early attainment of the membership goal (by May 1952), without any signs of dissent from among the leaders or the followers, the PKI was quick to learn that these tactics should become constants in its organizational and mobilizational work. The subsequent refinement, extension, and formalization of the Party's membership and educational drives, between 1952 and 1965, testify equally to the Party's commitment to hard work as they do to the unchanging requirements of political success in the Indonesian context: organization and mobilization.

Organizational Experiences and Accomplishments of the United National Front Strategy
(1951-57)

From March 1952, the PKI's adoption of new tactics in the context of the United National Front strategy spelled a commitment to the primitive and solitary accumulation of power resources. It is in these stark terms, that we may appreciate the growth of Communist power through March 1957. More specifically, it is possible to examine the nature and extent of Communist power by focusing, in turn, on the quantitative and qualitative growth of the PKI, its publishing activities, its mass organizations, its military potential, and its electoral support.

The quantitative and qualitative growth of the PKI was, at least in part, the direct result of Aidit's desire to forge what Van der Kroef has called

> an organizational weapon—something which Aidit was fond of expressing by means of his slogan "*Membolsewikkan PKI*" ("Bolshevize the PKI!") . . . [and which entailed the] establishment of better cadre control, more thorough and continuous ideological training, development and routinization of effective internal administrative procedures, imposition of a sense of individual subordination and party discipline, a constant reevaluation of tactics, and the creation of new fronts and organizational conduits as they became necessary.[33]

In the period under consideration, the clearest expressions of the leadership's desire to transform the Party into a huge organizational weapon were to be found in the two membership drives (announced in March 1952 and March 1954) and in the first "Plan of Organization and Education" (announced in August 1956). As we have seen, the first membership drive sought to increase the total Party membership to 100,000, while increasing the overall ideological quality of all members. The early attainment of the first objective conveniently allowed the Party to exert greater efforts to fulfil the second objective, which included the initiation of ideological courses, discussions, self-study sessions, lectures, and meetings for all members in the regions, the establishment of major regional language programmes, and the launching of local publications. The complete achievement of the first objective, and the good start made on the second objective, would have seemed incredible in light of the PKI's condition in early 1952, but in comparison to subsequent plans, these goals were modest. The completion of the six-month drive prompted the Party to organize its first intensive period of ideological study, in 1953, and this, in turn, generated higher expectations for the future.

Those expectations were embodied in the second membership drive, which was announced at the Party's Fifth National Congress in March 1954. Despite the fact that the Party was now engaged in electioneering, the decision to proceed with a one-year drive at this time indicated the PKI's profound willingness to engage in planned political activity. In this instance, the Party did not publicly commit itself to a desired membership goal, although Aidit gave a very important indication of this and of how smoothly the Party's organizational and mobilizational work was proceeding when he remarked in May 1954 that "it will not be simply luck if PKI at the end of this year is a Party with a million members and candidate members."[34] However, by year's end the Party had only approached the half-way mark in its drive. Additionally, there were indications that the Party's ongoing educational work had encountered problems of compliance at lower levels, that there was a shortage of trained cadres, and that genuine ideological training was being neglected. The results that emerged from the September 1955 election were extremely favourable to the PKI and helped to reinvigorate all aspects of the Party's work. Indeed, largely on the basis of this result, the PKI directed its full attention and efforts to the fulfilment of planned political activities.

The PKI's "Three-Year Plan of Organization and Education" was announced on 17 August 1956. The organizational aspects of the plan called for a 50 per cent increase in the size of the membership, the extension of the Party membership and activity evenly throughout Indonesia, the improvement of Party organization at all levels, the promotion of candidate members to full members, and the collection of dues, among others. In the educational sphere, the Party aimed to wipe out illiteracy among its members, organize schools and courses more broadly and thoroughly, and create educational resources for members and non-members alike in the form of publications, libraries, and even institutions, such as a People's University. In both spheres, the plan set quotas for each Party committee. In effecting especially its organizational goals, the Party was conveniently assisted by the electoral returns records that had been studiously collected and compiled by the Central Government. In practical terms, these records showed the Party where it was weak, and thus where it needed to organize and mobilize. More specifically, the records revealed previously unknowable levels of popular support. The actual figures for the total number of individuals voting for the PKI could then be used with some reliability by the Party, at whatever level it sought, in planning membership drives and achieving desirable ratios between the size of the Party membership and the availability of cadres.[35] Table 3 surveys the PKI's astonishing success in attracting members between 1948 and 1956.

The PKI engaged in an incredible variety of publishing ventures. In itself, this fact may not appear extraordinary. However, Communist publishing activities were quite revealing of the PKI's distinctiveness vis-à-vis other Indonesian political actors. For unlike other political parties, the PKI aimed at a very early point in time at expanding the forms that its message took and at widening the limits of its delivery. Thus, the Party actively publicized its views whenever a Party or public occasion arose. For instance, the Party transformed its national congresses and national conferences, and even Central Committee plenary sessions, into opportunities to legitimately engage in the mass dissemination of its views. Hindley notes that in preparation for its Fifth National Congress in March 1954, the Party published 150,000 copies of the draft program in five languages: Indonesian, Sundanese, Madurese, Batak, and English.[36] In the 1955 general elections, the PKI showed the same determination to spread its message broadly by producing 150,000 copies of its election programme in Indonesian, Javanese, Sundanese, and Batak.[37] In the 1957 local elections, the Party took a further step in the perfection of its communication system by having lower-level organizations issue their own publications, sometimes in the local language. The clearest barometer of the Party's success throughout this period, perhaps, is apparent in the dramatic circulation record that *Harian Rakjat* set. One comparison, based on figures from January 1956, showed the circulation of major party papers to be as follows: *Harian Rakjat*—55,000, *Pedoman* (PSI paper)—48,000, *Suluh Indonesia* (PNI paper)—40,000, *Merdeka* (pro-PNI paper)—38,000, and *Abadi* (Masjumi paper)—34,000.[38] The historical record for *Harian Rakjat* is presented in Table 4.

In understanding the nature of the PKI's political ambitions, it is of vital importance to also recognize the self-serving aspect of its publishing activities. To increase the ability of Party members to understand Marxism-Leninism, and then to permit them to articulate its general and specific merits, the Central Committee directed that the *Jajasan "Pembaruan"* begin the translation of foreign-language tracts and create specialized publications for the dissemination of the PKI message. From

TABLE 3

PKI MEMBERSHIP 1948-56

Date	Claimed Membership
1948	4,000[a]
1951	below 5,000[b]
Early 1952	7,910[c]
May 1952	100,000[d]
End 1952	126,671[e]
March 1954	165,206[f]
October 1954	500,000[g]
February 1956	1,000,000[h]

SOURCE: [a] Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism under Aidit," *Problems of Communism* 7 (November-December 1958):17; [b] Donald Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy in Indonesia 1948-59," *Australian Outlook* 13 (December 1959):254; [c] Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), p. 70; [d] Sudisman, "Peladjaran Fundamentil Selama 32 Tahun Berdirinja PKI," *PKI-Buletin* (20 May 1952), p. 12, cited in Hindley, *Communist Party*, p. 74; [e] Partai Komunis Indonesia, *Bahan-Bahan untuk Kongres Nasional ke-VI Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1958), p. 54, cited in Hindley, *Communist Party*, p. 74; [f] D. N. Aidit, "Some Results of Vth National Congress of Indonesian communist Party," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* (Prague) (15 October 1954), p. 3, cited in Hindley, *Communist Party*, p. 79; [g] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* (19 November 1954), p. 2, cited in Hindley, *Communist Party*, p. 80; [h] *Bintang Merah* (February-March 1956), p. 112, cited in Hindley, *Indonesian Communism*, p. 80.

TABLE 4

CIRCULATION FIGURES
FOR *HARIAN RAKJAT*
1951-57

Date	Circulation
July 1951	2,000
October 1953	12,500
February 1954	15,000
January 1955	23,000
January 1956	55,000
March 1956	58,000
February 1957	60,000

SOURCE: Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 77 and 82.

its modest translation efforts in 1950, which chiefly related to a serialized presentation in *Bintang Merah* of Mao's essay on the "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," the Party plunged into what would become a massive translation programme. Materials were in short supply through 1952, but by 1953, and with some assistance from the People's Republic of China, at least 40 new works were available[39]; in the year 1955, at least 30 separate publications were issued, amounting to 1,136,000 copies.[40] In the following year, the Party produced 700,000 copies of its various publications and confidently predicted a ceiling of one million copies for 1957.[41] By then, the PKI had access to the main thoughts of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Kian Ling, Ho Chi Minh, Hong Ha, Dimitrov, and Leontiev, among others. At the same time as the Party cadres acquainted themselves with the canons of Marxism-Leninism, they, in turn, acquainted the Party membership with syntheses of these thoughts and the Party's directing idea of Indonesia in a variety of publications.

The Party's first new publication under Aidit was *PKI-Buletin*, and although it lasted only from late 1951 to August 1952, it gave the Party a chance to resuscitate the flagging *Bintang Merah*[42] while dealing with the practicalities of extending its publishing reach. Thereafter, in relatively rapid succession, the Party introduced the English-language *Monthly Review* in mid-1954,[43] *PKI dan DPR* (*PKI and the DPR*) in June 1956,[44] *Mimbar Komunis* (*Communist Forum*) in January 1957, and *Marxist Science* in November 1957.[45] Clearly, with time, the increasing number and variety of Party publications became a direct indicator not only of the PKI's political sophistication, but of the PKI's statelike quality—for no mere political party could sustain the attention and resources that the PKI devoted to the discussion and publicizing of issues ranging from agrarian relations to the latest advances in science.

Quite aside from merely discussing and publicizing issues like agrarian relations and science, the PKI showed that it possessed a practical interest in these areas by endeavouring to create and guide a family of mass organizations. Indeed, the heart of the PKI's United National Front "from below" may be said to have consisted of its ormas. For despite their own habitual assertions that they were "non-partisan" and "non-Communist," Van der Kroef, writing in 1965, observed that

> their organizational structure . . . is closely modeled after the PKI's and the latter principle of "democratic centralism" . . . the top leadership of the fronts consists of PKI members or known fellow-travellers, and . . . known cadres are in command of the critical lower echelon positions.[46]

Although the PKI did not aspire to exert total control over its ormas, and actually eschewed formal links with all its fronts save the youth front, the basic mechanisms that van der Kroef has outlined were sufficient in their own right to give the relations between PKI and its mass organizations a fundamentally different character than those maintained by all other parties and their mass organizations. The PNI, Masjumi, NU, and PSI, among others, all possessed a wide net of allied fronts, but none rivalled the PKI in its energetic and disciplined efforts to control, organize, mobilize, or coordinate disparate social groupings. In fact, the PKI alone showed a determined interest among the political parties in organizing the peasantry, notwithstanding the fact that they were the single largest group of the population.[47] In short, no other party even attempted to actualize directing ideas by gathering and creating resources from among and within the masses. At times, it is true, healthy and mutually constructive rivalries emerged between the PKI and other parties to gather members from the recognized social domains, but the comprehensiveness of the PKI's exertions marked its efforts as distinctive, as part of a wider revolutionary undertaking. In short, the PKI envisioned creating a political constellation "from below" that stretched to the limits of organized social life, and wherein it could uniformly organize or re-organize all major groups as discrete but allied social systems.

The most important mass organizations in the PKI's political network included SOBSI, BTI, the People's Youth (*Pemuda Rakjat*), the Indonesian Women's Movement (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*—Gerwani), and the Institute of People's Culture (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakjat*—Lekra). At this point, it is more appropriate for theoretical reasons to examine the growth of these fronts up to 1957 than it is to explore other aspects of their organizational history. This is the case because growth in ormas' membership, its rapidity, and its coordinated scope, as shown in Tables 5 through 8, is evidence that a political actor is actively pursuing a state-building strategy. Moreover, an examination of this type of activity, as opposed to other possible forms of organizational work, helps us to appreciate the fundamental premise behind such activity. In this case, the PKI clearly showed that it was seeking, in a planned way, to involve and include large numbers of people who were for the mostpart previously outside organized political life. This work, in turn, suggests the PKI's very broad and radical challenge to existing political structures and forms, and not, as is conventionally supposed, its underlying desire to be included in the same.

Of greater interest, perhaps, than the Party's clear ambition to capture and organize large segments of the population, was its ambition thereby to exert effective control over territory. In the case of SOBSI, for instance, it was both large and strategically located "in all major phases of the country's production and services processes [which made it] better balanced, and potentially more dangerous, than other non-Communist or anti-Communist labour federations."[48] SOBSI's actual and potential power stemmed from its character as a federation, that is, from the fact that its constituent unions gave it the capacity to act within specific areas around sector-specific issues. Consider this early survey of SOBSI:

> The largest SOBSI union, SARBUPRI [Indonesian Estate Workers' Trade Union—*Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia*], dominates the labour scene in the great rubber area of North Sumatra and has branches on plantations in all parts of Java. [PERBUM] [Union of Oil Workers—*Perserikatan Buruh Minjak*] . . . has control of more than half the labour force in the important Sumatran oil fields. Plantation products and oil account for more than 50 per cent of the total value of Indonesian exports. In the same strategic export sector of the economy, SOBSI unions are powerful among harbor and railroad workers.[49]

The Party's revolutionary intentions of using its ormas in a coordinated manner to simultaneously address popular and territorial issues while capturing or creating control over both people and territory became unmistakably clear in 1953-54. At that time, Sarbupri and BTI precipitated a conflict with the Central Government over the long-running issue of squatters' rights on estate lands, notably in North and East Sumatra. This conflict was fundamentally an issue of superior control, which is not surprising because it was the very breakdown in the control over these estates in 1942 that allowed them to lapse into a state of muted anarchy. Then, with the Japanese occupation, squatters were unopposed in their own occupation and free use of the estate lands that formally belonged to foreigners. With the RTC agreements, the government was under the impracticable obligation to clear the estates of these now well-rooted squatters and return the land in question to their former (chiefly Western) owners. The government attempted to use its formal authority to remove the squatters and it was this intervention that served as the stimulus for BTI and Sarbupri (with the active assistance of *Pemuda Rakjat* and Gerwani), to organize and represent the squatters throughout the Sumatran estates. In September 1953, for instance, Sarbupri called a strike in East Sumatra "*after* the regional office of the government's labour arbitration commission had taken a *binding* decision in a wage dispute, a decision accepted by the estates."[50] "Within a few months," Compton has remarked, "the Wilopo Cabinet fell on the issue of agrarian policy in North Sumatra. When the smoke had cleared, the communists had succeeded in building the basis of a single strong peasant association in the Medan area through the fusion of most of the smaller

TABLE 5

SOBSI MEMBERSHIP 1949-55

Date	Claimed Membership
1949	220,000[a]
1952	1,561,760[b]
January 1955	2,661,970[c]

SOURCE: [a] Donald Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy in Indonesia 1948–1959," *Australian Outlook* 13 (December 1959):254; [b] Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program, and Tactics* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965), p. 203; [c] Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1963* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), p. 135.

TABLE 6

BTI MEMBERSHIP 1953–57

Date	Membership Claimed
Early 1953	240,000
September 1953	360,000
March 1954	800,000
April 1955	2,027,500
End 1955	3,315,820
September 1957	3,390,286

SOURCE: Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1963* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 165–66.

TABLE 7

PEMUDA RAKJAT MEMBERSHIP
1950–57

Date	Membership Claimed
November 1950	30,000
November 1952	46,598
June 1953	70,319
July 1954	202,605
June 1955	450,000
End 1955	616,605
End 1957	800,000

SOURCE: Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1963* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 188–91.

TABLE 8

GERWANI MEMBERSHIP
1950–57

Date	Membership Claimed
1950	500
December 1951	6,000
June 1953	40,000
March 1954	80,000
September 1955	400,000
December 1955	565,147
December 1957	671,342

SOURCE: Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1963* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 203–4.

peasant groups involved."[51] This development is of singular theoretical importance, for it showed the PKI's willingness to oppose the formal government's directives, the tangible quality of its own power, its capacity to coordinate actions among a variety of groups, and the first signs that the Party was succeeding in creating its own social constituency distinctively founded on a non-particularistic political vision.

In the open contest of political visions that are elections, the PKI unequivocally demonstrated in 1955, and again in 1957 and 1958, that it possessed a genuine and profound appeal—and capacity to appeal—to the wider population. It may be recalled that in the 1955 Parliamentary elections, the PKI secured 6,176,914 votes or 16.4 per cent. To its opponents, and probably to itself, this result was stunning. To the PKI, this result clearly spoke to the high value of its low-level organization and mobilization, which it bore out by being

> active in many areas in providing social welfare services at the village level, in carrying out such "small but effective actions"—this was the PKI slogan—such as organizing the sharing of agricultural tools, arranging mutual assistance when feasts were held, building new water channels, and helping the victims of fires and floods.[52]

To its opponents, the PKI's uncomfortably large share of the popular vote exhibited a potential political weakness, and that was the easy identification of the Party with Java and Javanese interests. For indeed, the PKI had scored its greatest successes in Java, chiefly in the provinces of East and Central Java. The Party had obtained 88.6 per cent of all its votes from Java, whose population represented 66.2 per cent of the country's total.[53] Within Java, the Party obtained 74.9 per cent of its votes from the two provinces of East and Central Java, whose combined population amounted to 45.6 per cent of the country's total.[54] The PKI polled second, behind PNI, in both provinces. In the fourteen residencies in these two provinces, the PKI was first in five (Madiun, Kediri, Surakarta, Jogjakarta, and Semarang), second in one (Bodjonegoro), and third in the remaining six (Besuki, Surabaja, Pati, Kedu, Pekalongan, and Banjumas).[55] In the municipalities of Semarang, Surakarta, and Salatiga, and in the regencies of Bojolali, Klaten, Semarang, and Sukohardjo, the PKI possessed an absolute majority.[56]

The results of the 1957-58 local elections, which were held to contest seats in the provincial and *kabupaten* [regency] councils (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah*—DPRD) of Java, and the provincial councils of South Sumatra and Kalimantan, have conventionally been interpreted as confirming the PKI as a fundamentally Javanese party. The basis for this view lies in the stunning fact that nowhere, among Java's one hundred municipalities and regencies, did the PKI lose support in relation to its vote in the 1955 DPR elections.[57] Accordingly to Hindley, the Party received 7,514,197 votes in Java, up an impressive 37.2 per cent, or 2,036,490 votes, from its result a mere two years earlier. Regionally, PKI support was up 42.5 per cent in Greater Jakarta, 71.8 per cent in West Java, 34.4 per cent in Central Java, and 28.4 per cent in East Java. At the lower levels, Hindley has observed that the

> PKI received over 50 per cent of the votes cast in eleven of the eighty *kabupatens*, and in six of the twenty municipalities. Between 40 and 50 per cent of the total vote was received in eight *kabupatens* and in four towns. Not only did the PKI emerge as the largest party in Java as a whole, but it was the largest party in 44 of the one hundred local council districts in Java, and the second largest in 17 of them.[58]

Elsewhere, the PKI's share of the popular vote increased from 12.1 per cent to 15.7 per cent of the total in South Sumatra, and from 3.0 per cent to 5.1 per cent of the total in Kalimantan.

An equally important aspect of the PKI's electoral success, besides its immense quantitative size, was its effect on other political parties and specifically on their perception of the relationship that now existed between themselves and the Communists. Even before the elections in Sumatra (in late 1957) and Kalimantan (in 1958), the PKI had demonstrated in brute terms that it was usurping the previously higher popular standing of all other parties where ever an electoral competition occurred among them. For instance, as compared to the 1955 election returns, the PKI moved from fourth to second place in Jakarta, third to second place in West Java, second to first place in Central Java, and third to second place in East Java. In South Sumatra, the PKI had demonstrated that alone among the major parties, it was capable of electoral growth; Masjumi retained its first place finish but lost 75,110 votes, PNI slipped from second to third place when it lost 26,724 votes, and NU was confirmed in fourth place with a loss of 2,050 votes. The PKI, by contrast, moved up to second place (from its third place finish in 1955) and acquired an additional 52,065 votes.[59] Van der Kroef has noted the results of the Central Kalimantan elections, held on 19 October 1958, "showed a nearly 100 per cent. gain in votes over the results obtained by the [PKI] in the parliamentary elections of 1955, and the losses suffered by the PNI, Nahdatul Ulama and Masjumi Parties."[60] These results prompted Lev to observe that

> the PNI has slipped in less than two years from first place to third in the five districts considered. Masjumi and the NU have declined, but retained their relative positions in the provinces. The ominous thing for these last two parties was less the fact that they declined slightly than that the PKI had made such a startling advance. What was most disturbing was that the PKI was the only party to have increased its support since 1955. It was a growing party, while the others were apparently shrinking; and all the evidence pointed to the likelihood of the PKI continuing to grow and the others continuing to shrink.[61]

Lev's somewhat pejorative assessment of the PKI's political fortunes mirrored the spirit and views of the Party's enemies. Indeed, the 1957-58 electoral returns helped to fix the hitherto nascent view, which was held mainly by Masjumi and PSI, that power in Indonesia was being selfishly wielded by the agents of Javanese political interests, chiefly the PKI and the PNI, and that the concerns of the Outer Islands were not being effectively represented at the national level. The latest spate of election returns were thus employed in the intensification of destructive political developments at the national level, at the same time as they were used to advance the conceptualization and realization of politically constructive power quests at the sub-national or insular level. In this connection, it was expedient for the leaders of Masjumi and PSI, their adherents, and fellow travellers to foster the notion that indeed the rise of the PKI heralded a Javanese political and cultural hegemony over the Outer Islands. With these ends in mind, Masjumi and PSI leaders transformed the objective reality of the PKI's territorial breakthrough in Java into the subjective threat of a future Javanese tyranny.

When viewed from the PKI's perspective as a state-building actor, its popular and territorial appeal in the island of Java in no way limited its political vision or appeal to these insular or cultural horizons. Above all, the Party's successful attainment of decisive popular and territorial influence in Java was a reflection of the "cruel demographic realities" of the archipelago which made it strategically necessary to cultivate appeals where most of the people were—Java. While Java was important to the PKI in a numerical, rather than cultural, sense, even Java had to be subordinated to the synthetic vision of Indonesia that served as the PKI's directing idea and to the practical organizational and mobilizational work that the Party enacted throughout the archipelago. To the PKI, then, Java was simultaneously a strategic asset and a liability. Being territorially fixed in Java had the effect of the Javanese label being affixed to the Party. Understandably, the PKI's enemies used the static electoral pictures of 1955 and 1957–58 to blur the first effects of the wider and dynamic revolutionary strategy of the United National Front.

In this confusion, it seemed unavoidable that the subjective representation by Masjumi and PSI of political developments in Indonesia would find an echo in the evaluative frameworks used by Western scholars, particularly because these parties shared an ideological affinity with the West and, not unimportantly for the time, offered an alternative to Communism. Western scholarship thus deviated from its earlier concern with the promotion of Indonesian democracy and economic development, but without abandoning its assumption that the formal political sphere was the supreme political object and subject of Indonesian political actors' activities. Indeed, it was relatively easy to shift the analysis at this formal level on the assumption that the Indonesian government was imperilled either by a Communist take-over, centred in Java, or by a dictatorship threatened by Sukarno and the Army, or by both, with time.

Scholarly studies of the PKI after 1957 have, for the most part, accepted the perception of the Party as a Javanese party, interested solely in effecting a Communist revolution through the eventual take over of the Indonesian government. This is an unfortunate representation of the PKI, because it effectively diverts our attention away from the Party's wider synthetic political strategy. More specifically, a focus on the Communists' relations with the formal sphere and formal actors overlooks what the Communists themselves decided at an early date was most important for the "completion of the August Revolution":

> The Communist Party of Indonesia sets as its aim to unite the Indonesian people into one national front and as a result of the revolutionary struggle of the many million masses to create a people's democratic government. The Communist Party of Indonesia regards its work in parliament not the main work of the Party and the parliamentary struggle not the only form of struggle. Does it follow from this, therefore, that the Communist Party is indifferent to parliamentary elections and the parliamentary struggle, and that it maintains one and the same attitude to all hitherto existing and to governments that will be in office until a people's democratic government is formed? . . . Not at all.[62]

It is revealing to state that out of consideration of the "country's backwardness," the PKI conceived of the future "people's democratic government" as being distinct from a "dictatorship of the proletariat." Its distinctiveness lay in its constitution as a "dictatorship of the people," and it was exactly the planned organization and mobilization of the "people" or "masses" that gave the Party's work, both "from above" and "from below," its purpose and its content. Failing to appreciate the Party's thinking on this point blinds us to its work less as a party after 1957, when liberal democracy came to an effective end, and more as a movement or statelike entity.

If the representation of the PKI after 1957 is unfortunate, then its effects on the representation of the Army are equally unfortunate. For if we fail to grasp the Party's all-round efforts to acquire resources throughout the archipelago—to supersede the liabilities of being labelled merely a Javanese party—then our chances of understanding the true magnitude and intent of the Army's dynamic political activities from 1957, let alone establishing their methodological and theoretical importance, decrease and perhaps even disappear. The TNI was not confronted in 1957 by a powerful, "Javanese-minded" Communist party, it was confronted by a highly successful and skilled revolutionary actor in the midst of realizing its state-building strategy in a vast archipelago. For the TNI, the challenge of political survival meant simultaneously acquiring the same kinds of power resources that the PKI sought, while advancing a meaningful counter-conception of the Indonesian identity. In short, the PKI forced the TNI, whose central leadership desired to wield power in the Indonesian context, to behave like the PKI. The TNI had to engage in meaning-creating actions, which meant competitively organizing and mobilizing resources in a revolutionary manner to fulfil its directing idea of Indonesia.

Decline, Crisis, and the Army's Assumption of a Directing Idea (1949-57)

Western and Indonesian military historiographers have typically drawn upon the TNI's experiences during the Indonesian Revolution to explain its rise to prominence in national political life beginning in 1957. More specifically, it has been argued that the TNI's unilateral decision to militarily defend the Republic following the second Dutch Police Action in December 1948 imparted a sense of independent national mission to the military. Commentators point to the political leadership's failure at that critical juncture either to issue orders to the military or to evade its own capture. Left to itself, the TNI waged guerrilla warfare against the Dutch while the "politicians" negotiated and bargained for their nation's freedom. The TNI's sense of mission was fulfilled when the Dutch eventually capitulated and an independent Indonesia was established. Further, it has been argued that during the 1950s, the Army's sense of mission underwent a renaissance as officers balked at the petty party politics of the time. On this view, the SOB was a reflection of the TNI's determination to end the excesses of liberal democracy ("free-fight liberalism") and to cripple the party system, and especially its most successful proponent, the PKI. Finally, the TNI's rejuvenated concern for the Indonesian nation and state was expressed by its determination to reinstate the 1945 "Revolutionary" Constitution and to thereby win itself a permanent place in the political life of the country by being officially considered a "functional group."

As with ex post facto arguments generally, this line of thinking unfortunately conflates important aspects of the TNI's historical experiences during the Revolution (which were confined to Java and, to an even more limited, Sumatra), into "explanations" for the TNI's later activities in a much wider geographic area and in a much broader political space. Without denying the TNI's experiences toward the close of the Indonesian Revolution, it is possible to argue that it was the TNI's own shift in perspective from late 1949 to 1957, and the factors that unfolded during this period, that account for the Army's political assertiveness and success after 1957. Furthermore, it is possible to view the Army's "rediscovery" of its revolutionary experiences during this later time period as an ex post facto project that would hopefully legitimize its novel political undertakings at the territorial, popular, and administrative levels.

Decline and Vision in the Indonesian Context

We have seen how the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949 was perceived by many Indonesian political actors as a signal that the political problem of Indonesia had been resolved and that a determined effort should now begin to solve sets of political, economic, and social problems within an established national context. Among the leading actors of this time, the TNI was outstanding in its determination to orient itself in accordance with this perception. This was the case primarily because leading military officers, including the Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff, Major-General T. B. Simatupang, possessed a "commitment to help build a democratic order and a professional, non-political military."[63] In this spirit, the Army leadership undertook to address the national problems posed by its own organization at a very early point following Indonesian independence. Under the command of Colonel A. H. Nasution, the Army Chief-of-Staff (*Komando Staf Angkatan Darat*—KSAD), Army leaders proceeded in a meaningful and applied manner to cope with their organization's limited geographical reach, bloated size, and low level of training and education.

In January 1950, Army Headquarters set about on the novel task of creating an organizational structure that would supersede the familiar limits of military planning for Java and Sumatra. Accordingly, commanding officers made the sweeping assumption that the whole of archipelago, excluding Irian Barat, could be included in their plans even before the troops of the TNI-dominated Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Indonesia (*Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat*—APRIS) had arrived in the vast area of the former "Great East." Thus, on 5 January 1950, eleven military territories were proclaimed: four in Sumatra, four in Java, one in Kalimantan, and two covering the NIT.[64] With the gradual collapse of the federal structures, a re-organization of these territories was enacted on 20 June 1950. The creation of seven territories (*Tentara dan Territorium*—T & T) suggested the Army's underlying confidence, perhaps bolstered by the unitarian impulse, to effectively encompass wider expanses of territory among fewer units. Henceforth, Sumatra was divided into two territories, Java into three, Kalimantan remained unified under one, and the balance of the archipelago (again excluding Irian Barat) was brought under a single T & T. The Army leadership envisaged that the TNI's (limited) experiences of guerrilla warfare within a consciously "territorial" framework in Java could be simply and directly applied in and to each of these territories. Formally, a "territorial" structure of military administration for each territory was established all the way down to the regimental level.[65]

To realize its goal of increasing the professional level of Indonesian troops, the Army leadership realized that it was first necessary to effect a rapid and gross reduction in the size of the standing forces. Thus, from 1950, Nasution aimed broadly to reduce the size of the Army, which stood at 200,000, already at a significantly lower level than the record high of 500,000 set in 1948. His goal, within the next three or four years, was to stabilize the Army at a level of 150,000 men.[66] In accordance with the thrust of these plans, Nasution and the Defence Minister, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, announced plans to discharge 80,000 of the remaining 200,000 troops at the outset of the Wilopo Cabinet's tenure in May 1952.[67] McVey has noted that around this time, politicians and military officers even contemplated reducing the TNI to a 100,000 man force.[68] Military and political leaders recognized and accepted that a natural outcome of these ongoing mass demobilizations and discharges was a reduction of the Army's call upon the country's budgetary resources. As such, the Army was quite prepared to accept a 28 per cent reduction in its budgetary allocation from 2,625 million rupiahs in 1952 to 1,900 million rupiahs in 1953.[69]

In the area of education and training, Nasution showed his determination to professionalize the TNI in four separate ways. First, he urged the creation of a conscript[70] or cadre[71] army, rather than a volunteer army, because this would enhance the possibilities of drawing in young Indonesians, giving training to large numbers of citizens, and further reducing salaries.[72] Second, the Chief-of-Staff effectively used the Netherlands Military Mission in Indonesia to receive higher standards of professional training. Third, Nasution gave greater but not exclusive weight to officers' military backgrounds in matters of promotion and staffing. In this connection, he assigned greater value to training obtained under Dutch colonial auspices (at the Royal Military Academy or Reserve Officer Training Corps) or even in the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL), than that attained either under the aegis of the Japanese (in the Java-based Defenders of the Fatherland army (Peta) or during the course of the Revolution. Finally, in his desire to affirm the TNI's professional character and defensive role in relation to the nation's affairs, Nasution denounced the fact that the Army was being forced to exercise emergency powers in various parts of the country: "the maintenance of Armed Forces as a police force in a national state constitutes a paradox because it functions only as a defence of the government against its own people."[73] The collective importance of these real and not costless actions and attitudes was that they were both instanced by, and served to substantiate, the fundamental shift in perspective since late 1949 away from the problem of Indonesia to the problems in Indonesia.

Unlike the Communist leadership, the Army's commanders were slow to perceive that the Revolution was fundamentally incomplete. In the meantime, both they and the TNI suffered from the adverse effects of the political parties' destructive dynamic. On 17 October 1952, for example, the Army command demonstrated its profound frustration with the appointative DPR's meddling in its internal affairs and the threat that these decidedly partisan actions posed to the Army's anticipated professional development. As a result of President Sukarno's unwillingness to entertain the commanders' coercively expressed views on the dissolution of the current DPR, and their own weakness, anti-Nasution officers ousted their Chief's supporters in the three military territories of East Java (October 21), East Indonesia (November 16), and South Sumatra (November 23), but failed in West Java. As a direct result of their failure, Nasution was replaced by Colonel Bambang Supeno as the (Acting) KSAD (16 December 1952), the Defence Minister resigned (1 January 1953), and the PSI Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence, Ali Budiardjo, was also replaced (31 March 1953). The personal defeats of these individuals had profound organizational effects. These consequences showed up in dramatic form when Supeno confirmed the usurping officers in their positions as the new commanders of military territories V, VII, and II and again, on 4 November 1953, when Major-General Simatupang was sacked and his position as Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff was abolished. Both of these developments spelled a sharp reduction in the ability of Army Headquarters to centrally control and coordinate the Army's affairs, let alone safeguard the nation's armed services in the challenges posed by armed contenders in the regions and jealous parties and individuals in Jakarta.

By 1953, then, it was apparent that the TNI command was being effectively challenged by emerging regional warlords (drawn from its own ranks) and anti-Republican statelike actors, both of whom shattered the notion that the TNI was a unified national liberation army. The concept of a shared, and thus potentially unifying, "history of revolutionary struggle" could not reasonably be articulated to compensate for these setbacks as such a deliberately invented record literally lacked the ground upon which to stand. Indeed, there was no avoiding the realization that even among Javanese and Sumatran military colleagues, who shared the closest thing to a common history of struggle of all the revolutionary fighting forces, serious and perhaps even intractable problems existed. At this point, various political parties and individual actors, including President Sukarno, were emboldened to openly conceive of the Army as yet another site to compete for political resources. The Army's call upon budgetary resources plummeted yet further,[74] and this, in turn, prompted a wider and more determined search for resources by regional military commanders.

Nasution began to articulate his views on these unhappy developments once he was removed from the military hierarchy, and these views were no more clearly and accessibly expressed than in his 1953 volume entitled *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*. Despite its apparent concern with how the TNI should conduct guerrilla warfare in the future, the actual subject of this book far exceeded the limits suggested by its title. Indeed, Nasution used his discussion of guerrilla warfare in three salient ways to demonstrate first, the need, then, the opportunity for revolutionary political action in the Indonesian context. First, he sought to demonstrate the necessity for a shift in perspective on Indonesia by delineating the shortcomings of his own and generally held assumptions about the internal accomplishments of independence. Second, he undertook to outline a directing idea of Indonesia. Finally, he attempted to assign a statelike role to the Army in the realization of this idea.

To demonstrate why it was necessary to shift the perspective on the Indonesian situation, Nasution elicited a fundamental insight about the link between formal politics and informal realities by way of an explanation for the TNI's lacklustre performance against regional guerrilla armies:

> the strange thing was that after 1950 we assumed, whether consciously or unconsciously, the mistakes of the former Dutch army . . .. We did not draft one systematic plan of operation in all [fields], but we limited ourselves to military operations only. In many ways we did not pay enough attention to the factor of their people. Many of our measures resulted in increasing our enemies. We have allowed the guerrilla movement to utilize the spirit of provincialism and religious adherence to help the guerrilla cause, while we struck at them and made more enemies. More and more people became sympathetic towards the enemy and distrustful of us . . .. We did not attract more people to be active on our side, but instead made them join the other side.[75]

At one level, this may seem like an argument for the TNI's better execution of guerrilla warfare. More fundamentally, Nasution was trying to make an argument here about the importance of the popular element, and especially of popular self-consciousness, in military and political undertakings. In this connection, he tried to argue that a basic perceptual error committed by Republican military and political leaders at independence was to assume that the people were already self-consciously united and behind them. The failure of Indonesia's leaders to address this antecedent condition, Nasution seems to be arguing, necessarily entailed both insoluble military difficulties for the TNI, and political difficulties for the whole country:

> The revolution has not brought satisfaction, but dissatisfaction. The people do not have an elected parliament and president as yet . . .. It is understandable how

> great the political and ideological dissatisfaction is among our people while the leaders avoid and avoid the solving of these problems.[76]

For Nasution, the record of guerrilla warfare pointed beyond itself to the very subject and object of these military and political contests: the people. Nasution thus furnished an important insight about the current situation and showed why perceptions of it had to change to include the popular factor in political and military struggle. The true magnitude of the country's problems, therefore, related to the level of popular involvement and the particular dangers associated with the manipulation of this involvement. In short, Indonesia still faced a revolutionary situation in which the fundamental issue of the people's participation was unresolved, and, by logical extension, so, too, was their identity and the status of the territory on which they dwelled.

Since these three factors informed Nasution's reinterpretation of the Indonesian situation, it was only natural for him to accord them a place in his directing idea of Indonesia. In spelling out this directing idea, Nasution showed his ability to use the narrow topic of the ideal political nature of guerrillas as a point of entry into a wider political discussion. According to Nasution, guerrillas ought to be involved in politics, that is,

> politics in the wider sense; it is statesmanship; it is fighting and defending a greater policy as is implied in the proclamation and preface of our original Constitution of 1945. Therefore, with such ideas we do not mean to say that the soldier must belong to this or that party, but that he must adhere to the wider political horizons.
>
> . . . it becomes clear that the moral-psychological problem of the army is more important than the outward officiality of its administration. The TNI soldier is not a mere instrument of government . . ..
>
> The guerrilla should be a revolutionary vanguard; this was our ideal in the past and should be our ideal in the future. He must realize that the revolution has not yet ended. This revolution has forcefully put aside the old laws and introduced new laws which are referred to by the 1945 Proclamation of Independence. Indeed, the tactics of compromise assumed by the national fight in 1949 seemed to have reversed the revolution and returned the old laws that the revolution was meant to destroy.[77]

With this, Nasution re-embraced the directing idea of all Indonesian nationalists: the notion of a *Negara Republik Indonesia* as delineated in the 1945 declaration of independence and the country's first constitution.

Unlike most of his contemporaries, however, Nasution tried to demonstrate that his espousal of this idea was neither ideal in character nor premised merely on the accumulation of formal power resources. Nasution thus began with the recognition that since the fulfilment of the directing idea entailed defining the people, their identity, and their territory as Indonesian, it was necessary to adopt a radical orientation and engage in radical action. He seemed to perceive the need and the opportunity to organize and mobilize political resources at all levels under a single authority. Accordingly, Nasution enjoined the Army to pursue what was essentially a long-term, resource-centred state-building strategy.

The first resource that Nasution believed the TNI ought to acquire and control literally constituted the tangible basis for the directing idea: territory. He firmly pointed out that "territorial work is not of second rank and is not less important [than military work],"[78] and that "for the next ten or fifteen years, in connection with the time needed for the growth of an air force and especially a sea force . . . we still must pursue a defence policy covering the entire archipelago, treating it as if it were a continent."[79] Nasution thus neatly circumvented the objective reality of Indonesia's archipelagic character, which could be used to legitimize naval expansion, into an argument for the Army's growth and participation in all spheres of social life:

> Because our islands are separated by water and because for the next ten or fifteen years our navy will not be strong enough to exercise control properly, every island must organize itself as an individual defence unit . . .. Politically, administratively, and socio-economically each island has not achieved unity. The opening of highways is one step in the direction of such a goal. Plans to build a highway through Sumatra and through Kalimantan therefore should receive all possible assistance from the army. Projects of transmigration from Java to other islands, especially Kalimantan, should be strongly supported and even pioneered by the army.[80]

Nasution deduced that since such "efforts of a politico-psychological and socio-economical character are the more important facets in the strategy of maintaining security in our country," the Army must be prepared to engage in "orderly administration."[81] The country's demonstrably poor security condition thus became a rationale not only for extensive Army involvement throughout the archipelago, but intervention of an intensive and enduring nature. Nasution pointed to the need for a

> long term plan and a rather permanent organization . . .. The organization and education have to be adapted to the expected tasks, and cannot be of an incidental or provisional nature. Army units on active duty need special organization and training different from those of a reserve status. Working procedures among the chains of command must be regulated not in a casual but in a more permanent manner.[82]

This is a succinct prescription for the creation not merely of an administrative capacity, but of putative patterns of governance embracing the resource of the whole Indonesian people. Nasution determined that under and through the Army's multifaceted organizational drives, it could achieve gradual control over the people, that is, it was possible to "win the hopes and faith of the people gradually."[83] Yet Nasution gloomily assured his Indonesian readers that they would have to forego the benefits of such a possible administration so long as "no one [was] in complete command."[84]

With this allusion, Nasution deftly broached the ultimate political resource of sovereignty. It is important to recognize that Nasution himself perceived the magnitude of what he was proposing, for he explicitly delineated both the novel and the exceptional attributes of the sovereign role that he anticipated the Army would play in the Indonesian context. Thus, Nasution made it plain that the novelty of the Army's challenge related to the successful achievement of internal security, and since neither the scope nor the depth of this undertaking could be known except in reference to immediate threats, the perpetual quest for internal security translated into a permanent, ongoing, and self-defining role for the Army:

> The anti-guerrilla war does not last one or two years but a much longer time, and a politically unstable, young country like ours needs a special military apparatus designed to guarantee security. This police task for the military is entirely different from its regular task and different from the usual police task; for this it requires a different organization and education. Because our operational methods have demonstrated that they do not bring the results sought, we should set up a special army for domestic security.[85]

The exceptional character of the Army's future role related to the unprecedented and unpredictable powers necessary for it to wage an "anti-guerrilla war": "The system and rules [in this context] must differ from the usual system and rules under normal conditions and must fit the emergency situation."[86] Specifically, in effecting the sequence of tasks that comprised the essence of the Army's state-building strategy—the "first task [being] . . . to increase the efficiency of the government apparatus; the second [task being] . . . to win the people and the villages back and to urge them to participate actively in guaranteeing security; and the third [task being] . . . to annihilate the armed bands"—Nasution called attention to the fact that

> Such powers were not found in the Governor or in the General, or in the Head of the Police in the peace-time structure [of the NEI], nor in the rules of the State of War and Seige of the Dutch East Indies, rules which are operating now; such powers are found only in the history of our struggle.[87]

Nasution left his readers with the impression that the novel and the exceptional tendencies in the Army's future role would be mutually reinforcing. Indeed, it was a matter of logic, and not mere wishful thinking, that as the (geographic and social) circle of the Army's anticipated activities expanded, additional powers would either be used or created to sustain the advances it was ostensibly making in the name of internal security. Nasution adumbrated as much for Indonesia with an unmistakable reference to a self-defining sovereign actor:

> The leadership in a chaotic region must be held by those who are in complete charge and in complete power. All instruments of power must reside in their hands and all instructions on military, political, social and economic affairs are given by them; in short they have the overall command in accordance with the

> total character of true anti-guerrilla warfare. They could be of the military or of the civilian; the thing that counts most is their ability to lead such a total campaign.[88]

In other words, to the degree that the military and the government experienced or perceived effective challenges to their formal authority, Nasution foresaw radical military planning and intervention that would effectively embrace people and territory and bring them under a single, defining authority.

There is a striking resemblance between Nasution's prescription for the successful execution of an "anti-guerrilla war" and Aidit's notion of "completing the August Revolution." Aside from their obvious exhortative qualities, both Nasution's and Aidit's formulations represented separate but similar directing ideas of Indonesia. It is clear that both directing ideas were, in one sense, defined by and, in another sense, defining of the Indonesian context. Both formulations were predicated upon the same comprehensive realization that Indonesia's problems related fundamentally to its territory, its people, and its identity. In their radical diagnosis of the problem of Indonesia, then, both Nasution and Aidit grasped the dangers posed by insular, religious, and the myriad of other particularisms that other actors could use to settle the question of identity (and thus circumscribe people and territory). Against these limiting standards and the possibility that the archipelago could be effectively divided into separate units if such standards were not confronted, Nasution and Aidit aimed to address the tangible and intangible aspects of the situation through peculiarly non-particularistic strategies. They aimed to acquire political resources through organization and mobilization, and this made their strategies revolutionary. They aimed to acquire territory, popular support, and establish patterns of governance and incipient identities, and this made their strategies state-building strategies. Finally, they aimed to authoritatively define the scope and substance of a future Indonesian state and society, and this made their strategies new state-building strategies. Nasution and Aidit showed an awareness that their formulations spelled novel and creative political undertakings because neither attempted the impossibility of defining the substance of an endeavour both knew would be settled by the assertion of sovereignty in a moment of exception. Instead, in their joint determination to supersede substantively centred or substantively discriminating particularisms en route to a future Indonesian state and society, both deferred to the limitless forms of organization, mobilization, and a universalizing modality of lawlike political conduct and contention.

The Emergence of the TNI as a Revolutionary Actor

If the PKI evidenced a new state-building strategy from 1951, then the TNI, under Nasution's renewed leadership, seized its opportunity to do the same under the cover of the emergency powers it acquired in March 1957. Prior to this, both before and during Nasution's second tenure as KSAB (a post he re-acquired on 7 November

1955), he attempted a variety of means to realize the wider strategy outlined in *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*. These initiatives either failed on their own, such as when the political party he helped to create in May 1954 (IPKI) failed to win any significant popular support in the 1955 DPR elections, or were thwarted by the effective power of his ostensible subordinates in Army Headquarters or in the regions.

Yet, in a manner similar to Aidit's and Lukman's quiet organizing and agitating before they achieved paramount power in the PKI, Nasution began to lay the practical bases for his stunning political initiatives after March 1957 by attempting to control existing political resources. In connection with a growing movement among Army officers to resist the intrusions of politicians and ambitious individuals in the military domain, for instance, Nasution reversed his earlier position on the Army's share of the national budget by writing in February 1955 of an "insufficient defence budget and the dangers of disintegration in the Army, internal demoralization, and the vacuum in the external defence capacity."[89] Immediately prior to his reinstatement as KSAD, Nasution wrote further that "the development of the Armed Forces should be tackled with new laws, particularly governing recruitment, and a budget allocation of no less than one-third of the national budget."[90]

Once his position as KSAD was confirmed by the Harahap Cabinet, Nasution moved to reverse the erosion of Headquarter's powers over its seven T&Ts and its hundreds of thousands of personnel (including veterans), while effecting an undeniable centralizing policy. The solution to both these problems seemed to lay in the addition of novel and importantly creative dimensions to the Army's organization: two new Inspectorates were created, one for Territorial Affairs and People's Defence, and another for Education and Training. To affirm his own power over his leading military opponents, and especially over the commanders (*panglima*) of the respective T&Ts, Nasution drew up a system of regular transfers that included the *panglimas* for the first time. Nasution attempted to effect a series of far-reaching transfers, beginning in June 1956, that would have won him greater command over his original base of military support, the Siliwangi Division based in West Java (T&T III), and taken away the bases of support from several of his leading rivals at Headquarters and in North Sumatra (T&T I) and East Indonesia (T&T VII). Nasution's actions provoked a backlash, including the "August 13" incident, in which the West Java *panglima* used his emergency powers to arrest the Foreign Minister, and, in November, an attempted coup by anti-Nasution plotters. The failure of Nasution's personal rivals to successfully deliver their armed and relatively widely supported blow in November merely caused them and their followers to consolidate and exert their power in the regions in the following months. Thus, Colonel Abimanju, the panglima of T&T VI (Kalimantan), "vigorously protested Headquarters' policy and went so far as to issue a retaliatory local order for the arrest of any high personages—Cabinet Minister, Member of Parliament, or other dignitary—who might venture into his area."[91] Abimanju's bold act helped to initiate the series of regional feats of defiance in Sumatra and East Indonesia with which we are already familiar.

Despite his poor record through most of 1956, Nasution did not relent in his quest for political resources. For just as his adversaries felt the pressure to intensify and expand their control over all aspects of their regions against him, Nasution felt the pressure of his failures to try harder. While the regional military leaders began to create or direct groups of armed civilians (Village Defence Organizations—*Organisasi Keamanan Desa* [OKD]), as "a kind of insurance in a coup situation,"[92] Nasution endeavoured to control two other sources of military expertise, that of officers-in-training and of veterans. Thus, he made an issue of who controlled the Army Staff and Command School (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat*—Seskoad),[93] and zealously pursued the expansion of Headquarters' control over all aspects of the Army's education and training programmes. Nasution's efforts badly split the student and staff officer body at the Seskoad, but generally succeeded elsewhere. Given this, Nasution made it clear that from the beginning of 1957, TNI activities in the education and training fields were to be under the single authority of the Inspectorate of General Education and Training; only the Seskoad and the National Military Academy were to be exempt from its purview.

In tackling the issue of instruction, Nasution had, through the control he now possessed over placement, begun to address the wider personnel issues in the Army and the influence that veterans continued to have in this vital area. More specifically, Nasution sought to curtail the influence that the Officers' League of the Republic of Indonesia (*Ikatan Perwira Republik Indonesia*—IPRI) exercised over policy in the Army, and thus over Headquarters. While McVey's discussion of Nasution's struggle with the IPRI informs us of Headquarters' desire to eliminate an alternative source of authority in the TNI, the importance of the particular solution that Nasution imposed on IPRI has been underestimated. Since IPRI contained both active officers and non-active officers (veterans), Nasution's motion in January 1957 to create a single veterans organization was aimed not only at effectively dividing this group, but sealing all veterans off from the influence of predatory actors, especially from the PKI and its veteran ormas Perbepsi. In other words, Nasution tried to manage the problem of control over the Army without widening its divisions so greatly that the resource of military expertise could be exploited by other actors. If we do not make Nasution's recognition of the veterans and their proven military capacity as a political resource in a competitive context of foremost analytical significance, then there is no adequate explanation for his sudden call of January 1957 or his ability, a few months later, to restrict the IPRI to making (harmless) internal proposals.[94]

More fundamentally, if we fail to realize Nasution's appreciation of the value of political resources, and of his earlier expressed desire to creatively organize and mobilize them, then there is little explanation possible of the sheer breadth of the Army's revolutionary undertakings in and after March 1957. Clearly, the proclamation of the SOB itself did not galvanize the Army into its subsequent actions, since the TNI had long exercised emergency powers to greater and lesser degrees in various parts of the country. Rather, Nasution was prompted to make an all-out effort to begin effecting his directing idea of Indonesia by the coincidence of recognizing others' success in beginning to effect their own "solutions" to the political problem of Indonesia while conceding his own in the same connection. Notwithstanding the fact that the TNI operated in a context where other actors could (and tried) to upset its plans, the very sequence and anticipated effects of the Army's actions from March 1957 to 1960 revealed that its leadership was attempting to enact a state-building strategy. Indeed, the TNI's efforts during this period may be seen as a long series of meaning-creating actions whose anticipated outcome would permit the Army to officially "reclaim" its "revolutionary role" while actually disguising its invention of such a (contrived) role to legitimize its rule over an unprecedented space and for an indefinite period of time.

The surprising and deliberate order in which the Army conducted itself from March 1957 revealed that its leaders' intentions were predicated upon, and grew with, their success in pursuing an organizing and mobilizing state-building strategy that was crucially centred upon political resources. The Army's tacticians could not depend upon the simple playback of their (spatially and temporally limited) historical experiences and beliefs because the strategy was substantively self-fulfilling in nature. The Army's leaders could only proceed with and within uncertainty. Even when they acted in concert with President Sukarno in fulfilling his radically inclined ambitions (which lacked separate organized popular support) to terminate "free-fight liberalism" and the "party system" in Indonesia, it was a matter of convenience for the Army leadership had no evidence that its duumvirate with the President had spelled an end to his manipulations, which were often personally motivated (as in Nasution's own case). Indeed, Nasution's organizational and personal sense of uncertainty seemed to have played no small part in his and his allies' determination to wade into the vast and politically resource-rich Indonesian context in the hope of creating their own base of popular support. Only then could they address the problem posed by the regional military leaders and their followerships, and, later, contend with the political parties and especially the PKI. Since the TNI exercised an important and perhaps even determinant degree of control over this action sequence, its ordering bespoke the proven political wisdom that informed the initial stages of the PKI's own strategy: act in small but meaningful ways while steadily widening one's practical efforts to acquire a wider circle of political resources.

To begin to realize the ambiguous notion that the Army should exercise military and political influence in the Indonesian context, Nasution used his powers as the Central War Administrator (*Penguasa Perang Pusat*—Peperpu) to initiate a zealous programme of acquiring extra-military support. In this connection, Nasution both used and resisted President Sukarno. In the actual pursuit of political resources, for instance, Nasution went ahead despite President Sukarno's exhortation, made early in the national emergency, that the Army was "not to play with politics."[95] Sukarno's appeal was an unwelcome reminder to the Army leadership that his earlier expressed views on the role of the military, notwithstanding the gravity of the prevailing crisis, had not fundamentally changed:

> armed forces are the state's apparatus, are weapons, are tools, once again, they are tools. This weapon must always be sharp, must always be *sakti* (power), regardless of whoever holds the weapon—as long as it is in the hands of the state . . . . Anyone in the armed forces practising politics must be blamed outright, for such action means a break in the service due from him.[96]

However, to the degree that Sukarno seemed willing to constrain the Army, as well as any variety of political actors, he also seemed to offer valuable support to the same, or, perhaps more accurately, could be construed by a variety of political actors as offering them his valuable political support. In this connection, Nasution tried to show that the TNI's efforts to secure popular support were in harmony with the President's own thinking on the "functional group" as the preferred basis for re-establishing Indonesia's political order.

The notion of the functional group was first officially articulated when President Sukarno unveiled his "conception" (*konsepsi*) to the nation on 21 February 1957. Briefly, through his conception, the President rejected the prevailing "imported democracy" of political parties as unsuited for Indonesian conditions and the Indonesian "soul," while proposing an alternate political order that was to be founded, in part, on functional groups. More specifically, he made two concrete (and somewhat contrary) proposals. First, he reiterated his call for the creation of a "mutual assistance" (*gotong-rojong*) Cabinet that included the four largest political parties at the parliamentary level. Second, he called for the creation of a National Council (*Dewan Nasional*) composed of representatives of the regions and members of functional groups (*golongan fungsionil*) at the national level. By functional groups, the President meant "workers, peasants, intelligentsia, national entrepreneurs, religious organizations . . . the armed services, youth organizations, [and] women's organizations."[97] These groups, combined with representatives of the regions, would vest the National Council with a membership that would include "the entire Indonesian people without discrimination against any group."[98] Although the President's conception was vague and understandably ill-received (because of the threat that it represented to the political parties), Nasution perceived that the unarticulated consequences of the notion of functional groups provided sufficient "material" to begin to assemble the resources for the Army's own going political concern. Nasution did not equivocate about disturbing the political balance that the President had tried to strike in his conception between the still powerful parties and any future organized functional groups. Instead, he seized upon the potential offered not only by the idea of the functional group, but, more importantly, by the practical challenge of achieving such a status for the Army, the other armed services, and all the remaining groups enumerated by the President.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Nasution moved faster than Sukarno, and in a manner that the latter had perhaps not anticipated, to achieve the first organized expression of the President's conception by creating the Youth-Military Working Body (*Badan Kerjasama Pemuda dan Militer*—BKS-PM) on 17 June 1957. Ostensibly, the BKS-PM grew out of the discontent that was expressed by the youth in their *Manifesto Kaum Muda Indonesia* (Indonesian Youth Manifesto) of 27 July 1956. Among other things, the Manifesto proclaimed that since "neither justice nor prosperity had been realized, and the living conditions of labourers, peasants, and the people were still at a minimum level," "the youth would actively oppose whomever harmed the people."[99] The open question of whom the "youth" would support was clearly answered when they began to receive the active guidance of Major Pamurahardjo, of Army Headquarters, beginning in February 1957. This assistance is perhaps more understandable in light of the fact that the youths in question happened to be drawn in large part from the ranks of young Army officers and the Student Soldiers of the ex-Brigade XVII. Ultimately, Pamurahardjo's guidance, in his capacity as the Government Coordinator on the Staff of the Central War Administrator, led to the creation of the BKS-PM. By 24 July 1957, the Body included 69 youth, student, and university student organizations. At that time, all members committed themselves to "pioneer the breakthrough of all the bottlenecks that existed in all fields and that could not be resolved as an outcome of party quarrels that were themselves very dangerous for the survival of the nation and the state."[100] This allusion to a political order-in-the-making was fundamentally inspired by Nasution and, given the breadth of his thoughts on the Indonesian situation, he could not reasonably be expected to confine the Army's role to the BKS-PM.

Indeed, Nasution's sentiments informed the creation of the National Council on 12 July 1957. The formation of this body, and particularly the manner in which it was constituted, served as an important indicator of how Nasution intended to broaden his efforts to realize the Army's directing idea. By agreeing with Sukarno that the Council should be a reflection of society, for instance, Nasution hoped to make functional groups and the functional group concept permanent features of both the method and outcome of his strategy. Thus, in a total Council membership of 45, 21 seats were designated for functional groups that now included representatives of "labour, peasants, former armed revolutionaries, national entrepreneurs, artists, journalists, women, *Angkatan 1945* [Generation of 1945], religious scholars, and citizens of foreign extraction."[101] In practical terms, and thus perhaps more significantly, Nasution and Sukarno make it clear that they were prepared to engage in a zero-sum competition with other political actors for political resources by ensuring that "almost all the 'functional' representatives were drawn not from party leaderships proper but from party mass organizations."[102]

The Irian Barat Tempest

Quite beyond either Nasution's or Sukarno's expectations, their entry into what was perceived as a zero-sum competition actually became an incentive for the PKI as the most competitive actor to try to alter the nature of that competition through a politically significant expansion of its terms of reference. At this time, the PKI was in the process of sweeping local elections in Java; this affirmation of its unrivalled power surely gave its leaders the confidence to begin to bluntly pose the unresolved issues of Indonesia's scope and substance, as such. Thus, without abandoning their efforts to widen the popular base of the Party or the reach of its ormas, the PKI leadership began to publicly consider and popularize outstanding issues of territory and identity. In this way, the PKI was seeking to secure and confirm its status as a statelike actor by demonstrating a capacity to popularly define what national (as opposed to religious, cultural, ethnic, or insular) issues were, and then to attempt to effectively address them. The PKI's very willingness, especially marked from mid-

1957, to articulate popular support in relation to acquiring control over other resources attested to its growth as a revolutionary political actor and to its central role in defining or at least establishing the widening margins of Indonesian politics. The issue that the PKI leadership decisively settled upon was Irian Barat.

Unfortunately for the Communist leadership, their military competitors at Army Headquarters shared the PKI's own appreciation for the true political problem of Indonesia and could, therefore, understand the purpose of the Party's Irian Barat campaign. Thus, as soon as it became clear by mid-1957 that the PKI intended not only to define Indonesian nationalism around the Irian Barat cause, but that it planned to do so by involving its organized popular supporters and the general populace, Nasution saw an opportunity to gather and organize Army Headquarters' own badly needed political resources. Accordingly, Nasution both used and advanced the developing revolutionary situation so as to empower the Army, as such, and as the directing (and thus defining) political agent in the Indonesian context.

In a manner that fit well with President Sukarno's own predilection to exhort the Indonesian youth into political activity, Nasution made skilful use of his own youthful supporters to extend the Army's popular appeal. On 19 November 1957, for instance, representatives of "labour," "peasants," and the BKS-PM signed a "charter of resolve" that compelled them to "collectively struggle to free Irian Barat from Dutch colonialism with all its consequences."[103] Later, on 26 November 1957, the Working Body of the LVRI and the BKS-PM "resolved to unify the power to extend the Irian Barat liberation movement."[104] Two days later, Sukarno publicly stated his wish to "all groups in Indonesian society" to "assist the efforts of the youth as gathered in the BKS-PM."[105]

Sukarno's public plea had the appearance but not the immediate effect of boosting Nasution's organizing and centralizing plans. This was the case because the revolutionary situation that Nasution had abetted now surged beyond his effective control. On 26 November 1957, Indonesia lost an important vote in the United Nations' General Assembly that would have pressured the Dutch to negotiate over Irian Barat. This was not the first time that Indonesia had lost such a vote—it had done so on four earlier occasions. This time, however, an effective, and thus meaningful, response could be delivered now that at least one political actor, the PKI, both possessed and could command organized popular resources in the name of otherwise ineffectual official words. On November 30, an assassination attempt was made on the President by members of a Sundanese separatist organization who were apparently reacting to the guileless support he was seen to be giving to the PKI in connection with the Irian Barat cause. These two developments were sufficient opportunity for the PKI and its closely associated allies in the PNI to irreversibly alter the terms of the political competition in their favour.

On 2 December 1957, members of SOBSI and the PNI's labour affiliate, the Populist Workers' Union of Indonesia (*Kesatuan Buruh Kerakjataan Indonesia*—KBKI) began to unilaterally seize and occupy the offices and factories of every major Dutch company. While Lev has suggested that members of the KBKI took the lead,[106] it was SOBSI, with its enormous organizational reach, that undeniably carried the anti-Dutch campaign to the farthest reaches of the archipelago. "In a matter of a few days the movement spread across the whole country. For a while it seemed the government had lost its power to direct events."[107] Indeed, the government had lost control, and in the wake of the SOBSI- and KBKI-led seizures and strikes, it had no choice but to accept their *fait accompli*. Thereafter, the government was compelled to fashion legal niceties to explain away its lack of effective power while somehow coping with the permanent and destructive nature of the change that had occurred. Thus, the government affirmed that it had not and was not moving immediately to nationalize Dutch properties and business concerns, since it lacked the law to do so. Further, it denied that the suggestion that it had "confiscated" the same. Rather, the government claimed that it was merely exercising "supervision."[108]

The effects of the government's implicit admission "that it had been unable to control the forces of extremism that it had unleashed with its campaign"[109] were not confined to the articulation of mere rationalizations of what had happened to the Dutch. The events of December 1957 had undeniable and obvious effects on all the major political actors, including the Central Government, the regional dissident leaders (collectively speaking), the PKI, and the TNI. For the Central Government, which had already incurred the immediate political sting of being seen to lack authority, the events of early December brought it the huge burden of having to replace the capital, skill, and equipment that was lost with the Dutch ouster. The government, one may recall, already faced enormous economic problems and now quite simply lacked the effective means to fill the enormous gap left by the fleeing Dutch. For instance, while organized labour had effectively broken the virtual monopoly over inter-island shipping that was exercised by the Dutch-owned Royal Mail Lines (*Koningklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij—KPM*), the Dutch managed to remove a majority of KPM vessels from Indonesian waters. While the government viewed this grave development as a manifestation of punitive Dutch colonialism, the regional military and political leaders perceived that the government had now capitulated to the PKI and its thinking. For their part, then, the time had come to stand more firmly and openly against Jakarta and the Communist "menace" and, in the absence of effective maritime links, to begin contemplating secession.

To the PKI, the events of early December brought it valuable and otherwise unknowable confirmation of its power and revolutionary appeal in an extra-parliamentary context. The PKI had far exceeded any other actor's expectations about the limits of its drive to make the Irian Barat issue definitive of Indonesian nationalism. As such, the Communists had demonstrated their capacity to conceive and realize, however briefly, a moment in which their own political preferences and mode of collective action defined Indonesian nationalist politics. Yet the PKI leadership clearly had more in mind than a fleeting demonstration of its revolutionary zeal:

> This move won the PKI wide acclaim and it appeared that the West Irian issue would be a means by which the PKI could develop mass support. In fact, soon after the seizure of Dutch property, the PKI and other radical nationalists had organized the Central Action Committee for the liberation of West Irian. The aim

> was to channel the national fervour against the Dutch through an organization led by the PKI.[110]

In this way, and around precisely the same issue, the PKI publicly and deliberately set itself against the Army and its Cooperation Bodies.

During the first days of the labour actions, it appeared that the TNI had suffered great damage to its reputation as the unstinting administrator of martial law. The labour actions occurred in blatant disregard of an Army-inspired law of August 1957 that banned strikes and labour disruptions in all "vital industries,"[111] most of which happened to be controlled by the Dutch. Nasution showed that he was not about to be outdone or cowed by the PKI's demonstration of resolve and he acted to supersede the PKI at its own mobilizing and organizing strategy. First, the Army became the active "supervisor" of all the economic concerns that had been seized in the name of the Indonesian Republic. As Anderson has observed, this development had profound ramifications for the Army because

> for the first time it obtained the financial means to attach the officer corps firmly to itself and to give the military as a whole a *corporate economic interest* quite distinct from that of every sector of Indonesian society. For the first time since 1942, the major *economic* resources of the nation were now under unified local control.[112]

Immediately thereafter, the Army moved to formalize its ongoing political work with different social groups by creating additional organizational matrices. Thus, a Labour-Military Cooperation Body was created (*Badan Kerjasama Buruh-Militer*—BKSBUMIL) on 12 December,[113] and, following the formation of the Labour-Peasant-Youth-Military Front (*Front Buruh Tani Pemuda dan Militer*—FBTPM) on December 19, the Peasant-Military Cooperation Body (*Badan Kerjasama Tani-Militer*—BKSTAMIL) was formed. Finally in 1957, after a "charter of resolve" had been signed between women's representatives and the BKS-PM on 22 December,[114] a Women-Military Cooperation Body (*Badan Kerjasama Wanita-Militer*—BKSWAMIL) was created.

Perhaps more ominous to the PKI than either of these initiatives was Nasution's attempt to exercise an organizational and mobilizational monopoly around the Irian Barat issue. On 7 January 1958, following his meeting with the FBTPM, Nasution announced that he would establish a National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (*Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat*—FNPIB). In his capacity as the Central War Administrator, Nasution formally established the FNPIB on 17 January; the government officially recognized the project on 10 February.[115] The true significance of the Front as well as the enormity of its creator's plans were suggested by Nasution's decision to allow only existing and future Cooperation Bodies to participate in the liberation efforts.[116] Thus, while the decision effectively spelled the demise of the PKI-inspired Central Action Committee, it became the Army's lease to organize and mobilize the popular resources that it deemed necessary for this cause. Nasution's use of his emergency powers in this connection was masterful since he demonstrated that he could turn the face-saving aspects of the SOB, which concealed his and the government's weakness, into the means to effect his own directing idea. More specifically, Nasution knew that when he and Sukarno invoked the SOB in March 1957, they did so because its provisions neatly legalized the *de facto* seizure of power by several *panglima* by making each of them the head of a Regional War Authority (*Penguasa Perang Daerah*—Peperda).[117] By February 1958, apparently, Nasution realized that he had created a common interest between himself and several of the *panglimas* by bringing Army Headquarters into open and frontal competition with the PKI. With some prospect of succeeding, therefore, Nasution instructed the *panglimas* "to establish branches of the National Front in their areas"[118] that would presumably be under his control.

That Nasution could realistically contemplate such an extension in his and the Army's power was revolutionary and, as such, unacknowledged testimony to the profound change that the PKI's bold action of December 1957 caused in the Indonesian context. Indeed, the greater significance of the PKI's spontaneous demonstration of political will and ability was not how it affected each major political actor separately, but rather how all actors were affected together, in a contextual sense, first, by the meaning-creating aspects of the PKI's actions and their irreversible and popular nature, second, by the PKI's assertion of alternate claims of revolutionary authority, and third, by the revolutionary dynamic that the PKI had thereby unleashed with the Army and other political actors.

The PKI's success at making the Irian Barat issue definitive of Indonesian nationalism was an intended result of the meaning-creating actions that it had undertaken since 1951. At that time, the PKI had stood virtually alone in its appreciation of the political significance of the Irian Barat issue in relation to the problem of Indonesia, and it most certainly was alone through the mid-1950s in enacting organizational and mobilizational drives around the Irian Barat issue at the popular level. The government-sponsored Irian Barat campaign that began in mid-1957 derived its effectiveness, importantly, from the separate organizational and mobilizational capabilities that the PKI had long cultivated and now directed on behalf of the government. From that moment, the concern for Irian Barat could no longer be exclusively elite in nature, no longer the preserve of a small group of nationalist leaders (as it was in 1945). The PKI had brought in the popular element and when SOBSI and KBKI members struck with impunity in early December 1957, Indonesian nationalism became a real force by becoming a mass, effective, and organized phenomenon. That the government and the TNI were both prepared to accept the disastrous economic consequences that attended the workers' actions merely confirmed the PKI's ability to define through action. In this way, the PKI had incorporated in a seamless and literal way a hitherto remote and meaningless (at least at the popular level until about 1957) physical entity (and the corresponding concept of territoriality), into the wider historical context of Indonesian nationalism, making it seem "naturally," "meaningfully," and eternally "Indonesian."

At another level, the PKI showed through the December events that it was prepared to test others' claims to authority as it widened and deepened its own search for political resources. Such an exercise involved the deliberate and public separation of the Party from all other actors, including the Central Government. Thus, in a manner that suggested the breadth of the PKI's claims, as a state-within-a-state, and its ambitions in seeking to become an authority in its own right, Aidit defined the separateness of his Party and its organized supporters from the government: "The workers took over the imperialist enterprises not in their own personal interest but to hand them over to the Republic of Indonesia, whose government was not yet a government of the working class."[119]

In a final respect, and perhaps most significantly for our understanding of new state building, the PKI's actions altered the terms of reference of political competition and conflict among political actors by making their survival contingent on their ability to effectively compete in defining Indonesia's scope and substance, that is, in qualifying a certain territorial and popular base as "Indonesian," rather than upon their electoral support. The Army's easy acceptance of the political resources that SOBSI and KBKI members inadvertently made available to it lessened the possibility that future political competition would take a non-revolutionary form. Indeed, Nasution's creation of the FNPIB signalled his commitment to fulfil a directing idea that was fundamentally alike, if not identical to, the PKI's, at least in the methods of its realization.

In fact, it was precisely this coincidence of the PKI's and TNI's mobilizing and organizing strategies that would intensify and broaden their competition, and eventually turn it into one of competing state-building strategies between rival states-within-a-state. Even at this early point in the competition, then, it could not be said that the formal state within which the PKI and TNI acted as "internal" actors imposed limits on the scope of their "external" ambitions; the political value of Irian Barat to both actors lay precisely in the fact that it was outside the effective control of the Republic of Indonesia and therefore reflected the fundamentally incomplete nature of the Indonesian Revolution and Indonesian independence. To achieve the latter, however, neither the PKI nor the TNI could eschew the one enduring achievement of the Revolution: Indonesian statehood at the international level. Indeed, as perhaps the only quality of the Indonesian "state" that positively affected their behaviour, both actors strove to act or to be seen to be acting in the name of Indonesia. In forging such a close and public connection between themselves and the "state," it is important to note, the PKI and TNI were constrained to express aspects of their respective state-building strategies in the language of state, as laws or broadly conceived policies. In this connection, the appearance and articulation of an official revolutionary parlance and a corresponding body of state acts from December 1957 became an open record of the progress being made by the PKI and TNI in realizing their respective directing ideas.

The analytical value of this record is profoundly important and deserves explicit articulation since it will be the basis for the subsequent examination of the PKI's and TNI's political behaviour between late 1957 and late 1965. As I have attempted to demonstrate above, the significance of the adoption or enactment of important laws or broad sets of policies by the Indonesian "state" after the events of December 1957 is that they reflected the effective power of leading political actors. This may seem an unremarkable observation except for the fact that the Indonesian "state" tended to adopt legal-cum-political objectives that were either unrealizable, or, in some instances, outlandish, or even knowingly destructive to the Central Government. The commonsensical expectation that a "state's" enactments tend to reflect some political actor's interests and either its own capabilities or the actor's abilities to realize those interests is inappropriate in the Indonesian context, mainly because it fails to appreciate the sheer magnitude of the political problem of Indonesia. Such enactments were not simply statements of commonly agreed principles that would then trigger "state" actions on the basis of such prior meaning; they were statements of action, agendas by which actors could acquire and control ever more resources in the name of "Indonesia" to then effectively define Indonesia.

Since this competition was dynamic, and depended fundamentally on an actor's success on the ground and on its influence over Sukarno and his retinue (who represented the formal "state"), no one actor retained an enduring paramountcy. Therefore, the "state" record contained a succession of entries that expressed each actor's directing idea (or refinements of the same) while simultaneously confirming their formal influence and consolidation of an independent power base. To the degree that the formal record thus reflected the development of a revolutionary situation between the PKI and TNI, prominent entries in it can be used as points of analytical entry in the development of the PKI's and TNI's respective and now competitive state-building strategies.

By using the record in this way, we gain a perspective on a novel and creative process as well as an understanding of the paradoxical role that Sukarno played in this process. More specifically, in contrast to many works that interpret Sukarno's role in Indonesian politics (especially in the period from 1957 to 1965) in terms of his personal ideological beliefs, the view presented here suggests that such beliefs were secondary to his desire to secure organized power for himself and this meant manipulating both the PKI and TNI in a way that accentuated their creative competition and the genuine empowerment of the "state" over which he presided. At some points in time, to be described below, the President encouraged the TNI against the PKI, and vice-versa. This intriguing record of erratic behaviour should neither obscure the evident and continuous effect of the President's actions nor the organizational and mobilizational constants that informed both the PKI's and TNI's ongoing and increasingly dynamic activities. Above all, the deliberate and dramatically symbolic style with which the President conducted himself should not be assigned analytical priority in attempting to achieve an understanding of Indonesian politics after 1957. This is so quite simply because while both the PKI and TNI publicly shared or shared in Sukarno's symbolic imagery, if not his style, they still competed with each another in broad and, later, ominous ways. In this connection, we should be careful to recognize that while the PKI and TNI concentrated their efforts on the tangible aspects of their competition (vis-à-vis the control, acquisition, or creation of political resources), the effect of them formulating and reformulating aspects of their rival directing ideas of Indonesia actually provided the "material" for Sukarno to sustain his own otherwise hollow symbolic rule. This political interplay between Sukarno, the PKI, and the TNI thus masked the effective dis-empowerment of the formal Indonesian "state" at the same time as it allowed the PKI and TNI to effectively consolidate their political endeavours around specifically "national" or state symbols, the succession of which, in turn, forced them to better and more effectively compete in ways that are actually constitutive of states—territorially, popularly, and even militarily.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZING THE CATEGORIZATION OF POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES: TOWARDS AN INDONESIAN REALITY

An analytical discussion of new states must not be confined merely to an examination of how political actors secure territory, popular support, and a military capability. While such an approach may suffice for the study of revolution, from whence it is drawn, it would be fundamentally incomplete by itself for the study of new states. This is so because such an approach excludes the difficult analytical task of specifying the source of the novel and the creative that are intrinsically associated with building new states. That is not to say, however, that the two tasks are separate or should be performed separately. For just as in reality, where the actor who assumes the political challenge of building a new state forges the tangible character of popular, territorial, and even military resources into the intangible, the student of new states must assume the analytical challenge of linking political resources with novelty and creativity. In this chapter, I propose to draw greater attention to the novel and creative aspects of Indonesian state building by focusing more explicitly on the relationship between revolutionary action, its effects, and the possibilities of definitive meaning. Thus, without de-emphasizing the importance or the role of the PKI's and TNI's once separate mobilizational and organizational work, this chapter will call greater attention to the importance of meaning-creating actions, their dynamic effects on both actors, and the revolutionary synergy that was thereby created. More specifically, I propose to identify the political competition or political conflict for power resources that the PKI and TNI consciously entered into as the source of the novel and of the creative in the formation of the Indonesian state. To accomplish this task, as I suggested above, I will use the formal state's record of laws and major policies as a point of entry into the widening dynamic of action, effect, and meaning associated with the creation of two states-within-a-state and the effective destruction or supersession of alternative or lesser political actors. To this end, I will examine the "Djuanda Declaration" (13 December 1957) and its consequences, and the process leading to the reinstitution of the 1945 Constitution (5 July 1959) and its consequences; these developments were measures of the Communist's and the Army's political ascendancy, respectively. These analyses will help us to understand that while the establishment of "Guided Democracy" in 1959 was actually a significant political achievement co-authored by the TNI and the PKI, it was also necessarily a transitional one as both actors remained en route to the formation of a definitively Indonesian order.

The Djuanda Declaration: Unreal Expansion and Real Division

As the first example of a formal enactment that directly reflected a political actor's progress toward a statelike status, the Djuanda Declaration of 13 December 1957 was outstanding in its revelation both of the scope and object of the PKI's directing idea and the meaningful lengths to which the Party was pushing Indonesian nationalism. The Declaration, which followed immediately after the seizure of Dutch commercial and financial concerns, reflected a defiant official and, now (due in large part to the popular and thus effective efforts of the PKI), public attitude toward the political and economic difficulties the country now faced. In disregard of the fact that the government did not possess the wherewithal even to replace the country's de facto commercial fleet (the recently departed KPM), it escalated its claims to control the waters of the archipelago. More specifically, on behalf of the Indonesian government, the Prime Minister declared that henceforth

> all waters around, between and that connect the islands within the territory of the Indonesian state without consideration of their width or breadth are natural parts of the territorial area of the state of the Republic of Indonesia and as such form a part of the internal waters or national waters that exist under the absolute sovereignty of the state of the Republic of Indonesia.[1]

This was a novel but quite unsubstantiated claim of power. The declaration's novelty lay in its advertised opposition to, and thus supersession of, any and all foregoing formalized limitations to the scope of official maritime control in the East Indies archipelago. Thus, Jakarta's PKI-inspired action challenged not only the maritime rules that the Dutch had accepted less than twenty years earlier,[2] but also confronted the wider framework of international law within which the Dutch had explicitly accommodated themselves by proposing a four-fold increase in the wide of territorial waters from three to twelve miles. When viewed positively, the object defined by the Declaration amounted to an improvement in scale and substance over previous conceptions of what Indonesia constituted in territorial terms. Quite simply, the Declaration served as the first official affirmation that Indonesia comprised an Archipelagic State (*Negara Nusantara*), that is, a state which drew its defining reality from both its land and sea characteristics.

On the basis of the evident disparity between the Indonesian government's claim to control vast areas of land and sea and its actual authority over the same, the Djuanda Declaration had just as much potential as many earlier government statements to become yet another empty official pronouncement. However, unlike most of the government's erstwhile policies and plans, the Declaration had an immediate and enduring effect. This was so because the directing idea it contained not only had an effective proponent in the PKI, it had an ambitious adherent in the rising TNI. Indeed, the Declaration, while not causing or prompting the government to realize greater maritime and territorial control, actually brought about this possibility of such control by articulating an idea or a meaning that was now shared among leading political actors. In this sense, the Declaration's real effect was in the realm of created meaning: it constituted a formalized expression of prior actions (namely those of early December 1957) whose consequences it categorized as distinctly Indonesian, that is, of the directing idea of Indonesia.

As such, the Declaration served doubly to specify a tangible political zone and to designate intangible principles of political conduct. It did so without delimiting either the zone or the principles as being premised on any particular ideological or particularistic character (other than "Indonesian"). In this manner, the Declaration was an ordering and organizing device; it was only incipiently substantive. It neither imparted nor imposed any particular ideological commitments on its adherents. Likewise, the Declaration neither solicited nor depended upon particularistic bases of support (such as "Javanese") for its realization. Instead, the Declaration held out the eventual instantiation of the substantive claims that it contained by heralding a "domestic" drive, which the PKI certainly intended to lead, to address the fundamental issues of the directing idea of Indonesia—and of "Indonesian greatness"—that it posed. Indeed, there was no avoiding the genuine appeal of the notion of the *Negara Nusantara*, which was exactly comparable to the earlier idea of the *Negara Republik Indonesia* and no less compelling. We may perhaps understand that allure better by referring to a comparison that a US diplomat drew at the time between her country and Indonesia:

> We too, under much less complicated circumstances, had a period, after the departure of the colonial governors, of strife between and among regions and the weak central government, creating extreme economic and political chaos. We too, counselled by the retiring President Washington, sought a form of "active, independent foreign policy" which we called "no entangling alliances" and 20 years later in a move not totally dissimilar to Indonesia's recent proclamation of sweeping control over vast territorial waters, President Monroe told the world in effect that the entire Western Hemisphere was off bounds to colonial powers.[3]

Despite the absence of any substantive achievement in the Djuanda Declaration, its intent and direction were sufficient to galvanize TNI support, on the one side, and regional military and political leaders' opposition, on the other side. We have already seen how Nasution approved of the events of early December 1957 or, perhaps more accurately, of both their consequences (which were creatively and effectively channelled to benefit the Army) and the opportunity that these consequences presented to the Army to categorize them as part of its own idea of "Indonesia." The Army's directing idea of Indonesia, like the PKI's, defined the whole archipelago as its object but was not thereby assured of the support of regional military and political leaders. Indeed, the PKI- and TNI-sponsored notion that the Djuanda Declaration was an expression of Indonesian nationalism was belied by the fact that military leaders in Sumatra and Sulawesi (chiefly, Simbolon, Hussein, Djambek, Kawilarang, Sumual, and Warouw) and political leaders from the Masjumi and PSI (including former acting President Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and former Prime Ministers Natsir and Harahap), stiffened their opposition to Army Headquarters, the Cabinet, and the "centre" generally. To them, the Declaration served as further evidence that narrowly based political forces, and more especially the PKI, were attempting to dominate Indonesia for their own allegedly insular ends.[4]

Acting on this impression, and regardless of its bearing in reality, the regional leaders aimed to formalize their effective power in the same manner as the PKI had its power formalized by the Djuanda Declaration. On 10 February 1958, regional leaders issued an ultimatum that the Djuanda Cabinet be replaced by one led by former Vice-President Hatta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Hamengkubuwono IX. In the past, both of these leaders had demonstrated their commitment to resolving the problems of Indonesia and now, in the immediate present, the forces in Sumatra and Sulawesi converged paradoxically to defend the appropriateness of this view. Their vision, which had already been articulated in the form of the Charter (*Piagam*) of Total Struggle (*Perjuangan Semesta*—Permesta) that Sumual had publicized in conjunction with his assertion of control over T&T VII (East Indonesia) in March 1957, uncritically presumed that the country's real problems (and thus their solutions) related to regional development. That is to say, in appealing for extensive regional autonomy, an instrumental (as opposed to consummatory or symbolic) approach to politics and development, and specifically territorial representation at the national level, the Charter's defenders echoed earlier colonial and federal principles about separate but eventually unifying development paths for the outer islands and their populations. In short, the regional leaders were demanding that steps be taken to realize their own directing idea of Indonesia. When the Government allowed the regional leaders' ultimatum to lapse, the latter severed all ties with the Republic of Indonesia and proclaimed a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*—PRRI) on 15 February 1958.

In recognizing that the ensuing confrontation between the PRRI and the Central Government (or more exactly the TNI) was a contest between adherents of incompletely realized but territorially overlapping directing ideas, we are better able to appreciate the true dynamic breadth of its consequences. In fact, the anti-PRRI/Permesta campaign amounted to much more than what is conventionally understood as Jakarta's "successful reassertion of control" over the affected areas of Sumatra and Sulawesi. It may even be said that the more important consequences of the campaign occurred well before its military phase had begun—or concluded in a surprisingly insightful manner. It may be argued that the more important consequences resulted, first, from the very fact that there was, and was going to be, a military campaign, and second, from the obscured bases of cooperation between and among the leading political actors that comprised each side. Of course, the actual outcome of the military phase was important but not simply, I will argue, because of the military successes or failures that it entailed. The elimination through battle of a rival—organized, and somewhat effective because popularly apprehended and supported political force—had profound effects for the victor and the victorious side.

The most salient effect of the creation of the PRRI was the consolidation of an alternate political position, consisting of opposing actors laying equally broad claims to represent "Indonesia." This polarization occurred despite the fact that many issues, not all of which were mutually reinforcing, informed the grievances of the regional leaders. However, their singular declaration of a separate political entity and identity neatly cleaved the whole "Indonesian" polity into two broad groups: Sukarno, TNI Headquarters, PKI, PNI, and sundry other clearly recognizable pan-Indonesian political parties, on the one side, and the regional military leaders, Masjumi, PSI, and other actors, including, later, the DI/TII, on the other side. In the history of independent Indonesia, such a clear, popularly and organizationally meaningful division was unprecedented. The reason for this, and in fact the reason why the issue was one which neither invited nor sustained equivocal solution, was that the actors involved on both sides had achieved a meaningful degree of power—a considerable accumulation of political resources—for their respective directing ideas.

Thus, the "surprising" manner in which the TNI Headquarters sought to solve the PRRI problem through force is not surprising in light of its own directing idea.[5] Likewise, the manner in which the PKI actively assisted the TNI, which had already presented itself to the Party in other ways as a serious threat, is not surprising in light of its directing idea. Indeed, as a conflict in which rival directing ideas may be said to have taken precedence, it is not surprising that the actual organizational form of its leading participants—army, political party, politician—would be irrelevant in the wider context of a struggle between adherents of opposing directing ideas. It did not matter that many actors and many types of actors were involved on both sides. What matters analytically is that cooperation was possible because actors making up each side shared a fundamentally similar directing idea of Indonesia. The nature and intent of PKI-TNI cooperation may be understood in relation to the fulfilment of this idea.

Sukarno, the Army, and the PKI transformed the logical possibility presented to both sides by the declaration of the PRRI of achieving the territorial and popular defeat of the other—in the name of "Indonesia"—into an actuality by seizing upon military confrontation as the only solution. The decision to conduct a military operation seems to have been based on a conscious calculation of political cost. If the central government could not rationally afford a military campaign, given the other worsening problems that observers and regional leaders alike had observed, then the central government could also not avoid such a campaign, given the directing ideas of the TNI and PKI. Accordingly, the decision was taken that "an estimated 48 per cent of [the central government's] budget and 45 per cent of its foreign exchange [would go] either directly or indirectly to military campaigns."[6] In short, there seemed no cost too high to pay in connection with the attempted fulfilment of the proponents' directing ideas. In their own calculation of the costs of defiance, however, the PRRI leaders "didn't think Djakarta would actually risk destroying itself in order to destroy them."[7] Their reasons for thinking in this way clearly related to their assumption that the central government shared their perception of the priority of the problems in Indonesia, and not the political problem of Indonesia. The fact that the central government acted contrary to the regional leaders' reasonable expectations unequivocally demonstrated the true nature of politics and of the precedence accorded the power imperative over other considerations.

Through their very act of defiance, the PRRI leaders had pushed matters beyond their own preferred framework. They had hoped that out of consideration of the country's onerous territorial, economic, administrative, and other problems, the Central Government would have confirmed its own role as government by actually attempting to address these problems (governing) rather than making matters worse by using force (ruling). Instead, with a remarkable degree of deliberateness, the Central Government and its military and communist supporters exposed the long-sustained pretence that an effective Indonesian Government really existed by embarking on a course that caused greater ruin and greater injury to the lands and people of the archipelago. Overwhelming all previous claims about an "Indonesian identity," "Indonesian needs," or the "Indonesian soul," the anti-PRRI actions from early 1958 onwards demonstrated the illusory nature of a single "Indonesia." The worsening of conditions that these actions actually brought about only reinforced and broadened their participants' perceived need to exercise more political power over wider circles of territory and people. On this thinking, the evident and increasing misery of the people became the rationale for increases in power, but increases which were achieved at the cost of greater objective misery. Hence, the expansive, even limitless nature of the efforts to resolve the political problem of Indonesia. Within this framework, there was no avenue of social existence which remained beyond the political imperative, that is, beyond the directing ideas and the corresponding actions of their military and communist adherents. Quite unintentionally, then, the PRRI leaders' actions precipitated a clash that facilitated the TNI's and PKI's separate state-building strategies because they were based on the issue of the effective territorial and popular control of "Indonesia."

The Central Government's, and especially the Army's, political success was out of proportion to its opponent's military defeat. Indeed, the actuality of the TNI's political achievement in connection with its directing idea, and with building its state-within-a-state, far exceeded the PRRI's defeat in the areas in which it claimed or exercised control. We may begin to perceive the dynamic implications of this defeat by recalling that the PRRI was a going political concern in the sense that its leaders had, to some degree, succeeded in gathering and mobilizing support and in raising a wider consciousness of their cause (or directing idea). When the PRRI came to a sudden end by mid-1958, then, its overpowering opponent obviously scored a military victory, but, less obviously, an underappreciated political victory. Whereas the PRRI leaders required a long period of time to create a cognizance among the people of parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi that they were "Outer Island Indonesians," the TNI could achieve the creation of a similar awareness, but this time of an unqualified "Indonesian" identity, with considerably less effort. This is so because the leaders of the PRRI, having engaged in their own endeavour, had already accomplished the difficult task of superseding the particularistic or narrowly insular foundations that were at the base of earlier identities in their areas of control. In this sense, the Army could advance its own directing idea more easily because the affected people had already been subjected to the politically inspired organizational and mobilizational strategy that informs the creation of new and transcendant identities. Thus, the very crux of the Army's political victory consisted of the fact that among the people affected by the anti-PRRI campaign, the knowledge of a PRRI defeat was also the knowledge that an effective "Indonesian" authority now operated in their midst. As Hauriou has observed, the very transmission of such an awareness among large numbers of people is a measure of a directing idea's objective character.[8]

At its most profound level, then, the fighting associated with the PRRI's demise revealed the political reality of Indonesia. What Indonesia was depended, first, on the existence of conflict between or among statelike actors over its scope and substance, and second, on the creation by the winning actor of an account of its actions that categorized the consequences of these actions in terms that were meant to be authoritative and that served as a foundation for the ongoing fulfilment of its directing idea. Hence, the notion that the TNI and the Central Government were merely engaged in safeguarding Indonesia from a secessionist threat is misleading. In actuality, the campaign marked an outward expansion of the Army's effective power over an unprecedentedly wide circle of territory and people. It remained for the Army to turn its success through action, its victory on the ground, into the definitive, authoritative, and thus "Indonesian" account of events. In this connection, it remained for the Army to create an Indonesian meaning for its actions.

The 1945 Constitution: Army Control and the Naming of Authority

To accomplish its task of creating meaning for its actions, the TNI began to create a new authority structure in Indonesia that was tied to, and served to advance, the Army's own effective power. Stated bluntly, the Army tried to couple its state-within-a-state with the formal state by making the latter conform to the former. The measures that the TNI took subsequent to the destruction of the PRRI, then, were of four distinct types and roughly in the following order. First, it expanded its own state-within-a-state in the areas previously controlled by the PRRI, specifically, and in the Outer Islands, generally. Second, it undertook to curb the activities and political prospects of other leading political actors, chiefly the political parties. Third, it mounted a wide-ranging effort to revise Indonesia's formal political structures and award itself a defining place within them. Fourth, it wedded military policy to state policy so as to permanently assure itself of a meaningful role in continuing to define the substance of the Indonesian reality.

As the fighting between the TNI and the forces of the PRRI passed from the conventional stage to guerrilla warfare in mid-1958, Army Headquarters acted both at the ground level and in the highest circles of government to consolidate its control over territory and people. It is important to note that at the ground level, Nasution did not limit himself to consolidating the Army's control to those areas that were the actual sites of the fighting. Rather, by using his powers as Peperpu, he made it clear the Army's powers and the mechanisms associated with it would be extended to the entire country. The broad basis for this downward and outward movement was drafted by Nasution in his Regulation No. 22 of 19 May 1958.[9] Even though it was clear at the time that the TNI had (or was in the last stages of achieving) a victory over the PRRI, Nasution proceeded nevertheless to call upon Indonesian citizens to fulfil their obligation and help "the instruments of government in safeguarding security, the implementation of civil defence, as well as carry out work of a military character to the degree that is necessary, along with the imperative of taking lessons."[10]

This broad measure acquired the force of reality through a series of subsequent enactments. The Army General Staff initiated the commingling of the military and civilian spheres in the most ambitious way possible. On 28 May 1958, in the name of "uniformity" and in the interest of awakening the Indonesian people to the defence of their nation, the General Staff ordered every Indonesian citizen between 18 and 40 years of age to be given training and understanding in the basics of military instruction.[11] The General Staff claimed that with this "Indonesian citizens with enough awareness, knowledge, and ability will make up the state's cadres in a broad sense relating to the importance of defence, development, security and happiness." Accordingly, through the combined efforts of military, police, and civilian authorities, all affected Indonesians were eventually to receive instruction in seven areas ranging from the elimination of disturbances, to the country's defence, to providing assistance in the field of development. Importantly, all such instruction was to be infused with the spirit of "Pantjasila, morality, discipline, the history of [the Indonesian] struggle, and enthusiasm for mutual assistance."[12] The Staff showed particular concern that the issue of security should be understood at the lowest levels in the broadest of terms. The notion of security was to be related specifically to the Indonesian state, as such, and to its regions. There, efforts to achieve security were to be understood, among others things, as "restraining the destructive activities of enemies, contributing to the village security system, strengthening villages, creating awareness of population movements, eliminating fifth columns, and guarding vital installations."[13] In short, this was a comprehensive effort by the TNI to penetrate to the lowest levels of local Indonesia.

In the following months, Nasution fashioned more specific instruments and reasons that amplified the thrust of his earlier pronouncements. On 14 July 1958, for instance, he issued an instruction for the creation of special "Territorial Forces" that ingeniously addressed the dual issues of territorial and popular control.[14] Within every Infantry Regiment Area (*Daerah Resimen Infanterie*) or Military Command Area (*Daerah Komando Militer*), existing military personnel were instructed to recruit candidates for the new forces. The purpose of this recruitment was not, however, to increase the size of the military itself by creating more soldiers. Rather, the purpose of the forces seemed to be the enlargement of the popular awareness of the military and its directing idea of Indonesia. This rationale was evident in the criteria the TNI used to select its recruits: the forces were to consist of "people who could be easily returned to society (because they already possessed a living)," "who were not influenced by existing [socio-political] groups or streams," and who met "minimum standards of fitness." So that large numbers of people could pass through this military structure, Nasution instructed that the forces' membership be renewed annually. In another measure issued about a month later, Nasution attempted to "prepare the energies towards the total people's resistance" by creating "security teams" in villages, businesses, estates, and other vital installations.[15] As with the Territorial Forces, these teams were consciously designed to affect large numbers of people by involving them in the TNI's security and defence efforts, specifically, and in its extra-military endeavours, generally.

In this latter sense, the Territorial Forces and security teams constituted quasi-martial counterparts to the Army's quasi-civilian BKSs. And, as the Army's military and political opportunities grew with the rise and resolution of the PRRI issue, so, too, did the BKSs grow. On the first anniversary of the founding the BKS-PM (17 June 1958), for instance, "it was announced that Cooperation Bodies Between Youth and Army had been set up in all parts of the country except Atjeh (North Sumatra), West Sumatra, and Celebes."[16] More generally, the Army had succeeded in creating eight such Cooperation Bodies by mid-1958.[17] The Army gave the clearest signals of its intentions vis-à-vis the Cooperation Bodies when it sponsored their formal promotion as instruments of the "state." This political elevation occurred in two stages and eventually yielded the formal acceptance of the *golongan fungsionil* concept within the year. The first significant development occurred on 25 June 1958, when a State Ministry for Civil-Military Cooperation was created.[18] From this implicit legitimization of the Army's cooperative schemes, Nasution acted to widen the (nominal) monopoly that the BKSs had over the Irian Barat liberation efforts within the FNPIB by widening and deepening the FNPIB itself:

> Territorial commanders were instructed to establish branches of the National Front in their areas. In various parts of the country the Army Chief of Staff presided himself [after the Front's creation in February 1958] . . . over the installation of the local commanders as National Front chairmen. On August 2, 1958, the Army announced that following a review by the National Council and by the cabinet of the position of the National Front it had been decided to strengthen the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian. It was to be known thereafter by its abbreviated name *Front Nasional* and be built into a "guided mass movement" based on the Cooperation Bodies between the Army and Youth, Workers, Women, Farmers, Religious Leaders and Veterans. The Army Chief of Staff remained chairman of the *Front Nasional*. The statement added that by strengthening the National Front "any attempts to revive conflicts among various groups can be prevented." . . . The Army Chief of Staff announced that within six months [from 15 August 1958] branches of the National Front were to be installed in all districts.[19]

The actual and conceptual widening of the FNPIB was rightly perceived as a menacing development by all other organized political actors, and especially the political parties. The basis for this perception lay precisely in the fact that despite the tremendous weakening in the anti-PRRI campaign of the "internal enemies and subversive groups" which the FNPIB had, in part, been created to destroy, the TNI began anew to identify enemies and subversive groups from among the remaining political actors. The parties' discomfort may have been reinforced by the fact that in much less clear power circumstances, Nasution had subjected them to far-reaching control measures in 1957. Then, as part of his anti-corruption drive, Nasution forced the parties and their leaders to disclose the origin of their property.[20] Furthermore, during the 1957-58 regional elections, the Peperda were empowered to "prevent excesses and disorder" and in so doing later disrupted the work of regional legislative assemblies.[21] By mid-1958, when Nasution had already revealed his ambitions and the object of those ambitions in a number of ways, the parties received much rougher treatment than in the past.

On 9 August 1958, for instance, Nasution ordered all government agencies to disclose the political affiliations of their highest employees.[22] To the PNI and NU, which relied on the largesse of its associates in the government and bureaucracy to promote their own political fortunes, this was a devastating development. Within less than a month, Nasution acted again and banned those branches of four political parties (Masjumi, PSI, Parkindo, and IPKI) that actively supported the PRRI/Permesta movement.[23] In late September, he "postponed" the 1959 general elections.[24] Lastly, in an act of singular resolve to finally settle the long-running struggle with the parties over their followerships among veterans—and to signal the fate of all party ormas in the future—the KSAD sternly declared on 10 November 1958 that all veterans' organizations would soon be effectively dissolved into the Army-led LVRI. Eventually, all parties capitulated to this demand and thereby relinquished, at least in name, control over a total claimed membership of half a million veterans.[25] To the PKI, which had recognized as recently as July 1957 the potential role of its veteran orma (Perbepsi) in "changing the balance of power so that the situation moves to the left,"[26] this development was immensely troubling.

While the parties may have been prepared for the day of attack on their veterans' ormas (because they had struggled with TNI Headquarters for almost two years over the issue), they were not prepared for Nasution's pronouncement the day after, because it was consciously novel. On 11 November 1958 Nasution spoke, without notes, before the military academy at Magelang. There, he stated

> that the position of the TNI was not like that of an army in a Western country, in which the military was solely an "instrument of the government" (*alat pemerintah*.) Neither was it like that of various Latin American armies which monopolized political power. Rather, the TNI was one of the forces of the people's struggle (*salah satu kekuatan perjuangan rakyat*) which was at the same level and which fought shoulder to shoulder with other forces, such as parties.[27]

Curiously, Nasution demonstrated that what he was saying about the Army and, implicitly, its revolutionary heritage, was not as self-evident to Indonesians as his comparison suggested, for he went on to make an ominous threat: "we shall see that the national leader will open sufficient channels [for the Army and its officers] as there is no other way because otherwise, like the volcano, Mount Merapi, erupting suddenly, trouble may occur."[28] Here, the zeal with which Nasution proposed to lift the Army's political standing should not be confused with a desire on the Army Chief's part to realize that end by force, through a coup. Perhaps, if all Nasution sought from the recent developments was to seize formal power, then a military coup may have been an option. As we have seen, however, Nasution's ambitions were less military in nature than they were political, and it was for this reason that he publicly eschewed a coup. A military coup would not resolve a political problem, especially one whose magnitude was as great as that of the political problem of Indonesia. Besides being an inappropriate solution, a coup would bring a premature end to many of the Army's recent territorial and popular initiatives. As such, a military strike would probably confine the Army's grip to the formality rather than the reality of power, and Nasution had amply demonstrated that it was the latter that was of uppermost interest to himself and the General Staff.

In rejecting a military coup as an option, Nasution determined that the Army's present and future role consisted of what later came to be called the "Army's Third Way" (*jalan tengah tentara*) or "Broad Front" (*Front Lebar*). The Third Way may be understood as a formal declaration of a new state-building strategy. This characterization is borne out both by the obtuseness with which Nasution presented his idea, and by the very act of proposing a role that was distinctive to the Indonesian military. If we recognize that obtuseness is inherent in creative and political undertakings, particularly when they are works in progress, without definite scope or substance, then the way in which Nasution presented his idea may be seen as confirming his commitment to engage in new state building. Whereas Nasution could be certain that his audience clearly understood his two pejorative references to armies elsewhere in the world, he could not be certain (and probably did not expect) that his audience or the wider public would know exactly what he meant by the alternative that he was proposing. This uncertainty was an unavoidable rather than an unintended result that actually served Nasution's interests. Since he himself did not know the exact content or substance of the Third Way, the deliberate juxtaposition of this unknown quality between two well-known referents allowed him to impart a vital sense of certitude to a future role for the Army without raising the question as to its content. Thus, like the PKI leadership with which he was in increasing competition, Nasution affirmed the role of essentially unqualified action, including organizational and mobilizational drives, in the fulfilment of his and now, more fully than ever, the Army's directing idea.

The second, and perhaps more important, respect in which the Third Way may be understood as a new state-building strategy relates to the manner in which Nasution used the notion to fashion a meaningful framework for further action. By publicly suggesting that the Indonesian military possessed a distinctive role in the life of the nation, and that distinctiveness could be conceptualized, and thereafter accorded its true reality, Nasution was really attempting to create meaning for past, present, and future actions that would or could actually be constitutive of an Indonesian reality. Obviously, since neither the future nor the troubled present could yield any incontrovertible bases that would legitimize the Army's Third Way, Nasution sought to create meaning for the military's present and future role by making references to the past. By equating the TNI's present and future role with that of the TNI in the past, however, Nasution was indulging in an imagined past, a past liberated from the confining spatial and temporal limits of Java and Sumatra in the late 1940s.

Then, the TNI had indeed acted in extra-military ways that may be understood as meaningfully "Indonesian." It was exactly this attribute that Nasution sought to extrapolate as a rationale for the Army's actions of late 1958 and, hopefully, long thereafter. Then, as now, the struggle related to the authoritative determination of Indonesia, but now, as opposed to then, the Army was confronted by an "internal" opponent whose equal regard for power and the accumulation and creation of political resources could make its own such determination possible. Now, as opposed to then, the TNI was not only making history, but its leadership was also attempting to make up history and Nasution began to do so with his notion of a Third Way—a veritable ex post facto construction.

What gives the Third Way idea its significance in terms of new state building, is that its formulation occurred after the TNI had acted in a way that could give effect to its affected meaning. That is to say, Nasution arrived at his idea when he and the Army had already achieved a degree of power over large territories and numbers of people who had not both previously been appealed to in terms of a single, overarching identity and been subject to a single actor's direct control. The Third Way idea, therefore, presented a means, a political resource, by which the Army leadership could categorize the consequences of its actions in "Indonesian" terms. From this perspective, it is important to distinguish between the "internal" and "external" aspects of the Third Way idea, that is, between the Army's categorization of itself as "Indonesian," which occurred through the adoption of the Third Way idea as Army policy, and the potential that this achievement held for the Army to create "Indonesia." By asserting that the TNI was acting both in an officially "Indonesian" capacity and in an historically "Indonesian" capacity, Nasution was trying to convert the unprecedented reality of the Army's power into a principled basis for the Army to be in formal positions of power. From there, Nasution apparently believed that it would be possible for the Army to continue gathering the political resources (chiefly territorial and popular in nature) that could be used to transform the apparent authority of the Indonesian government into real authority over a real state. Thus, the promotion of the Third Way held within itself the logical possibility, perhaps even the expectation, that the Army would actually attempt to make a determination about Indonesia's scope and substance and in so doing constitute itself as its authority. In other words, by seeking to categorize acquired territories and populations—in all their diversity—as Indonesian, the Army was intending to impose a monopoly of decision that would found and realize simultaneously its sovereign authority and the new state which it would direct.

In this light, the ordering and objectives of the political steps that the Army took over the next two years suggest that its leadership was expressly engaged in the execution of a new state-building strategy. The first step, which was taken immediately after Nasution's Magelang speech and most certainly at his prompting, consisted of the formal designation by the National Council of functional group status for the military. Hitherto, the representation that the Army and the other branches of the armed forces enjoyed in the National Council was due to the status of their representatives as "ex-officio Presidential appointees in the same category as appointed cabinet ministers," and not as representatives of a military functional group.[29] Whereas the Army's dependent status in public life had been essentially advertised as such in July 1958, when National Council Vice-Chairman Roeslan Abdulgani publicly enumerated the Council's groups to the exclusion of the military,[30] by November 1958, the Army showed its ability to engage in self-definition by forcing the Council, Cabinet, and DPR to confer the formal designation of functional group status on the military. By January 1959, the military had extended its victory in the Council to the DPR, where it won the right of representation not only for itself as a functional group (with 13.5 per cent of the seats), but also for all formally recognized functional groups. Here, the Army showed the subtle but revolutionary utility of its functional group status: it became a resource, a platform, to guide other functional groups to institutional prominence and thereby facilitate the realization of a wider and "more meaningful" formal framework.

By acceding to the military's demand for significant functional group representation in the DPR, the political parties contributed equally and essentially to the end of one political arrangement and the beginning of another. Indeed, soon after the Army succeeded in winning functional group status for itself and the other armed services, it became quite apparent from its wide-ranging efforts on behalf of all functional groups that its intention vis-à-vis the DPR was not limited to acquiring the right of representation and the seats to substantiate that right. The point of this activity was to transform the very site in which it was to unfold, and the success that Nasution had in reversing an August 1958 National Council decision to proceed with the realization of Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" within existing constitutional arrangements demonstrated that this was the case.

Logically, when the Army began to convince other actors in early 1959 that the 1945 Constitution (which referred to representation by group) ought to be reinstituted, the issue of functional group representation in the DPR ceased being a matter that was situated in the confines of the existing political system and instead became a matter that was of an other political arrangement. The Army's own functional group status thus became a tangible and meaningful bridge from the internal to the external aspect of its Middle Way idea. In traversing this bridge after November 1958, the Army effected its own subtle but revolutionary change in identity. The Army went from being an actor defined from mid-1957 by the place that its representatives held in the National Council, that is, parallel to but outside the formal sphere, to being an actor that would define future formal arrangements. Through its self-won inclusion in January 1959, it became co-definitive of formal arrangements by virtue of the support it extended to President Sukarno's decree of 5 July 1959 that reinstituted the 1945 Constitution and formally inaugurated Guided Democracy.[31]

Despite the fact that the forced return to the 1945 Constitution spelled an immediate change in the character and nature of Indonesian government, virtually entirely in favour of the executive,[32] the Army continued acting to create genuine state power, rather than merely exercise formal "state" power, through its own initiatives and structures. In this way, the Army's own behaviour after July 1959 suggested its leaders' doubts that the return to the 1945 Constitution, as such, had brought about any meaningful or authoritative resolution of the fundamental problems of the Indonesian context. That is not to say, however, that the military leadership did not appreciate the opportunity to create real authority that reinstituting the 1945 Constitution had brought about. Indeed, from the Army's perspective, the Constitution was more important as a framework for organizing the creation of authority and less important as a framework of governmental organization.

Unlike the previous constitution, which was essentially a framework of governmental organization, the 1945 Constitution possessed certain features that were conducive to the kind of creative and novel enterprise the Army intended to realize. First, the Preamble constituted an exact statement of the Army's directing idea. Second, the Army linked its "functional group" status to the reference to "group" representatives in the second article, thereby weaving itself into the very fabric of the Constitution. Third, because the Constitution was the very embodiment of law and of the form of law, the Army could more readily surmount the limiting and divisive effects of other actors' particularistically based appeals and actions (such as those of religious or ethnic groupings) by enacting measures on the basis of universalistic or transcendant provisions. Fourth, because the Constitution was extremely brief, consisting of a mere 37 articles, many of its provisions were scarcely defined; this feature afforded the Army an enormous opportunity to engage in meaning creation. Finally, the Constitution lent itself to the essence of new state building—the imposition of a monopoly of decision over all others—or war, for short. As Nasution himself declared, the "Proclamation Constitution . . . from the point of view of the requirement of war and war leadership . . . is the best system."[33]

The Meaning and Meaningfulness of the Army's Authority

Between mid-1959 and late 1960, the Army attempted to transform the possibility of meaningful authority that was entailed by the return to the 1945 Constitution into a reality. Accordingly, it acted in a way that was strikingly similar to its earlier behaviour, in the wake of the PRRI's destruction, when it first began to bluntly pursue a strategy of new state building. First, the Army hastened to accumulate and control political resources in the political spaces that it had opened. Next, it struck at other political actors in ways that deprived them of their accumulated political resources. Finally, it fashioned meanings for its achievements that could be incorporated as *norms* informing the *normal* functioning of the "Indonesian state." By briefly examining each of these phases, it will be possible to show exactly how Army tried to transform its still shallow control of territorial and popular resources into the basis of a meaningful seat of authority in, and as, the constitutive agent of a new Indonesian state.

President Sukarno's July 5 Decree, which opened wide political vistas for the Army in the emergent edifice of Guided Democracy, served as a sort of formalized counterpart to the Army's earlier and bloody efforts in 1958 to open wide geographic spaces to its own and the Central Government's authority. At the formal level, then, the Army sought admittance into the new Parliament, the proposed People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), and greater representation in the Cabinet. Thus, in the new DPR, which in mid-1959 comprised the members of the old DPR and a contingent of functional group representatives—all pledged to the 1945 Constitution—the seating of Armed Forces representatives gave tangible expression to their theoretical claims to functional group representation. The reality of functional groups became even more pronounced when Sukarno outlined the composition of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (*Dewan Permusyawaratan Rakjat Sementara*—MPRS) in his Presidential Determination No. 2/1959. Whereas nine political parties were allotted 130 seats, functional groups were given 391 seats and regional representatives 90 seats.[34] The Army rounded out its representation in the organs of state by having its members seated in the DPA, the majority of whose members were functional group delegates.[35] The size of the military contingent in the new "Work Cabinet" (*Kabinet Kerja*), which was established on July 9, also showed clearly how far Nasution and his allies had begun to populate the formal structures of Guided Democracy. Of 42 Cabinet positions, the Armed Forces held 12.[36] Furthermore, Nasution assumed the vital post of Minister of Defence and Security while serving concurrently as the KSAD. From his dual institutional bases, Nasution exercised authority over the Ministries of Defence, Justice, Police, and Veterans Affairs and exerted preeminent influence over the other armed services.[37]

Perhaps the most significant formal site for the Army, in terms of creating meaning for its directing idea, was the National Planning Board (*Dewan Perancang Nasional*—Depernas). The basis for the Board had been laid as early as September 1958, when the DPR passed a law that provided for its eventual creation.[38] Nasution had seen at an early point in the debates on the future of Guided Democracy between the President and himself, on one side, and Parliament on the other, that as the formal agent of development, Depernas could be a significant vehicle in advancing the cause of the Army's own functional group interests and, more broadly, its interest in state building. We may surmise that it was for this reason that Nasution attempted to monopolize the nomination of functional group representatives, who were legislated to be the majority of Depernas members, through the FNPIB in January 1959.[39] It was also for this reason that the Depernas survived institutionally as a formal body after the return of the 1945 Constitution, which contained no provisions for such an entity. By this measure alone, the Depernas was significant, for it indicated that the Army's ambitions exceeded merely winning functional group status for itself.

In the hands of the Army, the true significance of the Depernas really only becomes apparent when we consider the controversial issue of its composition. Unlike all the aforementioned bodies, the Depernas was unique in that Nasution and Sukarno succeeded in excluding all formal party representatives from it. Still, the significance of this feat would be inadequately translated by the fact that the Depernas was exclusively populated by functional group and regional representatives. More crucially, by constituting the Depernas in this way, it became possible for Nasution to link the development of the nation exclusively with functional groups and their activity. In this way, functional groups acquired created meaning as the sole agents of development.

This evolution was by no means "natural" or "inevitable," and by simply juxtaposing Sukarno's conception of functional groups in early 1957 with that of late 1958 and early 1959 we may see how the conceptual form of the functional group was contrived to serve a specific form of collective activity. Whereas functional groups were originally understood by the President to be "groups that are important in the life of the Indonesian people," as outlined in Emergency Law No. 7/1957, in the Law establishing the Depernas (Law No. 80/1958) and in his 22 April 1959 speech inviting a return to the 1945 Constitution, Sukarno modified this conception by ascribing a "working duty for functional groups in the field of production and services in bringing about social development."[40] By constituting the Depernas in the way that it did, then, the Army did not just exclude the political parties from the Board; it excluded them from the future by making that future contingent on a form of collective activity in which only functional groups could meaningfully and authoritatively participate.

In conceptual terms, the invention of an organic link between functional groups and development was a positive step for the Army and for its prospects of successfully building a new state. First, by selecting this form of collective activity, as against others that were arguably available to it (like a war of liberation for Irian Barat) and which may have advanced other actors' interests, it was easy for the military to thwart the political parties' objections on this score by simply pointing to the historical record of developmental failure in Indonesia since 1949. Second, by proposing development as the leitmotif of his and his allies' activities, Nasution provided a positive, constructive, and virtually limitless alternative to the largely negative and destructive efforts he had hitherto directed against the Army's opponents. Third, by embracing the notion of development, Nasution could dynamize the Army's formal achievement of functional group status. Fourth, the Army attached uppermost importance to the Depernas because the "over-all development of the nation"[41] that it was charged with overseeing could be used by the Army to forge links between itself and other functional groups, and between all such groups and the wider territorial and popular base that would actually experience such development. In short, the Army had ample reason to embark on sustained outward thrusts, throughout the archipelago, and downward thrusts, among the people. In its essence, however, the Army's emerging strategy of development remained more an organizational and mobilizational tool than one which either prescribed substantive "Indonesian" values or which was founded on such values, for these belonged properly to the future.

Notwithstanding its own gains and those of functional groups generally, the Army still had to contend with the reality that other actors, chiefly the large political parties, possessed significant organizational and mobilizational power (notably in the form of their ormas) and could, on this basis, engage in meaning-creating actions of their own that challenged its emerging definition of "Indonesia." Accordingly, as the Army completed its formation and occupation of Guided Democracy's formal structures, it acted against those parties that could jeopardize its meaning-creating and authority-creating activities by addressing their sources and means of accumulating political resources—indeed, the very bases upon which they could compete with the Army in their own state-building strategies.

The first direct blow against the parties came in the form of Presidential Regulations No. 2/1959 and No. 3/1959, which dealt with state service and party membership both at the central and regional levels.[42] Here, the objective was to prise the formal governmental apparatus out of party hands by compelling the affected individuals either to resign their government posts or their party memberships. To such larger parties like PNI and NU, this measure struck painfully hard at key financial sources of their strength. The next major blow was delivered in Presidential Regulation No. 7/1959 of 31 December 1959, which menacingly set forth "The Conditions for the Simplification of the Political Parties." By its stark provisions,

> every party had formally to accept the 1945 Constitution, *Panca Sila*, and the *Manipol/USDEK* [the programme of Guided Democracy as outlined by Sukarno on 17 August 1959], had to have a membership of at least 150,000 in sixty-five districts, and must not receive assistance from outside the country. The President was empowered to dissolve any party which opposed the principles of the state or was involved in—or did not condemn—rebellions.[43]

At a stroke, this instrument gave the Army and Sukarno the ability to abolish 19 smaller parties, and such larger parties as the PSI, IPKI, and Masjumi, which were involved in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. By August 1960, the government had succeeded in squelching all the affected parties except the IPKI. In the case of Masjumi, though, it had ceased to exist well before these provisions were used to announce its organizational death. Indeed, it is more accurate to say that Masjumi failed gloriously as a movement in 1958 before it failed ingloriously as just another banned party in August 1960. The government's categorization of Masjumi as one among many prohibited parties served to cheat Masjumi of its historical accomplishment as a statelike movement, controlling territory and people in conjunction with its military backers, while disguising the fundamentally revolutionary nature of the Army's own ongoing achievements. By August 1960, there were but eight parties,[44] all ostensibly circumscribed by their adherence to the ethereal notions in the Political Manifesto (*Manifes Politik*—Manipol) and of *USDEK*: the 1945 Constitution (*Undang-undang Dasar 1945*), Indonesian Socialism (*Sosialisme à la Indonesia*), Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*), Guided Economy (*Ekonomi Terpimpin*), and the National Identity (*Kepribadian Nasional*).

As the organizational and ideological vise grew tighter around the parties, the fact of their own resistance was used against them to further undermine their power. For instance, by reacting even in a guarded way against Presidential Regulation No. 7/1959, and by rejecting the government's national budget proposals in February, the parties in the DPR steeled Sukarno's resolve to bring all parties to heel. He declared his intention in March to dissolve the DPR and replace it the following July with an appointative "*gotong-royong*" ("mutual assistance") People's Representative Council (DPR-GR). Although the President appeared to accommodate the parties by reserving for them a numerically sizeable role of 130 seats, his accommodation was doubly conditional. First, he assigned an equal number of seats to functional group representatives (now known as *golongan karya* or golkar representatives), and one to the Irian Barat representative. Second, through the regulations governing the establishment of the Provisional MPR, of which the DPR constituted half of its membership, Sukarno ensured that the regional and golkar representatives possessed an absolute majority of 425 versus the parties' 130. Presidential Decision No. 5/1960 of 23 September 1960, which extended to the regions the logic of the developments at the centre, guaranteed half the seats on regional legislatures (DPRD) for golkar representatives.

Having been forced into the organizational and ideological matrices of Guided Democracy, the surviving parties now endured further unwelcome acts against their organizational and mobilizational capacities. The most far-reaching of these acts was delineated in Presidential Regulation No. 13/1960 of 5 July, which

> obliged the parties to register for official recognition, by reporting by 31 December 1960 their constitution, total of branches and members, the name, age, and occupation of each member, and account of their funds, receipts, and expenditures. The threat of dissolution [which was originally outlined in Presidential Regulation No. 7/1959] was restated.[45]

The provisions of this Regulation were unequalled in the power that they gave the Army to control other actors' political resources. The sensitive and outright damaging nature of their disclosures under the terms of this Provision was not lost on the parties, and certainly informed the extremely critical spirit of the PKI Central Committee's July 8 "Evaluation of the *Kerja* Cabinet after One Year in Office." Paradoxically, as a scathing denunciation of leading ministers, including Nasution, the CC's "Evaluation" served the Army's purposes ahead of those of its authors. For just as the DPR's earlier defiance prompted Sukarno to act against it in a more strident fashion, the Army used the PKI's statement to curtail its activities and threaten its political survival. Immediately, following the publication of the Evaluation, the entire CC was rounded up and interrogated and the Party daily, *Harian Rakjat*, was temporarily banned. Later, in August, regional military leaders banned activities of the PKI itself and its ormas in South Sumatra and South Sulawesi (until December 1960), and South Kalimantan (until August 1961).

Finally, in October 1960, the government launched an ambitious programme to regulate the whole of the Indonesian press. The most effective measures in this connection were those that shrunk the size of that press. The government enjoyed periodic "successes" by withdrawing licenses of specific newspapers, for instance those of Masjumi- and PSI-affiliated papers in early 1961, but none were as spectacular as that of 31 October 1960, when it suspended indefinitely the licenses for all seven PKI CC publications as well as those of the PKI's ormas.[46] The prospects facing the sole remaining PKI publication, *Harian Rakjat*, were already well known, the government having limited the amount of newsprint available for all newspapers on 15 February 1960.[47]

Whereas the spate of anti-party measures up to late 1960 could be viewed as having turned aside the PKI's revolutionary drive, they, along with concurrent and subsequent enactments inspired by the Army in the field of economic development, showed equally clearly that the TNI was intensifying and completing aspects of its own veritable revolution. In the starkest of analytical terms, the whole series of anti-party measures was little more than a naked strategy by the Army to accumulate, control, and create political resources with the intent of rendering the parties meaningless, for want of such resources, and itself as meaningful, by the possession and exercise of such resources. Certainly, by mid- to late 1960, the Army had achieved or had begun to achieve a number of the important territorial, popular, and administrative objectives that Nasution had specified in his *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*. As such, the Army itself was at a juncture, both in terms of its strategy and in terms of its status and identity. The Army's very success against the parties, for instance, pointed beyond itself to the long term, making it necessary for the Army to consider the logical requirements of sustaining its essentially fresh hold over its accumulated resources—the spatial-popular base it called Indonesia. Additionally, the Army's very success in creating—and creating a preeminent place for itself in—Guided Democracy also made it necessary to resolve the increasingly ambiguous question of its identity as a discretely military actor. By late 1960, the confluence of political success against the parties, military success against regional statelike actors, and overall success in alleviating the emergency conditions that served as a rationale for its SOB powers forced the Army to extend the scope of earlier categorizations that it had given to the consequences of its still earlier actions.

At the Army's behest, the MPRS decided on 3 December 1960 to adopt the Depernas-conceived Eight-Year Overall Development Plan (1961–68) as national policy (Edict MPRS No. II/MPRS/1960).[48] This legislative act served the Army in two fundamentally important respects. First, by categorizing Indonesia and Indonesians in reference generally to the activity of all-round material and spiritual development, the Edict ascribed a specific meaning to the Indonesian reality. Since the MPRS was the supreme repository of the people's will, its Decisions served incontestably as the highest formal expressions of meaning in the land. This particular Edict was additionally significant because it was only the second taken by the MPRS, and the first that specified a form of collective activity that was nationally meaningful in a "revolutionary" context. Thus, in one respect, the Edict was a statement of *desired* national content, of the "Indonesian-ness" of Indonesia. In a further, and perhaps more important, respect, the Edict also promoted a specific method (as outlined in its "Appendix A") by which the national content could be realized, namely, the Army's own state-building strategy as expressed in its newly adopted doctrine of "Territorial Warfare."

In having this doctrine adopted as "state" policy, the Army brilliantly linked its own organizational and mobilizational activities to the imperative of "national" development and thus, in time, to the effective as well as formal creation of authority and control over "Indonesian" people and territory. Stated differently, this linkage provided a way for the Army to meaningfully substantiate Indonesia (by allowing for a deepening of control over such tangibles as people and territory) and substantiate meaningfully an Indonesian state and society (by fostering the Army's authority to make definitive pronouncements about such collective identities). Thus, we see how the Army's sponsorship of "national" development actually entailed its own development as the nucleus of a future Indonesian state and society; the similarity between this undertaking and the PKI's sponsorship of a broad United National Front should not be lost on students of Indonesian politics.[49]

The Development of Territorial Warfare
Territorial Warfare as Development

As was the case with the PKI and its ormas, the novelty and creativity of the Army's venture lay precisely in its organizational drives and the ex post facto meaning that was created as a rationale for such activities. The Army's doctrine of Territorial Warfare served both of these purposes eminently, and its subsequent adoption by all the armed services and the "state" provides perhaps the clearest expression in all of Indonesian politics of created meaning. The doctrine had its origins in late 1958, when the Army was confronted with the reality of exercising genuine, centralized control for the first time over parts of Indonesia. On the basis of such sudden empirical developments, an Army Doctrine Committee (*Panitya Doktrin Angkatan Darat*) was struck in late 1958 to formalize the achieved reality of Army power. As the first elucidation of Nasution's Third Way concept, the doctrine had the object of legitimizing and expanding the Army's territorial and popular gains, that is, its control over political resources. To this end, both the conception of warfare and the issue of the country's possible opponents contributed maximally to the Army's own growth and influence in the archipelago.

First, the type of warfare that the Army foresaw as inevitable in the Indonesian context made a virtue out of the country's military weakness. Precisely because the country lacked sophisticated weaponry and a demonstrable military capacity, the Army reasoned that it would be necessary to depend upon "the people" to wage guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare for the present and well into the foreseeable future. To help make up for these shortcomings, the Army would have to organize the material and spiritual resources that could be found among the people, and, in turn, this meant the Army's "total" penetration of all parts of the archipelago in anticipation of struggle. Not surprisingly, these were the conclusions that Nasution had drawn earlier in his *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*. In contrast to the certitude with which the Army's doctrinal thinkers advanced the conception of guerrilla warfare, the identity of the actor or actors against whom all these preparations were being made was left utterly unaddressed. While this apparent failure may have suggested that irreconcilable differences about the enemy's identity (or enemies' identities) divided the top Army leadership, in actuality the Army's leaders were deliberately silent about their intentions because these were both provocative and ominous. Indeed, given that Territorial Warfare served political and "internal" above military and "external" purposes, a detailed discussion of Indonesia's "external" opponents would be irrelevant at best and distracting at worst.

Indeed, between the time the Army Doctrine Committee began formulating Territorial Warfare and when it was adopted as "state" policy, Nasution had amply demonstrated that his priorities were political and "internal" in nature by successfully carrying out an intriguing and far-reaching reform of the Army. Beginning in 1959, and building on the logic that informed his earlier creation of territorial troops and the Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People's Defence, Nasution altered the Army's seven *Tentera and Territorium* in such a way as to simultaneously broaden and potentially deepen the Army's actual control of territorial and popular resources. First, the seven T&Ts were dissolved and sixteen new Military Area Commands (*Komando Daerah Militer*—Kodam), with enlarged staff organizations, were created. The effect of this move was to greatly reduce the capacity of regional officers to create large and insularly significant bases of support for themselves and local allies as had hitherto been the case with the unwieldily large T&Ts. At the same time, the mere fact of subdivision created a large increase in the number of promotions and posts that were available to military personnel; the enhanced prospects for personal security and advancement that this step entailed certainly increased Army Headquarters' grasp over its officer corps. The benefits of this reorganization were not limited to countering past maldevelopments, however. The formation of the Kodams was both positive and creative in that by being smaller and better staffed than the T&Ts, these Commands could be used to realize closer and more sustained links with the people and their territory.

Beyond that, the Army reorganization also provided for a finer organizational division in 1960 at the regency level (with the formation of Military District Commands, *Komando Distrik Militer*—Kodim). Whereas "formerly a low-ranking officer with some aides had represented the Army," after the reform "a captain or major took charge . . . with an average staff of a hundred officers and men."[50] The Army's willingness in 1960 to dissolve its existing sub-district units (the BODM) before it had created and installed replacement units suggested that the leadership was conscious of its lesser control at those levels and deliberately sought to concentrate on asserting itself well at higher levels rather than poorly at lower levels. In this sense, the Army showed that for the present realizing the physical scope of its enterprise took precedence over realizing its popular depth.

It may be easy to overlook the profound analytical significance of this sequence of actions, first, because it only seems logical that the Army would choose the relatively less difficult before the relatively more difficult challenge, and second, because the Army had experienced genuine setbacks in its efforts to enliven the popular instruments that it already possessed, such as the BKSs and the FNPIB. In this case, however, the matter of realizing its control at lower levels was in essence no different to the Army than realizing the control of the Indonesian "state," of which it was ostensibly an "instrument." Indeed, the Army showed the issue of its own territorial and popular control to be exactly synonymous with the issue of the "state's" control, and thus of its scope and substance, in two ways. First, the Army tied its own development plans to those of the "state." Thus, the Armed Forces' "5-year Development Plan" (1961-65) became an integral part of the Eight-Year Overall Development Plan, with both due to begin on 1 January 1961.[51] Second, by deferring the issue of deeper control to the uncertainties of the future, the Army made its own development contingent on the state's and vice-versa. In short, the Army's and the "state's" planning activities and their anticipated results in terms of centralized control and authority were cases of each other.

Looking forward from the end of 1960 then, the Army leadership anticipated the planned achievement of closer and more dynamic links between the TNI and the "people" and, within and on behalf of the "state," of a range of revolutionary economic changes.[52] With regard to the former, the Army leadership confidently believed that it could eventually address such existing structural weaknesses as the absence of sub-district units, interregional commands, and commands that could facilitate the actual deployment of forces as the need arose. The first problem was to be solved by the creation of Military Rayon Commands (*Komando Rayon Militer*—Koramil), which actually occurred at the end of 1962. The solution to the second problem consisted of the formation of Interregional Commands (*Komando Antara Daerah*—Koanda), embracing several Kodams. Finally, Military Resort Commands (*Komando Resort Militer*—Korem) were to be created "in regions where many difficulties are encountered in the direct command of KODIMs by a KODAM. These difficulties may be due to the number of KODIMs within the region or to the problem of communications (the remote locations of various KODIMs)."[53] Elaborating, Yani declared that "the boundaries of the KOREM must be established carefully and must be flexible, since the KOREM . . . must provide an adequate area for the movement of large combat units."[54] With this one statement, Yani really underscored the whole thrust of the Army's planning, and that was to provide an organizational framework whose formal attributes defined the Army's intent of establishing certain territorial and popular control, but without defining out of existence the Army's capacity to respond in an undefinable manner to the anticipated uncertainties of keeping political control. The subsequent formation in, and after, 1961 of locally constituted but centrally directed brigades—Yani's "large combat units"—served to combine the competing demands of functional uniformity and operational flexibility that were placed on the Army's territorial units.[55] Their creation and functioning thus served as the culmination of the Army's organizational quest for wide, deep, and dynamic territorial and popular control.

In tandem with this "in-house" development, the Army was expected to contribute to, and be an integral part of, the "state's" Eight-Year Overall Development Plan in its capacity as a functional group. Here, the role that was ostensibly assigned by the MPRS to the Army and the other armed services suggested their involvement in revolutionary economic changes: "the Armed Forces and the State Police are now engaged in production activities. Their role and activity in the field of production bring them closer to the people in this process of national development, in industrialization and the implementation of land reform particularly."[56] As with the Plan itself, the role that was assigned in it to the TNI and ABRI was based on the Army leadership's earlier achievements. In this case, the reference in the passage to land reform was really a statement of one of the avenues of development that the TNI leadership had already defined as important for its own directing idea.

By addressing the issue of land reform—as provided for in Law No. 5/1960 of 24 September on Basic Regulations of Agrarian Principles (*Undang-undang No. 5 tahun 1960 Peraturan Dasar Pokok-pokok Agraria*) and the closely related Law No. 2/1960 of January 7 on Sharecropping (*Undang-undang No. 2 tahun 1960 Perjanjian bagi Hasil*)—the Army was forcing itself to forge closer links not only between the "state" and its popular base, of whom the majority were peasants, but also between itself and the peasants, whom it had earlier categorized as the largest "functional group of the Indonesian people."[57]

Two other measures defined additional avenues along which planned development could proceed in the productive sphere. One related to the effort "to create a web of rural cooperatives across the country" (as expressed chiefly in Government Regulation No. 10/1959),[58] while the other aimed to foster the creation of "enterprise councils" (*dewan perusahaan*) in every state concern (as delineated in Government Regulation No. 45/1960).[59] All four measures can be seen as indicators that the Army seriously intended to channel developmental activity into areas that had heretofore scarcely received the Central Government's sustained attention. Indeed, to the degree that the Army was intent on opening up especially the rural and village realm to centralized activity and control, the developmental activities that it was prepared to sponsor were politically pioneering, even revolutionary.

In preparing to actualize the "nation's" development, the Army was even prepared to direct the creation of governmental or "state" administrative and bureaucratic instruments. In this connection, the Army backed the government's unequivocal determination, as expressed through Presidential Edict No. 6/1959 of 9 September 1959, to extend its centralizing authority to the regions by reconstituting the *Pamong Praja*. This step did not entail a re-assertion of the Central Government's authority so much as it did the assertion of Jakarta's control over regions that had used the reality of their autonomy throughout the 1950s to win lawful rights to that autonomy. By the provisions of the Edict, the specific terms that formalized regional autonomy in Law No. 1/1957 were suspended. The Central Government thereafter undertook to revive the *Pamong Praja* and to resume appointing regional heads. Both of these achievements buttressed the "state's" and Army's developmental strategy in the obvious sense, by providing them with the beginnings of a truly country-wide bureaucracy, and in the non-obvious sense, by having regional heads ensure that their provincial legislative assemblies sent development-minded regional representatives (oftentimes military personnel) to sit on the Depernas. In the event that there were difficulties in the local implementation of the Edict's terms, the Army would be prepared to exercise its powers in the Regional War Authorities (Peperdas) on behalf of the "state."[60]

The Army's support for, and role in, the National Front (*Front Nasional*—FN) showed that it was also prepared to help the "state" realize national development by providing it with a vehicle for continuous (albeit) structured popular participation. Here, the Army tried to forge a connection between its own FNPIB, which was under threat of dissolution in late 1959 by President Sukarno who sought his own base of organized support, and the proposed FN. In short, the Army ambitiously attempted to endow the FN with the same broad coordinating functions its Front possessed over the BKSs. In the case of the FN, however, it was envisioned that golkars would be the only constituent members; parties would be totally excluded while their ormas would be fused into the appropriate or corresponding golkars. The FN, moreover, was fully expected to continue with the old Front's commitment to "overall development."[61] Despite unresolved questions about the Front's composition and purpose,[62] the Army acquiesced to the replacement (as opposed to dissolution) of the FNPIB and the formation of the FN Executive Board (in which ABRI occupied 11 of its 73 seats) in August 1960.[63] Presumably to safeguard the viability of the FN and ensure itself a dominant role within it, the Army acted to exert control where it mattered most—in the regions, where "of the 17 provincial branches established by April 1961, 9 were chaired by the local army commander, and another one by an army officer in his capacity as provincial governor."[64]

The Army took additional steps that were meant to ensure the FN's proper political evolution. These steps consisted chiefly of Nasution's affirmation (in early 1960) that the Inspectorate for Territorial Affairs and People's Defence would continue the work of the BKSs and FNPIB upon their dissolution in the FN, winning the right (in January 1961) to fulfil the FN's task of the "mobilization of functional potentials,"[65] and forming (in May 1961) three new functional groups—the Bodies for the Fostering of Functional Potentials (*Badan Pembina Potensi Karya*—BPPK)—in the material, spiritual, and religious fields to replace the BKSs.[66] Notwithstanding the fact that the FN showed early signs of being stymied by the prolonged debate among its political principals (the Army, Sukarno, and the remaining political parties) about its role in national life, there can be no denying that it was vitally important to the Army, which consciously positioned itself as a backstop to, and a source of initiative within, the Front even from its first moments as a "state" vehicle.

Although the Army's dominant power and influence in the Front and other "state" and government bodies may have been transparently evident by the end of 1960, it would be misleading to suggest that this condition satisfied the Army or constituted the realization of its final objective. After all, in the brief period since Nasution had acquired emergency powers, the Army had also scored truly unprecedented advances in terms of territorial and popular control and it was in these areas, more so than in the structures of Guided Democracy, that Nasution concentrated the Army's attention and energies. It may be argued that without this territorial-popular base neither the Army's representation in the structures of Guided Democracy nor Guided Democracy itself would have been possible. Given, then, that the Army's power stemmed from its successful actions to acquire and control territory and people, its significant standing in the formal realm, while not epiphenomenal, was also not the locus of its power.

As we have seen, any meaning or ideology that the Army attached to its presence in the formal realm was created, consisting of categorized statements of consequences. From this perspective, discussions of Indonesian politics that continued in the tradition of earlier scholarly studies to focus on elites and the formal sphere, overlook the Army's achievement of one territorial-popular base, its ongoing efforts to deepen its tangible control over that base, and, concurrent with the former, its official and ongoing characterization of all its efforts as indigenously "Indonesian."

Moreover, the emphasis within such studies on the basically Javanese character and conduct of Guided Democracy politics effectively inhibits us from recognizing the creative aspect of the Army's directing idea, because the Javanese and Java are seen to be causing but not undergoing significant political change. The basis for such a notion is the fact that it was Javanese troops of the Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaja divisions that were dispatched and garrisoned in the Outer Islands in the conflict with the PRRI/Permesta. On balance, however, these profoundly significant troop movements did not constitute a Javanese phalanx, they were not the embodiment of some straightforward projection of Javanese power, and Indonesia afterwards was not merely Java writ large. The Outer Islands were not forced to make up for their delayed Indonesian-ness through these military operations. Rather, during and after these operations, the Army had to make up the quality of Indonesian-ness for the whole of the area and peoples now under its control, including Java and the Javanese. Viewed this way, it is understandable why the Army leadership would not—could not—be completely satisfied with the condition of their project in 1960.

Viewed in this way, too, it is understandable why the Army leadership promoted "national development." Therein the Army recognized precisely the kind of open-ended activity that would allow it to extend its state-building strategy, furthering the tangible aspects of territorial and popular control while coincidentally realizing the meaningfully "Indonesian" content of that state. By thrusting itself directly into the development process, the Army showed how it became possible to achieve the dynamic interrelation of territory, people, meaning, and identity:

> the units of the Army's expanding Territorial Organization started civic action programmes, conducted public indoctrination, and organized cultural events. They sought closer contact with the civilian administration, religious and cultural organizations, youth groups, veterans, trade unions, peasant organizations, political parties and groups at regional and local levels. The Army sent doctors, engineers, work gangs of soldiers, and even entertainment groups to the villages in order to 'win the hearts and minds of the people'.[67]

In seeking to "fill in the details" in this way, the Army aimed to realize content, but its leaders, either intentionally or unintentionally, also found themselves addressing the issue of Indonesia's contextual limits. By committing themselves to development, and more especially to planned development, Army leaders had little choice but to define more or less precisely the space within which this activity was to occur. In other words, the Army leaders had to define the actual area that would be the site for development, and this meant specifying territorial limits. Successfully specifying such limits would be an immense step toward resolving this dimension of the larger problem of Indonesia, and it would help the Army to focus the "nation's" perspective on the problems in Indonesia. The Army leadership presumably believed that by addressing the issues of Indonesia's scope and substance in this way, the political fortunes of those actors (especially the PKI) who sought to define Indonesia in their own authoritative way would lessen with each successful act of development.

It was for this reason that Nasution made a profoundly important and specific categorization of Indonesia's scope in a lecture he delivered at Seskoad on 7 August 1961. Then, in reference to the *Kerja* Cabinet's short-term goal of "recovering" Irian Barat, Nasution suggested that some confusion prevailed about the issue:

> Our administrative apparatus, from the centre down to the lowest authority, must have security so that it can carry out its work in an orderly fashion. Our economy and our activities in the social, cultural, and other fields must have security so that we can carry out our struggle in all fields of life . . .. The problem of West Irian is included in the short-range program. I want to affirm right here that nothing is said in this program about regaining West Irian within this 3-year period. Many have misunderstood this, however, the program clearly states that 'the struggle will be continued'. The program is clear as regards food and clothing within 3 years and for adequate security within 3 years . . .. It would be too arrogant of us to decide to regain West Irian within 3 years.[68]

With this, the Army leadership may have presumed that their delimitation of Indonesia's territorial scope would presently permit the development process to gradually fill the area with its "Indonesian" content.

For all its efforts to control and categorize territory and people since 1957, however, the Army leadership could not escape the fact that the unprecedented success of its political efforts had yielded an artificial construct. The Army's exhortations about the historically grounded reality of one "Indonesian identity," "Indonesian socialism," or a "*Pancasila* ideology" hardly squared with its leaders' recent subjective political choices or the unpredictable fortunes of battle. Indeed, in 1961 what Indonesia was (in geographical terms) and what Indonesians were to become (in the future, by way of development) did not depend upon the Army's reclaiming or revivifying an historical role, so much as it did in the Army's ongoing ability to make and to programme history. What the Army had already achieved on both of these scores was unprecedented, and with or without the inclusion of Irian Barat (or, for that matter, any of the other lands that Indonesian nationalist leaders claimed as part of *Indonesia Raya* in 1945), that essential quality would not have changed. The created rather than re-created reality that the Army now faced could not possibly have been prepared for, or experienced in a prior fashion, regardless of the Army's doctrinal claims to the contrary.

Apparently, the only way in which the Army could publicly legitimize its present novel circumstances was to create a grossly inflated and essentially historically inaccurate conception of its role in the Indonesian Revolution that would thereby "explain" its predominance in Guided Democracy. Pauker confirmed that officers who were involved in formulating Army doctrine in the early 1960s had indeed committed themselves to this form of historical misrepresentation by remarking, almost certainly with unintended irony, that "Strange as it may seem, the lessons of those years [during the Indonesian Revolution] had apparently been forgotten [by the Army's doctrinal thinkers] between 1950 and 1958."[69] We are to believe that this feat of historical forgetfulness occurred despite Nasution's virtually uninterrupted dominance in setting Army doctrine since the late 1940s! Pauker's comment is revealing in another sense in that it suggests that the TNI had a greater problem with its immediate present and future than with its past, which proved easy to manipulate. McVey makes this same point rather more clearly in her review of Army doctrine:

> the military's indoctrination efforts had a curiously hollow character, a circling about a center that was not there. They appeared as a search for a formula that would somehow provide a single social meaning for the disparate traditions, experiences, and interests that went into the Indonesian Army's being. Nasution argued that the army should pursue a "middle way," . . . [but] it did not provide the clarity of purpose essential to give meaning to the army's broader role. This meaning had to be total and dynamic, the first in order to seal soldiers off from unwanted outside influence and the second to provide a vision through which the army could engage the society as a whole . . .. the army's doctrine was always in the process of coming into being, its formulation debated in SESKOAD, discussed in commissions, and weighed in seminars.[70]

McVey's comments, like Pauker's observation, take on added significance when they are understood explicitly from the perspective of new state building. Here, McVey helps, perhaps inadvertently, to pinpoint a fundamental dilemma facing new state builders. The dilemma relates to the non-obvious fact that while building new states is a negative political exercise, in the sense that its proponent must eliminate particularistically based actors or supersede pre-existing particularisms, forming and perpetuating new states are positive political exercises, in the sense that the directing idea must be normalized within an artificial and presumably hostile popular and territorial context. Hence, the irresistible appeal of "national development," which the Army perceived as readily furnishing the method and content by which to form and perpetuate a new Indonesian state.

The PKI and Guided Democracy: For, Against, and Within

From the foregoing discussion, we may view the Army in late 1960 as having successfully carried out the primitive accumulation of the territorial and popular resources that were necessary, but not sufficient, for new state formation. Yet just at that point when the Army had positioned itself and "Indonesians" for development, and for the prospect that such development held of graduating "state" authority, the political choices about scope and substance that informed this vision of the future came under challenge by the PKI and Sukarno. It is not difficult to understand how the very artificiality of the Army's achievements explains why it was possible, perhaps even inevitable, for such a challenge to be mounted at all. Such a challenge was possible because the Army possessed neither the criteria by which to eliminate those large actors who supported its endeavour to create a non-particularistically based state nor, more fundamentally, enough power over all the territories and peoples it claimed as "Indonesian" by which to forcefully exclude these same actors. Thus, unlike those actors who opposed the Army's directing idea of a *Negara Republik Indonesia* and thus could be conceived of, and were treated, as the targets of military force, it was difficult for the Army to exclude those actors at its side who opted for precisely such a result. In the case of the latter group of actors, the Army could only apply organizational or meaningless ideological criteria to exclude them, for it lacked the authoritative competence (which was, after all, to be realized through development) to determine what was and was not a truly "Indonesian" actor. More particularly, the TNI could not realistically resort to force against the PKI, which was the only large actor that met the Army's organizational and ideological criteria and retained its state building intentions, for two reasons. First, because there was no obvious grounds for doing so and second, because such a move would probably have precipitated a conflict that would have undone the Army's achieved and planned territorial and popular control.

At this juncture, it is important to recognize that the threat posed by the PKI to the TNI's political achievements stemmed both from the unprecedented nature of those achievements, as noted above, and from the nature of the PKI's own statelike achievements between early 1957 and late 1960, which I propose briefly to examine here. By the PKI's achievements, I mean the Party's success in acquiring greater popular support, extending its territorial reach, evolving organizational capacities, and creating meanings and categories at the ideological level that tended either to promote greater extensions of its power or to facilitate the creation of the Party's authority.

As we have already seen, the PKI emerged from the local elections that were held in various areas in 1957–58 as the only large and growing political party in the country. It is testimony to the Communists' real popular strength that when its superlative electoral performance was used, first, by supporters of the PRRI/Permesta and, later, by the TNI as an excuse to attack the Party and its ormas, the PKI and its organizational family emerged larger than ever. Evidence of this growth was delivered by Aidit at the PKI Sixth National Congress held in Jakarta in September 1959, when he reported on the impressive results of the Party's first Three-Year Plan of Organization and Education (August 1956–August 1959). At this point, total Party membership stood at 1.5 million, of which at least half were peasants, and approximately 17 per cent were women. Moreover, half of the Party's members were now full members, meaning that "between the two congresses the number of full members had increased fifteenfold."[71]

The growth of membership in specific regions, which was equally a measure of the Party's increasing and deepening territorial reach, was related in terms of percentage increases over membership levels of August 1956. Kalimantan sustained an increase of 63.5 per cent, Java of 36 per cent, West Sumatra of 38 per cent, and North Sulawesi of 40 per cent—"despite atrocities committed on Party members by rebels" in the latter two areas.[72] The Party's ormas, too, enjoyed increases in their memberships: SOBSI went from 2,661,970 (in January 1955) members to 2,732,909 (in November 1960); BTI went from 3,390,286 members (in September 1957) to 3.5 million, or 14 per cent of all adult peasants (in April 1959); *Pemuda Rakjat* went from 800,000 (at the end of 1957) to 1,250,000 members (in September 1961); and

Gerwani went from 671,342 members (in December 1957) to 700,000 (in early 1960).

Although the Army did not enact deadly violence against the PKI and its ormas, as the PRRI/Permesta rebels had during this time, the TNI did not also exempt the Communists from its wide-ranging measures to deprive all political parties of their organized popular support. The fact that the Army's strategy in this regard changed from an early emphasis on coopting leading ormas figures to its side, to the exclusion of party ormas from the FNPIB, to subsequent attempts to coercively fuse party ormas into single golkar bodies, was evidence of the Army's mounting frustration with the parties' perseverance and with its own inability to exert monopoly control over popular resources. Much to the annoyance of the TNI, for example, party-affiliated individuals and ormas operating within its BKSs continued "to assert their separate identities and activities," with some even "trying to break away."[73] More specifically, "the labour BKS had continuing troubles with its constituent ormas and the peasant BKS found PKI-affiliated ormas publicly asserting themselves as the leaders of the peasant functional group category . . . . [eventually] the PKI announced that it would no longer cooperate with the BKSs."[74]

The PKI and the other large parties proceeded even further by going into open opposition to the Army's schemes, despite Nasution's recent determination to force the formation of the LVRI. By the end of 1960, however, the parties had in fact caused the Army and government to suffer three significant set-backs in the popular realm. Here, the government and Army met with unexpected failure in their publicly advertised efforts to give life to youth, Revolutionary veterans (the so-called '45 Generation [*Angkatan 45*]), and labour golkars by fusing the parties' ormas into single organizations. While three new organizations were indeed formed through these efforts, namely the Youth Front (*Front Pemuda*), the *Angkatan 45*, and the United Organization of Indonesian Workers (*Organisasi Persatuan Pekerja Indonesia*—OPPI), the intensity of the party opposition to them, and more especially from the PKI and its ormas, deprived them of any real existence.

A concomitant of the Party's extension of its control over popular resources was an extension of its territorial reach. Speaking at the Sixth National Congress, PKI Central Planning Bureau chairman Amir Anwar Sanusi took the opportunity to supplant the notion that the Party was simply Javanese by pointing out proudly that "the activities of the Party are now more evenly spread over all parts of the country."[75] To illustrate this point, Party leaders cited an impressive array of results from the PKI's Three-Year Plan. The PKI now had branches in 98.7 per cent of all Javanese villages (an increase of 250 per cent since 1956), and sub-sections in 84.2 per cent of all Javanese *kecamatans* (an increase of 42 per cent since 1956). Viewed more widely, the Party enjoyed a sevenfold increase in its number of committee members since 1956, including a doubling of members at the provincial and island levels, a quadrupling of members at the section level, and a tripling of members at the sub-section level. As Hindley has remarked, "from these statistics it appears that during the plan PKI increased it cadre force even more rapidly than membership."[76]

The PKI ormas, too, extended the Communists' territorial reach. For instance, by November 1960, SOBSI had 165 branches and 5 preparatory branches (as compared to 150 branches in September 1957). Further, by April 1959, BTI had organizations in virtually all *kabupatens*, 45 per cent of all *kecamatans*, and 35 per cent of all villages (as compared to 32 per cent of all villages in September 1957 and similar results for the higher levels), with most of its growth "largely effected outside Java, especially in Atjeh, Bali, Sumba, Flores, and Timor."[77] Finally, despite the absence of earlier data that would permit comparison, other ormas like *Pemuda Rakjat* (which had 172 *kabupaten* offices, 1,416 *kecamatan* offices, and 10,798 subbranches as of September 1961) and Gerwani (which had an organizational presence in all provinces, 225 *kabupatens*, 70 per cent of all *kecamatans*, and 40 per cent of all villages as of October 1961) no doubt helped to extend and reinforce the Party's and other ormas' geographical reach.

If the Party's achievements in the popular and territorial realms reflected tangible dimensions of its progress in realizing its directing idea of Indonesia, then its initiatives in the organizational sphere reflected an intangible dimension, namely, the Party's own growing cognizance of such progress—of its own statelike qualities. This consciousness was reflected in five important ways. First, the Party engaged in finer degrees and types of organizational differentiation. At the highest levels, for instance, changes made in the course of 1958 and 1959 suggested that not all the growth the Party had achieved was desirable, becoming itself a problem. Thus, in the Politburo, a permanent Daily Committee was struck in April 1958 so as to allow its four members to handle routine Party business without having to convene larger groups of people. In the Central Committee, a Verification Committee was created in 1959. This Committee's purpose related broadly to "limiting bureaucratism,"[78] suggesting that this was becoming a problem, and thus it was specifically charged with controlling the Party administration, ensuring its proper functioning, overseeing the use of Party funds, and supervising the Party's civic actions.[79] During this period, the Central Committee also attained its maximum organizational expression in terms of the number and type of its Departments, of which five existed as of 1960: foreign, information (previously agitation and propaganda), education, economic,[80] and unity front.[81]

Cayrac-Blanchard has suggested that the other noteworthy organizational change made by the Communists during this period, involving the formation of Island (or Islands) Party Organizations, was a meaningful attempt to cope with both political progress and its adverse organizational effects:

> given its rapid growth, the party had become a heavy machine that was difficult to control, and it was not certain that directives coming from the top reached the base. That was why, in 1958, Aidit deemed it necessary to create island(s) committees which, like the bureaus [Departments] charged with assisting the CC, would maintain a narrower contact between the standing organization and the regional committees. In this period, Aidit insisted on the necessity of sending cadres at the centre to "go down."[82]

Focusing on these organizational attributes, Corsino has declared succinctly that

> In the workings of the party apparatus certain key functions were . . . performed: law-making, law-enforcing and law-adjudicating functions. There were also executive functions performed such as tax collection (membership fees and monetary or goods-services contributions of members or sympathizers), information and communication, educational administration, foreign policy formulation, and so on.[83]

Put differently, the PKI was no mere political party.

A second respect in which the PKI and its ormas reflected their growing political power, and their self-awareness of that power, was by seeking to extend their achievements through more planning. To further the basic objective of accumulating ever more popular and territorial resources, therefore, the PKI unveiled a Second Three-Year Plan of Organization and Education (in April 1960). Of equal or perhaps even greater significance was the fact that ormas began to adopt planning for the first time and with many of the same objectives as the PKI. In the case of SOBSI, for instance, its Central Committee adopted exactly the same education programme in October 1956 that the PKI had drawn up for itself earlier in July. Annual plans were drafted and executed for each of 1958, 1959, and 1960 to extend and improve organization, create more cadres and engage in an analytically significant "go-down campaign" among the masses. It may be taken as a measure of SOBSI's confidence in, and comfort with, this form of organizing and mobilizing strategy that it unveiled an ambitious Three-Year Plan of Organization, Education, and Culture for the 1961–64 period.

For the BTI's part, its leaders revealed their Three-Year Plan of Organization and Education in early 1959; among its objectives was a 100 per cent increase in membership, that is, Communist control over seven million peasants. It is particularly noteworthy that East Java BTI organizations undertook "to prepare two cadres of the branch level and four of a lower level for sending outside Java" in the first year of the plan.[84] The *Pemuda Rakjat*, too, drafted a plan of organization and education for the 1958–60 period. Like the BTI's plan, this plan was informed by the political desire to sustain the widest possible popular-territorial arena for organizational and mobilizational purposes and, for this reason, the *Pemuda Rakjat* gave "the areas outside Java a prior claim on cadres."[85] Finally, Gerwani set itself a three-year plan of cadre education beginning in December 1957.

A third respect in which the Communists aimed to evolve their organizational capacities was through planned research in rural areas. Aidit had long recognized the significance of peasants to the eventual success of the PKI project, especially since they constituted the overwhelming bulk of the population.[86] The steady growth of members of peasant origin in the PKI throughout the mid-1950s brought about a greater (but not necessarily more organized) interest in their affairs. Beginning in 1956, under the slogan of "going down to the masses," the PKI and BTI carried out "research in land tenure and rural social relationships, with a view to buttressing [their] demands for 'land reform' and [their] charges of incipient 'feudalism', 'aggravated landlordism' and general impoverishment of the Indonesian peasantry."[87] Although the first results of this research (as carried out in Java, Sumatra, and Nusa

Tenggara) appeared as early as January 1959, the research endeavour did not attain a concerted organizational expression until later in the year at the Sixth National Congress.[88] Then, in formalizing its second Three-Year Plan or Organization and Education, the PKI directed that research would be conducted "into the nature of 'feudal' exploitation in the villages."[89]

In this instance, research was confined to eight districts covering each of the three Javanese provinces. While the location of the research sites may have given the Party the appearance of narrowing its focus to Java, in actuality, its "go-down" movement made for a revolutionary breakthrough, the political and analytical significance of which has tended to be overlooked by others who posit the Party's essentially Javanese character from the outset. As Hindley has explained, "the movement has a greater value than just educating cadres in the realities of the life of the masses, for it has also provided the Party leadership with a store of social and economic data which permits the Party to formulate popular demands and slogans attuned to local, provincial, and national situations."[90] The analytical decisiveness of this comment lies in the paradox that it poses (or, perhaps more accurately, exposes): How could an ostensibly "Javanese" actor apply its power before having discovered or begun to discover its empirical bases? Unless we are prepared to concede that the Party's research efforts were really part of an already well-developed and wider state-building strategy to acquire, control, and create political resources so as to define the issues and the people they affected in "Indonesian" terms, we will remain trapped in the conceptual paradox suggested by Hindley's remark, unable to explain or situate the Party's "tardy" interest in rural Java.

Unless we are prepared to view the Party in relation to its directing idea of Indonesia, the conventional gloss of its Javanese character prevents us from recognizing that it was a pioneer, being the only actor since colonial times to even attempt to ascertain an empirical view of rural reality, and a revolutionary one at that, being seriously interested in bringing the people (or their largest section, the peasantry), into its political project. Finally, unless we are prepared to claim that the Party's massive organizational and mobilizational work was pointless, we must conceive of a quality of "Javanese-ness" that simultaneously locates all the major surviving political actors of this time within its ambit while explaining their political differences in a wider (that is, not exclusively Javanese) popular-territorial context. Of course, it is possible to invest the phenomenon of Communist rural research with too much significance, but in this political context its timing and direction certainly are suggestive of an "Indonesian," not "Javanese," directing idea.

A fourth measure of the Communists' organizational success was their ability to demonstrate that they possessed the practical means and the requisite outlook to address the variety of problems affecting the people in an interrelated way. At the practical level, the PKI and its ormas acted in an ever more concerted fashion to implement what were consciously perceived as temporary solutions to some of the country's larger problems. Nowhere was this pattern of political conduct more evident than in the villages and countryside, where the Communist family of organizations acted even in advance of promised land reform to independently remedy the life of the peasantry. While the basic thrust of the BTI's activities had long emphasized the "practical" aspects of rural production and output, its efforts became distinctly more politicized after it was joined by other PKI ormas from 1960 in the Thousand and One Movement (*Gerakan 1001*). Together they built upon the BTI's commitment to make local and practical advances for individual peasants, their families, or villages by promoting, through their very conscious organizational cooperation, the notion of a constituency. Thus,

> in villages with sizeable numbers of semi-employed or unemployed youths various community 'beautifying' campaigns [were] initiated, involving repair of roads, bridges, and other civic projects. Here the PKI youth front *Pemuda Rakjat* [lent] a hand, just as special courses for peasant women [brought] the collaboration of activists of *Gerwani*, the PKI's women's front organization.[91]

The Communists showed that they were not satisfied with merely exercising an immediate presence; their public and deliberate search from 1958 for lasting solutions to the problems besetting various social groups really amounted to the attempted routinization of an all-encompassing role in social life and the conscious development of an independent "national" leadership role for the future. In the context of the PRRI/Permesta challenge, for example, the PKI began to articulate its "national-mindedness" by hosting a wide variety of fora that aimed to find solutions to the distinct problems facing students (a seminar was held in early 1958), women (a national conference was held in May 1958), and peasants and fishermen (national peasants' conferences were held in April 1959 and July 1961). Additionally, SOBSI organized national seminars in February 1958 and May 1961 for the betterment of women's conditions. Finally, the PKI sponsored a national seminar on the economy in February 1959 and, in the following month, its Central Committee began to issue a new periodical, *Economy and Society* (*Ekonomi dan Masjarakat*). Clearly, the Communists were keen to advertise to their followers as much as to their opponents and the uncommitted that they possessed a breadth of vision and a pragmatic attitude that was not coincident with, but constitutive of, an Indonesian state and society.

The Communists could not depend simply on national or even regional and local fora of the above type to sustain their articulation of claims to power, of claims to being the true heir to the Indonesian Revolution. What the Party required, and what its leadership endeavoured to create, therefore, was the means to widen and deepen its capacity to articulate an Indonesian identity on an ongoing basis. To this end, the Party made a perceptible effort beginning in late 1958 to equip itself and its target constituency with a complete educational system, separate from that operated by the government; this is the fifth measure of the Communists' organizational progress during this period. Although the Party had indicated its intention of adding to its existing educational system by creating a People's University (*Universitas Rakjat*—Unra) as early as August 1956, McVey has shown how the decision to actually proceed with Unra's formation was a response to the proximate demands of the Party's own unexpected success. By this time,

> [w]ith the party apparatus spreading into areas far from its old centers of strength, the problem of insufficiently lettered (let alone doctrinally informed) cadres became acute. It finally appeared necessary to embark on a major educational program, aimed first at literacy and then at providing political skills. Such a system, it was hoped, would not only serve PKI adherents [as in the extant system] but bring enlightenment to the common people as a whole. Ordinary folk would thus see the party's usefulness; they would be able to compare its efforts with the failing government school system, and by participating they would be introduced to Communist ways of thought and drawn into an intellectual universe centered on the party.[92]

Aidit was just being honest then when he explained in his understated way that "the curriculum of the University is closely linked with the urgent tasks of the Party, namely the building of a national front and the Party. The education is aimed at eliminating ideological confusion, at deepening the understanding of present and future tasks."[93] In short, the Party was going out and going down among the people with the intention of making them members of its constituency, of its state-within-a-state.

An examination of the content and calculated effects of the Party's expanding educational enterprise shows that the PKI was more interested in creating Indonesians than it was in creating adherents simply of Marxism-Leninism. It is most evident in its course offerings, for instance, that Unra's operators were keen to advance the notion that the political destinies of the Party and Indonesia had been coincident in the past and would be so in the future. While the complete selection of course offerings (which included political science, English, journalism, art, and Indonesian language and literature) suggested a conscious desire to enhance the Communists' ability to organize and communicate, it was in the most popular and available of all the courses—political science—that the object of this emphasis was most pronounced.

Here, McVey has noted that the contents of the political science course were shaped by the fact that "subjects that were not taught with specific reference to Indonesian conditions were of little interest" to the participants.[94] Accordingly, the political science course that was eventually offered focused on "Marxism, the history of the Indonesian independence movement, Indonesian society and economy, Indonesian history, constitutional law, geography, and world history." Given this, we may agree with McVey that the course reflected an "overwhelming concern with things Indonesian," and not with things Marxist-Leninist, but disagree with her that such a focus was an accurate reflection of the "PKI leadership's interests."[95] Indeed, in her own remarks about the effects of the Party's educational drive, we see evidence that the leadership was really concerned to use its educational activities to advance their overwhelming concern to define things—people and territory—as Indonesian:

> . . . ideology alone would not tell the people how to organize, and might not convince them that they were learning something of direct use in mastering the problems of the day . . .. Such knowledge as how to keep a budget, run a

> meeting, set up a publication, and so on was not only directly useful for making the party and its mass organizations more effective; it gave the cadres a sense they were gaining mastery over modern methods of action. In fact, practical organization building continued to overshadow instruction on ideological matters, both because it was desperately needed by a party which was always expanding to (and sometimes beyond) its capacity for control and because of the PKI leaders' belief that to be organized was to be in a historical state of grace.[96]

The Party's expanded educational offerings of "things Indonesian" did not deviate from this long-standing emphasis on the practical, indeed, that the Party was even in a position to begin to define and deliver its education in "Indonesian" rather than narrowly Marxist-Leninist terms was a reflection of its practical progress. By late 1960, then, the Party was realizing through conceiving that its and Indonesia's futures could be coincident, and just as the PKI's educational programme bent to accommodate the practical realities that made for this coincidence, so, too, did the Party's ideology strain to keep up with its gains.

A final achievement of the PKI between early 1957 and late 1960 related to its ideology, and specifically to its leaders' ability to create meanings and categories that positively added to their state-building strategy without permitting themselves to succumb to the tremendous political flux of the time, prompting outright confrontation with the TNI, or excluding any particularistic group in their formulations. Although the PKI leaders could not, of course, know what the outcome of the country's emergency would be, they knew that their tremendous political success had been a major factor in precipitating the emergency conditions and that it was their organization's political survival that was now imperilled to a degree unequalled since late 1951. The PKI leaders also knew, however, that unlike the situation in late 1951, the nature of political conflict had changed fundamentally and in the present conflict, the struggle between the Central Government and TNI Headquarters, on the one side, and regional political and military leaders, on the other, was a struggle of, and about, Indonesia.

The ideological challenge that the Party appeared to face as a result of this understanding seemed acute, mainly because the phenomenon of an intra-Indonesian conflict on which it was predicated could not be adequately explained using the PKI's class-based Marxist-Leninist categories, least of all by the notion of a United National Front. By the same token, any sudden abandonment of the latter conceptual language would have undermined the Party in the eyes of its own supporters. The course that the Party leadership adopted over the following three to four years was, then, extraordinarily revealing in light of these tensions. We may view the manner in which the PKI ideologized from March 1957 as substantiating the point made earlier that the PKI had not committed itself to substantively discriminating ideological prescriptions; the meanings it assigned were fashioned for achieved actions and developments and for the further achievement of control over political resources within the directing idea of Indonesia.

Between March 1957 and late 1960, the Aidit leadership made four interrelated changes to the Party's ideological outlook. The first step was also the most significant and it was taken by Aidit in March 1957. At that time, Aidit tried to anticipate most of the difficulties that inhered in the PKI's ideological predicament by positing the reality of an Indonesian spatial-popular base while anchoring the Party's outlook to it, ignoring in the process the looming contest between the regional and central leaders to determine the very scope and substance of that base. Aidit counselled that "[w]e Indonesian communists are not dogmatic in the application of Marxist-Leninist teachings; we are creative. Marxist-Leninist theory is only a guide, the decisive thing in our policy being the concrete situation in Indonesia."[97] Having fostered this unprecedented and tentative connection between Indonesia, as such, and the Party's outlook, Aidit undertook to formulate a statement that detailed the link between Marxism-Leninism and the "concrete situation."

This second step was taken when Aidit, in the name of the Central Committee's Agitation Department, presented his study entitled *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* (*Masjarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia*) to the CC in July 1957.[98] While this study appeared on the surface to be essentially a history of Indonesia, its execution and content at this moment in time betrayed a much greater significance, a much wider political intention. We may understand the significance and intention of *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* better by briefly noting how the document was executed and what it excluded prior to considering its content.

The first point to be noted is that *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* was both an individual and a collective effort, the combination of which, as McVey has observed, yielded a peculiar style "which is bureaucratic but yet not anonymous, history with neither the facelessness of the chronicler nor the individuality of the historian. It has personality, but it is the character not of a man but of a regime."[99] Moreover, and in marked contrast to typical Communist texts, "sweeping images, a sense of urgency, relevance to local ways of thought are all buried under an uncompromisingly didactic prose."[100] Yet the objectives of this prose did not include having PKI members mimic the behaviour of Communists elsewhere in the world, that is, by acting explicitly within the confines of received nationalist sentiments, trying to realize their national part of the international revolutionary movement, or even out of concern with what Marx himself sought. References that would have contributed to the adoption of any of these patterns of behaviour were either oblique, as in the case of the single reference to Marx, or made only in passing, as in the brief treatment of the Russian Revolution. McVey has commented suggestively that this deliberate failure "to harness the power contained in the image of Marxism's international ideological modernity or of world revolution . . . [and] the elimination of any outside revolutionary context is extraordinary."[101]

One may even suggest, in shifting to a consideration of the content of *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution*, that what Aidit and the PKI were proposing was exceptional, both in the descriptive and substantive senses. With regard to the former, the historical narrative that was presented was unlike any that had preceded it. The historical narrative that is *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* was distinctive because it was premised on a "clear decision in favour of looking at history as the illustration of a grand scheme rather than attempting to discern a pattern from the concatenation of events."[102] From this it is evident how the exceptional descriptive form was used by its creators to call for a substantively exceptional outcome as part of the "grand scheme." McVey pinpoints this outcome by arguing, I believe correctly, that "[i]t is the founding of the Indonesian nation that was the fundamental historical fact for Aidit" and that his presentation of history was designed to show that "history is the working-out of that promise, the nation-state's realization of itself." I also believe that McVey is correct in her identification of the mechanisms that Aidit advertises as contributing to the realization of this outcome:

> Struggle became in fact the central image, a value in itself, a cardinal point of identification . . .. The emphasis . . . was on making people conscious that they should devote themselves to struggle rather than to obedience or the seeking of interior peace; that this was their true nature and duty, and that the appropriate form of struggle was the perfection of thought and organization . . .. The idea of surging forward through consolidation of the *apparat* seems neither very Indonesian nor very inspiring . . . [but still] organization became viewed rather as an end in itself, capable of qualitatively changing the situation, a true god from the machine.[103]

In short, and without recognizing it as such, McVey helps us to understand that *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* is actually a statement of the Party's directing idea.

Rather than examining the text from this perspective, and recognizing that the only ways by which its author could communicate the unrealized creativity and novelty of his Party's strategy was by exhorting others to struggle and organize to complete the "August Revolution" and by rigorously excluding the familiar (be it the "familiar metaphors," "references to religious or other cultural traditions," or "any outside revolutionary context" that she notes herself), McVey chooses to assert simply that Aidit's myth of origin for Indonesian society broke down. I believe that the manner in which McVey reaches this conclusion actually undermines her own position while substantiating the view presented here that *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* was both a statement of the Party's directing idea and an ideological achievement in its own right. McVey believes that Aidit's myth breaks down because of the "failure of [its] assumption of equality and closeness of relationship between Proletarian and Nationalist." McVey concludes that on the basis of this assumption, the Party mistakenly opted for a "strategy for a post-revolutionary situation in which nationalist and not Communist forces were dominant." The pursuit of this strategy ultimately led to a coupling of "proletariat and national bourgeoisie, of Communist and Nationalist movements."[104] By "concentrating on their legitimacy as nationalists," McVey states, the Communists

> tended increasingly to accept a frame of reference which was not their own and to stress the similarities rather than the rivalry between their aims and those of

> 'bourgeois nationalism' . . .. Though they devoted great energy in thought and action to reconciling their nationalist and Marxist ancestry, they never really succeeded, and where the two clashed it was the nationalist side whose legitimacy was accepted, with all the implications of this.[105]

Unfortunately for McVey, this passage is not what she claims it to be, that is, a critique of the structure of Aidit's historical myth. What McVey offers as a critique of Aidit's specially constructed history is itself a peculiarly constructed history—one that judges from the perspective of the present, from an ex post facto vantage-point, or, more bluntly, from the knowledge that the PKI failed in 1965. Certainly, neither Aidit nor McVey knew in 1957 that this was to be the outcome of the Party's work.

Aidit and the PKI were still "living life forward" then, and McVey has given us no reason to believe that the mechanisms and idea outlined in *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* were destined for certain failure. In fact, the virtue of McVey's discussion of the text lies precisely in her identification of the real bases of the Party's power—in struggle and in organization. Certainly, in the context of struggle over such tangibles as people and territory, the Party was well ahead of other actors, and therefore more potentially "Indonesian." And it is in this connection, above all else, that the intent of *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* becomes clear: it was written when it was, and how it was, to foster the Party's drive to acquire sovereignty, to place the PKI in the authoritative position to define peoples and territory as "Indonesian." The Party was not barred by, and did not founder on, the easy analytical distinction that McVey draws between Marxists and nationalists, for by the time *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* appeared, the PKI had already woven the Irian Barat issue into the fabric of Indonesian nationalism. In this light, *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* was a public self-invitation (specifically directed to PKI cadres) to carry on with the creative and novel work of new state building, to continue expanding and deepening the instruments that would allow for the eventual, sovereign determination of Indonesia.

In outlining this grand strategy, Aidit took a further step in advancing the PKI's ideology by including a section in *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* that was ostensibly an analysis of the social make-up of "Indonesian society." On the surface, Aidit's five-fold division of society into the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie, and the landlord class may seem unremarkable. Indeed, Hindley has taken Aidit's analysis at face value, structuring his own discussion of the "driving forces of the revolution" around the assumption that these five major groupings were identified by the Party after "the Aidit leadership undertook a sociopolitical analysis of the . . . major social forces in Indonesia in order to determine which might be won as disciplined allies, which might be won as allies under certain circumstances, and which were implacable enemies."[106] In other words, Hindley is suggesting that the Aidit leadership made these socially meaningful determinations—these ideological prescriptions to action—before engaging in political activity. What Hindley seems to have failed to appreciate is that Aidit only arrived at this analysis—the first such comprehensive survey of his tenure—in 1957. Thus, what Aidit was proposing by way of his social analysis was new, and by this measure, its theoretical and political significance to us is far greater than has been suggested by the literature.

For instance, when Aidit elucidates the details of familiar or unfamiliar categories or sub-categories (as when he writes for the first time about "the revolutionary value of the respective peasant groups"), or when he speaks of new categories (such as the petty bourgeoisie), he is not making the kinds of determinations suggested by Hindley. What Aidit is doing in his analysis is using Marxist-Leninist terminology in an extremely elastic manner to describe the achieved reality of Party power, and since that was not class based, neither is the language used by Aidit to describe it.

Notwithstanding its Marxist-Leninist form, Aidit's analysis does not carry the substantive prescription of class conflict normally associated with the use of this conceptual language. If we look closely at the criterion by which Aidit distinguishes between the Party's allies, supporters, and opponents, even within such received categories as the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, we see that neither class affiliation nor relationship to the mode of production is paramount. Instead, we see that members of both the landlord class and the bourgeoisie can be considered as "patriotic," placing them on the side of the Party's "traditional" allies, the proletariat and the peasantry. This is no small matter, considering the wider argument about Indonesia in which this analysis is ensconced in *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution*. By arguing that at least some portion of every perceivable group can be considered on the Party's side, Aidit is, in effect, dissolving the very class distinctions that he is drawing while directing the cadres, in the name of national unity, to precisely that end. Yet the truly revealing aspect of Aidit's argument is that he is no more able to offer a substantive or positive definition of "patriotism" than he is of "Indonesia." While Aidit has no difficulty in defining the Party's opponents in an entirely negative way, that is to say, by their connection with "imperialists," their "deceit," or their "banditry," these substantive characteristics do not positively reflect what it is to be "patriotic" or "Indonesian." Logically, in the absence of an authoritative definition of "Indonesia," it is not possible to define the quality of "Indonesian patriotism" that is said to distinguish the Party's allies from all others. From this perspective, the single most important achievement of Aidit's analysis is its nomenclature, which "explained" and directed reality in class terms without making this quality politically paramount, or was so focused as to prompt attacks from other actors, or was an obstacle to the control of popular resources generally.

In Aidit's analysis, then, the only certain means to achieve "national unity" was by avoiding situations or conceptions that could bring Communist supporters into conflict with other "Indonesians" until the Party itself was prepared to make sovereignty the object of such a conflict. The Party had thus to judiciously balance its efforts to acquire greater popular resources through group appeals with its efforts to exercise general control over all its resources. The demands of this balance were most apparent vis-à-vis workers and peasants. In September 1957, for instance, SOBSI declared invitingly that "All persons and groups, irrespective of political affiliation, religious conviction, ethnic group, and party, who are not proved to be agents of Dutch monopoly and who are not proved to be agents of the warmongers, are the friends of the workers."[107] By 1959 the demands of this policy showed in that the PKI's behaviour towards workers had become distinctly self-effacing: the Party "was not only *not* inciting the workers to militant action, but, for the sake of the national united front policy, was preparing to restrain them from radical measures provoked by the worsening economic situation."[108]

In the case of the peasants, Aidit permitted a rare glimpse of just how far the Party would strive to achieve "unity" while seeking ever greater peasant support. In July 1956, Aidit declared in *Harian Rakjat* that "We [Communists] also agree to cooperate with the anti-imperialist landlords, but at the same time we fight . . . to ensure that the landlords do not exploit the peasants *too much*."[109] Notwithstanding this tacit condonation of exploitation, Aidit was not at all inhibited from declaring shortly thereafter in *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution* that "the Party must always strive to be able to draw in and mobilize 90 per cent of the village inhabitants."[110]

By 1959, the PKI had realized the minimum objective of the ideological steps that its leaders had taken two years earlier, and that was to ensure the Party's own survival. In fact, whereas other actors had perished or were on the verge of doing so in their attempts to realize their own directing ideas, the PKI had not only survived, it had grown and extended itself throughout the political space that the TNI took the lead in creating. The Party had experienced tremendous territorial, popular, and organizational achievements between March 1957 and mid-1959 and the unanticipated effect of these was to cause a strain in the very language that the Party had adopted to save itself. The manner in which the Party resolved the tension, and took what I consider to be its fourth ideological step, is vitally important because it demonstrates the relationship between meanings and actions (or categories and consequences) clearly and at a theoretically relevant level. In this instance, the Party was faced with the incongruity between the language it used to describe Indonesia, which was considered a "semicolonial" and "semifeudal" country, and the objective improvements effected by the changes that both it and the TNI had achieved in removing Dutch capital and in crushing such "agents of imperialism" as the supporters of the PRRI/Permesta. Likewise, while the Party was busy characterizing its popular base in class terms, in reality the support that it had won dramatically transcended class divisions and was, in this sense, a reflection of the variety of peoples and groups found in the archipelago. On both accounts, the empirical consequences of the changes that had occurred between early 1957 and mid-1959 should have warranted a corresponding or corrective change in the Party's language.

However, the Party chose to insist on its characterization of Indonesia as a country while at the same time making a very important change in the characterization of itself as a political actor. Thus, while Lukman "justified at some length the Party's continued description of Indonesia" as "semicolonial" and "semifeudal" at the Sixth National Congress,[111] Aidit unequivocally declared that henceforth "class interests must be subordinated to the interests of the nation."[112] These remarks are analytically significant because they shed light on the PKI leaders' own understanding of what they had achieved, and had yet to achieve, with respect to their state building strategy. By declaring that the PKI would pursue "national" interests, Aidit was in effect making a positive adjustment to the Party's identity. This adjustment was premised on the knowledge of the Communists' tangible achievements, of which the most important related to their unrivalled organizational and mobilizational practices among peasants and labourers. In other words, by linking the Party's and the "nation's" interests, Aidit was making a tangibly defensible declaration: the PKI was meaningfully "national" because it was empirically "national."

Where the PKI's power and resources met their limit was where its leaders ceased creating positive meanings, and this is exactly why they insisted on a negative characterization of Indonesia as a country. By defining Indonesia negatively, the Party avoided a substantive conflict with other "domestic" or "internal" actors. By the same token, the characterization could be used to promote the achievement of sovereignty in the future because it directed the Party against, and made pressing issues out of, "feudalism" and "colonialism." Here, the value of attacking these "targets" in terms of the Party's state-building strategy lay precisely in the deliberate access they forged to political resources. Attacking "feudalism" meant engaging the bulk of the "Indonesian" people in the Party's ongoing organizational and mobilizational schemes, thus further extending the PKI's grasp over such tangible resources as people and territory. By declaring its opposition to "colonialism," the Party created a conceptually unlimited issue that would allow it to openly pose the question as to Indonesia's scope and substance, thereby promoting the Party's "national" authority.

In light of the foregoing discussion, it should be clear why the Party's ideological adjustment of late 1959 has been considered as its final achievement of the period. It is not because the structure of my analysis or my division of time periods makes it so. Rather, it is because this placement reflects the way in which the PKI leaders themselves used ideology. They created ideological meanings only after they had acquired the tangible or power bases to defend such meanings and, in this particular instance, the occasion of the Sixth National Congress was clearly a propitious moment for effecting such an ideological adjustment. The ideological change that the leadership made to the character of the Party and its publicly stated strategy, moreover, possessed a forward-looking element and thus, logically, constituted an implicit break with the past. Accordingly, the meanings that were created out of the notions of the "nation," "feudalism," and "colonialism" were at once and the same time an attempt to categorize the consequences of the actions taken by the Party since March 1957, and an effort to designate avenues for further action. Above all, the ideological adjustment was intended to make the Party's political achievements meaningfully "national" (and therefore "Indonesian") without conceding the reality of their novel character.

To the Party leaders, though, there was no avoiding the realization that by embracing the "nation" and "national interests" as their own, they had removed the last conceptual barrier to the possibility that the Party could create a new state. In this sense, the Party leaders had manoeuvred themselves into the same political position as the Army leaders, and at roughly the same point in time. By 1960 both actors had acquired or exercised the necessary control over enough territorial and popular resources to be considered (analytically and substantively) "national," as opposed to particularistic or insular actors. At the same time, it became apparent to both that neither had the one resource—sovereignty—that was sufficient to render their directing idea of "Indonesia" as authoritative. Unquestionably, the Party's empirical and conceptual accession to a "national" status had a powerful effect on the TNI and may fairly be seen as hastening the moment when both realized the commonality of their situations. From late 1960 onward, both were confronted with the self-assigned challenge of seeking to create sovereignty.

Novelty as Promise and Hazard

At this point, reprising the novel character of the situation that confronted the PKI and TNI in 1960 serves the analysis in two ways. First, it confirms the appropriateness of viewing subsequent developments in terms of a competition to create sovereignty. Second, it prepares us for a comprehensive understanding of the otherwise misunderstood course and outcome of these developments. With regard to the first point, it is important to emphasize that the political reality that the PKI and the TNI faced was really of their own making. Over the previous three years, both had contributed to the realization of a conceptual and physical space that encompassed, however imperfectly or incompletely, most of that part of the world that had been officially recognized as "Indonesia" for over a decade. More importantly, both had contributed to the physical elimination or political supersession of actors who sought either to divide this area into smaller physical units (the RMS, for instance), or who aimed to impose a transcendant, pre-existing, or exclusionary identity upon the whole area despite the alienation of peoples and islands that this would entail (as in the case of the DI), or who appealed to foreigners for military and political support (as in the case of the PRRI/Permesta). Stated differently, by late 1960, the PKI and TNI had eliminated (or were widely acknowledged as having practically eliminated) those actors who had controlled popular and territorial resources but had not (in principle and in practice) used them to create or to try to create an "Indonesian" identity that stood on its own, unattached to lesser or greater directing ideas or foreign actors.

There could be no relief in this accomplishment for either the TNI or the PKI, since the effect of their having eliminated the obviously "non-Indonesian" actors from the political arena was to precipitate a completely different kind of political contest. Henceforth, as the co-creators and co-guardians of a truly "national" political arena, the PKI and TNI confronted each other as no other political actors had before in the Indonesian context: they were truly "national" actors existing in a shared territorial-popular space of their dual making. Clearly, since the product of their efforts—a "national" arena—was itself both new and tentative, no authoritative criteria existed by which either actor could assert its "Indonesianness" to the exclusion of the other. Yet, at the same time, both actors' willingness to remove their accustomed party and army labels in favour of an unspecified "Indonesian" or "national" quality brought the issue of the authoritative determination of those qualities to the forefront of political life. It is in this light that we can recognize how the indistinguishable alikeness of both actors—as "Indonesian"—necessarily promoted their adoption of strategies of sovereignty.

To achieve a more complete appreciation of the significance and implications of this problem of novelty it is important to recognize that the strategies were not merely manifestations of a novel situation, but served to inform it as well. For by enacting their strategies and by interacting with each other, the PKI and TNI renewed the novelty of their common situation on an ongoing basis. To understand this open-ended process of novel renewal, one must look beyond the obvious possibility that political contention of any sort may yield both expected and unexpected results. One must recognize the peculiarity of the dilemma that both actors faced in the instance of the PKI-TNI encounter: since they could not contest on the grounds of accepted norms, and the very point of the contest now focused on authoritatively categorizing one's own popular and territorial claims as definitively "Indonesian," the only realms in which the clash could realistically or reasonably proceed (that is, from the actors' perspectives) was in these two areas. Thus, the continued efforts by both actors to exert or extend their control over political resources after 1960 (especially people and territory and, later, arms) spoke to the novelty of the context. At the same time, it is clear that these efforts would inform and prolong that condition of novelty, since the central element of both actors' separate attempts to resolve their dilemma and to promote a real difference between them had to be surprise itself (as expressed in territorial or popular terms). Accordingly, the dual representations or sets of claims as to which people and lands constituted "Indonesia" changed with the action and reaction of both actors to each others' popular and territorial initiatives. After 1960, answering the questions as to what "Indonesia" was, or who "Indonesians" were, was not a straightforward matter, as these issues remained to be authoritatively addressed in the course, or as the outcome, of the contest between the two actors. It is to the content of that contest that we now turn.

CHAPTER V

STRATEGIES OF SOVEREIGNTY: "NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT" VERSUS THE "INDONESIANIZATION OF MARXISM-LENINISM"

In contrast to many studies of Indonesian politics after 1961, which tend to focus on personal politicking in the formal structures of Guided Democracy and the PKI's endeavours to foster an exclusive alliance with a seemingly omnipotent President Sukarno,[1] the purpose of this chapter is to advance an alternate understanding of the same while drawing upon and refining the logical postulates of a analytical discussion that centres on political novelty and new state building. Instead of a narrow focus on the activities and attitudes of leading party and military figures, including the President, I propose to radically shift the centre of analytical attention to the very sources of political power that the major actors themselves sought: territory, people, and their deliberate organization expressed in terms of a created and putative meaning. Accordingly, I argue that the fundamental political dynamic of the period existed between the two largest collective actors (the PKI and TNI) and that both participated in an equal manner in revolutionary politics outside formal structures and away from the ostensible centre of power in Jakarta.

When seen from an analytical vantage-point that recognizes the importance to actors operating in a novel context of accumulating political resources and having recourse to revolutionary action (that is instantiated in organizational and mobilizational initiatives), it is difficult to avoid the suggestion that the driving forces of Indonesian politics would manifest themselves chiefly at the margins, rather than at the presumed centre, of political life. Indeed, since the "Indonesian" realm that the PKI and the TNI had created was not authoritatively ruled by either, it being, after all, a novel creation, the contest between them unavoidably became one of knowingly and publicly defining "Indonesia" as such. In short, their contest became one of a conscious struggle for sovereignty, that is, of creating sovereignty. Logically, one would be inclined to view such a political contest as unfolding simultaneously along the two dimensions that are inherently associated with the creation in time and space of a distinctive, non-particularistic territorial-popular entity, that is, at its limits and in terms of its declared content. For the purposes of explanation, this is precisely the task of this chapter.

More specifically, I will demonstrate how the arbitrariness of actors' pronouncements on "Indonesia's" limits was integral to their enactment of opposing strategies of sovereignty and, more fundamentally, of the condition of political novelty in which they operated. I will also show how the interaction of these strategies, and specifically of the tendency of both actors to assume essentially (but not necessarily publicly) opposing positions on the physical margins of political life, continuously recreated that condition of novelty. Finally, I will demonstrate how this strategic interaction ensured that the "Indonesian" project (as opposed to other conceivable ethnic, insular, or particularistic alternatives), in either its Communist or military guise, tended to be the most promising because of the organizational and mobilizational accomplishments associated with each actor's attempt to create sovereignty. In other words, I will argue that what "Indonesia" would become, authoritatively speaking, and thus physically, did not depend so much on the "historical" premises of Indonesian nationalism, cultural factors, economic forces, or political balances identified by others, as it depended on the inter-active effects produced through competing strategies of sovereignty.

We may follow this progression of political developments by identifying those (three) instances between 1961 and 1963 when one actor attempted, by means short of sovereignty (but totalizing nevertheless in its intended effect), to preclude the possibility of its rival realizing its own directing idea of Indonesia. Each of these instances was signalled by the adoption of one actor's action strategy as official Indonesian Government policy. We may then examine how each opportunity (subsequent to the first which necessarily entailed a presumption of a stable organizational and mobilizational matrix) was used by the ascendant actor to achieve mobilizational and organizational successes and the refinement of new facets of "the Indonesian identity." Third, we may briefly note the effect of such successes and refinements on the main rival as a way of explaining the dynamic interplay that tended both to promote greater revolutionary efforts on each actors' part (and hence clearer binary distinctions at the popular-territorial level), and greater apparent irrationality in Government policy.

"National Development" and the TNI's Presumption of Calculability

We may identify Nasution's lecture of 7 August 1961 on military policy as the proximate cause of the explicit contest over sovereignty that was to consciously engage the TNI and PKI leaders and their millions of followers until late 1965.[2] In pinpointing this occasion as the genesis of such a profound contest, I do so on the basis of the same logic that I have used elsewhere in this study to identify significant historical turning points: if the event was recognized as contemporaneously important to the actors involved, that is, in the forward living of their political lives and before any ex post facto interpretations could be offered of the particular event, then its analytical significance was manifest even before the inevitable "insights" of hindsight made it so. In other words, I am suggesting that even as Nasution spoke his words, both he and his audience were aware of their greater historical significance and the wider meaning that was imminently in the process of being created, for Nasution's action that day was to offer an unprecedented conceptualization of Indonesia that carried with it the suggestion that it was "nationally" authoritative and worth defending politically:

> Our administrative apparatus, from the centre down to the lowest authority, must have security so that it can carry out its work in an orderly fashion. Our economy and our activities in the social, cultural, and other fields must have security so that we can carry out our struggle in all fields of life . . .. The problem of West Irian is included in the short-range program. I want to affirm right here that nothing is said about regaining West Irian within this 3-year period. Many have misunderstood this, however, the program clearly states that 'the struggle will be continued'. The program is clear as regards food and clothing within 3 years and for adequate security within 3 years . . .. It would be too arrogant of us to decide to regain West Irian within 3 years.[3]

In short, Nasution was trying to make a subtly stated but potentially profound change not only to military and "national" policy, but to the whole character of Indonesian politics.

The essence of the change that Nasution was proposing was to substitute secure administration and development for the Irian Barat cause as "national" priorities. Clearly, this message differed little from the general arguments that Nasution had earlier presented in his *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*. Now, however, Nasution was presenting his views in a context where the slightest difference of opinion on the character of the "nation" or the "on-going Indonesian Revolution" made for significant departures from the essentially superficial "unity" that officially characterized Guided Democracy. In this instance, there are very good reasons for believing that Nasution and his audience were aware that the contents of the lecture marked precisely such a departure, especially in light of its highly unusual observations about the physical limits and moral quality of the "national" struggle. First, in terms of the development of the Army's wider political strategy, especially vis-à-vis the PKI, the time was propitious for a statement of the physical limits within which "national development" could be expected to unfold. In the sense that the Irian Barat cause was proving to be detrimental to the Army's gradual creation of its own true pan-Indonesia authority, either by the sheer expense and economic disruption of the enterprise or the opportunities that it created for other actors to exercise extraordinary power (including the President, who had done precisely that), it could even be said that the content of Nasution's lecture was expected.

Second, the situation in late mid-1961 in terms of the seemingly poor progress being made by the Army's political competitors and opponents also seemed to offer success to the kind of delimitation of "national" goals espoused by the Army. In the regions, for instance, the Army was delivering the last and decisive blows against the now shattered DI, RMS, and PRRI/Permesta (which was pretentiously restyled as the Unitary Indonesian Republic [*Persatuan Republik Indonesia*—PRI] in 1960[4]), and the

Kahar Muzakkar movement in Sulawesi.[5] In the formal structures of Guided Democracy, moreover, the major political parties had largely resigned themselves to the subordinate position that had been assigned to them by both Sukarno and the Army in 1960. For its part, the PKI had only just begun its political comeback from the near disaster of its critique of the *Kerja* Cabinet in mid-1960.

One year later, the PKI conducted itself with circumspection and caution, having prudently shifted the burden of political action away from itself to its ormas. Even now though, the character of that political action was in reaction to developments far removed from the "domestic" political scene; the takeovers of Belgian concerns in North Sumatra in March 1961 by Sarbupri (a SOBSI affiliate) and in East Java in April-July 1961 by SOBSI and its affiliate SBRI related to events in the distant Congo.[6] So as not to understate the political significance of these Communist actions, however, it is important to recognize how they bore on the greater issue of the establishment—or contesting—of authoritative norms in new state building. While the PKI may be seen through these actions as simultaneously attempting to create the context for the beginning of its own "national" authority while destroying others' prospects for the same, from the Army's perspective such endeavours probably seemed puny compared to the actions that had been taken against Dutch interests in December 1957.

A final circumstance that favoured the Army's decision to effectively diminish the Irian Barat cause related to its transformation from a public to a private issue. Between December 1957 and 1961 the Irian Barat cause had become less popularly driven and more the subject of Sukarno's Presidential prerogatives in international (as opposed to "domestic") politics. The decline of the popular element in sustaining the "cause" may be partially explained when consideration is taken of all the other issues that had dominated "domestic" politics since March 1957. Indeed, there is little surprise in the observation that the leading political actors preferred to address the threat that these issues posed to their own survival over and above that of Indonesia's claim to Irian Barat.

Notwithstanding the self-restraint that the political parties increasingly exercised over the Irian Barat cause, more and more the Army had to contend with the revolutionary (or, at least, radical) predilections of the President on this subject. Thus, when it became obvious that Sukarno was intent on personally monopolizing the Irian Barat cause (as when he compelled the Army to dissolve the FNPIB to make way for his new FN), the Army had some understandable reservations. However, the logical implications of this political development provided some unexpected, even ironic, relief to the Army. First, Sukarno's sponsorship of the issue ironically and effectively reduced the role hitherto exercised by the organized, nationalist masses. Second, in spite of the ostensible continuity in purpose between the Army's FNPIB and Sukarno's FN, the transfer of responsibilities from the former to the latter brought the Army's attempts to control popular input to their logical conclusion because the FN, which possessed only an incipient organizational quality, could not possibly organize any support. Third, with the Irian Barat issue now in Sukarno's hands, the next logical avenue for resolving the issue lay in the diplomatic realm. In this connection, Sukarno's decision to sever relations with The Netherlands in 1960 came as a matter of *informing* his compatriots of *his* decision during the course of his annual Independence Day speech. In the meantime, Indonesian military officials, led personally by Nasution, busily set about purchasing the military hardware (mainly from the Soviet bloc) for their "cause,"[7] confident that the technical character of acquiring weapons necessarily precluded sustained popular participation. In this easily controllable situation, the Army could comfortably condone Indonesia's purchase of mainly naval and air material, which Nasution had already recognized as integral to Indonesia's long-term defence interests.

Altogether, by late 1961 the Army leadership seemed to have developed its own reasoned argument not so much for lessening the urgency of the Irian Barat cause as for initiating a new political phase in its state-building strategy. To a very large extent, taking this stance was inescapable and inextricably linked to the Army's hard-won attainment of a formal role and status in Government—an achievement that necessarily entailed a declaration of formal policy, that is, the taking of an arbitrary decision. Yet precisely because taking this step was necessary for the Army to begin building its authority by deciding on a firm popular-territorial framework, it was necessary for its main opponent, the PKI, to resist. In this connection, the Irian Barat issue can be seen as reflecting inchoate, yet nevertheless sharply divergent and strongly held conceptions of Indonesia's scope and substance as a new state; the Irian Barat cause was thereby less a problem in its own right and more an inadvertent but no less real (because of its tangible quality) extension of the theatre of political operations between adherents of two separate directing ideas of Indonesia.

Surely, when President Sukarno spoke on the occasion of Indonesia's 16th anniversary of independence, only 10 days after Nasution had delivered his lecture at Seskoad, he knew that his comments on the unsettled nature of Indonesian-Dutch relations bore significantly on the nature of "domestic" relations too. More specifically, by dramatically embracing a much-expanded and popular-regarding approach toward Irian Barat, Sukarno may have been acting deliberately to resolve both sets of relations:

> . . . we are not going to waste any more words with the Dutch now! West Irian must soon be returned to the territory under the authority of the Republic. At present our policy *vis-à-vis* the Dutch is a policy of confrontation in every field—in the political, the economic, yes, even in the military field![8]

Clearly, this appeal was less a command to be followed by a government, ministries, or the subordinate components of a state apparatus, and more a romantic entreaty to powerful "domestic" actors to actually achieve the sort of political, economic, and military capacity necessary to oust the Dutch. Sukarno's appeal was, therefore, a striking reiteration of the very essence of the political problem of Indonesia: through its identification and publicization of the very resources or qualities associated with the existence of a state, Sukarno's stance on Irian Barat aimed for the all-round growth of organized political power, especially in what was already recognized as "Indonesia." More importantly, Sukarno's exhortation promoted the achievement of this outcome precisely because he was inviting political competition among Indonesian actors in terms of their creating, acquiring, or possessing irresistible (from at least the Dutch point of view) power resources.

Sukarno's statement of August 17 demonstrated at a stroke that however much the TNI sought to reason its way out of an Irian Barat venture, the novel political context of its own making ensured that this choice was more desirable than it was reasonable or "normal." For indeed, Nasution's decision to spatially and temporally delimit the TNI's scope of political, economic, and military activities to the implied exclusion of Irian Barat was essentially arbitrary in nature, regardless of the variety of calculations or the spirit of calculability that informed its formulation. Likewise, Sukarno's decision signalling Indonesia's determination to proceed with its claim to Irian Barat was equally arbitrary, except perhaps from the perspective of international law.

The arbitrariness of Sukarno's decision shows up, first, in the absence of any Indonesian historical claim to Irian Barat that pre-dates the (relatively tardy) inclusion of this territory by the Dutch into the NEI. Secondly, the quality and character of the Indonesian nationalist claim to Irian Barat was hardly unambiguous. While it is important to recall that the nationalist claim to Irian Barat stemmed from the decision that the KNIP took in mid-1945 to opt for an *Indonesia Raya*, and was therefore relatively longstanding, in theory and in practice it was clearly arbitrary of Sukarno to single out this territory when similar nationalist claims, formulated at precisely the same moment as the Irian Barat claim, were outstanding on Portuguese Timor and North Kalimantan. Moreover, when Republican political and military fortunes appeared at their nadir in the struggle with the Dutch, leading figures, including Sukarno, acknowledged the reality that the Republic was a phenomenon restricted to Java and Sumatra; Irian Barat, along with most of the East Indies archipelago, passed under Dutch-led federal control.

In any event, notwithstanding the clearly arbitrary grounds upon which he made his own pronouncement, Sukarno elliptically asserted that the TNI leadership was being unreasonable in its political understanding of the Irian Barat issue and, by logical extension, of the whole character of "Indonesia" and "Indonesians." As Sukarno would argue, the Irianese were "Indonesians" too, and therefore deserved the "liberation" that their confreres were attempting to achieve on their behalf. Sukarno made it plain through his zeal that any other stance toward Irian Barat could properly be perceived as abnormal, and in this zeal he won the PKI's unqualified support. To the latter, Sukarno's Independence Day Speech amounted essentially to a rebuke of the TNI's position, a signal that the Army's attempt to categorize the consequences of its own political ascendancy—its attempt to realize its own directing idea of Indonesia—was indefensible not simply because Sukarno opposed it, but, more profoundly, for want of TNI sovereignty.

Politics at the Edge: Nasakom and the Rejuvenation of the PKI's National United Front Strategy

The deficiency in TNI power that Sukarno's pronouncement served to expose was taken as an invitation by the Army's opponents to resolve the wider issue that this weakness concealed: the continuing problem of Indonesia, and specifically the imperative to create a "normal" "Indonesian" condition by assisting in the "return" of Irian Barat. Accordingly, the undeniable effect of the renewed Irian Barat campaign was the sudden transformation of the heretofore great promise of country-wide Army authority into a diminished possibility and even a short-term improbability. To be sure, after August 1961, the PKI aspired to set a new standard of "Indonesian" nationalism, a feat that was achieved "in the early months of 1962," when "no party outdid the PKI in articulating a quality of reckless daring that would somehow manage to bring West New Guinea into the Indonesian fold."[9] This achievement was clearly the PKI's overarching objective, yet beneath the ethereal sloganizing and behind the incessant agitation that were part of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution," the Party used the opportunity for action to realize a calculated strategy of forcing the edges of its state-within-a-state outward, upward, and downward. With these manoeuvres, and the refinements to the "Indonesian identity" that were thereby created, the PKI attempted to tangibly and conceptually preclude the TNI from the possibility of enacting "national development." Yet far from appearing to compromise national development, the Party contrived the means by which to postpone the Army's and the state's best laid development schemes while simultaneously acquiring for itself the resources and understanding that would be necessary in the longer run to execute such plans.

The Communists' Sense of Indonesia: Nasakom, Irian Barat, and the Peasants

The most immediate and effective consequence of Sukarno's August 17 speech was not the wave of vociferous nationalistic agitation to which it gave rise; it was the sudden and unexplained circulation of the Nasakom idea. To appreciate the significance of the circulation of this idea we must first recognize that the idea was actually being re-introduced after having been ignored for at least a year. Originally, President Sukarno introduced the notion during the course of his Independence Day speech of 1960; in this context, the idea enjoyed the status of official doctrine. By Nasakom, Sukarno meant the unity of nationalist (*Nasionalis*), religious (*Agama*), and communist (*Komunis*) forces that he believed informed the Indonesian identity. Notwithstanding its august credentials, however, Nasakom failed to animate and, perhaps worse, failed to reflect reality.

Almost overnight, however, the PKI and its ormas caused the Nasakom idea to come to life; for the first time, Nasakom attained the status of being meaningful by dint of the fact that it had a popular following that believed it to be so. This is a decisive point, for unlike Sukarno, who effectively commanded no popular base of his own, the PKI leaders did and could therefore make an idea meaningful in the sense of effectively giving over to it the adherence of a "public." Much more to the point though is the way in which an idea, once made meaningful by the directed adherence of mass loyalty, logically increases the directing actor's willingness to make ideas associated with or espoused by other actors meaningless. In short, animating an idea draws an actor closer to being definitive about its meaning and with this the chances of conflict with other actors about meanings increases, especially if they are mutually exclusive and relate, as in the case of Nasakom, to directing ideas of a new state. To advance the inner possibility of achieving sovereignty was the fundamental attraction of the Nasakom idea to the PKI leadership after August 1961.

The fact that the PKI could and did choose to invest Nasakom with its own living reality has been interpreted in a fashion that essentially denies this feat. Generally, when the PKI's promotion of Nasakom is discussed, the convention has been to portray this activity as the simple outgrowth either of Sukarno's ideologizing or his desire to check the Army's political ascendancy. And when this same activity is shown to have led to the eclipse of the Army's plans, an inference is drawn that confirms Sukarno's, rather than the Party's, political paramountcy and efficacy. These assessments of Nasakom obscure two essential points in the phenomenon of new state building.

First, the assessments fail to distinguish between the formality and the organized reality of power. For instance, Reeve implicitly suggests that Sukarno's publicization of the Nasakom concept on 17 August 1960 explains its popularity and the Communists' later success in using it to combat the Army and its concept of golkar. This view of matters imputes power to formality without recognizing the empirically crisp distinction that one can draw between Nasakom as rhetoric (August 1960–August 1961) and Nasakom as the method and content of a wider Communist state building strategy (from August 1961). By distinguishing in this way between the two guises in which Nasakom has appeared, it becomes possible to perceive the reality of the PKI's achievement and to separate this from the formal and formalized credit that the PKI leaders later gave Sukarno (or that he claimed) for the Nasakom concept. And what the PKI really achieved in the name of Nasakom was to keep the political problem of Indonesia wide open, regardless of the claims or expectations of those few formally charged with ruling Indonesia. In short, the PKI ensured popular participation without also having to define its constituency to itself or other contenders in any other than imminently "Indonesian" terms.

This brings us to our second point about new state building, and that is how the condition of novelty rewards contenders for refraining from substantiating created meanings or identities until or unless they are prepared to assert their sovereignty in defence of that determination. As we have seen, in the PKI's hands the power of Nasakom lay precisely in its ability to expose the Army's powerlessness to defend its substantially limiting determination of August 1961. In effectively wielding Nasakom against the Army, the PKI essentially confirmed the absence of authoritative "Indonesian" standards and, more profoundly, the outright artificiality of the Army's (and its own) political work.

Importantly, in adopting the politically offensive Nasakom strategy, the PKI leaders resisted the temptation faced earlier by the Army of trying to impose an authoritative (or wishfully authoritative) standard of "national" conduct on all actors in the Indonesian context. Rather, at this point in time, Aidit began to speak of "Indonesianizing Marxism-Leninism," pointedly avoiding substantially discriminatory (or, conversely, substantially committed) definitions of the "Indonesian nation," "Indonesian society," or the "Indonesian identity," which even in its Nasakom guise was not particularly substantive. Aidit's command to "Indonesianize Marxism-Leninism" was not an instruction to the Party and its cadres to make the PKI's formal ideology or its *modus operandi* conform to pre-existing normative "Indonesian" standards; it was both an exhortation to mobilize and organize everybody and everything into a self-conscious Communist state-within-a-state and an injunction to begin articulating "Indonesian" standards *as such*.

Under the banner of Nasakom, the "national" commitment to effect the return of Irian Barat encouraged the PKI to act in a daring but calculated fashion in further realizing its directing idea of Indonesia. The PKI's conduct was daring in that sense that the Nasakom idea advertised its own inadequacy as a reflection of the Indonesian reality; it was more a statement of an Indonesian reality-to-be. Additionally, the Party may be seen to have acted in a daring fashion in moving so decisively to contest the TNI, whose leadership had just tried and failed to be definitive with respect to its own directing idea. More importantly, though, the PKI's conduct was calculating and the revolutionary calculus entailed distinct mobilizational, organizational, and meaning-related endeavours; these dimensions of PKI behaviour may be examined in turn.

Notwithstanding the indeterminate quality that attached to the Nasakom concept, where the particular identity of the representatives of each of the three forces was not officially disclosed and could only be guessed at due to a plurality of competing nationalist, religious, and even communist actors, the PKI's campaign in the name of Nasakom gained the support of PNI and NU. The rationale for joining the PKI in this venture was clear enough and reflected the profound dissatisfaction that all parties harboured toward the TNI and the series of measures that it had enacted (or attempted to enact) against them since the very beginning of Guided Democracy. It will be recalled that the founding of Guided Democracy came with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, that is, a body populated by the elected representatives of Indonesia's political parties. That no parties were spared in this attack or in the TNI's subsequent wide-ranging tactical and conceptual assaults, guaranteed a common front when the Army faltered in its own plans.

Faltering in August 1961, therefore, meant the first opportunity among the TNI's opponents to express this common interest in a proactive way. While the PNI and NU leaderships avoided formalizing this commonality with the PKI, the leadership of the latter certainly recognized in private that its longstanding United National Front strategy, at least with respect to the "front from above," had actually and effectively been revived by the actors that it had targeted as being part of that front.

The broad-based unity between the PKI, PNI, and NU helped to turn the widespread agitation over the Irian Barat issue into a discernable mobilizational drive that at once and the same time rejuvenated the PKI's United National Front strategy and gave it a concrete objective to attain. More specifically, the three large parties, and especially the PKI, argued loudly in favour of arming those "patriotic Indonesians" not already in the armed services so as to accelerate the "return" of Irian Barat. When President Sukarno issued the People's Triple Command (*Tri Komando Rakjat*—Trikora) on 19 December 1961, wherein he outlined his three objectives of resisting the formation of an independent Papuan state, raising the Indonesian flag over Irian Barat, and preparing for general mobilization, the PKI seized the opportunity to quantitatively and qualitatively increase the stakes in its political strategy by giving organizational expression to what had hitherto been but a clamour for arms.

Part of the meaning of the "Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism" suggested itself when the PKI, PNI, NU, and other actors consented on 27 December 1961 to establish a new labour front (the Joint Secretariat of Struggling Labourers Realizing the Triple Command or *Sekretariat Bersama Perjuangan Buruh Pelaksanaan Trikomando Rakjat*) to wage the Irian Barat struggle. The other part of the meaning of the "Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism," which was far more ominous and consequential than the mere addition of a new organization to the political landscape, manifested itself in the selection of the motto for the new Joint Secretariat: "Unity-Bear Arms-Production." With this motto, later proudly advertised by the PKI, the Party very subtly let its true intentions be known. By realizing the "state" objective of preparing for general mobilization, the PKI could be sure that its assistance would actually help the Party to redress the outstanding issue of its own armed defence without making this underlying motive explicit or legitimately condemnable.

On the very day that the Joint Secretariat was established, the PKI was presented with a further opportunity to utilize the preferences of the formal state in its own organizational interests. On 27 December 1961, Sukarno issued Presidential Decision No. 658/1961 in which he finally resolved the question of membership in the *Front Nasional*. His decision to permit the entrance of "political groups," (*golongan politik*), "*karya* groups" (*golongan karya*) and "individuals inspired by the Proclamation [of Independence] of 1945" (*perseorangan yang semuanya berjiwa Proklamasi 1945*),[10] brought to an end the TNI's scheme (carried over from the FNPIB which the FN supplanted) to limit representation exclusively to functional or *karya* groups of its own sponsorship. In taking this Decision, Sukarno apparently listened to intense PKI and PNI lobbying to the effect that their support in the FN would bring the struggle for Irian Barat to a successful culmination. While this claim remained to be empirically tested, there was no contesting the virtually immediate effect the Decision had on the TNI's allies already in the FN: they were literally inundated by the influx of millions of new members, including the 10 registered political parties and their organizational families.

At the same time as the Party's "front from above" began to acquire new organizational expression, the PKI Central Committee initiated another mobilizational drive that was premised on widening and then enhancing its organizational grasp with respect to its "front from below." At the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee in December 1961, the Party leadership directed that a new effort, called the Thousand and One Movement (*Gerakan 1001*) be launched, "under which, in a 'thousand and one' different ways, the social and economic position of the peasantry [would be] fortified through production increases while its political consciousness [was] being mobilized."[11] In its very manifoldness, this movement was a squaring or cubing of the cumulative effort, if you will, that was entailed in all the preceding and lesser drives that the Party and its ormas had made into the countryside.

Yet aside from the sheer multiplication of effort advertised by the *Gerakan 1001*, its special characteristic consisted in the fact that the PKI invited no other actor outside its organizational family to participate. Indeed, how could it be otherwise? While the other political parties maintained their own peasant ormas,[12] they were isolated and separate islands of support shrinking in a rising revolutionary sea of Communist supporters and sympathizers. Moreover, it was the PKI, alone among the political parties, that indicated and acted upon its appreciation of what the countryside (where the bulk of the Indonesian population lived) signified in terms of power: the peasantry was onto itself the last and potentially decisive realm of unorganized power. As such, it was among the peasantry that the Party needed to push (outward and downward) the edges of its own state-within-a-state. The *Gerakan 1001*, in conjunction with the "Anti-hunger Command" (*Komando Anti Lapar*) in Central Java, embodied the Party's steely determination to be exceptional by engaging in rural conduct and to become substantively exceptional in harvesting the rural yield.

The PKI's Extraordinary Seventh National Congress (1962)

Despite its mobilizational and organizational successes, which were already apparent in the first months of 1962, even the PKI's accounting of such achievements during the course of its Seventh National Congress (Extraordinary) from 25 to 30 April was a further accomplishment. This point can be made clearly by an examination of the style and content of the Congress as well as the expectations that it raised. With respect to the style of the Congress, the fact that the PKI leadership presented the gathering as "Extraordinary" is quite significant. On the surface, the Congress was Extraordinary because it deviated from the norm of holding such an event once every five years as set out in the Party Constitution (article 36).[13] Instead of adhering to this course of action, the CC authorized the convening of a Congress in a manner consistent with its powers under "extraordinary" circumstances. Yet even in this instance, some reason had to be given for such a decision.

According to Aidit, its was necessary for the Party to stage a National Congress to alter its Constitution to conform to the changes demanded of it (and all other political parties) in Presidential Directive No. 7/1959 and Presidential Regulation No. 13/1960.[14] Both of these Presidential enactments related to Sukarno's and the TNI's efforts, taken very early in the life of Guided Democracy, to control all political parties. The latter measure is particularly significant in that it set out a deadline of 31 December 1960 on or before which political parties would have to conform to the demand for disclosure of personal information on all party members and party finances or face being banned or dissolved.[15] Clearly, the Congress would not have occurred had this condition not been fulfilled. Thus, the public premise of the Congress really had nothing to do with this issue, despite Aidit's statement to the contrary.

As a matter of historical detail, presented by Aidit himself, the PKI fulfilled all the required conditions and was officially permitted by force of Presidential Decision No. 128/1961 to operate as a political party as of 25 April 1961. In this connection, holding the Congress exactly one year later seemed to have more to do with commemorating history than making history. Yet there is ample evidence from other aspects of the style of the Congress to infer that the PKI really intended to make history. For instance, the Congress was suggestively named the "Glorious Unity Congress" (*Kongres Persatuan Djaja*) and its organizers selected "For Democracy, Unity and Mobilization" (*Untuk Demokrasi, Persatuan dan Mobilisasi*) as their directive slogan. In the Indonesian context this was neither an innocuous label nor a common appeal. Bearing in mind the whole range of anti-democratic, disintegrative, and demobilizing measures enacted against the political parties and their ormas in the preceding years, the PKI selected these words to signal its now publicly declared unity of purpose in reversing reality on each and every one of these counts. More than rhetorical appeals, these were words commanding repealing forms of collective action, words commanding the (un)making of recent history.

The defiant attitude embodied in the name and slogan of the Congress was sharply advertised when the Party exulted over the outcome of recent political developments. While in one breath Aidit spoke of the PKI's year-old freedom to function as a political party, in the next he gloated over the fact that the Masjumi and PSI had perished from the political landscape, having been banned under the terms of Presidential Directive No. 7/1959 for their involvement in the PRRI/PRI/Permesta rebellion.[16] Likewise, it was with a sense of relish that Aidit could look back upon the dark days of 1960 and 1961 and at last pronounce incontestably that "the biggest gains in the struggle of the Indonesian trade union movement in years were: *increasing the size of the revolutionary SOBSI trade federation and the failure of the attempt to dissolve that federation by means of the* [Army-inspired] *OPPI and PTK*."[17] Aidit's enthusiasm in pointing out SOBSI's victory over the OPPI and PTK carried him and the Party over a significant threshold: SOBSI and all the other ormas were encouraged to increase their memberships, a stunning appeal in that it "was perhaps the first time that PKI publicly acknowledged its direct involvement in these ostensibly non-Party organizations."[18]

The Party's willingness to exhort, exult, and disclose informed an overall attitude and style of daring. Clearly, at the same time that this disposition was used to foster a closer sense of comradeship among the individual and collective members of the Communist organizational family, it was directed toward imparting a sense of distinctness between this community and other actors. The true extent of this desire to be self-consciously distinct, yet without jeopardizing the Party's underlying National United Front strategy, was revealed by the fact that the Party proceeded with its Congress despite President Sukarno's counsel to the contrary. Indeed, as far back as 23 November 1960, "after consultation with party leaders [Sukarno] had 'specifically stated that in order to fulfil Presidential Decree no. 7, it [was] not necessary to hold a special congress'."[19]

The PKI's determination to act irrespective of Sukarno's advice returns us directly to the issue of the "Extraordinary" characterization given to the Congress. The Congress was not "Extraordinary" because of some procedural deviation, it was extraordinary because its style and, more fundamentally, the fact of its occurrence were provocative. Given that convening the Congress required both mobilizational and organizational skills, and given too that the Congress honoured and exhorted these qualities, the event itself instantiated the basic revolutionary insight of the Aidit leadership: the Party could use method (organization and mobilization) to create content and thus meaning. What better way to demonstrate the insight than by invoking it in a meaningful way against all expectations? Indeed, what better way to show the validity of the insight than by pointing out the consequences of the failure to sustain effective organizations, as in the cases of the Masjumi, PSI, OPPI, and PTK?

Bearing in mind the hard lessons of others, the Congress participants spent the bulk of their time reviewing and reflecting on the Party's progress since the Sixth National Congress in September 1959. The main object of their attention was the Three-Year Plan of Organization and Education, which had begun in April 1960. In conducting their review of the Plan, participants essentially reconnoitred the frontlines that the Party and its ormas had established in their battle to expand their state-within-a-state outward, upward, and downward. The PKI, as the stronghold of this state-within-a-state, had expanded its membership between April 1960 and December 1961 by an impressive 30 per cent.[20] With its total membership now approaching 2 million, of which over 60 per cent were peasants, the PKI was fast becoming the world's largest non-ruling Communist party. As the main standard-bearer of the PKI's struggle during the height of the TNI's anti-party campaign, SOBSI fared well in gaining over 300,000 members in the first year of its own Three-Year Plan of Organization and Education, which had begun on 1 January 1961. More impressive still was Njono's claim at the Congress that SOBSI had no less than 3,100,000 members.[21] Flanking SOBSI and the PKI was the *Pemuda Rakjat*, which now claimed 1,250,000 members.[22] Gerwani, the Communist women's front, was revealed to have grown to over 1 million members.[23] Finally, rounding out the "front from below," the BTI showed that it had advanced formidably and now claimed 4 1/2 million peasant members.[24] Quantitatively speaking, and assuming no overlapping membership, the Communist family had grown by roughly 23 per cent between late 1959 and early 1962, from approximately 9.65 million to 11.85 million members.

Qualitatively speaking, Congress participants revealed that successes had been made in the ideological training given to members of the PKI and its ormas, and in the Party itself greater measures of intra-organizational coordination and coherence were claimed. Djokosudjono, for example, affirmed that in the field of education good results had been obtained: "From among nearly one and a half million Party cadres and activists, from the Central level to that of the Resort, who are already receiving education in basic Marxist-Leninist theory, the problems of the Indonesian Revolution, as well as proletarian philosophy, 25% are now covered . . . one in every 5 members is already educated."[25] Pradigdo, who delivered the public report of the Central Verification Commission, sketched the progress scored by the Party's newest organizational addition, the Control Committee. Aware of the fact that this was the first occasion in which the Committee was being publicly scrutinized, Pradigdo tried to present a picture that spoke to success. He therefore informed his fellow comrades that since 1959 the Party had improved its inner administration, bookkeeping, and use of money, and generally succeeded in its own money-raising productive drives. However, all these areas of organizational life and others, including the collection of dues, keeping inventory, and publicizing *Harian Rakjat*, could—must—be improved. And it is this sweeping recommendation, coupled with the author's admission that not even the Commission's work procedures and composition had been resolved, that makes his report on the Control Commission an important reflection of the qualitative improvement of Party work. This report expressed simultaneously the profound belief that the development (essentially) of a bureaucratic entity would strengthen the Party's cause and prospects, and the equally profound fear or loathing of "bureaucratism."[26] In short, the report reflected collective feelings of commingled excitement and anxiety as the collective began directively, and perhaps clumsily, to acquire an awareness of itself and of how to be aware of itself. In this perplexing state, Pradigdo's report imparts a genuine sense of marvel at the Party's qualitative progress.

On another, more literal, front, the Congress participants reviewed the Party's widening geographical presence and its regional appeal. With respect to the former, there was plenty of good news to celebrate, for the Congress marked the first time in PKI history that delegations from all parts of the country attended such an event.[27] All that remained for the Party to achieve in the days ahead in terms of its geographical presence was to establish Section Committees in the remaining 2 per cent of all cities and regencies, Subsection Committees in the outstanding 3.5 per cent of all sub-districts, and Resort Committees in the 33 per cent of villages the PKI viewed as "empty." In Java, the Party needed to assert its presence in a mere 12 per cent of such villages, its work at higher administrative levels being complete.[28] Mindful of the fact that Irian Barat, which would represent 20 per cent of the Republic's land mass in the event of its "return," was also "empty," Congress participants took the opportunity in their discussions of the *Front Nasional* to advertise their intention to "fill" this territory.[29]

In attempting to expand and consolidate its geographical presence, the Party coupled its organizational drive with an uncharacteristically specific set of demands for the regions whose implications may have seemed contrary to the wider centralizing task it was practising. Among other matters, Aidit urged a return to the law on the equalization of finances, making autonomy as wide and as real as possible, "liquidating" the *Pamong Praja* system and vesting administrative power in regional hands, and proceeding with general elections for national and local representative bodies.[30] Assuming for the moment that these measures were actually realized, it would be unreasonable to believe that the Party would be dissuaded from pursuing its centralizing task anyhow, for these were the conditions that marked the Party's very rise to power in the 1950s. Aidit's proposals for the regions were not new, they were restatements of exactly those official policies and practices of the 1950s that initially promoted the Party's immense mobilizational and organizational success!

By pointing explicitly to the regions as the major theatre for Communist growth, the Aidit leadership did not assume that it could continue its outward and downward growth using the same methods as it had in the past. To its credit, the Aidit leadership appreciated that a centrally directed effort to extend mobilizational and organizational schemes outward and downward to the local level will invariably meet a point at which the sheer volume of detail overwhelms all anticipation, all central planning. Ironically, at this point it becomes necessary to plan to rely upon local discretion. The imperative of acquiescing to local judgement therefore contains within it a prescription for firmer central guidance and clearer central planning, that is, planning that draws it own limits in a planned way. In terms of the Party's state building strategy, the decision to target the regions, as such, heralded a profound and self-conscious change, it became the touchstone of the Party's aspirations and expectations.

This change took the form of what Luhmann has called "reflexivity," the application of a process to itself. In this instance, the Party's application of planning to planning seems to have been premised on a conjunction of considerations that Luhmann makes apparent in his discussion of reflexivity:

> The success of a process is enhanced when it is applied to itself, or to processes of a similar kind, before it fulfills its proper function. Social processes capable of becoming reflexive in this way are always based on a selective manipulation of information, and the success of this selection can be increased once the selective mechanism is itself preselected through a second mechanism of the same kind. Along with this increase in selectivity is an increase in the complexity of the situations that a mechanism can handle—precisely because it distributes the reduction of this complexity into two or more sequential stages.[31]

While Luhmann expresses this series of insights in the disembodied language of functionalism, there is no apparent reason to think that an actor would not or could not deliberately contrive reflexive mechanisms based on the same (but now selfish) considerations of enhanced ability, strategic success, and "making meaningful orientation possible."[32]

An examination of the planning measures discussed at the Seventh Congress readily shows that the Aidit leadership was well aware of these considerations and fully intended to realize each one. To enhance the Party's planning abilities, Party members, candidate members, ormas members, and Committees at all levels were instructed to make their respective regions the main focus of their attention. Resort Committees (CR), which comprised the lowest uniform tier in the Party, were singled out for specific mention and warned that the usual amount of foresight and discipline that informed all the Party's plans would not be sufficient for the new movement outward and downward. The reason for this was that the design of the Plan reached its limits at the level of the CRs. To proceed further with the Plan, it would be necessary to acquire command over greater detail. To acquire detail requires research, and to perform original research one must be a pioneer. To be a pioneer requires pioneering. Thus, to acquire the underlying pioneering spirit that was needed to enhance its planning, the central Party leadership outlined a series of fact-finding and research tasks that would turn the CRs and cadres into pioneers. Theirs was to be a wholehearted commitment to understanding conditions in their areas, gaining an awareness of the total population (especially its class and group composition), and knowing the state and demands of every group, ethnic group, and leading figures.[33]

Being a pioneer in these respects, the PKI greatly appreciated, or rather was able to perceive, the significance of the gap between an ignorance and an awareness of the regions and set out to expand its regional-language publications and the numbers of regional-language speakers among its members.[34] In proclaiming its intentions to use regional languages more widely, however, the Party was sufficiently conscious of its overall objective of realizing its directing idea of Indonesia to also staunchly defend *Bahasa Indonesia*. As the "national" tongue, *Bahasa Indonesia* was the "language of unification and freedom,"[35] that is, the language of unification against and freedom from existing particularisms. If any political actor was to have a working knowledge of such particularisms, the PKI intended to be it, for by moving outward and downward to the regions the Party aimed to acquire brute empirical data, to know more, to know better, simply to know.

The Party leadership aimed to know not only the particular, but also the general. Its great self-assigned challenge in this connection was to synthesize in a meaningful way all the data supplied to it from the PKI's lower organizational reaches and its increasingly self-starting cadres. So as to avoid being inundated by the sheer volume of detail, the leadership appeared to have recognized that a standard of methodological self-awareness would have to found and practised by all. Hence, all Committees were directed to focus themselves on politically significant research ventures, such as calculating the abilities of Party cadres under their jurisdiction, being able to prepare the conditions necessary to realize the Plan locally, and showing a firm command of the Party line and tactics. Even then, Committees were not left alone to judge their work; they were also commanded to heed central instructions and submit appropriate reports in a more diligent, timely, and simple fashion.

Reflexivity in planning was also manifest in the leadership's ambitious scheme to inculcate individual members and candidate members with an awareness in and of planning. In this connection, the Congress was informed that as of 31 December 1961, fully one quarter of all members and candidate members at all organizational levels had acquired an understanding through Cadre Plan Courses (*Khursus*^{2} *Kader Plan*—KP) of the Party's Second Three-Year Plan. In the approximately 30,000 CRs, almost every one now had its own planning functionary; at the sub-district level (CSS), three to five functionaries oversaw the execution of planning responsibilities.[36] These were no small achievements, since the understanding gained was not simply of the political side of the Plan,

> but also from the technical side, how the Plan is arranged, detailed, and implemented in accordance with its political objectives. Little by little, beginning with an understanding of the importance of the two sides [political and technical] of the Plan, the active implementation of the Plan will be promoted, until finally every Indonesian Communist will routinely work according to plan, that is, in a rational and effective way . . .. [N]ot far off is the time when we can fulfill the Party's duty, as declared by Comrade Aidit, [to ensure] that all members and candidate members of the Party be plan-minded.[37]

This condition of being plan-minded, its proponents pointed out, did not secure the virtue of consistency alone. Besides this, it was expected to help solve a glaring feature of the Plan's implementation up to this point in time, and that was the tendency of members and cadres to halt work associated with the Plan when unforeseen circumstances arose.[38] The condition of being plan-minded was to have been the basis for reconciling and unifying Plan work with the unexpected contingencies of daily political existence. The dissemination of plan-mindedness was to turn the PKI into a much more flexible, adaptable, and thinking entity, one whose leaders knew how to increase their planning abilities and gain greater strategic success.

During the course of the Congress itself, the leadership showed its increasing mastery over reflexive mechanisms and the power they may yield by identifying a significant planning problem then planning its solution. First, the leadership identified four areas of the Plan that needed particular attention; they identified the number of Party schools and courses, party and ormas members, and full members, and the amount of membership dues as all needing improvement. Then, it obtained general recognition of these areas as problems by designating them as the subjects of a "Four Increases Movement." Next, the leadership offered an interesting solution:

> In order to implement the 'Four Increases Movement' a separate 'corps of functionaries' was organized at each committee level to be sent down to each subordinate party level organization 'as far down as the groups', and this 'movement to go down to the ranks on a large scale' was designed to interlock with a new program of ideological training in party schools.[39]

Here, we must not fail to appreciate that this solution recognized not one problem, but two. Obviously, the first problem that was recognized related to the need to increase selected educational, organizational, and financial measures. The second problem consisted of the recognition that the solution to the first was itself problematic: it evidenced too great a reliance upon the problem-solving abilities and competencies of the centre. In this respect, the Party's work was unsatisfactory and the central leadership knew it; this was the reason it insisted on ideological training that would create future competencies not only for the centre, but more especially for the regions.

This sense of dissatisfaction may also be seen as having inspired the advocacy of "socialist competition" during the Congress. By socialist competition the Party leadership meant a state of deliberate but healthy contention between equivalent organizational units to realize common goals, in this case, the goals of the Second Three-Year Plan and especially those encompassed by the Four Increases Movement. The deliberate encouragement of contention within the shared framework of the Plan was apparently designed to achieve three results. The first, most obviously, was to meet the targets set out in the Second Three-Year Plan. Now, since this was the Party's objective all along, what special significance, if any, attached to the rallying call of socialist competition? The special significance of socialist competition, at least in regards to achieving Plan results, was that it relieved the centre of having to direct all aspects of the Plan's realization; it spurred and spurred on local initiative.

The shift of responsibility and expectation, from the single centre to a plurality of lesser nuclei, enhanced the latter's interest in, and commitment to, the praxis of the Plan. From this point forward, so long as the competition was joined, a certain measure of flexible self-interest was a necessary and saving aspect of the work of lesser Committees. To the central leadership, the pursuit of such self-interest was safely qualified by the common measures identified in the Plan and in the Four Increases Movement. Any innovating that occurred at lower levels was therefore both circumscribed and measurable, and thus capable of yielding insights on the basis of overall comparisons made by the centre. The indirect but undeniable perfection of method that was fostered through socialist competition can be identified as its second intended result.

The third and perhaps most important result intended by socialist competition was to make "meaningful orientation possible." This objective was suggested by the invitation that was issued to members of the Party's ormas to help it realize its Plan. While this invitation made it appear that the Party was simply interested in enlisting as much labour as possible to realize its goals, there can be no doubt that there was more to this judicious use of resources. The additional significance of the invitation consisted in its grouping of a particular set of resources and actors around a particular set of action tasks. By being particular in this way, the Party leadership could lay the basis in the experience itself for a wider identity among the participants while instantiating what it meant to be an Indonesian Communist at the individual level.

Collectively and individually, meaning and identity derived from action. For the Communist collective, the endless process of "discussion—implementation—control—conclusions, discussion—implementation—control—conclusions, etc." that was entailed by democratic centralism achieved both the integration and the induction of more and more participants in wider and wider circles of territory. Individually, a Communist came to be defined as such by his or her commitment to "better work," "better studies," and "better morality." By "better morality" the Party meant "Communist morality" (*moral Komunis*), which was a commitment to three values in particular: simplicity, integrity, and thrift. These were not typical moral qualities, having little to do with issues of right and wrong; these were the qualities of a soldier, as subtly pointed out by Politburo member Sudisman.[40] These were also the qualities of a pioneer.

Sudisman's equation of Communists with soldiers was a new and consequential axiom in the PKI's revolutionary calculus: if the Party was peopled with "soldiers," then the Party was less a party and more an army. To establish this notion, more so than to comply with official registration requirements for political parties, seems to have been the overriding purpose and accomplishment of the Seventh National Congress. When we recall how much of a struggle it was simply to hold the Congress, we now recognize that its extraordinary quality really had to do with this aspect; it was the first battle in which the PKI recognized itself as an army. The Congress was itself the first victory in, and the signal to commence, a wider campaign. The style, content, and expectations of the event all pointed irrevocably to the initiation of a political war.

Reading like a battle plan, the documents of the Seventh Congress clarified all the important dimensions, save one, of an actor prepared to engage in political warfare. There were statements about the availability of troops (Party members and candidate members plus ormas members) and the state of their preparedness (through ideological training and familiarity with the Plan). There were statements about the appropriate methods of conducting the war. Research and fact-finding expeditions would be conceived and executed at the regional level while the central leadership would endeavour to respond to perceived weaknesses along the generalized frontline with appropriate plans or refinements of plans (such as the Four Increases Movement). Joint operations involving the combined forces of a region would be encouraged (socialist competition). All operations were to be carried out with a high regard for detail and with the expectation that problems of supply and coordination inhere in expansion (as pointed out by the Verification Commission). Finally, there were statements about the objectives of the war.

For the PKI, the war consisted essentially of capturing the hearts and minds of the "people." Since the bulk of the people were peasants living in the regions, this is where the Party ventured to expand the struggle. To traverse these areas and make them its own, the Party resolved at its Congress to approach via the broad avenues of culture and education; taking these routes would help the Party establish a lasting presence while also affording the possibilities of eventually paving narrower and more specialized "service roads" (such as regional Control Committees) or even connecting the main avenues in a sort of "ringroad" of "Indonesian culture."

The one dimension in which this battle plan appeared to be incomplete was arms. There was only muted treatment of this issue, it being relegated to the background in the form of one of the slogans of the Congress—"A hoe in one hand, a rifle in the other"—or an oblique suggestion in connection with the Irian Barat cause. But this was really a non-treatment of the issue. It may be supposed that the Party was simply unwilling to antagonize the Army directly by appealing for arms. For a Party that did little to disguise its new and daring attitude, however, this seems incongruous, an assertion designed less to explain and more to prop up the thesis that the PKI was completely reliant on Sukarno and would not say or ask for anything until he had done so first. What it is more likely is that the PKI leadership took heed of the fact that all other political actors who had resorted to arms since 1949 were crushed or in the process of being so by the Nasution-led TNI. For the Party, drawing this grim conclusion recommended neither its voluntary acquiescence to military dominance nor its zealous and suicidal pursuit of self-armament. Instead, this conclusion, when linked with the shrewd observation that the TNI had used its weapons to seize power, suggested another: the nature of their possession was ambiguous. That is not to say that using them was not decisive, because it was decisively fatal for all who contested the TNI in the medium of arms.

To the PKI leadership, the question of gaining victory in these circumstances had a ready answer: Sudisman's axiom. While the axiom specifically held that the Party was filled with "soldiers," it carried with it the ominous implication that the Party would behave like an army. And an army on the march cannot remain so without weapons. Sudisman's axiom called for weapons, not in the conventional sense of hardware like the TNI's, but weapons in the sense of more soldiers—more Party and ormas members and sympathizers—and greater knowledge of territory and population. By proceeding in this fashion, studiously avoiding any potentially fatal grab for arms per se, the PKI aimed to build itself up as a rival "army."

Predictably, matters would become worse for the Army if it were confronted with a situation that forced the defence of Indonesia from external aggression. Compared to the organized and mobilized bulk under the PKI's direction—an incipient "people's army"—the TNI could then be portrayed by the Party leadership as one unit within the larger "Indonesian army." In circumstances such as these, the TNI's possession of arms would appear as inconsistent with the "needs" of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution," maybe even self-serving. The radical application of Sudisman's axiom would thus put pressure on the TNI to share its arms or permit others to acquire military hardware and, through this very act, eliminate the Army's claim to distinctiveness among Indonesian political actors. Despite its authentically revolutionary character, long manifest in its new state-building endeavours, the TNI would soon be perceived as a conservative force. As such, it would be a lonely island of "reaction" in a revolutionary sea, subject to, if not willing, its own inundation.

Already, during the Seventh Congress, Aidit hinted at this scenario by effecting a major redefinition of the Party's enemies. This redefinition was not spelled out in simple Marxist terms, but in terms of the territory these enemies occupied in the state and in the regions. The PKI singled out "Capitalist Bureaucrats" (*Kapitalis Birokrat*—Kabir) as its main "domestic" opponents, meaning Army officers (ensconced in the nationalized enterprises once belonging to the Dutch) and landlords. That the Party had identified the kabir so precisely, while leaving the identity of landlords subject to its on-going and future research in the regions, reinforces the overall impression that the PKI was keen to escalate its new state building strategy and impart a threatening quality to the Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, however, by judiciously refraining from expressly and publicly identifying the TNI as one of its main opponents, the Party cheated the Army of a discernible target against which to use its arms. Thus, despite the fact that the Army knew the Party had nothing with which to fight, the Party knew better: the Army had no one, especially itself, against whom it could legitimately fight.

The perfect application of Sudisman's axiom was not only designed to deprive the TNI of any reasonable ability to use its arms, or to find a target in the PKI, it was crafted to have a highly corrosive effect on the Army's own strategy of sovereignty through "national development." In this connection, the PKI's self-assigned challenge was to disillusion the populace about "national development." To disillusion a populace is no simple achievement. This is so because the action of deliberately disillusioning masses of people depends upon a series of presumptions, each of which prescribes a specific and ancillary activity. To presume the possibility of disillusioning a target populace presumes also that that populace is illusioned, that one can expose the illusions in a meaningful way, that one can present a meaningful picture of reality, and that the audience is amenable to such a presentation. To deliberately disillusion a target populace logically requires that its agent engage in at least four kinds of activity. First, the agent must be involved in self-education to recognize the condition of illusion. Second, the agent must exercise a local and national presence to be able to identify the incongruences between the reality of people's lives and the idealized schemes other actors use to characterize or direct mass existence. Exposing such incongruences through further research constitutes a distinctive and third activity. Fourth, the agent must bridge the gap between people's lives and its own directing idea either through teaching, indoctrination, or some other form of constructive directed activity.

The PKI found in the empirical fact of worsening social conditions the fuel that would propel it from its presumptive stance to dynamic and all-encompassing action; the "1001 Movement" was the vehicle specifically designed to use this fuel. To set the Movement in motion, the central leadership avoiding prescribing or prioritizing any one action. Rather, it was left to local Communist initiative, usually at the Resort level, to conceive of the appropriate action for the circumstances, that is, to arrive at and effect a situationally specific solution to some pressing local problem. The solution itself bore witness to the incongruity between the affected people's lives and "national development." As more and more of these solutions were found and implemented, the Party hoped that a decisive political impression would take hold at the popular level. That impression was explicit in the very name of the Party's movement: so very much could be done to improve people's lives, perhaps as many as 1001 things.

This impression conveyed a contrast that the PKI was eager to draw between itself and the Army: of the two, the Party could make a greater difference to people's lives. The Party's concern with the welfare of the "Indonesian people" may have been manifestly mundane, as revealed by the interest cadres showed in the proper construction of irrigation ditches, in effective ways to combat rodents, and in a myriad of other unglamorous tasks, but that was exactly its political virtue. The PKI was down to earth, in attitude and in practice. Unlike the TNI and the "state," the Party could substantiate its claim to be concerned with the welfare of the "Indonesian people." The Party could direct the improvement of livelihoods because it was there, its presence and its achievements were tangible. Where it was not, it planned to go by pushing forward with research; where it was not, it soon would be. In this sense, the PKI's outward and downward movement depended upon the momentum of its own action.

Taking reference from its own action, the Party could do little to disguise the indeterminate nature of its forward motion. Its every effort continued to be characterized as part of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution," as a step toward "Indonesian socialism," or as some manifestation of the "Indonesian identity." The Party told itself and others that it was scoring victories, but no sense was conveyed of when a definitive or culminating victory was in the offing. As in the past, there were simply more challenges ahead; the front lines would continue to be pushed outward and downward. However, in the wake of Aidit's appraisal of the Party's political standing at the Seventh Congress, there seemed to be a concentration of effort on surrounding a few strongholds, a subtle hint that the political war had an end. It was this possibility of an ending, and more especially of bringing about an ending, that addressed the sense of lingering that must have accompanied the Party's necessarily vague pronouncements about its own position and movement.

By identifying capitalist bureaucrats and landlords as the Party's remaining "domestic" enemies, Aidit had selected targets whose destruction uniquely suited the fulfilment of an advanced new state building strategy. By this, I mean to suggest that the overwhelmingly tangible or spatial quality of the Party's outstanding enemies was not incidental to the furtherance of its strategy, but essential. It was essential to identify Party enemies on the basis of the space they occupied or in which they operated because this was what registered within the Party's resource-centred field of political vision. In a sense, then, the Party's own expansion had carried these other actors into the lights of its forward movement. They had to be addressed for the same reasons that permitted their identity; they were pockets of resources that were beyond the control of or opposed to the PKI.

Unlike its treatment of other pockets of resistance, such as those controlled by the *Darul Islam Indonesia* or the *Republik Maluku Selatan*, the PKI could not simply encourage the violent appropriation of the space occupied by the capitalist bureaucrats and landlords. The Party was undeterred by this impossibility, however, and opted to surcharge its forward momentum with the argument that the only genuine development was "Indonesian socialism," which could only commence when all the obstacles in the "people's" path had been overcome. Since the Party held bureaucratic capitalists and landlords to be among these obstacles, it was logical for them to be pressed politically. With this argument, the Party had found a solution to more than one of its problems. First, it found a way to continue pursuing its resource-gathering strategy without having to adopt characterizations of conditions or opponents that entailed firm definitions of "Indonesian" substance or meaning. Second, it found a way to relate the many activities it was undertaking in the context of the 1001 Movement to a more general objective, thereby helping it to combat or limit the tendency toward fissiparousness that inheres in a myriad of locally initiated endeavours. By relating such small efforts to a wider enterprise that promised eventual and "genuine" development of the whole, the Party also created a demand at the popular level for its own equipment of the knowledge and skills that would be necessary to solve problems and to solve them within a context of development. This political stance helped to keep the PKI attentive to the realities of popular life and away from any ideological delusions of the same, a solution to a third problem. Arising from this reinforced commitment to hug the ground of empirical reality, the Party could be content that it had found a way to cope with the indeterminateness of its political position; it was not a matter of finding a persuasive reason for doing the work ahead, it was a matter of being pushed by the momentum already gained and already building upon itself.

In this light, the PKI's inability to secure arms in connection with the "liberation" of Irian Barat hardly effected its prospects. As it turned out, even before the Seventh National Congress was held, the Irian Barat campaign was being decisively shaped by actors other than the Party and its Nasakom partners and in ways that would cut short any possibility of turning it into a truly popular struggle. The TNI rightly regarded the Irian Barat affair as alarming, especially to its own well laid plans, and acted from the moment Sukarno issued his Trikora to prevent the PKI's enjoyment of any benefits from this obvious breach to its own attempted circumscription. Within the shadow of the Supreme Command for the Liberation of Irian Barat (*Komando Tertinggi Pembebasan Irian Barat*), established by Sukarno in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the Army moved resolutely to secure operational control for itself. The Army acquired this control through the person of one of its officers, Major-General Suharto, who became the commander of the Area Command for the Liberation of Irian Barat (*Komando Mandala Pembebasan Irian Barat*).

While the Army seemed interested in showing its military keenness, not least by secretly infiltrating troops into Irian Barat even before the Area Command was established on 11 January 1962, other aspects of its actions showed a profound reluctance to allow the Irian Barat cause to escalate beyond its control. In addition to its (successful) efforts to ensure that the millions of registered volunteers neither saw Irian Barat nor combat, the Army leadership actively enticed the United States into mediating the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands. In any event, the Army seemed certain that the narrow definition it was giving to the military aspect of the campaign and the behind-the-scenes nature of diplomacy itself could effectively limit or exclude any meaningful PKI participation.

Ultimately, the Army succeeded in keeping arms out of the PKI's hands while helping to win the "return" of Irian Barat, but its own ineptness in the field and its encouragement of US mediation were skilfully used by the PKI to deprive the TNI of much credit. The Army's efforts to infiltrate troops, for instance, "were far from successful" as they "were easily picked up by Dutch security forces."[41] More embarrassing yet was the breakdown of security revealed by an (unsuccessful) assassination attempt on Sukarno in Makassar, a military staging area, on 8 January 1962. Finally, due to the utter failure of military coordination and discipline, the acting chief of the Indonesian Navy, Commodore Sudarso, was killed in a failed attempt to invade Irian Barat on 15 January 1962. The Army's subsequent recourse to US mediation met with brazen attacks by *Pemuda Rakjat* activists on US targets, including its embassy in Jakarta on 5 February 1962 and its consular office in Surabaya on 16 February 1962.

While neither the PKI nor the TNI could claim sole authorship of the agreement on Irian Barat that was reached between Indonesia and the Netherlands on 15 August 1962, the peace that would now prevail heralded profoundly different consequences for each. These consequences were shaped by the terms of the agreement. The agreement called for an orderly transition of authority over Irian Barat, first, from the Dutch to the United Nations (specifically the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority—UNTEA) on 1 October 1962, then, from UNTEA to Indonesia on 1 May 1963. Thereafter, in 1969, an "Act of Free Choice" would be held in which the Irianese could choose finally between independence or continued membership in the Indonesian Republic. On these terms, the military aspects of Indonesia's Irian Barat campaign were complete. This premise, together with unmistakable evidence that TNI operations against the DI and the PRRI/Permesta had already clinched victory, suggested that the emergency conditions confronted by the Republic had at last been overcome. At the same time, and by way of contrast, the political campaign to "welcome" the Irianese "back to the Motherland" and to consolidate the "Indonesian identity" within a larger and more real *Republik Negara Indonesia* was just beginning. In short, victory for the TNI meant the end to its powers under the SOB,[42] while victory for the PKI, which had not staked its strategy on securing arms anyhow, meant further opportunities to implement the Sudisman axiom. In this manner, the peace that the Army had helped to win renewed the more vital struggle for sovereignty between itself and the PKI, not least because the Army had some political catching up to do.

The Return to the "State": The Army's Second Attempt at "National Development"

If the Irian Barat cause had fostered in the PKI a determination to become more like an army, towards the end of the crisis and afterwards there were unmistakable signs that the Army was possessed of a similar but opposite determination, that is, to become more like the PKI as a massive and genuinely popular political entity. The Army leadership, along with its civilian allies, recognized that through the Irian Barat cause the PKI had scored absolute political gains at its own expense, for "national development" had absolutely not received the attention or resources it was due in policy from either the "state" or the Army for more than a year. From the Army's perspective, the political competition between itself and the Party had grown decidedly closer and it was time to widen the gap, indeed, to attempt to lap the PKI within "national development" once again. Therefore, despite the predictable loss to its power that would be entailed by the end of emergency conditions, the Army leadership did not find its second attempt at "national development" to be an unwelcome prospect. Indeed, every pretence had to made that this was the only way for the "on-going Indonesian Revolution," the only activity deserving of the Army's and the "state's" attention.

Importantly, the Army's decision to re-engage "national development" had, in a sense, already been made for it by the PKI. By mid-1962, thanks mainly to the PKI's ability to make the Irian Barat issue a compelling priority, the Army simply had not had the opportunity to try realizing development schemes on the ground. Despite the economic deterioration that continued to manifest itself during this time, the Army was saved from turning in any developmental results, good or bad, and, as such, its interest in this strategy was not put into question. Indeed, the very opposite result obtained because of the delaying effects of the Irian Barat campaign: "national development," as the Army's strategy of sovereignty, was put beyond question. In both a strategic and tactical sense, the Army could not wait to busy itself and the whole of "Indonesian society" in this activity.

While delay and socio-economic deterioration increased the Army's impatience to begin "national development," this very response pushed the TNI into a position where it was unwilling to advertise its own fundamental presumption. The Army presumed that it was imperative for itself and the body of officialdom making up the "state" to address the socio-economic circumstances not simply because they revealed a dire condition, but more importantly because they were perceived as posing a threat to the existing order. The presumption made was that the worsening situation reflected the weaknesses of an existing state order, rather than being the manifest evidence that there was no such order. Such a presumption meant ignoring the evidence, accumulating since late 1961, that the PKI had made the sharpest of political points by organizing and expanding its own sphere of power and using it *inter alia* to prick the pretension that a real state existed; the TNI's strategy was being deflated to a literal and conceptual baselessness to which its leadership seemed oblivious.

"National Development" and the "State" as Articles of Faith

By renewing its commitment to "national development" as a strategy of sovereignty, however, the TNI put the presumption of order beyond question. With this, the Army freely enveloped itself in a world of officialdom that lacked any independent fundamental connection to, or grounding in, empirical political reality. In this new, post-Irian Barat environment, the Army seemed content largely to pretend that the feat of making itself part of the "state" also and automatically meant that it could direct the state and that the state could achieve directed results. Yet to believe these things was necessarily an act of political faith, since only those sharing in this faith could look at the increasing distance between official appearances and unofficial realities and still believe that "national development" could span them both.

From the Army's perspective, believing in "national development" seemed to entail disbelieving that a series of changes effected by President Sukarno during and after the Irian Barat campaign had in any way impaired the possibility of realizing its strategy. The first major change came in June 1962, when Nasution accepted Sukarno's invitation to fill the revived post of Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff.[43]

Nasution was apparently misled into believing that his new position, originally called Armed Forces Commander, wielded more power than that of the Army Chief-of-Staff (a role which he was required to relinquish to his Second Deputy, Major-General Ahmad Yani) and was itself the embodiment of the long-sought unification of the Indonesian Armed Forces. In neither instance were Nasution's expectations borne out as Sukarno manoeuvred to reduce him to "little more than the administrative head of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces staff,"[44] where the latter now included the Police, much to the Army's chagrin. These changes spoke to Sukarno's greater influence over the operational control of all the armed services.

Elsewhere, in the Cabinet and in the "state," Sukarno moved quickly and unambiguously to expand his influence, mainly at the expense of Nasution personally and the Army collectively. In March 1962, Nasution was left out of the presidium of the Cabinet; in July he was replaced by Yani in the Assistant Body to the Supreme War Authority (*Badan Pembantu Peperti*) and thereafter had no voice in the administration of SOB powers. Collectively, the Army was the target of a series of administrative readjustments at the "state" level that aimed to assert civilian (meaning Sukarno's) dominance. In quick succession, the military was subordinated to civilian control in the economic, "state," and "revolutionary" spheres through the formation of the Supreme Command for Economic Operations (*Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi*—Kotoe) in mid-1962, the Committee of Seventeen in October 1962, and the Consultative Body Assisting the Leadership of the Revolution (*Musjawarah Pembantu Pimpinan Revolusi*—MPPR) in December 1962, respectively.[45] Despite the inclusion of the top five military Cabinet ministers in the MPPR, alongside the chairmen of PNI, NU, and PKI, and four civilian ministers,[46] Pratignyo's observation that the Body heralded a new and civilian order sums up the deflating fate of the Army, even at the formal level, during the course of the year.[47] Perhaps not surprisingly, the year 1963 began with the MPPR assuming responsibility for administering martial law up to May 1, when the SOB would formally end.

The culmination of the Army's desire to reinforce the impression of an orderly setting—the only kind of setting in which its leadership believed "national development" could unfold—was to actively encourage what it perceived as the definite establishment of a political centre. In this connection, the Army promoted Sukarno himself by consenting in the MPRS's official decision to elevate him to President-for-Life on 18 May 1963.[48] Above all, the sense of finality that could be expected to attend such an action served to reinforce the Army's belief that it was at last realizing the proper environment for its chief concern, its strategy of sovereignty. Unfortunately for the Army, this belief precluded the possibility of it seeing that it was not assisting in the definite consolidation of a real state so much as it was being used by Sukarno in the unwitting elaboration, if not celebration, of his own position. Because of its own presumption of, or pretension to, normalcy based on the formal "state," Sukarno, as the highest spokesman of this "state," could easily persuade the Army to agree with him in advancing what appeared to be the consolidation of the *Negara Republik Indonesia*.

In reality, the Army's cooperation was used to bring about the final details of the involution of the formal state around its self-appointed centre—Sukarno himself.

Thus, it was not the case that the Indonesian "state" was being anchored to a popular-territorial base, rather, it was assuming the status of a whorl with Sukarno at its centre, essentially static in relation to the revolutionary and swirling mass around it, moving only from involution to involution within itself. The Army was being drawn into the central but deceptive pretence of a real order. As such, the Army ignored not only the political injury that was being inflicted upon it by Sukarno within this very sphere, but evidence that the official sphere showed little substantive coherence beyond Sukarno and his immediate entourage. For instance, the Cabinet, which was supposed to function as the President's main team of advisors, had been reformed in March 1962 with the intent of realizing this ideal.[49] At that time, a new distinction was drawn between first deputy and ordinary ministers in what "appeared to be a rational hierarchy culminating in a comparatively compact leadership."[50] Unfortunately, it was the strength of individual personalities that characterized the operation of the Cabinet and not the official plan. Moreover,

> the eight deputy first ministers did not themselves operate as an inner Cabinet. Regular meetings were discontinued and effective decisions on important questions tended to be passed to the President. There was no collective policy, and it [was] no secret that the general views of [Prime Minister] Djuanda himself were different from those of his colleagues and the President on a number of issues—making him perhaps the only Prime Minister in the world who [disagreed] with the policies of his government![51]

Not surprisingly, the much wider body of Indonesian officialdom whose pinnacle was drawn in to the Cabinet also exhibited some of its alarming features. For instance, similar effects manifested themselves within departments as arose in the Cabinet when a distinction was drawn between ordinary and extra-ordinary staff members. In the case of departments, the institution of secretaries-general (permanent professional functionaries) was increasingly overrun by the more partisan principal assistants of the minister (*pembantu utama*). As the phenomenon spread, so too did the dependency of the whole department upon its minister, and especially on the minister's policy (*politik menteri*). This dependency, where "even the most minor decisions [had] to wait for the minister personally," was reinforced by the fact that "legal checks on them were in most cases extremely weak."[52] Indeed, the only check upon ministers was political, namely Sukarno's influence, but other than this they did as he did and that was enjoy a virtually unqualified "freedom from institutionalized controls." This condition extended

> to a large number of other officeholders—military commanders, heads of state enterprises, regents, prosecutors, and so on. Each of these men had very wide freedom of action within his own sphere as long as he was assured of protection from others who were more powerful.[53]

Hence, the compelling demand from within the "state" for (at least) the appearance of an all—powerful "state."

Behind this facade, and despite the deceptive substantiation the formal state enjoyed due to the TNI's territorial successes during 1962, there was a dynamic at work that overwhelmed even the most zealous efforts undertaken by Sukarno and the Army in the late 1950s to set the administrative machinery of "Guided Democracy" in order. Ironically, it was because of, rather than in spite of, their efforts to pry the formal administration from the political parties' hands, impose discipline in the bureaucratic grades, and give to the "state's" servants a new purpose in "national development" that the administrative service became more politicized,

> for as the powers of parties and parliament declined there ceased to be a clearly delineated political sphere in which conflicts could be resolved. Thus a pattern emerged in which no barriers existed between politics . . . and administration . . ..
>
> As the job of the bureaucrats became more and more one of choosing between policies as well as implementing policies chosen, so battles between rival cliques and 'empires' within the bureaucracy grew in importance . . .. senior civil servants . . . were drawn into political conflict by their very determination to move ahead with their programmes, for they found that they could not obtain the resources which these programmes required without support in key places. It was this which forced them to concentrate on building and maintaining their political positions and those of their agencies, and to make their appointments and promotions with a view to this rather than to rewarding efficient performance of tasks.[54]

While the Indonesian "state" suffered from an overall lack of coherence and direction, a particular department or bureaucratic "empire" might be narrowly decisive; on balance, though, as Legge observed in early 1963, the "state's" "real authority falls short of its claims. Its power to control and direct, to cope with the problems of the economy, to stop the renewal of smuggling, or to prevent corruption, appears to have declined."[55]

Attempting to realize genuine "national development" in these circumstances seemed a dubious proposition, but the Army, its impatience surcharged by the Irian Barat campaign, was undaunted and doubly determined to shield itself behind, while strengthening, the "state" to counter PKI gains. To this end, between August 1962 and mid-1963, the Army diligently shaped official Government policy to reflect the new priority of "national development." The first official measure that seemed to signal Indonesia's seriousness about moving down this path took the form of a regulation governing foreign investment or "production sharing."[56] This regulation, first publicized on 3 August 1962, was significant as much for its precise content as for the political advertisement it sent abroad regarding Indonesia's changing attitude toward foreign capital and its abandonment of an earlier preoccupation with nationalization. Another part of the effort to show Indonesia's desire for development took the form of loud and widely publicized pronouncements of budgetary cuts in spending on defence and security. The Prime Minister, Dr. Djuanda, foresaw a 47 per cent cut in military spending for 1963; Nasution, speaking early in that year, anticipated a reduction of 75 per cent.[57] While such steps were a logical outcome of the effort to "regain" Irian Barat, their size was certainly staggering and suggested a spirit of veritable sacrifice on the part of the armed services' leadership.

Whether it was the weight of senior civilian and military opinion about the necessity of "national development," the concrete steps already taken in this direction, or the absence of any distracting "anti-colonial" and "anti-imperialist" projects that informed President Sukarno's intervention on this issue or not, his Economic Declaration (*Deklarasi Ekonomi*—Dekon) of 28 March 1963 gave the Army's strategy an apparently irresistible political momentum. This outcome was perhaps attributable more to the honesty of the statement than to any immediately realizable and concrete results.

For instance, the Declaration indirectly acknowledged through its outline of "the method by which the [Eight-Year Development] Plan was to be put into effect" that no method had existed prior to that moment and therefore, logically, no development had really occurred. While pointing ambitiously toward the future, Sukarno also pointed accusingly to the past and admitted, in a manner quite at odds with the official Indonesian standard of dissimulation, that the economy had hitherto "been neglected in favour of 'Nation and Character Building'," and that earlier leadership "only pressed down and kept the people's potentials and creative processes from developing."[58] Despite the fact that for a brief moment these two admissions pierced the pretension of Sukarno's and his Government's political position, their honesty helped to transform the Dekon from being just another Presidential address into a veritable truth of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution," equal in ideological authority to the Political Manifesto of August 1959. Accordingly, those for whom "national development" was being prescribed were expected to believe that the Government and "state" could "surmount with concentrated strength the problems of the country's economy in their entirety."[59]

At the very least, some of the provisions within the Declaration, especially those dealing with the private sector, entrepreneurs, foreign capital, and state enterprises, gave to the whole of this endeavour a measure of promise commensurate with its accommodation of the "objective criteria of commerce," that is, to the profit motive and competition. Equal to these concessions to non-state actors and forces, however, the Declaration was an expression of the same mindset of "politics-first" that had guided its author through his Presidency; Sukarno reiterated that "we [Indonesians] cannot develop if development is not discussed politically and with political objectives as well."[60] In other words, the Declaration derived part of its significance—perhaps the larger part in Sukarno's mind—from the President's "conviction that the ideal 'Indonesian socialist economy' could be achieved only after the total destruction of feudalism and imperialism (*Oldefo* [Old Forces]) abroad as well as within Indonesia."[61] To this end, a new body was created to realize the Dekon within its wider "revolutionary" setting, the National Development Planning Body, *Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional*—Bappenas.[62]

In translating the Dekon into reality, Sukarno's subordinates in the "state" and Government chose to ignore the thick revolutionary gloss that he had painted over it by enunciating a series of reform measures for immediate implementation. These 14 measures, called the "May Regulations," were publicized by the First Minister, Dr.

Djuanda, on 26 May 1963. Djuanda's intent was to combat the mounting problem of inflation through adjustments to existing wage and price policies. Economic stabilization was to be purchased, among other things, through a reduction of subsidies on basic commodities and transportation, an increase in export incentives, and an all-round freeing of the market mechanism. The fact that at least some of these measures (dealing with commodities and transportation) had an immediate effect showed both that Sukarno's revolutionary romanticizing could be put aside and that the strategy of "national development" could begin to shape people's lives. To have achieved the latter result, however tentative, brought the Army and the "state" in which it was ensconced to an unprecedented political crossroad.

Through the action of economic reform, the Army and the "state" had succeeded in causing an effect over a popular-territorial medium. Effectively, pursuing economic reform had promoted the stability that is necessary for the creation or closedness of a shared whole while, at the same time and by dint of this achievement, the action itself acquired the quality of meaningfulness that can only be conferred from those sharing the same whole. In other words, the Army's meaning-creating strategy of "national development" was finally realizing the first signs of meaningfulness that can only be manifested at the popular level. In this sense, the quality of "Indonesianness" that the Army leadership had long sought to realize, and about which it intended to be increasingly authoritative from its position within the "state," was acquiring a measure of reality for the first time.

In favour of such a beginning was the fact that Sukarno's elevation to President-for-Life and the announcement of the 14 Regulations occurred within little more than a week of each other. This was a (perhaps not so coincidental) coincidence that lent the impression that the Indonesian "state" was now more secure than ever before. Indeed, if the "state" appeared more certain, then so, too, did the prospect of "national development." Any gain for the one, so the impression was given, would be a gain for the other. This neat coupling had the virtue of being mutually reinforcing, since favourable developmental results would put both the unreality of the "state" and the strategic nature of "national development" beyond political questioning. At the same time, the results would eliminate any alternatives to the developmentally dedicated "state" and a "national" devotion to "development"—outright expressions of the Army's directing idea of state. In this way, the action of "development" would also yield a specific, substantive outcome; the Army's deliberate setting of the bearing of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution" meant that it would arrive at one port, as it were, to the exclusion of others. In this connection, the May Regulations seemed to signal that the Indonesian ship of state (the formal state) had at last been launched, that is, it was now under its own power as well as the uncontested captaincy of its one pilot, Sukarno.

The Army and the Indonesian Ship of State

While this tidy and comforting image may have been the one that the Army sought to advertise, there can be no doubt that below deck—in reality—the Indonesian ship of state was vitally dependent upon the provisions (resources) of others in regards its fuel and its engine. Indeed, the fuel for this undertaking was, at least initially, to be of foreign origin; the engine for which this fuel was destined was the mechanism of the Army's own state-within-a-state. Receiving foreign fuel, or capital, for Indonesia's developmental endeavours was not accidental, but rather essential to their design. "Beyond doubt or argument," Tan has asserted, the Eight Year Overall Development "Plan's viability depended on an official policy reasonably attractive to overseas investors, and the Indonesian Government of the time knew it."[63] The first injection of capital came in the form of the "production-sharing" agreements that were authorized beginning in August 1962. The second, and apparently more significant, capital injection came in the wake of the publicization in August 1962 of the Humphrey Report, written by an American Economic Survey Team sent to Indonesia to examine the Eight-Year Overall Development Plan.[64] This report apparently emboldened Indonesian authorities to take the measures they did in May 1963, confident that they could avail themselves of a "stabilization credit of $400 million" being held by the International Monetary Fund.[65] In this, the military designers of the Indonesian ship of state seemed to have anticipated the commotion that accompanies all launches.

Likewise, below deck, these same designers seemed to have recognized both the scale and the detail that must be attended to in giving a vessel political momentum. Here, mainly under pressure of the PKI's own demonstrable capacity to impart shape and direction to the "on-going Indonesian Revolution," the Army's political engineers effected a remarkable, year-long expansion and fine-tuning of their state-within-a-state. While this political work generally reflected the Army leadership's answer to the question of how to survive politically (when they could no longer rely on the powers of the SOB or the conditions that made them necessary), its four parts were more specifically related to the tasks of propelling, commanding, peopling, and managing the ship of state. It is in this connection that we may gain a better understanding of why the Army would, after Irian Barat, seem to pretend that the formal state was capable of achieving "national development" when all the evidence pointed to the opposite outcome; ultimately, the Army's reasoning seems to have been that any burdens or expectations placed upon the state in the context of "development" would have to be communicated below deck, to the engine room and to itself, anyhow. The virtue of dwelling below deck was that the dirty work of generating and imposing political momentum was generally not exposed for all to see.

Thus, the Army's first task was to position itself as the battery for "national development," to be the source of manpower, momentum, and direction. It did so chiefly by fashioning a peacetime role for itself through the conceptual and practical frameworks of "Territorial Management" (*Pembinaan Wilajah*) and "Civic Missions" (*Civic-Mission*). Second, the Army created an internal communications and command system between itself and top-deck officers (junior and senior state ministers and bureaucrats) through training and indoctrination programmes that amounted to incipient patterns of governance. Third, the Army actively recruited passengers as well as encouraged all others to book passage. Here, great efforts were made to fashion an Indonesian society alike but opposed to the PKI's "front from below."

Finally, Army leaders deliberately attempted to exclude fellow-travellers of the "Indonesian revolution," stow-aways, vagabonds, and potential mutineers among the officer-corps and the passengers already on-board. In this respect, the intellectual and organizational articulation of the *karyawan* identity signalled that the wider "Indonesian Revolution" was being divided into two separate, conscious, and increasingly opposed compartments. Each of these aspects of the Army's political work between mid-1962 and mid-1963 may be reviewed in turn.

With the dawning of a peaceful settlement to the Irian Barat issue, shown by the first light of US mediation in March 1962, the Army leadership moved overnight to fashion a new role for its state-within-a-state that would outlast the SOB and carry it into eventual sovereignty. The formalized expression of this new role was Territorial Management, which Army information sources advertised to be the logical peacetime counterpart of Territorial Warfare. Briefly, the concept of Territorial Management contained an imperative, described as a "philosophy": "Territorial Management must create and develop a social structure in Indonesian society which will be capable of mastering conditions before, during, and after a war. It must be carried out using radical and revolutionary measures . . ."[66] Territorial Management was intended to be exhaustive in scope in that it called for a "total utilization of national forces" covering the "spiritual," "material," and "war management" fields. The sum total of the forces and resources drawn from these fields would be used to inform the preparation, execution, and termination of a war between Indonesia and any opponent. In short, Territorial Management was expected "to achieve and maintain a national defence potential before, during, and after a war."[67]

Notwithstanding arguments about the logical association between Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, the latter was at least equally a response to the political situation on the ground confronting the Army in 1962 as it was a reflection of systematic doctrinal thinking. Indeed, when the MPRS formally embraced the notion of Territorial Warfare in late 1960 (and then only as a "second line of defence"), there were no explicit traces to be found of the concept of Territorial Management; only in 1962 was the concept publicized beyond the confines of the Seskoad itself. In this connection, the sudden and discrete appearance of Territorial Management related to the Army's imminent and eventual victory over the DI/TII in West Java in June 1962, which was coupled with the longstanding worry that precisely such successes would promote the political marginalization of the Army. Territorial Management was a concept designed, therefore, to widen the Army's competencies beyond its familiar and well-established military credentials to include an explicitly developmental expertise that would, hopefully, guarantee it a role in any post-bellum order.

That this was the objective of Territorial Management is apparent in the formation in early 1962 of a sixth section of the Army General Staff, and in the "rediscovery" of the Army's social mission in the wake of the destruction of the DI/TII. Nasution established a Special Section for the Army's Extra-Military Functions (*Seksi Khusus Urusan Karya Angkatan Darat*—SUAD VI)[68] in the Army General Staff in March 1962. Interestingly, this decision was taken and implemented in advance of a formal declaration of the scope and content of Territorial

Management. In other words, Nasution equipped the Army with an additional organizational arm before there was a corresponding and articulated rationalization (outside of a sheer desire to survive politically) for this addition. SUAD VI had to await developments on the ground before it was given any meaningful tasks.

The opportunity to dedicate SUAD VI arose in part in connection with the wider successes enjoyed by the TNI against the DI/TII in West Java. Beginning in April–May 1962, the Army began to practice some of the doctrinal refinements worked out at Seskoad "which linked military operations with Territorial Management in order to win popular support." "At the local level," in West Java, "the change of doctrine was reflected in a new, respectful, attitude toward the population, the avoidance of brutalities and exactions, and participation in the social and religious life of the villagers."[69] By early June 1962, the DI/TII leader S.M. Kartosuwirjo had been captured and his movement virtually annihilated.

Pauker concluded definitively that this achievement "was aided by the doctrinal rediscovery of the role of popular support in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations" that the TNI had emphasized during the course of the "Indonesian Revolution."[70] What is curious about this claim, and about his additional claim that "strange as it may seem, the lessons of those years [1945–49] had apparently been forgotten between 1950 and 1958,"[71] is that this "rediscovery" actually occurred while the author of such doctrines and practices—Nasution—was the Army Commander-in-Chief. Given Nasution's longstanding conviction in popular support, it is untenable to assert that Territorial Management amounted to a "rediscovery." Rather, this concept and its deployment reflected the increasing pressure on the Army to reconcile itself to, or seek out, closer affinities with civilians in light of the PKI's political fortunes, and not its own imagined past. That Pauker was forced to admit that he did not know "whether this policy [of Territorial Management] played an important role in the termination of the PRRI-PERMESTA rebellions," that is, in events that had occurred a mere year earlier, shows how recent was its birth. The defeat of the DI/TII publicly marked this event and necessarily had an animating effect on SUAD VI.

This effect arose in the wake of the Army leadership's conscious effort to generalize on the perceived relationship between popular support and the Army's military fortunes in West Java. In fighting the DI/TII, the Siliwangi Division had practised a methodical counterinsurgency programme that emphasized "civic action." The intent of this action was to confront the opponent in its strongholds and to win popular support in proportion to civilian need. The needs of civilians were met by large-scale assistance that took the form mainly of repairing infrastructure, including official, educational, and religious buildings and even agricultural lands. On the basis of the perhaps surprisingly quick demise of the DI/TII, the Army leadership realized the wider importance of the relationship it had discovered:

> The argument was developed that if national defence policy relied on a concept of popular resistance (perlawanan rakjat), then community development (pembangunan desa) was needed not only in areas stricken by the rebellions of past years but everywhere in the country. Such community development efforts

> became particularly urgent under the specific political circumstances then prevailing.[72]

Accordingly, SUAD VI was assigned in part the responsibility for formulating the all-encompassing and seemingly limitless "extra-military" function called for by community development.

Being "extra-military" meant being civilian, and it was distinctly to this realm that the TNI directed its doctrinal efforts in the last several months of 1962. The objective of these efforts was to conceive of an explicitly civilian counterpart to Territorial Management. Ironically, in realizing this objective, the TNI received an important measure of US military assistance.[73] This assistance arrived conspicuously at the very same time as the Americans were busy persuading "state" officials about the desirability of "development." Thus, in response to a request made jointly by Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff/Minister of Defence General Nasution and Army Chief-of-Staff Major-General Yani, a US Inter-Agency Civic Action Survey Team visited Indonesia in September–October 1962. As a result of this visit, and in-house deliberations at Seskoad that occurred through the Fall, the TNI, in conjunction with the other armed services, succeeded in formulating a sweeping peacetime role for itself.

Formally, this role was expressed as the "Work Operation of the Armed Forces" (*Operasi Karya Angkatan Bersendjata*), which included "Civic Missions" (*Civic-Mission*) conducted by the TNI in the context of Territorial Management. By Presidential Decree No. 371, issued on 3 December 1962, Sukarno made the Work Operation an integral part of Government development policy:

> In carrying out development projects in the fields of Production and Distribution, the Government makes use of the availability of the units of the Armed forces, as a SKILLED, SEMI SKILLED and UNSKILLED force to assist in the implementation of said projects . . ..
>
> The Work Operation of the Armed forces concerns: a. on the Central level: national projects included in the program of the respective Departments in the fields of Production and Distribution; b. on the Regional level: regional and village rehabilitation and development projects as determined by the Body for the Coordination of the Development of First Level Regions.[74]

In practical terms, the Work Operation allowed the TNI to sustain its own numbers—its personnel resources—in spite of its leaders' earlier expectations of mass demobilization and fears of consequent mass recruitment by the PKI. Additionally, the Army managed to gain secure access to a wider popular-territorial base under the innocuous cover of "development." Metaphorically, this achievement was akin to manning the Indonesian ship of state with a very large crew. While a large crew had the benefit of providing plenty of manpower, it suffered the drawback of allowing crew members the right to occupy virtually every compartment of the ship: the productive, external trade, monetary, and financial sectors as well as the agricultural, transportation, administrative, educational, religious, spiritual, material, and physical realms of village, regional, and national life.[75] Moreover, by scheduling Territorial Management and Civic Missions to cover both times of peace and times of war, crew members would not be expected to surrender their right to occupy every quarter of state and social life since being on-duty (military duty) or off-duty (extra-military duty) was irrelevant. Thus, SUAD VI's purpose became, mechanically speaking, one of a distributor: in proper sequence it distributed political direction through military officers occupying civilian posts to functional groups to achieve a properly running order.

At the same time as the Army General Staff extended and attempted to improve its grasp over its own and sympathetic civilian personnel through SUAD VI, it endeavoured in three other notable ways to advance and enhance its own organizational reach downward and outward. The first such change, which was carried out beginning in late 1962, marked the resumption of the Army's presence at the sub-district (*kecamatan*) level. Importantly, this downward movement seemed to belie Yani's warning in September 1960 that establishing the Army's presence even at the district level would "entail a great deal of work" and that "sub-military regions" would be eliminated in favour of Korems, which operated within the largest structures of the Territorial Organization (Kodams).[76] Significantly, the formation of Military Rayon Commands (Koramil) did not just return military influence to this level, it extended permanent, centralized military influence to this level for the first time. Once established, the Koramil operated on the premise that "to prepare the people for territorial warfare the community [had] first to be mentally secured. The task . . . would be to prevent mental unrest."[77] Further to the establishment of the Koramil, military leaders, especially (but initially only) in West Java, pushed their permanent organizational reach right down to the village level in the form of non-commissioned officers charged with the task of "cultivating" or "building" (*Bintara Pembina).* Against this vague descriptor, the point made clear by the Army was that its personnel, as *bintara pembina* and otherwise, would operate at the lowest and most intimate social junctures possible, a view implicit in Sudisman's axiom, too.

The second change carried out by the Army consisted in putting the vehicle of the Koanda (Inter-Regional Commands) to the military test. More specifically, the Koanda of East Indonesia was made an integral component of the Irian Barat campaign and of the *Komando Mandala Pembebasan Irian Barat*. When Nasution originally proposed the Koanda in the late 1950s as a way of undercutting excessive regionalism in the military structure, while at the same time delivering to Headquarters the means to coordinate and direct forces between and among Koanda, it was an untested innovation. By 1962, Sukarno's nationalist determination combined with Major-General Suharto's organizational skills (as head of the combined services in the Command) afforded the chance to apply and, hopefully, improve the operational qualities of the Koanda. That the Irian Barat issue was resolved essentially peacefully did not mean that an opportunity had been denied; the event had several negative and embarrassing military lessons that would provide the Army leadership with the chance to upgrade its structural capacities. According to McVey, the military misadventure in Irian Barat would allow—or force—the Army leadership to strengthen the Koanda.[78]

Closely connected with improving the Koanda, and thus the capacity of Army Headquarters to control a large popular-territorial base, was the third change, which entailed the creation of the Army's own dedicated strike force. As of August 1961, the Army achieved this objective in a preliminary way by creating its own General Reserve force (*Tjadagan Angkatan Darat*—Tjaduad) consisting of three brigades and the elite Commando Training Regiment (*Resimen Pendidikan Komando Angkatan Darat*—RPKAD). Following the Irian Barat campaign, in which these forces saw action, it seems that same lessons informing the improvement of the Koandas were applied to the General Reserve. Under its commander, Suharto, the General Reserve was tellingly recomposed on 1 May 1963, the day the SOB and the *Mandala* Command formally ended, with the provocative title of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Komando Tjadagan Strategis Angkatan Darat*—Kostrad). The formation of Kostrad spoke to the Army's greater military confidence, not merely because its constituent brigades (cavalry, artillery, and infantry) were enlarged and strengthened, but in the fact that the Army had settled upon the brigade as the military unit most appropriate for its doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management.

The significance of the brigade, as compared to the favoured regimental units of the pre-1961 era, was that they were not fixed to specific territories or administrative divisions. Rather, brigades, which usually consisted of three KODIM-specific battalions and one auxiliary battalion, operated within and without divisional boundaries and depended upon the Territorial Organization for their logistical and administrative support. In this way, the structure of brigades reflected local origins and central direction, where their mobility afforded the centre enormous operational flexibility. Kostrad was the ultimate expression of Army Headquarter's unique competence to give operational direction to forces in the field.

The formation of Kostrad was the culmination of a series of changes designed to enhance and to extend the Army's organizational reach outward and downward; the Army leadership had simultaneously preserved a large pool of manpower and refined the means of giving it political direction. The Army's intention in effecting these changes was clearly informed by a sincere commitment to the directing idea of a *Negara Republik Indonesia*—an Indonesia that was robust in the popular and territorial senses. This was not an idea that included the Outer Islands so much as it depended upon them for its integrity (*Indonesia lainnya*). After Irian Barat, the Army instantiated this view through its activities and programmes: "In the outer islands particularly, [members of the armed services] were engaged in the construction of public works" as part of the "Work Operation" of the armed services.[79] For the Army's part, an important and tangible commitment was made to the success of "civic actions" in that approximately one third of its 140 battalions were devoted to their execution.[80] Significantly, "Nasution envisaged that the Air Force and Navy would assign one-third of their transport facilities for inter-insular traffic."[81] Nasution's expectations were not unrealistic; they were the concomitants of a wide directing idea of Indonesia. The comprehensiveness of this idea was being substantiated by the Army's own extensive and intensive movement and structural renovations. This movement, and the rationale for this movement, showed that the association between the Army's directing idea and the Outer Islands was integral to its notion of

Indonesia. Being neither accidental nor derivative, the Army's movement was essential to, and essentially creative of, an "Indonesian" reality.

In its self-appointed capacity as the (intellectual and manpower) engine for the formal Indonesian ship of state, the Army quickly recognized that the energy of its directing idea and of its outward movement could not be applied uniformly to all compartments of the ship. In some instances, the wiring (organization) was not in place or was of insufficient grade to animate the affected areas in the way the Army sought. By this, I mean to suggest that while the message of "development" could and was communicated universally through the ship's public address system and the Army's Territorial Organization, its realization was situationally contingent. Civic actions, Territorial Management, and "development" all depended for their initial success on balancing local circumstances with general standards. The type of balance entailed here was precisely the same as that which the Communist central leadership needed to effect in directing its Party's movement into the regions. In both cases, the TNI and PKI leaderships appreciated that reflexive mechanisms and structural adaptations would have to be adopted to deliver to themselves a centralizing, coordinative competence while simultaneously accommodating the sheer plurality of local circumstances.

Between the centralizing impulse to standardize and the disintegrative effect of acceding to the variety of local circumstances, the Army contrived both an organizational balance and a flexible attitude. Organizationally, SUAD VI and the Koandas counterpoised the Koramil and the *bintara pembinaan*. Attitudinally, the Army showed that although it was unprepared to surrender its self-assigned directing role, it would act on the premise that civic missions should proceed at the lowest social or administrative levels, where a condition of intimacy, informality, and mutual-awareness could be expected to prevail between military and civilian participants.[82] Even at this level, the Army recognized the virtues of proceeding in a flexible manner:

> For a region that is not experiencing disorder, the funds for security follow-up are unavailable. In this case, the financing can be shared together by affected villages with other funds used by officials already in place. What needs to be given attention is that not until there is a deviation in the law can there be finances for that purpose.
>
> In determining the place for operations we must begin with strategic areas, areas that guarantee success for civic missions. This can be obtained by choosing a place that is not rich and not too poor. A success in a rich area may be regarded as natural; in an area that is very poor, on the other hand, the possibility of success is too difficult. When a project in a "contented" area succeeds, projects in other areas have a hope of succeeding.[83]

The pragmatic attitude that the Army adopted in the face of a bewildering array of regional theaters of activity carried over into its view of popular relations:

> In realizing assistance to villages, the people must be invited along. The people's participation should be based on persuasion so that no feelings of compulsion are felt, thereby lessening the possibility of their resistance. In using existing village bodies, namely the village assembly or village elders, opposition can be minimized.[84]

While these observations suggest the Army's awareness that its developmental endeavours would be hollow without popular support, they also hint at the Army's unadmitted recognition of opposition to itself based upon the popular support that had already been achieved by its main contender, the PKI. In either instance, the importance of gaining and keeping popular support for both actors had been affirmed. It is perhaps for this reason that Seskoad underscored the Army's leading position vis-à-vis the people. In a manner parallel to the PKI's advocacy of a "communist morality," Army thinkers advertised how "fine mental and physical preparation" would help Army units "obtain good results" in their developmental efforts.[85] These results were the outcome of a strict imperative, that "relations between the soldiery and the people must resemble relations between fish and water, where each partner must work together." "In times of peace," Seskoad affirmed, "'the fish and water' must safeguard each other so that the water stays clean and the fish can stay healthy."[86]

The valued cordiality of relations with the "people" did not represent the outer limit on the Army's willingness to wire the ship of state. In its self-assigned role as agent for "national development and national prosperity," the Army showed that it was prepared to carry a charge and energize all the regions—populated or otherwise—into which it entered. Initially, the Army planned to proceed with a demonstration of developmental success at a rate of one regency (*kabupaten*) per province. The sweep of its directing idea entailed a much more broad outward and downward movement, which Army thinkers revealed in the context of a discussion on transmigration from Java to the Outer Islands. In this connection, Seskoad asserted that transmigration

> would be multi-purpose, as a strategic arrangement, for economic development and assimilation . . .. To implement this strategic transmigration, lessons could be taken from the Nahal Projects in Israel, which established opening areas that border on enemies for defence arrangements. In Territorial Warfare every compartment must be self-sufficient, where the need for inhabitants is adequate for logistical manpower as well as fighting power. In Indonesia the movement of military units to open the jungle is used for the purpose of that strategic objective.[87]

In short, the TNI was prepared to wire as well as populate the marginal compartments of the Indonesian ship of state. This is an understandable motivation when we recognize that the outermost and lowermost compartments contribute most to defining the shape and scope of the vessel, indeed, they give a vessel its integrity as such.

Although the Army was intent on establishing its presence in the outer and lower recesses of the Indonesian ship of state, it also expended a significant amount of energy creating a communications and command system with the ship's top-deck officers, that is, with higher state functionaries at the central and regional levels. Here, there was an equal concern for the system's content, direction, and form. In terms of content, the Army had an overriding interest in promoting the message that the formal state was embarking on "national development," which was supposed to be the itinerary as well as destination of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution." Given that "national development" was the Army's strategy of new state building, the actual direction of the flow of communications was unmistakably from the bottom (or at least from the engine room) to the top. The pretence was maintained, however, that orders flowed downward from the formal state, through its officers, to the wider vessel of "Indonesian society."

The way in which the Army set the content and direction of the communication and command system was through a subtle process of conceptual dissemination. Beginning in 1962, Seskoad offered "orientation" courses to senior officials in the Government. These courses did not lead to, and were not predicated upon, a straightforward programming of the state through its officials. Rather, these courses were more like lessons in learning a language, where the emphasis was on sharing an idiom and its corresponding worldview:

> the Army was trying to obviate the political consequences of being deprived of legal authority by getting a substantial number of senior civilian officials to understand the relationship between Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, hoping this would create enough consensus between civilian and military authorities to help them close ranks.. . . the Army figured that an Inter-departmental "Orientation Course on Security Problems," explaining the concept of Territorial Management, would make it possible, if it could rally the support of enough senior officials, for the Army to retain maximum influence throughout the country.. . . By the end of 1962 some 300 senior officials had participated in the SESKOAD courses.[88]

The communication and command system took a form that was appropriate to conceal the real content and direction of onboard communications—it was camouflaged. In this sense, the Army aimed to exercise control over the upper decks of the state by being felt and heard, but not necessarily seen; the Army's central and regional outlets were constituted in such a way as to veil effective control. While the composition of the Cabinet achieved this result at the central level, at the provincial level, since 1961, military and civilian personnel were recruited at SUAD V's direction into single bodies charged with overseeing Territorial Management. These bodies, known as Committees of Four (or *Tjatur Tunggal*—Four in One), consisted of four leading civilian or military office holders: the territorial military commander, the civil governor, the chief-of-police, and the attorney general. As Pauker has observed, the operation of these Committees amounted to a "pattern of government."[89] During the SOB, military commanders chaired the regional Committees and were thus in a position to enhance "developmental" prospects; after the SOB, the Army expected civil governors who shared its regard for "development" to continue to advance this strategy from the positions they would inherit as Committee chairs. The transformation of the *Tjatur Tunggal* into Regional Development Coordinating Bodies (*Badan Koordinasi Pembangunan Daerah*—BKPD),[90] which took effect in January 1963, must surely have pleased the Army. The BKPDs not only left the membership composition of their predecessors unaltered, they gave to their military incumbents, and the Army more generally, another officially sanctioned role in "development" that made them practically indistinguishable from officialdom itself. With this, the difference between the blatant advertising of "development" as a strategy, and giving information about and practising "development" as a ship-wide reality, became increasingly blurred in the pronouncements of the onboard communication and command system.

The shift in communications from advertising to sharing, which is equivalent to a shift from teaching initiates a language to conversing in it with them, coincided with an equally profound shift in the Army's orientation toward popular resources. This change, where the Army as crew began to actively enlist and organize passengers to embark on a journey of "national development," comprised the third broad refinement to the TNI's state-building strategy in the period from 1962–63. The starting point for this refinement began in the compartments the Army had occupied longest in the ship of state, and which now served as its strongholds. These were the state-owned and military-managed enterprises formerly belonging to the Dutch. In the period since they were occupied and managed by the Army, the enterprises had become crucial to the Army's strategy of "national development," constituting an unadvertised source of productive potential.

Through the 1950s and early 1960s, the control of these enterprises partially informed the struggle between Sukarno and Nasution to establish the paramountcy of their own National Fronts. Despite the fact that the Army lost this struggle when the FN effectively replaced the FNPIB in 1961, the Army remained empowered to engage in the "mobilization of functional potentials" through its hold over the enterprises. At one level, this capacity manifested itself in the creation of three Bodies for the Fostering of Functional Potentials (BPPKs), which exactly matched the divisions in the DPR-GR.[91] In the name of Material, Religious, and Spiritual "functional potentials," military officers ambitiously promoted the growth and expansion of these Bodies, to the point, even, of challenging the FN.[92] Like the BKSs before them, the BPPKs also attempted to deprive existing party ormas of their members and parties of their ormas.

At a lower level, the Army's mobilizational "responsibilities" translated into a re-organization of personnel in the state enterprises themselves. From January 1961, Unions of *Karyawan* Forces (*Persatuan Tenaga Karyawan*—PTK) appeared. The tendency to exercise greater coordinative power across the enterprises was apparent on 10 May 1961, when a Central Coordinating Body of *Karyawan* Associations of State Enterprises (*Badan Koordinasi Pusat Persatuan2 Karyawan Perusahaan*^{2} *Negara*—BKPKPN) was established.[93] This series of changes reflected a commingling of factors, including the TNI's desire to retain control of its political resources in the face of Sukarno, its drive to realize the productive and rural development schemes envisaged in national laws it had helped sponsor, and its competition with the PKI.

Against this admixture of influences, the nature of the changes made by the Army to its popular resources in late 1962 suggested that it was now responding with a single-minded determination matched only by the compelling nature of the stimulation. The stimulation in this case was the success engineered by the PKI in rejuvenating its United National Front, particularly its "front from below." The Seventh National Congress, with its revelation of the links between the Party and its ever growing ormas, was as much an occasion for a daringly public confession as it was a self-advertisement for yet greater outward and downward growth. The high standards set and realized by the PKI now became the subject and object of conscious emulation by the TNI. By August 1962, the TNI was already responding, already impatient with its centralizing efforts in the form of the PTKs of the previous year. At this time, the BKPKPN authorized the imminent formation of a new and overarching entity: the Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist *Karyawan* (*Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia*—SOKSI).

SOKSI as an Endangered Society

Upon its inception on 17 December 1962, and during the first year of its organizational life, SOKSI achieved political significance mainly on the basis of its popular and territorial attributes, that is, from its status as a large pool of (especially popular) political resources. To have registered at all as a popular and territorial actor, though, SOKSI had to advertise itself in a certain way: it had to be catholic. By characterizing the Central Organization as a "material development mass *karyawan* organization," SOKSI spokesmen could claim that its "body therefore consisted of the assembled mass organizations from *golongan karya* or elements of workers, labourers, employees, peasants, fishermen, cooperatives and entrepreneurs." "Besides that," they could (and did) claim the "additional support from mass organizations from elements of the youth, university students, women, intellectuals and other groups."[94] Obviously, SOKSI's appeal to individuals and groups was deliberately unlimited. In this connection, SOKSI's membership composition paralleled that of the PKI's "front from below." And like the latter, SOKSI resembled an incipient society, lending substance to an endeavour that greatly transcended the islands of support in the state enterprises from whence it was launched. That SOKSI publicists felt compelled to assert bluntly that their organization "was not only made up of the workers' karyawan organisation"[95] confirms this point.

Under cover of its catholic appeals, SOKSI attracted a considerable amount of popular support in a short period of time and came to exercise influence across wide collective and geographical expanses. In its first year, for example, SOKSI claimed to have secured the support of 146 mass *karyawan* organizations, and realized regional leaderships in 24 provinces and in 60% of the *kabupaten* throughout the country.[96] SOKSI's organizers appreciated both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of popular resources. They would thus claim in respect of the former "to have trained more than 100,000 cadres, 1,800 at the centre, the rest in the regions," and in respect of the latter to have 1,615,800 members (in January 1963) and, later (in November 1963), 7,500,000 members.[97]

As SOKSI emerged on the political landscape, the geographical scope of its activities increased. The content and apparent intent of these undertakings, which were generously characterized as manifestations of "revolutionary stamina," were strikingly alike the kinds of projects being carried out at the same time by the PKI as part of its outward and downward movement to the regions. Thus, SOKSI declared its awareness that successfully addressing the food problem would further increase "revolutionary stamina" and, therefore, it was prepared to pioneer the opening of empty land for cultivating foodstuffs within the framework of a scheme to realize regional self-sufficiency. In this context, SOKSI specifically cited its efforts in South Sulawesi, which it claimed could be developed into Indonesia's breadbasket or, more appropriately, rice stores.[98] In the field of education, too, SOKSI recognized the possible contributions to "revolutionary stamina," and thus its cadres involved themselves in attempting to eliminate illiteracy in enterprises and in the regions.[99] SOKSI showed its eagerness to assist people (in the face of the destruction wrought by the DI/TII) by describing its part in "the economic operation . . . to lift the burden of the people's suffering."[100] Finally, in the context of the struggle to "liberate" Irian Barat, SOKSI took credit for the far-sighted contribution it made in the form of dispatching its members to "establish economic units."[101]

Notwithstanding its popular-territorial accomplishments, of which some were unquestionably given to exaggeration, SOKSI exercised its political and organizational presence perhaps most keenly in the state enterprises and in the associated enterprise councils. This was partly due to the fact that SOKSI's leading proponent and first Chairman of its General Presidium, Lieutenant-Colonel Suhardiman, was a senior official in the Ministry of Economic Affairs and served as the Director of the Body for the Nationalization of Dutch Enterprises.[102] Of greater significance in explaining the intensity of SOKSI's political work in the enterprises, though, is the fact that the enterprises, almost unique among social structures at this time, genuinely possessed both a formal (vertical) and an informal or popular (horizontal) significance. Enterprises occupied a bridging position between the formal state, of which they were an official part and subject in law, and the wider popular realm, from which they drew labour. In this position, the enterprises could be used coordinatively, to realize a narrowing of the distance between the official and non-official realms in the Indonesian context. Presumably out of an appreciation of this point, SOKSI was conceived neither as a direct organizational extension of the Army into society (like the *Badan Kerja-Sama*), nor as an organizational format mirroring pre-existing divisions in the DPR-GR (like the *Badan Pembina Potensi Karya*). Rather, SOKSI was a conscious improvement on the coordinative aspirations of the BKSs and the BPPKs by virtue of its willingness to find allies among pre-existing groups, where possible, and create allies, where necessary. Thus, unlike the other two Army projects, SOKSI had a specifically creative quality.

SOKSI proved to have little difficulty in finding allies associated with the formal state and its operation. Three entities of particular significance were the

Union of Civil Servants Association (*Persatuan Sarekat Pegawai Negeri*—PSPN), the Indonesian Republic Teachers Association (*Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia*—PGRI), and the Association of Families of Social Welfare Officials (*Ikatan Keluarga Pegawai Sosial*—IKPS), each of whose leading functionaries was in some way tied to the formal edifice of power.[103] As such, as Reeve has observed, these allies "represented an entrée into the civil service and the support of powerful figures."[104] In the non-formal sphere, as well, SOKSI found ready allies in the Indonesian Farmers Brotherhood (*Rukun Tani Indonesia*—RTI) and the Indonesian People's Movement (*Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia*—Gerinda). Where SOKSI could not apparently avail itself of needed allies, it was prepared to invoke them through its own creative organizational efforts. Thus, during the course of 1963, SOKSI's organizers showed a penchant to match the PKI's "front from below," virtually element for element: "*karyawan* organizations for farmers, women, agricultural students, intellectuals, and youth were formed, called Kartasi, Gerwasi, Tertasi, Getsi, Pelmasi, PPII, and SOKKAPPMI."[105]

While the enterprises offered SOKSI a firm site from which to launch its unprecedented upward and downward forays, they, along with their Government-mandated enterprise councils, served as a point of entry for opposing political actors. The PKI and its PNI ally (and their combined labour ormas) attempted to weaken SOKSI in its very strongholds by numerically overwhelming its representatives in the enterprise councils. Towards the end of the period when the representation on councils was being established—a slow process that took from April 1962 through 1963—the PKI could proudly show that its representatives constituted the single largest bloc. Of some 656 enterprise councils in existence in late 1963, SOBSI claimed 677 of 2,737 total members. Next in size was the contingent representing the enterprises, typically consisting of military officers or military-appointed civilian managers, which totalled 656. Below this was the SOKSI/PTK group (406 members), then the PNI-affiliate KBKI (344 members), and then the PKI-affiliate BTI (142 members), with the balance (512 members) made up of six other blocs consisting of PNI, NU, or Murba affiliates, experts, and regional representatives.[106]

Reeve is correct in pointing out that the victory SOBSI claimed ignored the existence of operative alliances among contingents, alliances which effectively nullified its numerical superiority. The PKI could actually rely on 819 members, a figure which excludes PNI support; the Army had the support of 1186 members (drawn from the enterprise representatives, SOKSI/PTKs, NU ormas, experts, and regional representatives). While this may have been the case, of which both the PKI and the Army/SOKSI were surely aware, Reeve's correction does not weaken the underlying reality (about which the rival parties were perhaps even more acutely aware) that the Army's competitor could compete successfully in *its* strongholds.

The PKI's presence in the enterprise councils was alarming to the TNI/SOKSI not simply because the SOBSI and BTI contingents were of considerable size, but because SOBSI, in particular, brought the Party's "plan-mindedness" mentality to the challenge of controlling the councils and actually expended the effort and resources to direct its members and cadres in this specific goal.[107] In short, the Communists' undeniable success in the councils and enterprises derived from the fact that they planned and planned to win everywhere.

By bringing with them a public and self-conscious strategy of winning-through-planning, SOBSI and the PKI revealed the same high political appreciation of the enterprises and their councils as that of SOKSI and the Army. Paradoxically, by then securing a foothold in them, the PKI/SOBSI seemed to have forced an increase in this appreciation of all enterprises and councils. Indeed, early on, as the composition of individual councils became public and it was clear that SOBSI and SOKSI could each consistently secure representatives, these representatives were soon deemed insufficient by both parties. Not content with a share, both SOKSI and SOBSI increased the political stakes of their competition by each insisting (explicitly or implicitly) on having a monopoly on the composition or work of all councils:

> SOKSI promoted itself as the one source of members and sought revision of councils already formed. SOBSI accused SOKSI of impeding the formation of councils and of impeding the work of those formed. SOBSI also accused the military managers of trying to forbid employees from holding party or ormas membership, of splitting and dissolving existing ormas so as to create *karyawan* organizations, and of unleashing 'terror tactics' in the plantations.[108]

Neither SOKSI nor SOBSI was content for long with publicizing details of the other's (sometimes real, sometimes alleged) obstructionist behaviour. During the course of 1963, each actor attempted to inflate the significance of its own position and role in the enterprise councils. The preference of both actors was to give themselves the benefit of history. For SOBSI, its representatives were said to speak to the Indonesian people's historical resistance to capitalism and imperialism. The representatives themselves, who, it was claimed, were the representatives of the working and peasants classes, belied the claim that there was "no longer a class struggle" in the enterprises or on the plantations. Their purpose was to preserve that historical legacy, even to the point of "bravely and fiercely" exposing such SOKSI-inspired "attempts to conceal the principle of class struggle" as the *karyawan* and family principles.

SOKSI's reply to the alleged historical inevitability of class revolution was to advance an equally deterministic thesis, one which necessarily and knowingly conflicted with that of the PKI. To SOKSI, the future would be one of "*karya* revolution" or "*Pancasila* revolution."[109] The reason for this, according to SOKSI, was that the principle of *karyawan*, as well as the (allegedly) integrally associated practises of *musjawarah* (deliberation) and *mufakat* (consensus), flowed down to the present from the most ancient headwaters of the "Indonesian identity." It followed logically, therefore, that SOKSI would behave in a way that included displaying "indigenous and historical roots by the use of Sanskrit wherever possible," engaging in "evocations of Majapahit," and making use of the claim that "functional groups were 2,000 years old, and [were] to be found in the *Ramayana*."[110]

While SOKSI was intent on demonstrating its historical credentials, its spokesmen put equal effort into showing that SOKSI was intrinsically connected with

Indonesia's future, too. By asserting that SOKSI was "a logical consequence of the Indonesian people's return to the 1945 Constitution, a logical result of the rediscovery of the democracy of the Indonesian identity," it became possible within the terms of a discussion on "Indonesian Democracy" to anticipate the shape of the future, which had already been partially realized by SOKSI's own formation. That future would be one where the

> people's voice is not only channelled through political organizations, but where *golongan karya* obtain their legal right to organize in order to channel [the people's] voice and wishes to fulfil the obligation of joining in completing the Indonesian Revolution as implementors of the basic strategy of struggle of the Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution [Sukarno], [a feat] which requires the complete uniting and unity of progressive-revolutionary strength to destroy colonialism, Imperialism, Neo-colonialism, and feudalism.[111]

In short, Indonesia's future, like its past, would be coincident with the karyawan principle, of which SOKSI was its contemporary expression.

Curiously, while the historical determinism of this analysis made it irrelevant for SOKSI's organizers and members to concern themselves with their organization's role and place in the contemporary Indonesian context, the fact that SOKSI publicists found it necessary to proclaim their historical insights is a significant and revealing contradiction. The existence of this contradiction actually shows the greater importance that SOKSI organizers attached to the immediate circumstances confronting their organization, beginning in December 1962, rather than to the distant past or future. But that is not to say that the historical analysis, as rendered, was either useless or pointless. The unlimited freedom that SOKSI publicists enjoyed in characterizing both the past and the future was put to sophisticated use to shape the present in a very subtle, yet inescapable way.

Clinging to their fundamental determinism, SOKSI publicists made the argument that

> Every event in the historical process meets with its reaction. The same is true with the birth of SOKSI. From those who do not yet usually think in terms of the democracy of the Indonesian identity with the *golongan karya* element as one of the channels carrying the people's voice, one can expect a cold and negative reaction. Those whose organizations express the voice of certain groups in society, when not inspired with great spirit and the spirit of mutual assistance as in the democracy of the Indonesian identity, will look at the birth of SOKSI as constricting their room for manoeuvre or will view SOKSI as one of their competitors. SOKSI calculated in advance that from them there would emerge an attitude that is cold, negative, even opposed.[112]

Thus, the reason SOKSI became detained in mid-historical stride had to do with the very opposition it anticipated; it was no accident that SOKSI's presence had to be asserted. The very existence of transient political entities, consisting of groups and political parties allegedly motivated only to realize their narrow interests, made it so. SOKSI's historical mission, therefore, became one of overcoming these actors, of ensuring their transcience.

The "truth" of this mission was confirmed by the status that SOKSI had thrust upon it as a "target of the enemies of the Revolution." Significantly, SOKSI repeatedly called attention to its dubious status, indeed, more attention than any other single aspect of its existence.[113]

> Not only because in a short time had it succeeded in gathering large numbers of revolutionary masses, but also because of its ideological principles and political tactics, did SOKSI become the main target of vested interests that felt damage because of its behaviour as part of the consequential motion on the rails of the revolution.[114]

SOKSI publicists exhibited a surprising tendency (given the sweeping nature of their historical pronouncements) to be specific in identifying the "interests" it had offended. "For those who always base their social considerations on class differences," it "is difficult for them to accept" that deliberation (*musjawarah*), consensus (*mufakat*) and mutual assistance (*gotong rojong*) will resolve "differences of interests in society, disagreements among social groups, and problems regardless of their difficulty."[115] Clearly, SOKSI had singled out the PKI as the subject of its verbal blast, mindful, perhaps, of the real presence the Party exerted in the enterprises and enterprise councils.

With the inclusion of this implicit, but unmistakable, reference to the PKI in their historical overview, SOKSI publicists showed the one connection to the real world that mattered, or that mattered enough for them to deviate from their determinist presuppositions. It could hardly be imagined that this reference was accidental. For the way it was used—which was to evoke a sense of fear and an associated spirit of defensiveness—the reference to the PKI can better be seen as a revelation of the real premise for SOKSI. The inescapable impression to be gained from the reference, and from the tireless reiteration by SOKSI of its status as "the main target of the enemies of the Revolution," was that SOKSI and its affiliates were being knowingly menaced.

While this message may not seem significant, its conception and propagation signaled a profoundly important step in the Army's effort to realize its directing idea of Indonesia. For by publicly intimating that SOKSI faced both competition and opposition, SOKSI spokesmen effectively communicated the suggestion that there was a contest over identity, namely the "Indonesian identity." This suggestion carried with it a series of nested presuppositions. First, there was the innermost presupposition that at least two (rival) conceptions of the "Indonesian identity" existed. From this there followed a second presupposition: the proponents of these rival identities had themselves advanced beyond simply (but necessarily) accumulating popular and territorial resources. Third, and finally, there was a presupposition that defending what was perceived to be the "genuine Indonesian identity" was an appropriate stance for SOKSI to adopt.

For SOKSI organizers and spokesmen, suggesting from late 1962 that there was a contest over the "Indonesian identity" was itself ingeniously sufficient both to initiate such a contest and to provide the real motive force for their organization. This becomes clear, in part, when we recognize that SOKSI was founded after the Communists had already shown their organizational influence in the enterprises and enterprise councils. Thus, the claim that SOKSI's creators "calculated in advance" the opposition they would attract was, in a very real sense, a true statement. The truth of the statement, however, did not hinge on the power of SOKSI's organizers to predict history. More accurately (and mundanely), the truth of the statement consisted in the realistic calculation made by SOKSI's organizers that *if* they launched an organization such as SOKSI, *then* they could be certain of *continued*, and even *enhanced*, Communist opposition. Thus, the proposition itself guaranteed opposition that, in turn, perversely guaranteed the success of the proposition. In this connection, SOKSI was an instance of its own thesis, which held that "an idea can only be realized if it is struggled for."[116] SOKSI's organizers apparently believed there was no better way to realize SOKSI, and through it the *karyawan* principle, than by putting it in danger: by threatening its survival, by struggling in defence, by wearing the badge of honour conferred as "the main target of the enemies of the Revolution."

For these claims of endangerment to elicit a response that was compelling enough to command the popular-territorial resources that would eventually characterize SOKSI, they had to have been believable in a specific way. Specifically, the threat of danger had to be predicated upon the existence of danger, just as the threat to survival had to be predicated upon the desire and capacity to end survival. On both of these accounts, it was not difficult for SOKSI organizers to point to the Communists as dangerous, motivated to destroy SOKSI which they publicly ridiculed as little more than a "bosses organization," consisting of "unions of bureaucratic-capitalists."[117] But what mattered more to SOKSI's military authors than the shrillness of the Communists' verbiage was their reflexive organization, which was demonstrably in place in the enterprises and enterprise councils. This attribute, which the PKI alone possessed among the actors represented in the enterprise councils, was what substantiated the suggestion that SOKSI was in danger and faced with a threat to its political survival. In this sense, the military and civilian organizers of SOKSI conscripted the PKI and its ormas to act as the (involuntary) guarantors of their own undertaking. SOKSI was not, therefore, simply the result of a wider application of an argument for unity on the pre-existing basis of the *karyawan* principle. It was instead an organization started and shaped to defend a social identity and a principle (of *karyawan*), both of which, in this stance, it was effectively in the process of creating. On both accounts, SOKSI really depended upon the irrefutable reality of Communist power, in both its spatial and temporal dimensions.

The power exerted or threatened by the PKI was sufficient not only to give SOKSI a measure of momentum, but to foster a countervailing alliance with SOKSI at its centre. The reason for this was that in giving SOKSI its negative impetus, the Communists also promoted a convergence between various actors who were already repulsed by themselves. In the case of the enterprise councils, as we have seen, this convergence of trajectories brought together representatives of SOKSI and the PTKs, NU, the enterprises, experts, and regions and, later, even representatives from PNI ormas in a grand alliance. One should be careful to comprehend the nature of this alliance, for its significance can hardly be overstated, although this was exactly what SOKSI and the Army increasingly (and misleadingly) did. Above all, the alliance was tactical in nature. Thus, unlike the overstated claims of SOKSI and the Army, the alliance was neither strategic, in the sense of it being a manifestation of some transcendant historical process, nor was it substantively ideational, in the sense of it being founded on the *karyawan* principle alone or in combination with the wider "Indonesian identity." Bluntly, and somewhat brutally, "the *karyawan* notion had no appeal to the NU . . . but protection did."[118]

Where the PKI could excite a willingness in even one actor to submit itself to a third actor's protection, especially in the case of such a large and seemingly durable entity as NU, is where the alliance derives its real significance. For the formation of such an alliance suggested that a process of virtual self-abnegation had commenced in the Indonesian context. Lesser actors revealed themselves to be such by seeking refuge under the aegis of either SOKSI or the PKI/SOBSI. Thus, hitherto separate actors were effectively reconstituting themselves as components of one of two large and self-conscious movements. By mid-1963, at least as far as the enterprise councils were concerned, only representatives of the Murba ormas, the Central Organization of Labourers of the Indonesian Republic (*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Republik Indonesia*—SOBRI) attempted to maintain a position that was meaningfully independent of the directed activities of the SOBSI- and SOKSI-led alliances. That SOBRI had the single smallest contingent of representatives in the enterprise councils, a mere 14 individuals,[119] spoke to the elusiveness of such independence.

The polarization among Indonesian political actors was attended by, and most certainly accelerated, a steady change in the idiom that characterized political exchanges between the PKI/SOBSI and the TNI/SOKSI. Specifically, beginning in 1962, there was an erosion of the standard of obliqueness that had heretofore governed their mutual references. The change was remarkable in that each had referred to the other in a very guarded fashion while simultaneously launching virtually indistinguishable denunciations of such common enemies as the DI/TII and the RMS. While the harmony of their views on the latter actually made it difficult for observers to appreciate the common areas of their interests (most notably of their directing ideas of Indonesia), the standard of obliqueness may have been purposely upheld for just that reason. The appearance of the notion of kabir, most notably at the PKI's Seventh National Congress, made it clear that the Party had begun to dispense with the standard, although the use of kabir lowered it only half-mast, as it were. The precise meaning of kabir was still elusive, that is until SOBSI used it (or perhaps was drawn into using it by SOKSI) in connection with its critique of the Central Organization. By mid-1963, therefore, SOBSI dared to be bluntly realistic in its depiction of SOKSI, which it believed to be made up of "unions of capitalist-bureaucrats." Affixing such a label to a discrete and well-known organization was a very bold step for the Communists to have taken.

As we have seen, SOKSI's response was to single out the Communists, referring to them with a discernible indirectness as "those whose organizations express the voice of certain groups in society," and "those who always base their social considerations on class differences." While SOKSI may have been indirect in pointing to the Communists, the effect of this was, at the very least, to point them out, and to isolate them from all others. Thus isolated, the Communists were to be treated in a way in which they could be dispatched, as SOKSI's historical narrative had pronounced. To that end, SOKSI's formation as a *karyawan* organization was itself the historical solution to the problem posed by the Communists and to the self-assigned challenge of "national development":

> Attached to *sosialis*, *karyawan* [had] the function of eliminating the role of the proletariat, in enterprise as well as in the nation, while giving the appearance of including the Marxist component. There [was] nothing remaining then apart from bureaucracy and technocracy.[120]

Thus the inner rationale for SOKSI's drive upward into the formal bureaucracy and downward in the form of its own mass *karyawan* organizations. Like the Communists' fronts from above and below, SOKSI was merely attempting to make it clear that the differences between actors it referred to verbally (even if they were distinctions—in—progress) corresponded to real, organizational differences which cumulatively informed an all-embracing "Indonesian identity." It may even be presumed that SOKSI's own formation as an organization was the leading example of this very concern.

Given the foregoing, we may recognize that the most significant outcome of the Communists' and Army's abandonment of their verbal standard of mutually indirect references was to turn the possibility of either one of them realizing a distinctly Indonesian directing idea into a probability. That is to say, their more explicit opposition to each other actually enhanced the likelihood that the outcome of their contest would be a strengthened notion of the "Indonesian identity" relative to other possible identities. The reason for this is clear in SOKSI's creation and in its creation in turn of other organizational entities covering the waterfront, as it were, of all possible *karyawan* facets of the "Indonesian identity." For only the reality of organizations, especially a family of organizations encompassing every major de facto social group, could lend credibility to the catholicity of the appeals being made by the Communists and Army (through SOKSI). And in committing themselves singly to creating organizations in this comprehensive manner, the PKI and the TNI committed themselves collectively—in an unarticulated but reinforcing manner—to a similar but not wholly coincidental circumscription of people and territory bearing the same name: "Indonesia."

The Diversity of Revolutions and the Unity of Indonesia

The two organizational complexes, surcharged by the heat of their verbal and conceptual explicitness, each drove outward and downward and, as the contest in the enterprises showed was necessary, upward as well to the formal state. Proceeding thus in all directions, the PKI and TNI organizational families created political waves that threatened the inundation of all other collective political actors. Ironically, the life-vests of alliance that both the PKI and SOKSI/TNI tossed to these actors proved in most instances to be lethal to their organizational independence. Nevertheless, the growth of these alliances reinforced the original rationale for their creation, which was, from SOBSI's and SOKSI's perspective alike, to substantiate and hopefully expand their own organizational grasp on the state enterprises. As perhaps the most important pools of political resources in the formal state realm, the enterprises made compelling first targets and were accordingly keenly appraised by both sides. And both sides proved themselves capable of striking these targets, with each controlling some portion of their administration through their respective council representatives by late 1963. With the balance of forces stalemated in the enterprise councils, however, there was little to prevent either party from applying the original rationale for their organizational drives to all other parts of the formal state. In this way, both parties began to search out new sites in which to establish an organizational presence. In this way, too, did the two organizational families begin to force an answer to the question, posed by the stunning extent of their activities from mid-1963 onwards, of which state-within-a-state would authoritatively determine the "Indonesian identity."

As the two leading actors set about answering this question from 1963, we should be careful to appreciate how each was equally qualified in this directed endeavour. Quite simply, neither the PKI nor the TNI was more—or less—revolutionary than the other since each was attempting to realize a novel and transcendant circumscription of people and territory. The PKI and TNI had set themselves apart from other political actors on the basis of their directing ideas of Indonesia; so long as they continued their endeavours to realize their ideas both the PKI and TNI would retain their essentially revolutionary characters. The presence or absence of other collective political actors was irrelevant to this quality. Unfortunately, the decline in importance of lesser political actors, who acquiesced to the terms of ostensibly life-saving political alliances centred in the enterprise councils, contributed to misleading scholarly portrayals. Among these are studies that have emphasized the differences between the PKI and TNI (such as in analyses that depict a latent, then manifest, struggle between the two[121]), that have shown a weakening of the revolutionary drive among Communists (as in the embourgeoisement of the PKI[122]), or that have perceived the contestants as subordinate to commonly binding frameworks (as in their struggle to resolve the terms of Sukarno's ideology[123]). It is an irony of these studies that the reason for the effective diminution in the importance of third actors had to do with the TNI's becoming more revolutionary, not less, and certainly not "counterrevolutionary."

In venturing to form SOKSI in December 1962, the Army both anticipated and counted upon the adverse reaction of the Communists to initiate a polarization among collective political actors in a way it could not do unilaterally. In this light, the TNI was obviously dependent upon the repulsive effects that the PKI generated in others; the appearance of SOKSI, in the enterprises especially, presented an opportunity for those repulsive effects to assume a positive expression. Yet to have channelled those sentiments in such a way that invited the effective acquiescence of others to its protection, SOKSI had to have brought with it something additional, something integrative. That something was the unadmitted and essentially daring confession that lay at the heart of SOKSI. For in taking as its objective the creation of *karyawan* organizations where ever possible, SOKSI was admitting that the arguments made earlier by the Army about "national development" being consistent with "Indonesian society" presumed the existence of that "society." Now, its every organizational and mobilizational effort spoke to the necessity of creating such a society, ergo, "Indonesian society" did not exist.

With the creation of SOKSI, therefore, the TNI had stepped away from the notion that its work in creating a formal state in the guise of Guided Democracy somehow corresponded to the irresistible and prior demands of "Indonesian society." Indeed, with the creation of SOKSI, the Army had for the first time unreservedly committed itself to the revolutionary challenge of creating such a society from the ground up. It was no mistake, then, that SOKSI was born in haste, amid fear, and with an imaginary historical lineage that made it the equivalent of an organizational messiah. These conditions gave SOKSI the swaddling it required to be cushioned from the blows of Communist opposition while simultaneously inviting other actors to participate in what appeared to be its defence, but what was more truthfully its strengthening through the disciplining effects of struggle.

The grim ingenuity that anticipated how vitalizing Communist opposition could be to SOKSI also recognized how it could provide an opportunity to transform SOKSI from an embattled organization into an organization for battle. Initially, SOKSI received extensive Army support, but only of a certain admitted quality. Perhaps due to the close association between the SOKSI Chairman, Suhardiman, and Colonel Sokowati, the chief of SUAD V, the Central Organization won the "support of the Army's territorial organization, particularly through the local extensions of SUAD V and VI."[124] The significance of this was that the Army was not prepared to back up its endeavours with weapons in hand, either publicly or in the silent business of actually directing SOKSI into existence. As SOKSI grew outward and downward, however, it earned the mounting wrath of the Communists. This pressure, in conjunction with the anticipated lifting of the SOB on 1 May 1963, helped military leaders over their inhibitions.

From December 1962 onwards, senior Army leaders actively planned from for the armed defence of their civilian political undertakings. The defence scheme was two-fold. The first part was subtly connected with the Civil Defence (*Petahanan Sipil*—Hansip) programme, which was formally established country wide in June 1963 but which had been the subject of thinking associated with the doctrine of Territorial Warfare since at least April 1962. In setting out a list of entities that could be expected to request civil defence assistance, the terms of the programme communicated a hierarchy that privileged *karyawan* organizations by placing them immediately below the four armed services and above all other actors; political parties were not explicitly identified.[125] In this way did SOKSI begin to receive real armed support, albeit indirectly.

Between mid-1963 and late 1963, the Army's reluctance to publicly arm SOKSI diminished completely. During this time, and evidently with the support of the Army which jealously guarded its weapons, SOKSI created and manned its own armed corps. The *Baladhika-karya*, which drew its personnel from the pool of "thousands" of cadres SOKSI had already trained by October 1963,[126] was designed as a "complementary organization" within SOKSI. In this capacity, the *Baladhika-karya* served both "inside," in "consolidating and safeguarding the stability of SOKSI," and "outside," in "applying its service and work in social development, like the civic missions of the Army." The parallel that SOKSI drew between its new adjunct and the Army with respect to the agenda of "national development" was but one of many between the two armed organizations. Like an army, the *Baladhika-karya* also existed as a highly centralized entity, its personnel bore discernible ranks, and it was animated by the spirits of discipline and "patriotism." Above all, the *Baladhika-karya* resembled an army by virtue of its coercive competence which, like the arms it was provided, had been indefinitely extended to it by the TNI. Yet the exercise of this competence did not make the *Baladhika-karya* like just any army, it made it exactly like the TNI in that its self-described operational purpose was comprehensively novel and creative, consisting of

> all operational activities in the social-economic-political field that are CONSTRUCTIVE as well as DESTRUCTIVE for the sake of realizing the State directives of the Manipol [Sukarno's Political Manifesto of 17 August 1959] along with securing the revolutionary doctrine and Pancasila, which aim at Nation-building for the Indonesian Socialist society.
>
> Destroying operations include efforts to face the enemies of the Indonesian revolution mentioned in the Manipol, counter-revolutionaries and fake Manipolists, and are characterized as tactical, defensive, and destructive.[127]

This self-conception was enormously significant because of the way in which it irresistibly altered the terms of political competition in the Indonesian context. Like SOKSI, which relied to a large extent for its self-enlargement on the pent-up anxiety induced by its own historical and contemporary political portrayals, the *Baladhika-karya* drew on this pool of fear for its own existence. Yet in getting across this pool of anxiety to the safety of being a real and large organization, SOKSI had knowingly taken a path from which there could be no retracing of its steps. By supposing itself to exist in an embattled condition, then using the anxiety associated with this mindset to actualize the *Baladhika-karya*, SOKSI guaranteed itself a rendezvous with battle through the very tangibility of its act.

Moreover, SOKSI provided the basis for such a premise in the minds of its followers and opponents alike by choosing a particularly provocative mission for the *Baladhika-karya*. This mission was vitally apparent in the organization's motto which, appropriately enough given SOKSI's deliberate obfuscation of the political novelty which it was engineering, needed to be translated from the Sanskrit so that its members could understand it. At one level, "*Djaya Pasopati Pratiwi*" meant "Mother Earth's magical weapon for victory" (*sendjata-ampuh Ibu Pertiwi untuk kemenangan*).

At another level, the reference to the "magical weapon" as *pamungkas* (as opposed to *sendjata-ampuh*) literally implied the beginning of the end, for the appearance of such a weapon in the *Ramayana* signalled the final part of the epic as well as the finishing off of those against whom it was wielded.[128] In this light, the *Baladhika-karya* was designed to eliminate potential "mutineers" from among the passengers and crew already on-board the "Indonesian ship of state." Its presence on the scene from mid-1963 onwards invited as much as it evoked apprehension.

Whether the apprehension it created in other actors was deliberate or accidental, the presence of the *Baladhika-karya* on the scene from mid-1963 commanded all-round attention because of this compelling effect. The fact that the *Baladhika-karya* possessed the capacity (alone among civilian organizations) to identity and physically dispatch "enemies of the Indonesian revolution . . . counter-revolutionaries and fake Manipolists," was perhaps not as significant as the presumption upon which the use of such arms rested. For the use of such arms entailed the possibility, and even the necessity, of authoritatively distinguishing between and among actors on the basis of an "Indonesian" standard. In other words, the *Baladhika-karya* was more significant by virtue of the authoritative competency to which it aspired (on behalf of SOKSI and the TNI) than by its actual capacity to coercively enforce such a standard (the Army reserved the bulk of the weaponry for itself). Therefore, despite its small size, relative to the huge organizations into whose company it entered, the political message that the *Baladhika-karya* promoted on behalf of the Army was as consequential in design as Nasution's presumptuous assertion of August 1961, when he declared that the "nation" was ready for "national development." Then, as now, it would be more accurate to say that "national development" was awaiting the "nation." Then, as now, the Army was signalling its intent to speak to a standard that would be binding on all actors. The difference this time was that the Army had succeeded in creating a tangible and armed platform from which it could make the same statement without the fear that it would be publicly accused of, or perceived as, threatening a coup d'état. In this sense, the *Baladhika-karya* served the message on the Communists like a subpoena, commanding them by dint of unobscured armed compulsion to quit the competitive political arena and enter the court of conflict.

With this, the Army's efforts over the previous year and a half seemed to be nearing their point of completion, where discrete meaning-creating actions would begin to assume a definite and shared meaning. And in this case, it was the quality of being "Indonesian" that was implied in all these efforts. The formation of the *Baladhika-karya* served to make this implication explicit. Although the implication was tenuous, especially given the fact that beneath the common roof of *karyawan* SOKSI housed a catholic assortment of popular affiliates and was still striving to widen that membership over a larger and larger territorial expanse, it was also daring in its inner promise to substantiate the implied meaning of "Indonesian." For there can be no mistaking that the *Baladhika-karya* carried with it the determination to be categorical about what it meant to be "Indonesian," and in so doing it promised the categories of "Indonesian" and "Indonesia." The daring component of the *Baladhika-karya* therefore inhered precisely in the movement it signalled away from merely identifying "non-Indonesian" elements in a negative way, to the determination in a promised and positive way of "Indonesian" qualities. Now, since to determine in a positive way is to posit, to attempt to posit in the context of a new state building strategy is to prepare for the moment of exception that alone yields the positive power of sovereignty. Thus, in its self-priming to categorize its efforts as "Indonesian," the Army was actually positioning itself to precipitate the conditions that would yield it a monopoly of decision relative to an "Indonesian" standard. This is the same thing as setting the standard, defining the meaning, and circumscribing people and territory in a new state. Therefore, the conflict into which the TNI was enticing the "mutineers" on the "Indonesian ship of state" was knowingly and inescapably of the exceptional type.

CHAPTER VI

A CONFLICT OF MARGINS AND MEANING

THE ENDING AND BEGINNING OF THE INDONESIAN STATE

By mid-1963, the consciousness of a desire for sovereignty that was implied in the formation and directed growth of SOKSI, Hansip, and the *Baladhika-karya* signalled the appearance of a second dimension in the contest between the TNI and PKI. In addition to their longstanding efforts to compete at the margins, and thereby widen the scope of their respective states-within-a-state, the two protagonists now began to compete explicitly in terms of the content of these incipient wholes. Yet, as the discussion of the *Baladhika-karya* makes clear, the Army's promise to actualize a positive definition of content (or meaning) logically entailed a threat to exclude everything outside the scope of that implied meaning. This meant that while the struggle took its form, as such, on the basis of the second dimension of contested meaning, its outcome was nonetheless vitally dependent on each actor's achievements along the first dimension, and more especially on the capacity to safeguard those achievements against the other. Where the competition had turned into a conflict about meaning, it could hardly be otherwise. And where the competition took the form of a conflict over incipient meanings of "Indonesia," the formal state became for the first time not only the subject of the conflict, but its main object. Indeed, it was because the TNI and PKI were compelled to create something that could not be shared (sovereignty), and which therefore did not already exist (notwithstanding the pretensions of the Central Government), that their subsequent interaction became elevated to the status of a conflict. This conflict necessarily entailed the partition and dissolution of the formal state, for it was the widening reality of their respective states-within-a-state that each actor endeavoured to substitute for the unreality of the "Indonesian state" between 1963 and 1965.

The Formal State as the Subject and Object of Revolutionary Activity

In the process of substitution, the Army possessed an early, but invitingly assailable and thus slight, advantage over the PKI. The advantage consisted in the

Army's status as part of the "state" and the Guided Democracy establishment. This was an advantage that the Army spent reinforcing from mid-1962 to mid-1963. As the sharp policy reversal on Irian Barat made clear, its status did not carry a guarantee that the Army could realize its directing idea of Indonesia in the predictable and consistent manner required by "national development." Accordingly, the Army's creation and fostering of SOKSI, the Hansip system, and especially the *Baladhika-karya*, were efforts to substantiate and empower itself in a more thorough-going, revolutionary, and irreversible fashion. In doing so, the Army seemed determined to forestall any further challenges from the Communists to its privileged capacity to set the direction and speed of the "Indonesian ship of state," where "below deck" it was increasingly securing a self-sought base of popular support from mid-1963.

When the "May 26 Regulations" began to be implemented as Government policy, and the "Indonesian ship of state" proved responsive to the power and direction provided to it by the Army, it appeared that the TNI was beginning to realize its advantage over the PKI. In one fundamental and unavoidable respect though, the advantage that the Army appeared to be enjoying vis-à-vis the "state" was still limited by the same drawback that Nasution had vainly tried to ignore in August 1961. The limitation was that every scheme for normalcy presupposes norms and therefore the competence to determine such norms; schemes of normalcy, in short, are earnest aspirations to sovereignty. In August 1961, Sukarno had invoked this limitation, effectively substantiated by the PKI, by making the "return" of Irian Barat the touchstone of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution." Now, in the summer of 1963, the Army presumed the effective acquiescence of other actors to its strategy, which was communicated on-board as Government policy. And now, the Army gave to its presumptuousness the additional quality of being armed.

This quality alone ought to have left the weaponless PKI with no choice but to effectively acquiesce, but it did not because the resource of arms did not matter most to the PKI or even, for that matter, the TNI. The latter's advantage was only protected by arms, not realized by their possession. The Army's advantage was that it possessed resources in the form of Government offices, from which it could at least pretend to sovereignty in a way that the PKI could not hope to match. In either case, it was sovereignty itself that both actors really sought. The TNI and SOKSI showed in the intensity of their struggle to exercise control of the state enterprises and enterprise councils how fundamental was the possession of ostensibly "state" resources. In this sense, it was the Army and SOKSI, with their weapons bared threateningly in jealous protection of a dear political resource, that caused the PKI to consciously focus its attention on the "Indonesian state" as both the subject and object of its directed activities.

Before the "state" became the explicit subject and object of concerted Communist strategizing, it was an entity whose importance was partly evident and partly obscured to Communist leaders. In the period following the Indonesian-Dutch agreement on the peaceful "return" of Irian Barat, for example, the PKI seemed content to return to its familiar refrain (which was also heard at the Seventh Party Congress) of making demands on the "state" and the "state leadership" for a new Cabinet in which it was represented. By December 1962, Aidit's frustration with these acts of tried and tired pleading showed when he warned sternly that "rejection of NASAKOM would mean a denunciation of the peaceful way to socialism and lead to dissension inside the nation, and the peak of this dissension would be an internecine war."[1] This frustration was preliminary to the awareness, which was brought out by SOBSI's and the PKI's on-going struggle with SOKSI in the state enterprises and enterprise councils, that pleading was a decidedly less effective tactic than simply organizing within the ostensible confines of the "state." As we have seen, the Communists' abilities in this regard distinguished them from other competitors, who did not self-consciously plan to win through planning. And SOBSI's success in winning the single largest bloc of representatives enlightened the Party to the possibility that it could plan to win in the "state," too.

Further to this remarkable insight, the PKI showed itself prepared to improve its perception by learning from its experiences in the "state" and also from those of the TNI. In fact, it was mainly on the basis of the latter's experiences, following the lifting of the SOB on 1 May 1963, that the Communists made the most important and radical (and therefore last) adjustment in their orientation to the "state." In that month, quite without warning, the FN dissolved the BPPKs. This feat was doubly remarkable in that the FN had been notoriously ineffectual and paralysed by in-fighting up to this point in time, but now delivered a blow against the Army and its strategy of "national development." Significantly, the BPPKs were not just the forerunners of SOKSI, they were organic extensions of SUAD itself, which through them aspired to show a perfect symmetry with the "state," specifically with the DPR-GR and its sub-groups of "Material," "Religious," and "Spiritual" golkar. Thus, despite the fact that the "May 26 Regulations" took effect shortly afterward, and in a way that the Army encouraged, it had been deprived of one of its own organizational limbs. This was the point that seems to have invited Communist reflection and learning.

For the Communists, the sudden dissolution of the BPPKs revealed a double frailty. The first and obvious frailty was that of the Army, whose ability to set the direction and speed of the "Indonesian state" had been usurped by those to whom it publicly subordinated itself—the "state leadership" and the President it had promoted "for life." The Army's essential weakness, which Sukarno himself exposed for unknown and probably unknowable reasons, was its inability to publicly resist the President because of their wider collusion in, and concern to safeguard, the pretence of an "Indonesian state." Logically, the Army's frailty was Sukarno's too. For while Sukarno and the "state leadership" had assumed the responsibility for "national development," it was by no means clear that the "state" could effect its plans without the TNI and its civilian allies. The dissolution of the BPPKs did not entail an automatic transfer of personnel and organizational resources from Army control to that of the "state." Moreover, it was uncertain that the Government's contracted dependence on foreign capital could substitute, or substitute for long enough, for the amount of surplus required by an economic framework as wide and diverse as the archipelago's. Thus, while Sukarno showed himself capable of limiting the Army's quest for its own sovereign authority—an ability conferred on him by the nonjusticiable nature of their collusion—he was unable to achieve this same objective for himself by merely directing the involution of the "state" upon itself, with him at its centre.

Viewed in this light, the dissolution of the BPPKs was encouraging to the Communists for two reasons. The first reason related to the public perception and expectation of the post-SOB era. Specifically, there was a widespread anticipation that some form of "normalcy" would prevail in the wake of the rescission of the SOB. This expectation was, in fact, fostered by the TNI out of an intentional concern to create the conditions in which "national development" could flourish. The disappearance of the BPPKs thus made for an ironic, but not illogical, outcome to the TNI's own efforts to impress the existence of an "Indonesian state." On the basis of altogether different motives, the PKI also sought to foster an expectation of life after the SOB. Its conception of "normalcy" aimed for a deliberate, rather than ironic or accidental, diminution of the Army's place in Guided Democracy. This was conveyed by the belittling sentiment that it was time for the military to "return to its barracks." When Sukarno took his action against the BPPKs, therefore, it happened to meet with the self-generated expectations of both the TNI and the PKI, the former in an ironically formal way, and the latter in a substantive way. The point the Communists must have found heartening was that they stood to benefit from a situation of the Army's own making. Moreover, it was a situation that the Army was not in a position to unmake, even in the face of a "state leadership" that was acting injuriously toward it, because the very premise of the existence of such a "state leadership" was at the base of its defence of "Indonesia" and its promotion of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution."

The Communists were encouraged by the demise of the BPPKs for a second reason, for the sudden disbanding of the Bodies provided them an unexpected, but illuminating contrast with their own recent experiences in the "state." Where the Army had spent years in the official limelight associating itself with, preparing others for, and setting up the organizational framework of comprehensive "national development," the end of the BPPKs was a public and substantive loss. By contrast, where the PKI had for years acted outside the "state" by undertaking "small yield" or "small but significant" activities "from below," it was now securing a presence inside the "state" (through the enterprise councils).

The contrast amounted to far more than a mere gain for the Communists and a loss for the Army. The event itself surely elicited mixed feelings of unspoken relief and delight, but above all it must have evoked a sense of appreciation in the Communist leadership. The relief of knowing that they retained their sizeable niche in the enterprise councils had not come without someone else's losses, and it was only against the backdrop of this kind of loss that the Communists could appreciate the truly radical nature of their achievement. Over and above the staving off of an organizational reversal, the Communists came to the realization that they had succeeded in pioneering and preserving a new form of representation in the "state." This achievement, moreover, came even during a time when the "state leadership" showed a jealous concern for its own prerogative in "national development."

Starkly stated, the Communists were brought to the full awareness that their representation in the enterprise councils was self-realized, the outcome of sheer organizational work energized by pent-up frustration with old tactics. This achievement was in marked contrast with its on-going representation in other "state" bodies, where its delegates dutifully took their *appointed* seats in an *advisory* capacity (in the DPR-GR, MPRS, Depernas, MPPR, and so forth). That they had neither been extirpated from the enterprise councils nor repulsed in their unfolding tactic of organizing within ostensibly "state" bodies suggested to the Communists wider possibilities yet. This was especially likely since Sukarno had already demonstrated his determination to subordinate the Army to the very "state" of its own creation. These two factors, or reasons for PKI encouragement, spoke to the dawning realization that organizing in the "state" was already a limiting tactic, when it was the "state" itself that could be organized.

Aside from the dissolution of the BPPKs, there were other signs in the period immediately following the lifting of the SOB that suggested to the Communist leadership that the "state" itself could be the subject and object of their directed activities. Sukarno, for instance, accentuated his independence of the Army, manifest in an attitude of "l'état c'est moi," by undertaking a sweeping revision of the *Komando Tertinggi Pembebasan Irian Barat*. According to Sundhaussen,

> It was expected that the [Command] would be dissolved after West Irian had been incorporated in the Republic. But in July 1963 Sukarno surprised the political élite with the announcement that in its place a *Komando Operasi Tertinggi* (Supreme Operational Command; KOTI [Koti]) was to be set up under his leadership. Its function was to execute government programmes in general, and in particular address itself to combatting counter-revolutionary efforts and colonialism/imperialism, as well as implementing economic programmes. KOTI was thus designed substantially to reduce the powers of the cabinet.[2]

Indeed, it was in this specific connection that Koti revealed itself to be a body of some significance, albeit a negative significance from the perspective of the Army, whose leading figure was obtrusively and effectively excluded:

> the personnel of the new KOTI differed considerably from its predecessor. The position of Vice-Commander-in-Chief, formerly held by Nasution, was abolished altogether. He was not given any other position of influence in the new KOTI . . .. However, this new humiliation of Nasution reportedly created such significant unrest and disapproval in the Army that he was finally included in the rather powerless advisory body of KOTI.[3]

Other evidence that encouraged a radical treatment of the "state" came from the Communists' own direct interactions with its parts. To a certain extent such interactions were anticipated by the Communists, as part of a wider effort at self-promotion they had eagerly planned since late 1962, but the actual exchanges were probably surprising in their timing, intimacy, and extent. For example, even before martial law had actually receded, Aidit himself was invited by the Police and Air Force to deliver lectures to their members.[4] After the SOB had been lifted, and the

Communists undertook to publicly disseminate Aidit's Police and Air Force lectures (and thereby, perhaps, set a standard for all armed services to follow), Aidit was subsequently invited to lecture at Seskoad in June, and the Navy Staff and Command School (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Laut*—Seskoal) in July.

In addition to these interactions, the Communists multiplied their word-based interactions manifold by resuming the publication of seven Central Committee journals the Martial Law authorities had suspended in 1960. Finally, under the same cover of confronting "Communist-phobia" that was used by Aidit to win admission into the armed services' organizational strongholds, other comrades energetically ventured into the regional wings of the "state." And there, beginning in July 1963 and continuing on for several months, their work gave substance to a promising future: "a number of strongly anti-communist provincial governors were replaced by men with less strongly anti-communist convictions, or even PKI sympathizers[,] thus weakening the grip of the Army on the regions."[5]

As both the Army's and Communists' experiences in, or with, the "state" unfolded between February and July 1963, Aidit successively modified his public portrayals of the "state" or its parts in a way that intimated, while expanding, the possibilities of consciously treating the "state" as a subject and object of his Party's state-building strategy. In February, for instance, Aidit used the fact of opposition to his presence before Police graduates to articulate a far-reaching view of how the "instruments of the state," including the Police, ought to be used. Selecting as his starting point those who objected to his lecture, Aidit denounced them as "confused because they still lived in a time of colonial thinking, a time when Communists and the instruments of the state, especially the Police, were opposed to each other."[6] But now, in conformity with Sukarno's express wishes of February 13, when he pronounced himself on the issue of "Communist-phobia" and "Nasakom-phobia" before the FN, Aidit declared that it was necessary that such people be crushed, the more so since the "Indonesian Revolution" was "on-going," ever distancing itself from the colonial era. What made this outcome particularly compelling, according to Aidit, was that there were now "two aspects of political power" in Indonesia, one that was "pro-People" and the other "anti-People."[7] By weight of the fact that Sukarno had asked for the "People's help" in opposing those who were anti-Nasakom, Aidit implied that the President was speaking to the "pro-People" segment and speaking against the "anti-People elements who still play a role in politics." This was the juncture at which Aidit attempted to forge a relationship between his Party and the "instruments of the state," including the Police.

Simply stated, Aidit presented his Party as the only mediator who could bring together the "People" and elements in the "state" to ensure that the "pro-People aspect" in Indonesian politics prevailed. Yet, Aidit made it clear that his Party would only act this way for *some* elements of the "state." Specifically, Aidit identified those in the Police who were not enthraled by "Communist-phobia" or "Nasakom-phobia" as warranting his Party's effort to adjust the "People's attitude" toward the Police, which was suspicious given colonial and more recent history. Likewise, Aidit asserted that the Party would require these same elements to help the entire "Police movement" adjust their attitude toward the "People's revolutionary movement, especially towards the Communist group."[8] Without saying it explicitly, it is very clear what Aidit was doing with his description: he was prescribing. He was preparing a new arena in the "state" in which the Party could direct its creative presence. Notwithstanding even the abstract and heroic appeals to the image of the police—"as individuals of the People, as a corps an instrument of the revolutionary state"—there was a tangibility, a self-confessed "concreteness," a resource-mindedness to the relationship Aidit was proposing with the Police. It was another effort to organize within, to pursue meaning-creating actions whose very outcome would yield exactly the bifurcation between "pro-People" and "anti-People" segments. By February 1963, therefore, it seemed clear that Aidit was coming to the realization that even sensitive parts of the "state" could become sites for PKI organizational endeavours, indeed, parts of its own state-within-a-state.

When Aidit appeared before Seskoad in late June, his thinking about the "state" was more elaborate and focused than the thoughts he shared with either the Police or the Air Force. These qualities were reflected in the clearer organization and length of his lecture, whose provocative title conveyed what the Party was really seeking from the Army: "National Defence Must Submit to the General Strategy of the Indonesian Revolution." To promote this message, Aidit applied the force of his words to several levers whose combined effect was designed to impart to the TNI the momentum to merge with the forward march of the "revolutionary movement." Some levers were designed to push the TNI into motion, some to pull it, and some to limit its forward momentum and thus keep it within the confines of a directedness of the PKI's determination.

Aidit's assertion about a changed way of thinking was among the arguments clearly designed to push the TNI along the "rails of the Indonesian Revolution":

> we must be cheerful that in our country as time goes by we increasingly lose consciousness of the thinking that distinguishes between civilian and military, People and soldiers, and increasingly gain in the thinking which strives for the integration between civilian and military, People and soldiers, without blurring the work to be done in the People's realm.[9]

If this argument was not sufficiently compelling, Aidit showed that he was prepared to pull the Army along by demonstrating that it already had a stake in the successful outcome of the "Indonesian Revolution." Appealing to individual soldiers, Aidit reminding them of their own peasant origins, or connections with the peasantry through family, and the "objective" fact that the peasants served along with the workers as "pillars" of the "Indonesian Revolution." Appealing to the Army as an armed service, Aidit declared that neither "national defence" nor "development" could occur successfully without the workers and peasants, without the "People," and only by embracing both could such schemes succeed.

Finally, Aidit presented a series of arguments whose overall thrust was to ensure the subordination of the Army once it had been pushed or pulled into becoming a full participant in the wider, revolutionary "national front." Through his discussion of *Pancasila* as a "unifying force," for example, Aidit attempted to show that if anyone sought the success of the "Indonesian Revolution," they would have to observe a rigorous equality in its five constitutive principles. Here, Aidit was motivated to show that on the standard of *Pancasila*, not only did the Communists constitute an integral part of the "Indonesian Revolution," but those people who deliberately emphasized one of the five principles of *Pancasila* above the others were in error and threatened the standard itself. Accordingly, Aidit could conclude that the essence of the *Pancasila* was its "revolutionary tolerance," which was "the base upon which all revolutionary strength could be embraced and mobilized."

The upshot of this message was that all actors had to submit themselves in the spirit of tolerance to the superior demands of the *Pancasila*, which was, after all, part of the "General Strategy of the Indonesian Revolution." In a way that may have made some in his audience chafe, Aidit also declared that the decisions made by the MPRS in 1960 (at the behest of the TNI) regarding "national defence" were also informed by an understanding of this same "General Strategy" and, therefore, commanded common observance in the manner of the *Pancasila*. If this reminder of the Army's own predicament vis-à-vis the "state" and Sukarno was not enough of a restraint, Aidit's lengthy discourse on the geographical aspects of the Indonesian archipelago aimed to substantiate the implicit view that the Navy and Air Force were at least as important as the Army: "an attempt to place emphasis on only one armed service would not be using the instruments of strength in a way that is truly appropriate to Indonesia's specific characteristic as an island country."[10] In other words, the Army was but one among equals.

In the comprehensiveness of his arguments, as well as in the variety of his positive and negative appeals to Seskoad, Aidit showed a willingness, much in advance of his appeal to the Police, to seek the assistance of others (or invite their acquiescence) in consolidating an emergent "Indonesian" reality. While Aidit took every effort to verbalize his own and his Party's due acquiescence to the symbols, slogans, idiom, and "state leadership" of Guided Democracy, there could be no mistaking the concrete reality he was attempting to direct into existence. Many of the Chairman's appeals consisted of opening up avenues to wider social spaces, or sensitive social spaces like the realm of "national defence," that would allow the PKI the opportunity to engage in mobilizational and organizational drives. And in this respect, Aidit essentially told his audience to let him and the true adherents of *Pancasila* worry about the details of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution."

That it would be the details of any ensuing actions—meaning-creating actions—that would tend to yield the authoritative meaning of *Pancasila* (or any other "Indonesian" standard) was probably not lost on Aidit. For to have even voiced the opinions he did before an Army audience was a bold step, but not any more bold than the insight that came from the Party's own experiences with the "state" and which was now confirmed by the fact of his lecture at Seskoad: the Party could press its state-building opportunities throughout the "state," including the "instruments of the state." Indeed, it was precisely the comparative understanding that the Party had gained of these "instruments" that gave to it the unique capacity to direct the dynamic movement of the whole "Indonesian Revolution" by setting its faster moving components against slower ones, or at least against ones that proved resistant.

Aidit brazenly demonstrated this capacity during his lecture to Seskoal on July 16. On this occasion, and in a remarkably confrontational manner, Aidit denounced the idea of Civic Missions as "wrong and anti-People."[11] With this, Aidit himself began to direct the bifurcation between "pro-" and "anti-People" elements not simply in one service, or between services, or even among services, but, in the most radical sense, in the whole body of the "Indonesian state." He showed that the PKI had undergone an enormously significant shift in perspective, from a jaded frustration that sought relief in efforts to organize in the "state," to a comprehensiveness of experience that exuded the confidence to organize the "state." Clearly, Aidit's boisterous claims about the "Indonesian Revolution" harboured no reserve, because nothing was reserved from the ambit of the Party's directed activities. Henceforth, the "state" was the subject and object of the Party's organizational and mobilizational drives.

The PKI's Four-Year Plan: Method as Content and Meaning

The generalized expression of the Party's radical perspective on the "state" was its Four-Year Plan on Culture, Ideology, and Organization. Notwithstanding its seemingly innocuous title, or the reverential motives that informed its publication on the highly symbolic date of 17 August 1963, this Plan was meant to be of such novel and creative consequence to the Communists that they actually spent four-and-a-half months (between April and mid-August) planning it. In essence, the Communists spent their preparatory time practising, and presumably refining, their own work method on themselves. Apparently, this was in direct response to the dissatisfaction Aidit expressed in February with the manner in which the final phase of the Second Three-Year Plan was being realized. Even though the Communists were to report shortly that their efforts in that Plan were largely successful,[12] Aidit

> underscored again the necessity of following the leadership method established at the Sixth Congress in 1959: combine words of a general nature and concrete guidance, establish a link between the leadership and the masses; the leadership method must always go hand-in-hand with a correct work style, which consists of allying theory with practice, establishing close ties with the masses, and developing auto-criticism.[13]

He also made it clear that "the collection and systematisation of the 'opinions of the masses', scientifically summarized and then 'disseminated back' among the masses, [was] . . . the best means of realizing the objectives of true party leadership: 'from the masses, back to the masses'."[14] In the interest of meeting the implied criticism, therefore, the Communists engaged every member and corporate body possible in the planning activities that would produce their new Plan:

> This new plan was elaborated in a democratic way, with realistic possibilities. As soon as the Central Planning Board, an adjunct of the CC Secretariat, elaborated a project for a plan, this was scrupulously discussed at the time by the assembled provincial committees, sections of the Party organs and Communist sections in public organizations. With that followed a vast discussion in all Party organizations, without exception. In the course of these debates, militants made their remarks, and brought up amendments. The plan was, in its entirety, approved unanimously.[15]

In truth, what the Communists approved as the Four-Year Plan was really a plan-within-a-plan, or at least a Plan with two very distinct and chronologically staggered aspects. The first aspect, which became apparent in July 1963, related to the renovation of the Party's educational apparatus. At that time, a decision was resolutely taken to replace the *Universitas Rakjat* (Unra) system in its entirety. Since its inception in 1958, the Unra system had shown itself to be limited (in the number of qualified teaching personnel and committed students, among other things) and it continued to deteriorate in the harsh conditions of the SOB. By July 1963, with months of planning deliberations apparently pointing out the need for such a change, the Communists inaugurated a new-model Unra (Unra *Gaja Baru*) system with Aidit as its head.

The second aspect was the Plan itself as presented in August. Its relationship to the first aspect was to advance the expansion and development of the Unra *Gaja Baru*, but to do so in a way that made this new enterprise appear as nothing more than a continuity of the preceding Plan.[16] Whether or not there was a deliberate effort here to conceal the failure of the first Unra system may never be known. What was quite apparent, though, was the relatively greater emphasis that the Communists placed on their newest organization, as opposed to the Unra *Gaja Baru*, in the Plan itself. For the appearance of the Plan on August 17 did not only bring four-and-a-half months of planning work to an end, it witnessed the creation of the PKI's own Department of Culture—a body of such apparent importance that it was to be directly supervised by the Central Committee. Despite this, the Communists insisted on portraying the Department, like the Unra *Gaja Baru*, as simply a logical outgrowth of earlier endeavours. More specifically, the argument was made that the Department had been created to make good on the shortcomings of earlier work, which "had not been carried out in a systematic fashion, had not been steered as agreed, and had lacked intensity."[17]

The surprising aspect of this view, as well as the portrayal of the Unra *Gaja Baru*, was its deliberate contradiction. Both organizations were clearly the outcome of months of effort and vigorous planning and, at the same time, they were passed off as straightforward logical extrapolations of earlier efforts. If the sheer planning effort that the Communists undertook makes the latter view unbelievable, then it also makes it difficult to believe that the Communists were simply trying to mask any earlier failure on their part. Whether the theme of continuity they used was accurate or not, their decision to do so revealed a reluctance to publicly disclose the full extent of their undertaking, or even its real thrust in the guise of "culture." And in this, the

Communists were probably exercising good judgment, because what they had resolved to achieve, as demonstrated already by their investment of time, effort, and resources into a comprehensive educational system and a Department of Culture, was the realization of a single, authoritative "Indonesian" standard in the synthetic guise of "culture."

The analogy between this strategy of sovereignty and the Army's is almost exact: as Civic Missions were to "national development," the Party's educational system was to "culture." Where the TNI had created a tangible, "in-house" expression of its wider strategy, consisting of the dedicated resources and organization of the Civic Missions, the PKI endeavoured to achieve the same result with the Unra *Gaja Baru*. Where the TNI could use the Civic Missions programme either defensively, as a backstop, or offensively, as a set of dry-runs, for its wider strategy, it was apparent that the PKI could realize the same dual function with the Unra *Gaja Baru*. Defensively, the system could provide an inner coherence and source of enrichment to the Party's work; offensively, as the Four-Year Plan made obvious, it would serve as the undergirding over which the synthetic fabric of "Indonesian culture" could be stretched taut. And where the execution of Civic Missions required the animation and coordination of the distinct divisions in SUAD, the realization of the educational objectives outlined in the Four-Year Plan invited a similar collaboration between the members of the Communist organizational family. Finally, where "national development" presupposed an integrity or unity having spatial and popular limits, the singularity of the notion of a national "culture" presupposed the same thing.

As the most striking of their likenesses, the bounded comprehensiveness of "national development" and "culture" was also the one factor that most rigorously impelled their distinction. The underlying reason for this had less to do with the status of "national development" and "culture" as rival standards, and more to do with the fact that the standards themselves reflected a condition of organizational comprehensiveness to which the TNI and PKI were approaching. Indeed, the recourse that each made to a transcendant standard followed from, or accompanied, organizational drives whose own achieved or directed comprehensiveness required a concomitant measure of comprehensibility; the standards were those measures. In the case of the Army, its failure to successful apply the standard of "national development" in 1961 made it painfully evident that a more thorough organizational effort would be required the next time; the Civic Missions and SOKSI were the direct evidence of this awareness.

In the case of the PKI, its endeavour to promote the standard of "culture" occurred in conjunction with its substitution of one (failing) organizational matrix for another. This path was clearly different from that taken by the TNI in August 1961, and was almost certainly informed by an appreciation of the Army's mistake in discounting not only the Communists' ability to rally others on the Irian Barat issue, but the latitude exercised by Sukarno. By now proposing simultaneously to hoist and realize its standard of "culture," the PKI carried itself with a spirit of daring resolve, indeed, its leadership positively brought the whole enterprise into danger. For unlike the Army, which had presumptuously raised the standard of "national development" on the premise that doing so on the Indonesian "ship of state" would elicit its popular observance, the Party seemed to be wagering that its standard and the organizational effort to realize it would succeed together or fail together, but in either event, the outcome would not depend—or be allowed to depend—on the presumption of some autonomous "state."

Rather, the outcome of its efforts would depend on its own self-directed and self-fulfilled activities as outlined in the Four-Year Plan. In their full blossom, those activities were reverentially referred to as the "Ten Raises," which Aidit described as the "core" of the Plan:

> (1) raise the cultural level of the mass of Party members and the people (anti-illiteracy campaigns, Centres of People's Sciences and Houses of People's Sciences); (2) raise the ideological level of the Party members and the people (Political Schools and People's Courses); (3) increase membership of the Party and the mass organisations; (4) raise the status of candidate members to members; (5) expand the grouping of Party members and candidate members; (6) further activise the Resort Committees, the Sub-Section Committees, the Sections and the Fractions; (7) increase the collection of fees; (8) intensify more suitable transfer and placement of cadres; (9) intensify the going-down movement; and (10) improve the implementation of the method of leadership and the style of work.[18]

While Aidit may be excused here for expressing the brightness and intensity of the "Ten Raises," we must not lose sight of the fact that every blossom, political or otherwise, depends for its beauty upon its roots. And in this case, the "Ten Raises" and the Plan were rooted around two broad objectives: "cultural education" and "ideological improvement." As a brief examination of the ways in which the two objectives were to be realized reveals, they provided for a measure of coherence in the execution of the "Ten Raises," and thus prevented the Party from simply engaging in a sprawling or kaleidoscopic growth. At the same time, the steady realization of the two objectives fostered an outcome with a coherence of a different kind: a coherence of a deliberately fostered integrity, of an incipient wholeness.

Taking the objective of "cultural education" first, the Plan called for the intensified creation of the enormous and cascading educational infrastructure of the Unra *Gaja Baru* system; in conformity with Aidit's later observations,[19] this part of the Plan may be rightly regarded as its "technical administrative" half. At the central and provincial levels, optional academic courses were to be offered; Section Committees, through "popular universities" or Mipera,[20] were charged with offering the equivalent of a complete secondary-school education; Sub-section Committees, through "popular institutes" or Bapera,[21] were responsible for giving a partial education at the secondary-school level; and Committees in organizations at the base were directed, through the vehicle of "popular education centres" or Panpera,[22] to offer instruction corresponding to that of primary-level schools. Additionally, the Plan called for the creation of teacher-training courses for the Mipera, Bapera, and Panpera; it directed the organization of professional teaching courses; and it commanded the creation of correspondence courses for those members who could not commit to a regular educational programme because of the dynamic character of their "revolutionary activities." The explicitly cultural components of this vast educational scheme were manifest in the creation and work of the Department of Culture, as well as in the convening of a conference on the problems of arts and literature, in addition to other unspecified measures.

The other half of the Plan concerned the improvement of the ideological level of the cadres and envisaged a wide variety of measures. Under the banner of "ideology" were included such measures as the training of teachers for Party schools at all levels; education in philosophy, especially in Marxism-Leninism, but not to the exclusion of an understanding of the "concrete problems of the Indonesian Revolution"; work education for artists so as to promote their closer links with the masses; the organization of a research project in the economic domain and in the history of culture; and the construction of sites for Party schools.

Given the myriad of prescribed measures, the task the Party had set for itself in realizing even one of these objectives was managerially daunting. Through its call for the simultaneous realization of two objectives, however, the Party and its planners had ingeniously simplified their work, making it a matter of supply and demand in both a general and a specific sense. Generally, where the main target of the first objective consisted in the creation of an educational apparatus, it followed logically that there would be a demand for specialized personnel and knowledge, the provision of which was the directed outcome of the second objective. In specific terms, the reconciliation of supply and demand was made more realistic and less risky because the separate Committees of each of three levels of the PKI organizational structure were responsible for creating their own tier in the integrated Unra *Gaja Baru*. The comprehensive and the particular reconciliation of the processes of supply and demand promoted coherence in the work and in the working out of the Plan.

Although the benefits arising from the interaction of the forces of supply and demand have occasionally been attributed to the operation of an "invisible hand," there was nothing invisible about the Communists' attempts to wed "cultural education" and "ideological improvement" to obtain the key benefit of their Plan: the coherence of their "Indonesian" wholeness as expressed through the standard of "culture." In the first place, the Communists were as bold as they were frank when it came to disclosing the scope of their planned enterprise. At its popular limits, the Communists envisaged doubling the sphere of their own organized power by doubling the number of their own adherents. To realize its widest possible geographical limits, the Plan called explicitly for a special effort to be made to assist committees "outside of Java and Sumatra." In its inner construction, this sphere was to be reinforced by the explicit and publicly acknowledged presence of the PKI ormas. And just as the Party membership was to double in size to lend body to its widening sphere, the ormas were expected to enlarge by an equal measure. Finally, the Plan called for a determined effort on the part of all Communists to "go down" to the countryside and the peasants, thereby giving a uniform direction to the Party's own behemoth-like movement.

If the scope of their enterprise tended toward a self-conscious omnipresence in the Indonesian context, the Communists made it very clear that they intended to cultivate a self-conscious omniscience as a concomitant of their unfolding presence on the ground. Already, the self-assurance of such a collective psychological disposition was apparent at the start of the Four-Year Plan, when its publicists argued that by "binding closely the study of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism with life, the general line of the Party, and daily activity, the militants will better understand the justice of the Party policy on all these questions." Indeed, to cite the power of understanding of Marxism-Leninism in this way was to encourage its use in understanding all questions, and in confronting all problems. And in the specific case of the Four-Year Plan, which carried the Communists further afield among the "masses" than ever before, it stood to reason that it would be the "masses'" questions and problems that would become the proper subject of this understanding. However, below the abstraction of the "masses," the Party clearly anticipated that its movement outward and downward entailed a concentration of efforts among the peasantry, which was indisputably the largest single group in the general population. Notwithstanding this, over and above the narrow appeals the Party still made to such discrete groups as the peasants, workers, women, fishermen, and so forth, its embrace of the master category of the "people" showed that its own Marxism-Leninism had now been "Indonesianized" to its maximum extent; no further resolution could be possible because no greater social category obtained in the Communists' directing idea of Indonesia.

If the PKI's pursuit of "cultural education" and "ideological improvement" was premised on making itself both omnipresent and omniscient, then the deliberate synthesizing of these activities in the guise of "culture" was intended to make the Party omnipotent. We may appreciate this point, without ceding any mystery or invisibility either to this outcome or to the achievement of this outcome, by recognizing that it is the combination of a presence of being and a presence of mind that affords an actor the ability to *make sense* of a context, to *order* a context. In the case of the Indonesian context, the PKI's tactic of "cultural education" aimed at expanding and improving its members' already highly structured presence of being, while the tactic of "ideological improvement" aimed at a forceful expansion of its cadres' presence of mind. To make sense of the Indonesian context, though, the Party showed that hoisting a standard of "culture" in the abstract was not its final objective. For it was not the abstract achievement of a standard that mattered so much as the achievement of a standard in practice, in the combinative action of "cultural education" and "ideological improvement."

Now, since collective and collectively defining standards do not meaningfully prevail in the abstract, but rather in the context of collective behaviour, raising the standard of "culture" was fundamentally an organizational and mobilizational challenge for the PKI. It was for this compelling reason that the actual attempts to raise a standard of "culture," to raise the "people's" own voice, occurred with the directed collaboration of the Party's ormas. For by working out a standard of "culture" between and among the *ormas and itself*, the PKI could be confident in the exercise and reality of its growing control and (in the framework of the planned doubling in its and the ormas' size), give an irresistible boost to the claim that the "cultural" and "popular" actions undertaken by this incipient community spoke to a context-wide standard. In this connection, the work undertaken by the BTI and Lekra ormas in conjunction with the PKI warrants particular attention.

The Role of the BTI

Taking the work of the PKI and BTI first shows the seriousness with which the Communists aimed to foster a genuinely popular standard for their maturing political enterprise, a standard which, in the empirical circumstances of the Indonesian context, meant a standard of and for the peasantry. Of course, the peasantry had long held the interest of the Communists, but from mid-1963 onwards that interest was expressed as a desire to effect a comprehensive programme of peasant inclusion and consciousness raising. In securing students for its schools through its own growth, for instance, the Party intended that its new school system would "address itself squarely to the task of educating the common folk, particularly in the rural areas. The PKI . . . resolved to emphasize the peasantry in fact as well as rhetoric. This meant a particular effort to make rural people politically conscious and not just generally sympathetic to what they imagined the Communist party stood for."[23] Since what the Party "stood for" was currently under revision, and was being deliberately shaped by the self-imposed challenge of learning the concerns of the very peasants it was inviting into its ranks, the Party clearly perceived the importance of being among and knowing the peasantry to the greatest possible extent. It followed that much closer organizational and mobilizational cooperation would be necessary between itself and the BTI. To an important extent, then, the Unra *Gaja Baru* was an expression of this deliberate cooperation, for within it the two organizations worked in tandem to realize the outcome of what had become in reality a joint creative endeavour.

Based on McVey's description of the inner workings of the Unra *Gaja Baru*, the BTI and PKI each made separate, but not unrelated, contributions to the furtherance of "cultural education." For its part, the BTI was handed the most basic of responsibilities: "bringing literacy and the Communists' general message to the villages." This task informed the very foundations of the Unra *Gaja Baru*, for it would be the BTI's success initially in winning and holding the attention of peasants that would largely determine the subsequent attendance at all levels of the school system. The BTI appears to have presumed that by being as accommodating as possible at the outset of a student's learning, more individuals would then commit to Communist schooling. And indeed, the BTI tried very hard with both its younger and older students while still adhering to the objective of giving the rudiments of learning:

> Its [anti-illiteracy] campaigns were to run during the harvest season, when spirits and cooperative efforts ran high. The idea was to spread literacy as rapidly as possible—within two months pupils should be able to read and write—by employing the principles of "many teachers, a limited number of pupils, modest space and equipment, and concentrated instruction." To make the campaign a success, courses were organized for people who would act as PBH [*Pemberantasan Buta-Huruf*—Anti-Illiteracy] teachers, and "model areas" of

literacy were to be developed which would serve as a beacon to the rest. In addition peasant front locals were supposed to organize creches for village children during the planting and harvest seasons, and to sponsor primary schools (*sekolah dasar sederhana*, SDS) which would cater to children who had been forced by poverty to leave government school.[24]

On the basis of the BTI's preliminary work, the PKI would then direct its adult student cadres through the three-tiered structure that formally constituted the Unra *Gaja Baru*. Even here, within the context of more rigidly defined structures, the PKI showed itself prepared to change its ambitious plans when the human material it was attempting to shape showed that this was necessary. "Because the students were adult and highly motivated party cadres," McVey has observed,

> it was initially assumed that Unra schools would be able to accomplish in two-years of part-time education (ideally three times a week in four hours of forty-minute lessons, but in fact whatever arrangement was convenient to teacher and pupils) what state primary schools conveyed in six years of full-time work . . .. It soon appeared, however, that this was unrealistic, and instead it was determined that a student would have to have the equivalent of third-grade knowledge before entering the Panpera. Consequentially, illiterates had first to attend PBH or other preparatory courses for about ten months in order to attain the rudiments of literacy.[25]

Even in the face of revision and refinement, the Communists still managed to abide a sense of urgency in their work.

Significantly, Aidit made it clear that the Party's real focus of attention among the Panpera, Bapera, and Mipera schools was with the former, that is, with the link that most immediately connected its work and itself with the BTI. In placing its emphasis on the Panpera, the Party showed that it was unprepared to simply wait for successive cohorts of cadres to make their way through the entire educational structure before the point of their "cultural education" had been made. For in effect, the point of their "cultural education" was already apparent in the preliminary activity of directing people from one organization's auspices to another's as part of a single, comprehensive, and integrated process. That is not to say that what the students were expected to learn by way of course content in the Unra *Gaja Baru* was inconsequential; it is just that the similarity in content between this system and the schooling offered in the decaying Government-run system was not marked.[26] What was different, and what the Communists seemed most keen to accentuate, was the multi-layered comprehensiveness of their educational enterprise.

At the most superficial of levels, one of scope, a sense of comprehensiveness was apparent in the comparison, which was drawn and acknowledged by the authors and participants of the Unra *Gaja Baru* alike, between their growing system and the badly deteriorating public school system:

> The New Style Unra was designed to respond to the . . . frustration [in the public system], offering a badly needed service and at the same time demonstrating that communism could function where sclerotic state bureaucracy failed. This was part of a much larger PKI campaign to demonstrate that the party knew how to solve Indonesia's problems and was therefore a fit source of government.[27]

The comprehensiveness to which the PKI was here aspiring entailed a complete substitution, aspect-for-aspect, of an existing (but clearly disintegrating) system for a system of its own creation. So intent were the Communists in this creative, substitutive comprehensiveness that as early as 1963 "a person [could] go from analphabetism to the equivalent of a university degree entirely within [the] Communist educational system."[28] Not surprisingly, the capacity to offer a comprehensive education, in terms of a complete programme of studies, carried over into a comprehensiveness of outlook. In this connection, the Communists offered something the Government's schools did not:

> the principal difference was that the higher Unra schools included ideological subjects, though they placed less emphasis on them than in the past, for now the stress was on training people to be expert as well as red. Therefore the exact sciences and general knowledge were to be stressed, and still more importantly a modern civilization was to be imbued. The Indonesian citizen of the future had to be a new man culturally, Chairman Aidit pronounced, for only through a profound civilization transformation would he be able to overcome the country's problems. He must become able to see the world through the lens of dialectical and historical materialism (MDH), which would align his vision with the truth. Thus the Unra's task was to make Marxism, the philosophical expression of this approach, the possession of the Indonesian masses and the Indonesian nation. In the shorter term, an Unra education would acculturate students to the world proposed by the PKI, making them both more loyal and more effective participants in the movement.[29]

The final, and most profound, sense of comprehensiveness arose in the course of the Party's attempts to consciously realize a comprehensiveness in its offerings and a comprehensiveness of outlook. The third type of comprehensiveness is that sense of total self-awareness and perceptible completeness that arises when an actor pursuing a social objective begins to realize it partially, but not completely, and in such a way as to encourage the thoroughness of its completion. Stated differently, the appearance of evidential fragments of the intended outcome before it is completely realized serve as "early returns" that tend to confirm the appropriateness of the original directed activity or activities. Concretely, the "model areas" of literacy mentioned by McVey serve as an illustration of the kind of comprehensiveness meant here. While the "model areas" were not part of an ordered social life, in the sense that an ordering principle obtained in their operation, they were nonetheless created fragments of an orderly social existence of the Communists' own on-going creative design. Thus, the "areas" represented partial instantiations of the Communists' drive to be everywhere and know everything. In the essentially creative endeavour of which they were a part, these "areas" and their participants were among its first creations, hints of the creative comprehensiveness aimed for and now partially realized in the name of "cultural education" and "ideological improvement." With their spatial and popular qualities, these phenomena were also at their beginnings as self-conscious and self-regarding communities, pockets of society in the body of a state-within-a-state. As such, they could serve as tangible, living platforms for the much wider application of their own constitutive standard of creativity.

The Role of Lekra

To assist it in the full elaboration and multiplication of this work, the PKI directed the Lekra to play a uniquely creative role in advancing a popular standard of "culture." For this task, the Lekra was particularly well suited, having long advocated a view of culture of a peculiarly synthetic nature:

> . . . Lekra gives active support to everything that is new and progressive, Lekra actively assists in the demolition of the remainders of colonial "culture" which has left a part of our people in dark ignorance, with feelings of inferiority and with weakness of character. Lekra accepts our ancestral heritage critically and studies carefully all its aspects, just as it does the classical creations of other peoples anywhere, and thus creatively endeavours to further the great tradition of our history and our nation, directing it toward a new culture which is rational and scientific. Lekra proposes to its members, but also to other artists, scholars, and cultural workers who are outside Lekra, that they study . . . the actual truth in life, and be faithful to truth and reality.
>
> In the arts, Lekra supports creative initiative, creative daring, and Lekra agrees with every form, every style, etc., so long as it is faithful to truth and meets the highest standards of artistic beauty.
>
> In short, in repudiating the antihuman, antisocial character of the culture that is not-of-the-people, in repudiating the violations of truth and beauty, Lekra helps shape a new society capable of self-advancement, a society developing its individuality which is both multifaceted and harmonious.[30]

In addition to Lekra's outlook, its superlative nature would give to the PKI a political advantage that was simply and indisputably unavailable to any other actor. Not only was Lekra "the first organizational response in Indonesia to the question of the relationship between a commitment to social and political change and the practice of art and literature,"[31] but, as Hindley observed in 1963, it was the "only national cultural organization to have survived the last thirteen years" and, as such, it was the "only significant nationwide cultural organization in Indonesia."[32] Under these circumstances, the Lekra leadership seemed sufficiently emboldened by its organization's unique standing to publicly declare its membership size for the first time: in May 1963 Lekra admitted that it had 100,000 members.[33] Above all, Lekra's special quality consisted of its status as a large pool of gathered political resources, a status which meant that it could serve in the PKI's directed activity of making sense of the Indonesian context. Indeed, like the BTI in the rural educational sphere, the Lekra could be engaged to achieve "early returns" of a similar comprehensiveness, but with a distinctly "cultural" form.

Aidit himself made Lekra's engagement in this task explicit in March 1963. Speaking in Medan before the first conference of Lekra's Literary Institute (*Lembaga Sastra*—Lestra), the PKI Chairman authoritatively ventured that "our writers must be of one mind and one resolve with the masses of the People."[34] By this, Aidit meant the complete implementation of the principle (which would figure importantly in the Party's own Plan five months later) of "going down" to the peasants (*turun ke bawah*). Now while it is true that neither this activity nor its objective of achieving harmonic expression with the "people" was brand new to Lekra, the explicitness and directness of both for political reasons was new, and reflected the priority of changes then occurring in the PKI proper.

Already, since at least January 1959, when Lekra held its first National Congress, the Institute began the steady outward and downward movement that would carry it to the peasants and, in a preliminary manner, to the point where it would consciously articulate a "cultural" standard. These activities were entailed in the two slogans of "going wide and going high" (*meluas dan meninggi)* and "politics is the commander" (*politik adalah panglima*). According to Foulcher, the idea of "going wide"

> was pursued with utmost seriousness, and its ramifications [were] felt in all subsequent LEKRA activity. It meant . . . that there would now be much greater attention to activities at the level of regional culture, beginning with support for anti-illiteracy campaigns and extending into types of cultural and artistic expression designed to encourage a more broadly based level of popular participation.

As for the idea of "going higher," understood in the sense of realizing "higher quality," Foulcher saw this partly as an effort to redress the perception (held to varying degrees inside and outside Lekra) that the Institute's work was aesthetically inferior to that of other groups and artists. At the same time, the quest for "higher quality" in aesthetic terms was not to be "divorced from political awareness and understanding," that is, it was not to be realized separately from "a [high] level of ideological awareness." The slogan of "politics is the commander" found its relevance in this connection, and was intended to clarify beyond all doubt the point that Lekra's every activity possessed a prior political rationale. At the time, that rationale may not have been finely articulated, but the slogan's author, Njoto, a PKI Politburo stalwart and original member of Aidit's group, could be fairly confident that the intent of his message had been received: "politics was now seen to command not only the commitment of individual artists in their creative work, but also a great deal of LEKRA's energies as an organization."[35]

As with the PKI, whose own outward and downward motion promoted its adoption of a more differentiated series of directed activities and imparted a clearer sense of direction, Lekra's experiment in "going wide" and "going high" promoted the bases for its own graduation to a more expansive and intricate creative stance. The sloganized expressions of this new stance—"the five combinations" (*lima kombinasi*) and "going down" (*turun ke bawah*)—were at once more precise than the earlier slogans and, at the same time, reprisals of their basic directive impulse. In the case of the exhortation to realize the "five combinations," the Lekra leadership continued to recommend "going wide and going high," but it also urged progress in those specialized ways that had become apparent to them in the course of "going wide and going high." Thus, the original impluse became one current in a new, but not discontinuous, stream of directed activities from the early 1960s onward: "going wide and going high, a high ideological quality and a high artistic quality, positive tradition and the revolutionary present, individual creativity and the skills of the masses, and socialist realism and revolutionary romanticism."[36]

In substantive terms, the "five combinations" promoted Lekra to a commanding presence in the cultural sphere, where its reach extended across the spectrum of art forms as well as across the geographical space meant as the seat of a barely perceptible standard of "Indonesian culture." Since 1959, when Lekra reorganized itself with an eye to establishing centralized control of the creative process and equipped itself with seven different institutes corresponding to major art forms,[37] this outcome became a matter of concerted effort. By July 1962, Lekra's command in the three areas of plastic arts, voice, and dance was felt to be sufficiently firm for it to open the "People's Art University," where instruction was offered on these topics. At the same time, Lekra showed the breadth of its presence at the level of individual artists by endeavouring to provide them with scarce and therefore expensive supplies, conducting exhibitions of their work, and inviting them to participate as members of delegations going abroad or as representatives greeting delegations from abroad. That no other cultural organization could dispense with this many resources, at both the collective and individual levels, or engage successfully in this range of activities, certainly made Lekra a lonely but understandably compelling artistic magnet.

Part of Lekra's unrivalled attractiveness also consisted in its determination to exercise an all-encompassing geographical presence, one that took seriously the artistic traditions of regions and regional groups. In fact, this part of "going wide" was exercised with such energy that Lekra's "cultural workers" found themselves "propagating the sometimes all but forgotten dance styles of various Indonesian islands and ethnic groups," an activity which, importantly, carried them "to the remoter rural areas."[38] At the same time, also under the cover of "going wide," Lekra increased the number of its formal affiliates by attracting scores of previously independent local groups practising such varied art forms as the theatrical art of Jakarta (*lenong*),[39] the masked dance (*reog*) of West Java, the shadow play theatre (*ketoprak* and *wayang*) of Central Java, and the all-male folk theater (*ludruk*) of East Java.[40] Lekra's influence extended to such a degree among *ketoprak* troupes that it even created an association specifically for this art form—Bakoksi.

As Lekra embraced and animated regional folk arts in an ever expansive way under the guise of combining "positive tradition and the revolutionary present," it also started to bend these efforts, and even the forms themselves, into the undergirding of a wider, "Indonesian" synthesis. Thus, Lekra's encouragement of the "recognition of the value of regional languages" was balanced by its "opposition to the use of regional languages 'for imperialist, reactionary and separatist agitation'"[41] and its promotion of *Bahasa Indonesia* as a language of "unification." Likewise, the Institute's embrace of local and regional folk arts was not separate from considerations of their use as resources or platforms to communicate wider political messages. In fact, the use of a particular art form precisely as a resource sometimes entailed its own essential modification. For instance, Lekra seriously contemplated translating the *wayang* from its indigenous Javanese (*Bahasa Jawa*) into Indonesian (*Bahasa Indonesia*) and making other modifications deemed appropriate from a political standpoint.[42] That this proposition was initially handled very cautiously testifies to Lekra's own recognition that its contribution to a directing idea of Indonesia, especially in a cultural realm full of existing and vibrant particularisms, did not entail the modification of these particularisms so much as it did their likely transmogrification.

While the scope of Lekra's activities was being altered and becoming more differentiated, the premise that "politics is the commander" was being superseded in favour of the new slogan of "going down" (*turun ke bawah*). Importantly, the notion that "politics is the commander" was not replaced, rather it was integrated with the "five combinations" to become a statement of the "base" of Lekra's work. At the same time, both of these notions became subject to the idea of "going down," which was conceived as a "working method": "It expressed a particular concept of the relationship between cultural workers and ordinary people, and was intended to ensure that the artist was at one with the thoughts and feelings of the people, not an observer of their lives but [a] full participant in them."[43] Clearly, with this notion the whole of Lekra's enterprise was being oriented to some transcendant, yet incomplete, "popular" standard, a standard awaiting discovery through the combination of an extensive distribution and accumulation of "cultural workers" and sheer collective determination. The parallel with the Unra *Gaja Baru* was exact: like the PKI, which seized on the construction of the new educational system as a chance to create vital expressions (through its students and structures) of its own message of creativity, Lekra's implementation of its "working method" (through a virtual diaspora of its artists into the rural areas) created its own vital instantiations of its message of creativity, of the nurturing of a "progressive consciousness." It was in this sense, where a deliberate distinction was being drawn between sending "cultural workers" to rural areas and arranging their permanent stay, that Aidit engaged Lestra, and by implication the wider Lekra membership, in March 1963.

From this point in time the knowledge that Lekra had accumulated, the experience that it had gained, and the popular resources and affiliates that had been won in the preceding years, all became the building material of a conscious and politically determined effort at synthesis. In a very transparent and unmistakable way, Aidit showed this to be the main "cultural" challenge from that moment forward when he "proposed strict production guidelines for writers to adopt."[44] By directing writers to adhere to such guidelines, it was only reasonable to expect two ensuing processes of standardization. The first and most obvious process of standardization entailed the more consistent portrayal of the subjects of this writing, the "people," and especially the peasantry. The second process of standardization, complementary to the first, consisted in the articulation and emphasis of elements common among and thus common to the "people," that is, shared (and thus standard) traits that gave them their quality as one "people." Clearly, in the same way that every effort to make sense compels a near simultaneous ordering and imposition of order upon the relevant data, these processes of standardization tended, in their co-dependence and co-existence, to be mutually reinforcing. Not surprisingly, when guided to look for certain evidence, Lestra's and Lekra's "cultural workers" tended to find it:

> Creative talents in its ranks, including Communists, depict in their works the life and struggle of the people, their sorrows and suffering, and expose imperialism and feudalism—the enemies of the people and of their national democratic revolution. Their works have won wide recognition among the public.[45]

Aidit's directive to Lestra, while exceedingly significant both to this organization and to Lekra, was no less so for the PKI. For when Aidit urged writers (and presumably the whole family of Communist "cultural workers") to adhere to certain guidelines, he explicitly outlined a role for the PKI that was clearly designed to ensure such compliance. The PKI Chairman argued specifically that "[l]iterary works should be directed to the party cadres, who would be their reading public and the means by which writers learned of the lives and struggles of ordinary people."[46] The significance of this role cannot be understated. At one level, it irresistibly gives rise to the image of the PKI as a self-appointed judge of community standards—and thus of a community. At another level, the PKI seems to have been engaging in a specialized division of political labour, wherein the relatively more basic work of the "five combinations" could be left to its cultural ormas and the task of higher integration could be realized by itself. In either case, Aidit's redefinition of the relationship between the PKI and its cultural ormas carried with it an undeniable assertion of authority. This public assertion, precisely because it was made in connection with the meaningfulness of the Communists' cultural work, implied that there was a public meaning, a public standard, a public. Lekra alone did not represent this public, but the ensemble of the Party's ormas was certainly being directed to behave like an incipient public, now possessed of an incipient sovereign in the Party itself. This conscious advertisement of being an incipient sovereign is what gave Aidit's declaration its true significance.

The Role of Other Ormas

Where Aidit's Lestra declaration represented a first but crucial whisper of a living standard, the subsequent direct and indirect efforts made by the Party in the higher intellectual realm represented a zealous effort to amplify this murmur into a veritable roar—the voice of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution" itself. Literally and figuratively, the Party set about investing the resources needed to create the finishing schools for its own political students. Not surprisingly, this endeavour occurred within the context of the reform of the Unra system. Here, as with the structural changes envisaged in this scheme, the quest for a discrete intellectual stance was initiated in advance of the formal expression of this determination in the Four-Year Plan. Beginning as early as late 1962, and lasting for the duration of the next two years, the PKI founded a series of "scientific academies" which "were to function both as research institutions/think tanks and as a tertiary level for Unra education."[47] McVey lists as the principal academies the Bachtaruddin Political Science Academy, the Dr. Ratulangi Economics Academy, the Roggowarsito History Academy, the W.R. Supratman Music Academy, the Multatuli Literary Academy, the Engineer Anwari Technical Academy, and the Dr. Rivai Journalism Academy.[48] These entities served as the differentiated bases for a Communist cosmology, being themselves the points of light, self-illuminating a constellation of insight.

Indirectly, the Party attempted to raise the volume and quality of its intellectual pronouncements by enjoining either new or rejuvenated mass organizations of an educational or youth type to advocate on its behalf. For instance, the Party drew upon the membership of the League of Indonesian High School Youth (*Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia*—IPPI) for participants in its rallies and other organized gatherings.[49] More ambitiously, the Party aspired to turn the Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements (*Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*—CGMI) into the country's premiere vehicle for university students. In this regard, the CGMI has been deemed to have been both successful and unsuccessful. With respect to the former, Hindley, writing in 1963, remarked that the CGMI possessed a uniquely attractive quality: "All other national student organizations are either openly tied to a political party or to a religion. For young students without political affiliation or strong religious feelings but who wish to join a national student organization, CGMI is the only one open to them."[50]

Notwithstanding its attractiveness, McVey has judged the CGMI more harshly by pointing out that a significant portion of its membership consisted of Unra students, not true university students at all. Moreover, she has pointed out that the CGMI "tended to draw greater support from . . . peripheral institutions . . . whose members were socially insecure."[51] While it may be easy to evaluate the CGMI in this way, that is, against the standard of the PKI's ultimate failure, it is rather more difficult to critique the organization in the living context of an "on-going Indonesian Revolution" and the "Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism." Indeed, given the latter, the CGMI's ability to serve as yet another arena for participants in the Communist community enriched their existence as well as that of the community proper. In this light, attracting the socially insecure and peripheral spoke to the continued political engagement of hitherto uninvolved segments of the population. Thus, the CGMI was itself a reflection of a widening and more well-rounded sphere of organized Communist power. In a more modest manner, the PKI-directed Indonesian Scholar's Association (*Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia*—HSI) could make a similar claim at the upper reaches of the intellectual realm.

Among the ormas specifically dedicated to educational or youth matters, it was chiefly the *Pemuda Rakjat* that was delegated the task of weaving together the efforts of the other ormas in a practical manner. Importantly, the PKI directed the *Pemuda*

Rakjat, the chief embodiment of the "intelligentsia of the youth," in a three-fold manner that coincided exactly with its own rural and cultural endeavours:

> First, students are directed as much as possible toward special party indoctrination courses and cadre schools in order to heighten their 'ideological preparedness'. Secondly, students participate in a variety of party-sponsored 'go down to the masses' campaigns. These consist of projects of assistance to the peasantry in selected village areas. Groups of students under the leadership of a few cadres help out on the fields, repair roads, irrigation dikes and bridges, and generally seek to exemplify the officially touted spirit of *gotong royong* (mutual assistance). Thirdly, and under carefully specified conditions, the party mobilizes its youth front for demonstrations of patriotic fervour or of 'national purity'.[52]

If the BTI, IPPI, CGMI, HSI, and *Pemuda Rakjat* helped to bring illumination into the Communist cosmology, none shone as brightly as the Party's own Aliarcham Social Science Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Sosial Aliarcham*—AISA). In its capacity as the Party's premiere centre of learning, this Academy operated as the equivalent of an intellectual North Star, constant and enduring. Indeed, its formation in 1959 was an unqualified occurrence, being "the first time such a school had been established by a non-ruling Communist party."[53] In matters as seemingly mundane as its admissions policy, course offerings, and style of operation, the Academy showed again and again what was really entailed in furthering the Party's directing idea of Indonesia.

In admitting students, for instance, Academy guidelines were deliberately set in such a way as to curb the large influx of students coming from Java: "At first, 80 percent of the students were from Java, but, since the PKI leaders were determined to increase the party's Outer Island presence, a policy of preference for non-Javanese was instituted, reducing the central island's portion to about 60 percent."[54] Those running the Academy showed a similar vigilance in trying to overcome existing particularisms or biases that could interfere with their synthetic "Indonesian" work by offering courses of a "corrective" nature. For example, courses on cultural anthropology, Islamology, and Oriental philosophy, which were conducted under the auspices of the Departments of Philosophy and Problems of the Indonesian Revolution, were seen as part of "an effort at overcoming cadres' anti-Chinese and anti-Muslim prejudices."[55] Finally, with regard to the work style of the Academy and its students, the emphasis was decidedly in favour of achieving results of instrumental significance or practical worth. In this connection, full-time students were expected to divide their time evenly between studying and organizational or field work in the provinces. So much emphasis was placed on obtaining practical results, McVey has observed, that when "[s]ome university students who belonged to CGMI asked to transfer to Aliarcham academy . . . the party was reluctant to accept them, for however much it made of the PKI's own educational system it valued a party supporter with a university degree more highly."

While this last, evaluative, comment of McVey's may seem unnecessarily harsh, especially in light of the Party's enormous investment of time, money, and personnel in the Unra system, her more important point is indisputable: the Party

> wanted to show that Communist students were the best and the brightest, capable of socially responsible rule. The party leaders also wanted people with good claims to non-political expertise: capable technicians and managers who were motivated not just by the challenges of their field and individual material gain but by social commitment.[56]

Stated differently, the Party made it clear that it intended not only to cultivate new state builders, but, more importantly, new state perpetuators through the operation of the Aliarcham Academy and all the other ancillary institutes and academies that comprised its educational and cultural system. The Party was preparing in advance what Peacock has described (specifically in connection with *ludruk*) as a "mental gymnasium—a place where proletarians can exercise and so preserve attitudes that are at this time [before 1965] not fully utilizable by Javanese [or "Indonesian"] society."[57]

That the Party was already anticipating the consequences of its own (as yet unrealized) sovereignty was certainly striking, but neither the candour nor the gumption of its efforts should be allowed to obscure the analytical point that the Party really had no choice about pursuing such a radical and ambitiously comprehensive course of action. Since standards and their adherents do not exist separately, in the context of novelty, the creator of one must also be the creator of the other. And in the Indonesian context, where the Party had long opted to pursue a non-coercive strategy, the Party had of necessity to cope with the simultaneous demands of creating while teaching and teaching while creating its "Indonesian" standard. Proceeding in this fashion was necessarily uncertain, since in attempting to effect meaning through action the point at which meaning would prevail would remain ambiguous in all circumstances save in a moment of exception.

Knowing this, the PKI leadership adopted the logical posture of planning, that is, of minimizing the uncertainty associated with the creative enterprise itself. To plan, and more specifically to plan past the immediacy of the moment and in anticipation of what may or may not eventuate by way of a defining standard, was both the least and the most that the PKI could do for its directing idea. That the Party preoccupied itself in the manner that it did in resolving the form and content of the Four-Year Plan, by conducting a virtual self-diagnostic in preparation for the greater performance it expected of itself as a sovereign actor, attests to this very point of uncertainty. Indeed, such uncertainty is uniquely the burden and the privilege of the creative actor. Undaunted by an ambiguous situation of its own making, the PKI nevertheless expressed itself in an imperative fashion. The Four-Year Plan consisted of nothing less than a radical set of meaning-creating actions which were intended to establish "culture" as the axis of social rotation through the very momentum of their unfolding as part of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution." If ever there was a strategy of new state building that depended for its success upon the seamless advancement of its comprehensive inner dare, the PKI's Four-Year Plan of Culture, Education, and Ideology was it.

Daring to be Sovereign: The PKI's Advance and the "State" from 1963

From August 1963 onwards, with the initiation of the Four-Year Plan, the PKI committed itself and its organizational family to realizing a dare. The essence of the dare was to create exactly that resource that was necessary and sufficient (given the Party's other appropriations and accumulations of resources) for the PKI to make any standard—"cultural" or otherwise—authoritatively and categorically Indonesian. That resource was sovereignty. Realizing that resource, however, precipitated a contradiction: to embark on a venture as profound and uncompromising as establishing sovereignty meant that the Party would have to completely change the very circumstances (the status quo) that furnished it with its original motivation (rejection of the status quo). In other words, for the PKI, attempting to realize sovereignty meant changing itself (to continuously reject, first, the status quo it had previously consented in and even helped create, and, subsequently, any status quo that obtained short of its own sovereignty) as well as the political context, which meant the "state" and the TNI. Since it could not be imagined that the latter would idly accept Communist-directed change, the dare assumed the duality of being inherently creative and destructive, thrilling and imperilling at one and the same time. Thus, the challenge the Communists set for themselves was to manage the making of a standard and the unmaking of what appeared to exist as a standard. Since the Party had resolved internally during the course of the drafting of its Four-Year Plan to move away from a mere acceptance of a TNI-dominated Guided Democracy and toward the creation of a "cultural" standard, it is analytically more appropriate, without excluding mention of internal party developments during the course of the Plan, to focus on the external dimension of this phenomenon. To this end, it is useful to consider the kinds of directed action that informed the "two aspects of the state" theory, which was articulated within the first two months of the Four-Year Plan and acted both as a covering statement and prescription for developments outside the Party, as well as the implications such actions had for the "state," the TNI and other political actors, and the presumption of Communist sovereignty.

For the PKI, the initiation of the Four-Plan on 17 August 1963 was as much a beginning as it was an end, as much a way of putting the past behind it as a way to seize command of the future. In this light, it is really in relation to what the Communists imagined they were leaving behind that we can grasp the magnitude of, and meaning they hoped to achieve from, their subsequent actions. For in resolving to achieve sovereignty, even through the seemingly innocent insinuation of a "cultural" standard, the Communists steeled themselves against the status quo, which was really an accumulation of contributions made by itself and others to the facade of Guided Democracy.

Soberly assessed, Guided Democracy by August 1963 was still a losing proposition for the PKI. Although the objective political conditions that prevailed reflected many of the attributes of the PKI's own directing idea of Indonesia (particularly as they touched on territorial integrity and freedom from effectively organized expressions of particularistic sentiment), an element of dissatisfaction remained. That dissatisfaction was informed by the recognition of the indeterminacy of present circumstances, of the half-wayness of the response in the East Indies to the challenge of independence that had presently resolved itself into Guided Democracy. Despite having played a directive role in that response, of having helped to supersede forces and actors of a particularistic nature, the Party could see that its connection with the establishment and its unspoken collaboration with the Army had outgrown its tactical purpose. That the Army had lately succeeded in setting the "ship of state" on a voyage of "national development" only added to the PKI's rejection of the status quo. This cognizance, together with the Party's recent and unfolding experiences and success in dealing with "state" entities, informed a creative boldness whose centre of attention was fixated on resolving the problem with, or rather, the pretence of, the "state."

In this connection, the PKI could contemplate political affairs—and contemplate changing them—in a way that the TNI did not even dare. In contrast to the Army, which was busily ensconcing itself in the edifice of Guided Democracy and spreading itself throughout the "ship of state," the Party could, from its main seat of power below deck, take a more sceptical approach to the common impression that sovereign authority already existed in Indonesia. Indeed, whatever progress the Army made in the name of "national development" itself became a test for the PKI, which recognized that its distinctiveness as a political actor was bound up in the fate of this scheme. To make good on that contrast, therefore, the PKI had to be willing to challenge both the reality that it faced an armed opponent in the Army and the impression, which it had helped to create, of an already existing order. On neither account did the fundamental issue under consideration—the Party's own survival—prompt the PKI to become desperate. Rather, in a manner that was consistent with its maturing planning abilities, the Party demonstrated its capacity for reflexivity, this time by applying daring to daring.

The slogan that was used at the outset of (and even somewhat before) the Four-Year Plan—"Isolate the reactionary forces, strengthen national unity and consolidate the progressive forces"—expressed well the double nature of the PKI's dare. This registered immediately as an implied threat and as a commitment, in the wake of the polarization it nurtured, to force all actors to consider the stark question of survival. To make good on its dare, it remained only for the Party leadership to activate it, that is, to take action whose consequences would be irresistible to others. In the Indonesian context, the leadership recognized that the most efficacious way of doing this was to take action that raised questions about Indonesia's scope and content. The Aidit leadership appreciated that these were questions whose answers would be incomplete without sovereignty. Posing such questions was thus an indirect reminder of the pretence of the "state" and the fact that there were, as yet, no final arbiters on these issues. Of course, there were positive ways, borrowed mainly from Sukarno himself, by which the Party effectively broached these concerns, such as when it spoke of the need to "consummate" the "Indonesian Revolution." And the Party had precisely this singular concern in mind when it began, with unheralded but sustained vigour, to push the "on-going Indonesian Revolution" down the rails of confrontation, ostensibly to overcome "neo-colonial imperialism" in the case of Malaysia and "feudalism" in the case of land reform.

Malaysia and Land Reform as Marginal and Definitive Issues

Alongside their prompting of questions of the scope and content of the Indonesian idea, the issues of Malaysia and land reform were significant because of the sudden and sustained definitiveness with which they were regarded, or, more precisely, made to be regarded in the Indonesian context. On both counts—appearance and endurance—the issues were manifestations of one underlying fact: the PKI had the power, resources, and, presently, the daring to proceed to extend itself into areas formally of "state" competence, namely foreign affairs and the domestic application of law. To consider the PKI's animating role in these issues as anything less than decisive would make it very difficult to account for the fact that the issues, first, arose at all and, second, enjoyed the staying power that they did.

It is precisely the suddenness and the staying power of the issues that are important matters to analyze, since it is in these aspects of collective activity and behaviour that we can most clearly discern the profile of an actor now intent on realizing sovereignty. Indeed, to even commence such a venture entailed having in mind its final outcome; the behaviour in between the start and the desired finish could hardly disguise the nature of the outcome to which it was directed. And an actor who possessed both the daring (verging on usurpation) and the nerve to stay its directed and pacific course (no matter what) could hardly contain the qualities desired by the dare to the completion of the dare. Consequently, before the PKI had sovereignty in hand, it behaved like it had this resource in mind, and that is why the issues it—and it alone—selected in Malaysia and land reform were executed with audacity and single-minded stamina.

For the PKI to be able to turn the suggestion, first mooted in May 1961 by Malayan leaders, to create a Malaysian Federation out of the territories of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak, and Brunei into an issue crucial to the "on-going Indonesian Revolution" was extremely ironic. This is so because the historical record shows that the PKI was the only Indonesian political actor of significance to have expressed an opinion when the idea of this Federation was still an idea. Not surprisingly, the PKI responded negatively to the assertion, made by the Federation's proponents, that Malaysia would act as a bulwark against Communism in Southeast Asia. The PKI formalized its opposition early and glaringly. At the Plenary Session of the Central Committee in late December 1961, the Party passed a resolution that expressed its belief that the proposed Federation was little more than "a form of neo-colonialism," deliberately loosed on Southeast Asia "to strengthen the position of imperialists."[58] "In the months following this resolution," as Van der Kroef has observed, "*Harian Rakjat* and other party and front organs kept up their attacks on the idea of Malaysia, being virtually the only publications in all of Indonesia to do so."[59]

The negative attitude expressed by the PKI had the potential of being isolating when the Government itself expressed none of the reservations so clearly and repeatedly articulated by the Communist press. In fact, in 1961 and later, the Indonesian Government indicated its benign disinterest in the Federation scheme.[60] Evidence suggests that only by about June 1962 did the message disseminated by the PKI begin to win adherents in the Indonesian Government. Even from that point forward, the Indonesian Government was moved only to pay closer attention to developments surrounding the Federation scheme, especially as they related to defense provisions. When Foreign Minister Subandrio took matters to their furthest public extent in September 1962, by threatening to allow a Soviet base on Kalimantan should the Americans acquire the same in Sabah, Sarawak, or Brunei, the idea of Malaysia was itself not attacked. Official Indonesian antagonism, such as it was through most of 1962, was decidedly more a response to the comments and insinuations of Malayan leaders about Indonesia than it was to any thorough-going policy review by the Indonesians themselves. Here, the Malayans made the mistake of publicly imputing to the PKI as much influence in the Indonesian "state" or Government as it appeared to be exercising with groups in the area of the projected Federation (especially in Malaya and Brunei) which were opposed to the scheme.[61] In any event, officials in Jakarta were slighted and the PKI probably delighted at this exaggeration of its power in the "Indonesian state."

In the wake of the failed rebellion launched on 8 December 1962 by the leader of the Brunei People's Party (*Partai Rakjat Brunei*) and member of the Brunei Legislative Council, A. M. Azahari, President Sukarno himself endeavoured to diminish the influence and leading role of the PKI in the subsequent anti-Malaysian outburst. On 28 December 1962, Sukarno declared that the "sympathy of the Indonesian people for the struggle of the North Kalimantan people was definitely not the result of Communist influence," but those who thought so, he added correctly, were "in fact paying great tribute to Communism."[62]

While it may have appeared that Sukarno was paying indirect tribute to Indonesian Communism, too, his actions on the Malaysia issue from late December 1962 to September 1963 showed a recurrent tendency to resolve matters in a diplomatic way, that is, in a way that he could influence. Already by early 1963 steps had been taken to this end, when Indonesia's sympathies were embodied in the semi-official "Committee for Solidarity with the North Borneo People's Revolution" and expressed by its elite members, including Cabinet ministers, military officers, and party leaders.[63] Sukarno took decisive strides toward an amicable resolution of the issue when he consented to participate in two high-level diplomatic meetings that occurred, not insignificantly, outside of Indonesia. Between May 31 and 1 June 1963, Sukarno met with the Malayan Premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in Tokyo and the two leaders agreed to recognize the "'desirability' of restoring friendly relations."[64] In their subsequent meeting in Manila from July 30 to 5 August 1963, which was hosted by Philippines President Diosdado Macapagal, Sukarno and Rahman formalized a "Declaration," "Joint Statement," and "Accord." Among other achievements, the three leaders created a mechanism by which the sentiments of the North Borneo people could be objectively ascertained prior to the formation of the

Malaysian Federation. Going further still, the three leaders formally expressed their interest in creating a larger federation—Mapilindo—that would embrace all three countries. By winning especially the Malayan leaders over to literal and figurative diplomatic settlements of differences, Sukarno had actually neutralized one of the main forces contributing to the popularity of the PKI-inspired and PKI-led anti-Malaysia sentiment. With Malayan clumsiness and bluntness brought to an apparent end, so, too, was the PKI's ability to draw upon the outrage of their conflations and imputations. Sukarno had made the Malaysian issue matter less to Indonesians by making it matter more to the Malayans at the diplomatic level. At that level, the PKI's voice did not register loudly; Sukarno's elevation of the issue had returned it to the quiet in which it first existed.

If it took the reality of Malayan acrimony toward Indonesia to make the idea of a Malaysian Federation an issue to more Indonesian actors than the PKI, then it was perhaps fitting that the abrupt materialization of the Federation on 16 September 1963 also became the basis for the PKI to materialize its leadership in the Indonesian context. On that and subsequent days, the PKI and its ormas behaved as if they were making up for having acquiesced in Sukarno's past diplomatic successes, which were not only being undone abroad by the newly constituted Malaysians, but at home by what appeared to be nothing less than an incensed Indonesian population. On that day, SOBSI and *Pemuda Rakjat*-led crowds rampaged through Malaysian and British diplomatic facilities in Jakarta while SOBSI members seized British commercial ventures in the city as well as in other parts of Java. While these brazen acts were similar to the seizures of Dutch commercial enterprises in December 1957, they differed profoundly in one vital sense. Whereas the Dutch were solely the target of action in December 1957, it can hardly be imagined that the PKI had only British and Malaysian injustices in mind when it had warned its countrymen about the dangers of the Malaysian scheme from the outset. Now, with the Federation already in existence, assured of British military protection, and the sentiments of the North Borneo people still in dispute, the PKI could dare to instantiate its views against a standard of leadership now discredited by events. The PKI made recourse to rationalizations drawn from Sukarno's own ethereal revolutionary idiom, especially as it related to the planetwide struggle between the "Newly Emerging Forces" and the "Old Established Forces," but on the ground, the Party commanded a reality beyond even Sukarno's effective control. Making this point, while doing away with diplomatic niceties and conventions in the course of *konfrontasi*, was essential to the Party's state-building strategy and to the displacement of real or imagined standards.

The deterioration of Indonesia's relations with Britain, and the extremely bad start made in its relations with Malaysia, coincided with developments on the "domestic" front that seemed equal in their ability to disturb the fundamental pretence of order and authority in Guided Democracy. At approximately the same point in time at which the PKI and its ormas were besieging and taking over British commercial enterprises, Party and BTI cadres began directing especially landless peasants and share-croppers throughout Java, Madura, Bali, Sumbawa, Lombok, North Sumatra, and North Sulawesi in a concerted effort to realize their legal rights. The fact that the Party and the BTI presently based their efforts on provisions and regulations that had been in legal existence since at least 1961 is compelling testimony of the break with "normality" to which the Communists now committed themselves.

Suddenly, the Party and the BTI were prepared to backstop the most fundamental provisions governing share-cropping arrangements and land tenure arrangements with action. These provisions were contained in the Share-cropping Law of January 1960 (*Undang-undang No. 2 tahun 1960 Perjanjian Bagi Hasil*—UUPBH), the Law on Basic Regulations of Agrarian Principles of September 1960 (*Undang-undang No. 5 tahun 1960 Peraturan Dasar Pokok-pokok Agraria*—UUPA), plus the regulations meant to implement these laws.[65] Of principal interest to the Communists were the provisions that related to establishing an equitable, transparent, and contractual division of the harvest between landowners and share-croppers, and the provisions that aimed at setting ceilings on the amount of land that could be owned by any one individual. With regard to harvest share, "the Minister of Agriculture stipulated that no share for the sharecroppers could be fixed below the minimum of half the produce of irrigated land."[66] This outcome was a disappointment for the PKI and BTI, both of whom had argued that the sharecropper should be entitled to 60 per cent of the harvest.

With regard to land reform and land tenure, the basic principles declared, among other things, that "agricultural land is for the tilling farmer; . . . absentee ownership is not allowed except for those persons in active state service and for other exceptional cases; [and]] the economically weak farmers should be protected against those occupying a stronger position."[67] In a subsequent 1960 regulation, a ceiling of five hectares of irrigated rice paddy, and six hectares of non-irrigated land, was established for individual land owners on Java. Land holdings in excess of these ceilings were to be purchased by the Government. This surplus land would be combined with land formerly belonging to principalities and ex-principalities (sultans and rajas), land of absentee landlords,[68] and state lands (including estate land and land leased to plantations)[69] and then be sold to landless peasants. As with their arguments on share-cropping, the PKI and the BTI were frustrated (except, perhaps, in spirit) in their fundamental desire to make a "land-to-the-tiller" movement the centre of land reform. Despite being thwarted in their most ambitious objectives, however, the Communists essentially waited for rural matters to take their legislated and regulated course. They waited patiently until August–September 1963.

At that time, mainly landless peasants and share-croppers began spontaneously seizing harvests and occupying land (in *aksi sepihak*—unilateral actions) in some locales in response to the chronic tendency of landlords to evade the provisions and regulations of the UUPH and UUPBH,[70] especially those relating to ceilings on land holdings. With this spark, the PKI and the BTI were prompted to act in the name of the law and in the name of a standard whose spirit they believed was already manifest in the relevant laws. What the PKI and the BTI actually did was therefore circumscribed by consideration for what was legally permissible and what was politically desirable. With regard to the former, the Communists began in a generalized way to direct peasants to a cognizance of their legal rights. Beyond that, at the edges of the daring and the doable, the Communists tried to lead the peasantry to an active willingness to realize (empirically and abstractly) the notion of justice that was evident in the laws, as well as that that inhered in the Party's preference for "land-to-the-tiller" or (second best) in a division of the harvest where 60 per cent went to the sharecropper. In practice, the Communists behaved pragmatically by emphasizing, on one hand, a rigorous observance and enforcement of regulations whose authorship belonged to the "state" and, on the other hand, advocating their own notions of "land-to-the-tiller" and a 60 per cent share of the harvest as the most desirable of objectives.

In embarking on a course of action that took the provisions and regulations of land reform seriously, the PKI and the BTI used (and ultimately depended upon) their enormous organizational and mobilizational resources to make it a serious concern for one and all, and therein was the undeniable significance of the development. Unfortunately, the tendency of observers has been to overlook the creative and real aspects of the Communists' rural undertakings. Instead, attention has been paid to the contradiction between an egalitarian land reform programme and an insufficiency of land for everyone; or the fact that rich peasants and landlords could be found as members of the PKI and BTI; or that class distinctions were not precise[71]; or that there were "peasant struggles against the wrong monopoly of land."[72] In practice—in the sphere that the PKI and the BTI showed mattered most to them—all of these observations were essentially irrelevant. For instance, neither the Party nor the Peasant Front could help it that the regulations set a fairly generous ceiling of five hectares of land in small and populous Java, thereby making it impossible for all who wanted land to have land. Likewise, the Communists could not be held accountable for the fact that there were many landowners with holdings below this ceiling who were themselves share-croppers or hired share-croppers. Furthermore, that both organizations attracted rich peasants and land-owners to their ranks does not necessarily mean that the effort at land reform was fated to fail, was insincere, or was theoretically flawed.

Rather more important than the factors that were beyond the Party's control, or that seemed superficially to be contradictory, were the ones that were within its control or its ability to direct. Indeed, the fact that the Party proceeded with aggressive land reform despite there being factors beyond its control, or in the face of internal (the class origin of some members) and external contradictions (insufficient land), may be seen as the strongest evidence of the Party's faith in its own ability to control its organization (as well as that of the BTI and other ormas) and direct meaning-creating action. Action and organization were thus held to be superior to the almost unfathomably complex reality obtaining in the countryside. To confront and change that reality necessarily entailed an act of massive simplification, which is what land reform became in the hands and in the minds of the PKI and the BTI. If the price of obtaining a simpler reality and a standard that was deemed more appropriate for the rural component of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution" was to transcend the detaining minutiae of rural existence, then the Communists showed themselves prepared to pay. The Communists engaged themselves and others in this purchase even before the standard to which the landless peasants and share-croppers were being directed was fully articulated; the Communists trusted in the possibility of completing this transaction by guaranteeing it with the liquidity of their ability to mobilize and organize.

As with the Malaysia issue, the Communists' effective leadership on rural matters impinged upon affairs that were formally related to the competency of the "state." In many instances, the Communists could rightly assert that local officials charged with executing the provisions and regulations of land reform were, at best, tolerant of evasions by landlords or, at worst, shared complicity in the same. The implication of such transgressions was far ranging since those who were to oversee the land reform programme were selected by standardized criteria. Typically, the Second Grade Regional Land Reform Committees, which Huizer contends "were the most important in the execution of the actual [reform] programme,"[73] consisted of representatives of the civil administration and the largest party-affiliated peasant organizations. Among the former was included "an officer appointed by the Military Administration, the chief of police and the public prosecutor of the kabupaten,"[74] and among the latter were representatives of PNI's Petani; NU's Pertanu; and the BTI. The point is that when the deceptiveness of some Committees' practices was exposed, usually by the BTI representative, the criteria that once promoted all-round involvement (of "state" and party figures) could potentially lead to all-round repudiation, save of the Communists. Logically, when there was a local repudiation of a Committee, there was some effect on the wider (bureaucratic, party, or ormas) associations of its members. In this way, the civilian and military administrations and the parties stood condemned, or at least condemnable. Thus, aggressive land reform carried with it the destruction of the pretence of land reform under the auspices of Guided Democracy, as much as it carried with it an incipient standard tied to the reality on the ground, the presence of organization, and the directing of mobilized masses under Communist auspices.

As issues, the Malaysian and land reform campaigns were intimately related. From the moment of their daring initiation, they were two organizational and mobilizational impulses enacted in tandem to give effect to a sovereign standard and the order that that principle would then serve. In launching these two efforts, the PKI clearly meant to displace the pretence of genuine authority and an existing Indonesian order with the irresistible (because tangible) reality of Communist leadership over a popular-territorial base. Being savingly constrained by its non-coercive strategy, however, the PKI leadership could not be so brash as to simply declare that it was in charge, or that the existing Government and "state leadership" were irrelevant. Instead, the Party leadership took the bold step in September 1963 of publicly articulating a view of recent developments that essentially promised to make irrelevant those who would resist the standards in foreign policy and land reform it was busily pioneering. In short, the Communists promised to create a revolutionary context—their own organized sphere of power—the advancing margins of which would either envelop or overwhelm all opposition. The formal expression of this view was the theory of the "two aspects of the state."

The "Two Aspects of the State" Theory

Aidit's theory of the "two aspects of the state" ingeniously combined the promise of creation and the threat of destruction within the camouflage of contextual statements relating to the "interests of the people." Camouflaged or not, Aidit was probably acutely aware of the new degree of daring to which his theory effectively committed his Party and its organizational family, something he was prepared to do presumably on the basis of the Party's experiences with the "state" over the previous months (yet in advance of the inflammatory formation of Malaysia). Perhaps it was for this reason that he delivered his analyses of "state power" in Indonesia before audiences in the People's Republic of China.[75]

Briefly, the PKI leader expressed a view of the state that reflected the existence and primacy of contradictory economic forces. While the "economic structure (basis) of the Indonesian society today is still colonial and feudal in character," Aidit asserted, "there also exists a struggle of the people to resist the economic system and to establish a national and democratic economy." As such, he discerned two forces—"the forces of the colonial and semi-feudal system and the forces which are fighting for the establishment of a national and democratic economy." According to Aidit, these forces were reflected "in the superstructure, including state power and chiefly the *cabinet*"[76]:

> In state power a policy against imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic-capitalists, and compradors is reflected alongside the policy which defends imperialism, vestiges of feudalism, bureaucratic-capitalists, and compradors. A sharp conflict exists between the two policies in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia . . ..

On the basis of this contradiction, Aidit detected the existence of two opposed "aspects": "The *first aspect* is that which represents the interests of the people. The *second aspect* is that which represents the interests of the people's enemies."[77] According to Aidit the first, or "popular," aspect was embodied in the "progressive attitude and policy of President Sukarno which enjoys the support of the CPI [PKI]," while the second, or "anti-popular," aspect was embodied in the "attitude and policy of the rightists and diehards; they are the old established forces."[78] It should be noted for the sake of accuracy that Aidit did not claim the first aspect was embodied in the President's "progressive attitude and policy" per se; it was only embodied in those elements of his attitude and policy that the Party supported. With this, Aidit promoted a tautological understanding of the first aspect, whose manifestations, not unimportantly, were for the Party alone to determine.

To the degree that Aidit gave a prognosis of the resolution of the contradiction he described, he pronounced himself carefully:

> Today the popular aspect has become the *main aspect* and plays a leading role in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia, meaning that it guides the course of the political development in the state power . . .. The popular aspect which at first [following the transfer of sovereignty in 1949] was not the main aspect has

> now developed into the main aspect . . .. On the other hand, the anti-popular aspect has ceased to be the main aspect and no longer guides the course of development in the contradiction. However, it is still the dominant aspect . . .[79]

By September 25, Aidit could amend his remarks in the shadow of the now immensely more serious campaign to "confront Malaysia" by bluntly voicing the concrete "demand of the Indonesian people for purging certain officials from the Government and readjusting the state organizations."[80] This demand, coupled with the express resolve of the Party "to continue to help the popular aspect to become stronger and dominant," and thereby "exclude the anti-popular aspect from the state power," imparted a sense of grimness to Aidit's analyses of "state power."

Although Aidit's analyses were significant because they carried with them a sense of grim foreboding and conferred a seemingly arbitrary competency on the Party to identify manifestations of the popular aspect of state power, what really matters to our consideration of the PKI as a new state builder was that Aidit's construct of state power effectively propelled the Communists across the threshold from meaning-creating actions to action-creating meanings. Here, the content of the construct, and the consequence implied in the content and arising from the act of articulating the construct, all helped to achieve this extraordinary result. In so far as the content of the construct is concerned, Aidit advanced what was (up to that point in his leadership) the simplest portrayal of political forces in the Indonesian context. At a stroke, Aidit had reduced the myriad of greater and lesser political actors into two large camps which he now implied were in diametric opposition. Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of this depiction, Aidit revealed how careful he was in his analyses by including very specific references to the activities or influence of the respective camps. For instance, Aidit attributed the "U.S. programme for economic stabilization" and attacks on the "peasant movement" to the machinations of the anti-popular forces, while he credited the popular forces with the Laws on Share-cropping and Land Reform and the "struggle against 'Malaysia'."[81] It is noteworthy that Aidit was at his most precise when he identified the Cabinet as the main site where the forces were in contention.

In its simplicity, its directness, its empirical references, its precision, and its concreteness, the content of Aidit's analyses was unusual, for the Party's portrayals of the Indonesian context before September 1963 did not typically possess these traits. Almost as a rule, the Party's previous portrayals possessed a characteristic trait of vagueness that more or less guaranteed the PKI a certain margin of safety, or a measure of freedom from attack that might have been mounted by the subjects of those portrayals. This was especially true in the characterizations of other "domestic" actors or forces. Here, the Party used fairly ethereal labels for the "targets of the revolution" that it chose to differentiate and identify: "feudalists/semi-feudalists," "landlords," and "bourgeoisie/petty bourgeoisie," "rightists," "diehards," "chauvinists." While these labels were theoretically negative, they were not very sticky and did not force the Party to embark on a resolute set of consequences. This changed when the Party confronted "domestic" actors who were already tagged for opposition by the TNI. The Party could be and was antagonizingly negative in its characterizations of the DI/TII, PRRI/Permesta, PSI, Masjumi, and RMS, among others, knowing full well that the consequences of its opposition would be borne or shared by the Army as well. Thus, where the Party (along with the TNI) controlled the consequences caused by the adoption of any meaningfully negative or prejudicial attitude on its part, it showed itself ready to discriminate and antagonize. Similarly, in regard to the international sphere, the Party saw no prospect of having to face repercussions from its characterizations of "imperialism/neo-imperialism" and "colonialism/neo-colonialism." Here, the Party could afford to excoriate particular countries, leaders, and actions, knowing the chances of facing anyone's wrath (at home or abroad) on this account were vanishingly small.

By contrast, the content of Aidit's analyses after September 1963 seemed positively a solicitation of danger. Aidit's analyses essentially dispensed with the fine gradations that Party portrayals had once routinely recognized between and among "domestic" actors; the "middle forces" "had tended to disappear in the analysis"[82] by this time. Now, in place of a highly differentiated field of actors, a single bifurcating divide gave rise to two camps, whose total membership appeared exhaustive. Aidit made it clear that the two camps stood opposed in the abstract. Perhaps even more important was the impression he appeared to invite that the two camps also stood opposed on the ground, in reality. Indeed, this was the essence of Aidit's revealing remark about the Cabinet, which fixed political matters for the Party in the way a nail suspends a picture on a wall. Aidit's formulation clearly took the Party beyond its usual characterization of its enemies by concretely identifying them within an exclusively Indonesian framework: the anti-popular aspect occupied a place in time and in space in such a way that there could be no avoiding them. The camps were doubly circumscribed, really and abstractly, and their apprehension at either level could not fail to give rise to the impression that they pressed upon one another. Indeed, their commingled, circumscribed, and fixed existences seemed a guarantee in itself that each actor would be in the other's way. That Aidit intended the content of his analyses to herald precisely such a consequence was as plain as the referential, precise, and concrete manner in which he set about sealing all the escape hatches so familiar to preceding Party pronouncements.

If the content and adumbrated consequence of Aidit's analyses could be considered necessary factors in propelling the Communists across the threshold from meaning-creating actions to action-creating meaning, then the very act of publicly articulating the construct of "state power" was sufficient. For this to be the case, the articulation of the construct had to have been both an act in itself and have meaning in itself. The articulation of the analyses did indeed register as both action and meaning. Obviously, Aidit was performing publicly when he spoke, but, more than that, his speaking was an act of daring, of daring to pronounce and to embrace the course of action that was implicit in the pronouncement. As we have seen, both the content and the consequence of Aidit's analyses were exact and, as such, inherently risky. That Aidit spoke publicly was a guarantee of risk and its concomitant, danger. Yet it can hardly be imagined that Aidit did not know what he was doing, for his pronouncement was itself informed by actions of an unprecedented nature. Success in making issues of Malaysia and land reform had together fostered a new standard, a new reality of uniquely Communist making. Aidit was surely aware of this achievement, just as surely as he knew his pronouncement was a statement to that effect and more—it was an assertion of self-awareness and therein did his pronouncement pass from being informed by action to an informant of action. The essential meaning in Aidit's pronouncement was exactly this assertion of self-awareness, of the Communists' own cognition of having successfully transcending the gaps between awareness and self-awareness and consciousness and self-consciousness. Only by being able to change or make reality through action could this condition have been attained, and even then, all depended upon the accumulated political resources that yielded the Communists their own popular-territorial base.

Aidit's analyses hardly left the Communists dwelling on their achievements, for once having expressed the Communists' self-recognition as makers of reality, Aidit pushed them into becoming its master. The manner in which this was achieved was two-fold and consisted, first, of harmonizing the language used to direct action and resources and reality and, second, of communicating that language in a way that compelled action of a specific quality. Clearly, Aidit's analyses served to close the gap that had been opened up by the creation of a new reality and the language employed to direct action and resources. At the same time that that gap was closed by embracing the notion of the two aspects, and the Communists had made the transition from meaning-creating actions to action-creating meanings, Aidit ensured that the passage would be one-way precisely by making the Communists' forward motion irreversible. Quite simply, the starkness of the two aspects of "state power" that now confronted the Party compelled an awful choice: either push forward the pro-people aspect or succumb to the anti-people aspect. Like the construct itself, the action Aidit was recommending in favour of the pro-people aspect was self-serving, but self-serving in a way that only a collective aspirant to sovereignty could both contemplate and direct.

In pointing the way forward, Aidit made it clearer than his dyadic analyses of "state power" alone conveyed that the attainment of sovereignty was the principal concern and subject of subsequent Party action. Certainly, his analyses gave rise to the impression that the future heralded an appalling choice, from which no one seemed to be excused from making. Aidit had, after all, signalled the aspect with which the PKI was going to ally itself. Beyond this statement of alliance with the pro-people aspect, however, Aidit had in essence already taken further action during the course of articulating his construct. For the manner in which he delineated the content and consequence of his analyses—simple, direct, empirical, precise, and concrete—were also the qualities of an attack. Viewed from this perspective, we may appreciate Aidit's theory of "state power" as being a scenario of attack, and the articulation of the theory the actual initiation of such an attack on its main target—the Cabinet, where the pretence of order and authority was at its densest.

Launching such an attack, let alone contemplating it, showed how decisive Aidit was prepared to be to force the Party into action-creating meaning. Indeed, Aidit was prepared to take the ultimate gamble with his daring, and his daring knowingly put the PKI's entire thesis, or directing idea, into the danger of rejection or annihilation. That the PKI leadership was prepared to countenance the possibility of these consequences is testimony enough of the Party's essentially creative nature. For in resolutely placing itself into potentially lethal circumstances, inviting a moment of exception as it were, the PKI leadership was in fact behaving in a quintessentially creative and modern manner—the manner in which modern science routinely tests the validity of a thesis by systematically subjecting it to the (strengthening) danger of rejection. It is from this association with modern science, too, that we can say that in late 1963 the PKI collectivized and reversed Descartes' original scientific insight—"I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am"—into—"We are, therefore we think, therefore we dare." This is the slogan of the aspiring and self-aware sovereign, at once self-serving, self-starting, self-directing, and self-fulfilling.

As the embodiment of the transition from meaning-creating action to action-creating meaning, Aidit's theory of "state power" became the expression of a new state builder voicing its collective determination to peacefully destroy the saving pretension in which it had once willingly and necessarily sought shelter. As such, the theory directed the ending of Guided Democracy in an essential, rather than incidental or accidental, way. For now and for the future, action was to be informed by the "Indonesian" meaning or standards that the Communists established and learned they could define with their power. In this way, the Communists began to hold the meaning of "Indonesia" and "Indonesian" as self-evident, making their actions borrow from the objective of sovereignty at the same time as lending to its realization.

Accordingly, the "cultural" actions they undertook in connection with Malaysia and land reform were more consciously enacted and communicated using the language of the wider struggle of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution" against "imperialism" and "feudalism" respectively. Although these were distinct issues, the Communists pursued them in combination and in a mutually reinforcing manner to promote the underlying sense that Indonesia's very scope and substance were at issue and only the PKI and its organizational family—in the unity of their resources, organization, and action—possessed the competence to resolve matters. Indeed, it was for this very reason that the BTI had been (and continued to be) "in the forefront of organizations denouncing Malaysian premier Tunku Rahman and the concept of the Malaysian federation."[83] From late September 1963 onwards, therefore, PKI-inspired and led actions became those of completion, not initiation, and it became readily apparent that the Communists sought the complete control of the Indonesian context through a complete and coherent extension of themselves, meaning their resources, organization, and action. In this pursuit, there could be no strategic compromises to the Communists' "rule by touch," only tactical ones of the sort that would, for the time being, allow President Sukarno to enjoy "rule by sight" in the involuted, but increasingly hollowed out, pretence of Guided Democracy.

The Passage to Action-Creating Meaning

If Aidit's theory of "state power" was itself the bridge from meaning-creating actions to action-creating meaning, then his political report of late December 1963 was nothing less than an exuberant boast about having made a successful passage and an energetic avowal to meet the remaining challenges along the Party's self-chosen path[84]. The exuberant aspect of the report was evident from the uncompromising title that was given to the report—*Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat!*—and the fact that Aidit delivered his report to a Party audience whose composition suggested an extraordinary, celebratory gathering. Speaking to the combined memberships of the Central Committee, the Central Auditing Commission, and the Central Control Commission, Aidit's report acquired the quality of a uniquely collective statement, a statement, almost, of a complete and assembled government.

The energetic avowals were to be found in the content of the report, which fully disclosed the energy—the political resources embodied in organization—to be used and the avenues down which it would be directed. Here, Aidit addressed himself directly to the "we are" and "we dare" portions of the PKI's sovereign slogan, that is, to the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the PKI's directing idea of Indonesia. Quantitatively, Aidit took the opportunity to advertise the enormous size and geographical reach of the PKI, but not before revealing the same information about the BTI! Speaking of the Party, the Chairman indicated the general nature of its success in numerical terms—the PKI now had more than two and a half million members—and more especially in geographical terms where

> Today it is only West Irian that as yet has no CPI Major District Committee due to the fact that Guided Democracy is not yet operating there, and parties are not yet allowed to be established there. But the moment this ban is lifted, the Party is ready to set up a MDC and lower Committees. There are CPI Section Committees in 93 per cent of all *Daswati II* [Residencies] in the country, CPI Sub-Section Committees in 83 per cent of all *ketjamatans* [districts] or regions at the same level as a *ketjamatan*, and CPI Resort Committees in 62 per cent of all villages or areas of village level.[85]

As for the BTI, about which Aidit seemed exceptionally excited in his report, its success was simply superlative:

> Under the leadership of the Indonesian Communist Party, more than 7 million adult peasants are organised. The *Barisan Tani Indonesia* . . . has a membership of 7,099,100, or more than 25 per cent of the adult peasant population. Of the roughly 42,575 agricultural villages (the total number of villages is 47,305), 21,263 groups of the mass revolutionary peasants' organisation have been established (nearly 50 per cent); in 2,587 agricultural *ketjamatan* (districts), (the total number of ketjamatans is 2,874), 2,186 sub-branches have been established (more than 84 per cent); and of the 259 *Daswati II* (second-level government regions), 262 branches have been established covering 251 *Daswati II* (almost 97 per cent).[86]

In terms of the completeness of their separate organizational structures, the PKI and the BTI were clearly without serious rivals in their respective party and peasant spheres.

The notion that Aidit seemed keen to encourage on the basis of his empirical observations was that the Communists were not simply well positioned to be comprehensive in their undertakings, but that they were compelled to be so by virtue of the completeness or near completeness of their organizational presence. This is exactly what he meant when he proclaimed that "we have succeeded in creating a Party that is at one and the same time a mass Party and a cadre Party," an organization filled with those "who are generally educated in the outlook, standpoint, method and spirit of Marxism-Leninism, who are spread throughout the entire country and consolidated politically, organisationally and ideologically." It followed logically, Aidit implied, that "the CPI has basically succeeded in Indonesianising Marxism-Leninism, which in essence means integrating the Marxist-Leninist CPI with the peasants."[87]

Informing this profoundly significant remark was Aidit's assertion of the Party's readiness to defeat those beyond its sphere of power or influence: "right-wing socialists, right-wing religious persons, right-wing nationalists and other reactionaries."[88] Essentially, Aidit was suggesting that the Party would defeat all those actors beyond the pale of the meaning that its own organizational presence (and the BTI's and other ormas') substantiated of Indonesia, since it itself now identified completely and comprehensively with Indonesia. In short, by excluding these actors, Aidit asserted an exclusive, and thus authoritative, power to define what it was to be "Indonesian." This was Aidit's essential vow, a vow that was energized by achievements on the ground whose reality was now being given its own unique identity and identifying name: Indonesia.

To begin naming the Party's achievements in Indonesian terms was to begin consciously articulating the qualitative dimension of the PKI's political work. In reporting on this dimension, Aidit reiterated the overriding importance of the peasants, whose central role in the Four-Year Plan was to provide the certain foundation for the PKI's new state building. In connection with the Plan, Aidit asserted that

> we must never for a moment forget that the implementation of this Plan must be closely linked with the line of consolidating our Party's integration with the peasants. What does this mean? This means that our cultural work must *in the first place* be aimed at raising the cultural level of the peasants and arousing the peasants' spirit and joy in the struggle. This means that our ideological work must *in the first place* be aimed at further integrating the thoughts of all Party cadres with the peasants and strengthening the proletarian ideology of the cadres who work among the peasants. This means that our organisational work must *in the first place* be aimed at further expanding and consolidating the Party organisation and our mass revolutionary peasants' organisation so as to guarantee unanimity of thought within them, so as to guarantee their discipline and fighting spirits. The Party's work among the youth must *in the first place* be aimed at the peasant youth, its work among the women must *in the first place* be aimed at the peasant women, its work among the artists must *in the first place* be aimed at the village artists, its work among teachers must *in the first place* be aimed at the village

> teachers, its work among children must *in the first place* be aimed at the children of the peasants, and so on.[89]

In other words, Aidit confessed that the very novelty of the PKI's new state building enterprise depended absolutely upon the engagement of the people, which in the Indonesian context meant the peasants. In this connection, Aidit was being honest when he solemnly stated that "So important is the position of the peasants in our revolution that it is not possible for our revolution to be victorious without organising and mobilising the tens of millions of peasants."[90] Likewise, Aidit was being perfectly frank when he declared, with emphasis, that Party members and cadres "*must think the 'thought of the peasants' revolution', the thought that the key to our revolution is the village.*"[91]

By specifying the peasant aspect of the "Indonesian Revolution" in this definitive way, Aidit brought the qualitative and quantitative measures of the Party's work together at their highest possible resolution. Where the former suggested a comprehensive social outlook based in the village, the latter carried with it the reality of organizational completeness. Given these two measures, Aidit could logically suggest that the essence of the Party's work ahead consisted quite simply of drawing together and strengthening the connections between the Communists' own being and thinking. Indeed, this is what he meant when he encouraged his audience to step up

> the work of bringing about simultaneousness between activities for implementation of the Plan and Party activities among the masses of the peasants, the masses of the workers, the masses of the youth, the women, the intellectuals, the writers and artists, the poor urban dwellers, and so on.[92]

In recognizing this quality of simultaneousness as "one of the most vital guarantees of success for the implementation of the Four-Year Plan," Aidit had pinpointed the very essence of what it now meant for the Party to be engaging in action-creating meaning. To bring its directing idea of Indonesia alive meant daring to take the uncompromising action or actions that would make it so: pursuing land reform and opposing Malaysia. These were to serve as the two chief fronts along which the Party would push itself outward, organizationally and in terms of a comprehensive perspective, and so force the integration of its being and thinking to yield an indisputably Indonesian standard and standard-bearer.

If the PKI leader had this objective and role in mind for his Party, he was daring enough to explicitly links its effects on state power. Simply put, Aidit argued that by working "even better among the masses of the people, in particular working from below, both among the organised people as well as among the unorganised people," the condition would be fulfilled "for breaking down the wall that separates the proletariat from state power."[93] Despite the enormity of this proposition, which posed the PKI's sovereign aim in a deliberately naked fashion, Aidit spoke in an unhesitating way about its fulfilment. "Of course, President Sukarno can do very much in connection with the question of forming a Cabinet," Aidit assured his audience,

> [b]ut we cannot hope for something magic to happen or for something philanthropic to happen as regards the question of state power. As has frequently been said, the question of power is a question of the balance of forces and there is no class that voluntarily wants to share power with another class. This is the reason why for the formation of a Gotong Royong Cabinet with Nasakom as the core, we must unceasingly, in a spirit of great enthusiasm and with persevering work, carry out the line: consolidate the progressive forces, unite with the middle-of-the-road forces and continuously isolate the diehards.[94]

To prove his own point about the transparent nature of acquiring "state power" in the Indonesian context, Aidit dared to extend the PKI's organizational completeness and comprehensiveness of perspective to the "state" itself. To achieve a condition of organizational completeness among Communists in the "state," Aidit asked:

> Should those comrades who are members of Governmental Organs and Representative Councils not be allowed to make use of the facilities that they obtain in connection with their positions? Of course they should. They must make the best possible use of all the facilities and opportunities available to them in order to increase their service to the people and the revolution and not in order to "consolidate themselves."[95]

Further, for the purposes of establishing a comprehensive Communist perspective at the "state" level, Aidit declared that

> all Committees under whose leadership there are members of Executive Government Boards, Regional Legislative Councils and other Councils must establish a special commission, a *Commission on Governmental and Representative Affairs*, to assist the work and control the activities as well as, where necessary, criticise in time (not too late) those comrades who are members of such bodies. Together with this, the Control Commissions of all Committees must be activised.[96]

In the two respects of being and thinking, the Chairman told his audience and all Indonesian Communists that their fate was in their hands, everywhere and anywhere in the Indonesian context. By acting on-the-spot to give voice to a oneness of Communists in the "state" then formalizing that integrity in a new organization was exactly the kind of "work" Aidit had in mind "for the time to come." Clearly, the simultaneously inclusive and exclusive "work" being undertaken by Indonesian Communists effectively split the "state" in two. The sloganised expression of "Ever Forward, No Retreat!" entailed the knowing subordination of the "state" and "state power" to the organized, single-minded, and unrelenting will of Indonesian Communists. In formalizing this statement of wilful intent, Aidit signalled the beginning of an unremitting assault on Guided Democracy. To the Communists, the time had arrived to take the initiative that would erase the difference between an incidentally ordered and an essentially ordered Indonesian existence.

From an Incidental to an Essential Indonesian Order

From late 1963 to the end of the period under consideration, the Communist assault took the form of substituting the reality of PKI power for claims to power formally exercised by "state" personnel or bodies. In this fundamental exercise of substitution, the PKI blended tactics that destroyed or, perhaps more accurately, exposed other actors' unsubstantiated claims to authority with those that created or, again, more accurately, disclosed its own organized, substantial, and standardized command of authority. In almost every significant development associated with the campaigns around Malaysia and land reform, the two tactics were pursued simultaneously. On the whole, this record of meaningful activity was one of Communist success, especially for the year 1964. This success may be seen by briefly examining, in turn, the anti-Malaysia campaign and the land reform campaign during most of that year.

As an issue, Malaysia was important for the effect it had discretely on Indonesia's external relations,[97] but even more so for the effect given to it by the PKI in the course of establishing its unassailable leadership in matters of Indonesia's foreign policy.[98] From the perspective of new state building, the guerrilla warfare that occurred between Malaysian/British and Indonesian forces mattered less than the political fight that occurred simultaneously between and among Indonesian political actors after the PKI leadership finally resolved in late 1963 to strike at the very pretence of "Indonesian" authority. That official Indonesia became increasingly virulent in its denunciations of the Malaysians and all their real and imagined backers, or that it increasingly identified with the Communist Chinese vision of revolution in the developing world, only reflected a course of events directed by the PKI. The animating force of PKI leadership, especially in early 1964, sustained the issue despite even the efforts of Sukarno to settle it. Indeed, it was the PKI's pointed, unspoken, but real defiance of Sukarno and his writ that made the issue of Malaysia the indelible mark of a Communist-conceived and directed reality, and not merely a sudden and unexplained reversal in Indonesian Government policy.

The Indonesian Communists began their large-scale reality building (as opposed to the less ambitious practice of "reality-testing") in January 1964. At that time, Communist-inspired and Communist-led activists pushed the Malaysia issue beyond the political (but not military) control of those whose official competency dictated leadership and responsibility. President Sukarno had acted out of such apparent leadership and responsibility as early as September 1963, when he issued Presidential Decision No. 7 in response to the take-over and occupation of British commercial concerns by zealous employees and outraged citizens.[99] The intent of the President's Decision was to countermand the seizures. Instead of facilitating in the return of the affected commercial concerns to their British owners and proprietors, however, the Decision marked the beginning of what, given its original premise, was an unwanted "expropriation process":

> Despite Indonesian government assurances that British holdings would be returned eventually, there occurred instead, in subsequent weeks, a process of steadily advancing supervision and control by the government, including by Army officers.[100]

Regardless of this steady favourable progress, the PKI showed its readiness to accelerate its command of the Indonesian situation in mid-January when it wrecked any prospect of a US-inspired and led mediation effort among the erstwhile Mapilindo partners.

At that time, the US Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, was to confer with President Sukarno in Tokyo. On the very day of their meeting, January 17, Aidit declared in *Harian Rakjat* that "it is our obligation to avoid efforts which have the nature of compromise." Through the eyes of the Communists, the President's consent to a ceasefire with the Malaysians and a meeting of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines amounted to a compromise. On January 18, almost immediately after this agreement had been reached in Tokyo, members of PKI ormas began to seize British concerns that had been spared their fury and daring in September 1963. On this occasion, members of the PKI ormas for estate workers, Sarbupri, began to take over rubber and tea estates in West Java. In Jakarta, members of SOBSI started to take over facilities belonging to Shell Oil and Unilever. These actions were in clear contravention of Presidential Decision No. 7 of 1963. Moreover, the actions were completed against the explicit demands of the acting President, Johannes Leimena, who reminded the parties involved of the Decision. Unmoved by this appeal, or the support given to it by Sukarno when he returned from Tokyo, SOBSI further defied the President and the regime by seizing facilities belonging to the British-American Tobacco Company on January 20.

By early February, Indonesian officials continued to acquiesce in the belief that they possessed authority over a reality of the Communists' own making, but their acquiescence was absurd, at best, and a farce, at worst. On February 2, the Indonesian Government formally created the Supervisory Office of British Enterprises (*Badan Penguasa Perusahaan2 Inggris*). According to Van der Kroef, its official purpose was "to 'safeguard' and 'exercise control' over the British concerns."[101] This high-sounding mission did little to disguise the fact that it was itself the echo of the roar of Communist power. Quite loudly and bluntly, because that was how the Communists intended their proclamation, they "would no longer tolerate a course of compromise or moderation in the [Malaysian] crisis." By moving the Indonesian Government to categorize the consequences of its actions in the way it did, the PKI began (at the very least) to exert indirect control over the foreign policy of the country. And when the PKI chose to practice intransigence on the Malaysian issue, "this now in effect became Indonesia's intransigence."[102]

Following the furious events of January–February 1964, the Communists effectively consolidating their leadership over the issue of Malaysia in all respects except one—militarily. The most remarkable measure of this tendency was the seemingly unlimited willingness of other political actors to mouth the Party line on Malaysia. Certainly, the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines charted no independent course nor realized any self-sustaining momentum during their deliberations in February and March. Depending on the perspective taken, their talks ended in abject failure or stunning success. Thereafter, non-Party figures, especially President Sukarno and the Foreign Minister, Subandrio, became unconstrained advocates of the impulse to "crush Malaysia!" (*ganjang Malaysia!*). On March 16, for instance, Sukarno appeared prepared to overpower the Malaysians by reciprocating their call for general conscription with his own appeal for volunteers to "preserve the National Revolution." Ominously, or not, depending again on the perspective taken, Sukarno explicitly envisaged mass weapons training as part of this voluntary service.

On March 23, Subandrio concluded abruptly that "if at a certain point Indonesia is made to choose 'between the conventional and revolutionary aspects in the implementation of her foreign policy she will choose the one which will benefit the Revolution'." As if anticipating the desire for clarification and explanation that his stark conclusion invited, Subandrio professed that the adaptability of the "Indonesian Revolution" "'to the growth and demands of the present era stage by stage'" sometimes meant "'defying rationalization'."[103] Subandrio's words did not defy rationalization: they said almost exactly what Aidit had prescribed for Indonesia's foreign policy in December 1963. Two days after Subandrio's statements, Sukarno told the United States "To hell with your aid!"[104] And on May 3, Sukarno steeled his country for a headlong conflict with the opponents of the "Indonesian Revolution" when he issued the People's Double Command (*Dwi Komando Rakjat*—Dwikora). Alongside the command to intensify the "Revolution," Sukarno called for 21 million volunteers to stand against Malaysia. The President's subsequent decree of May 16, which created the Alert Command (*Komando Siaga*—Koga), formally committed Indonesia and its armed services, especially the Army, to preparing itself for a military resolution of the conflict.

From that point forward, then, through the balance of the year and into most of 1965, it was a militarily engaged Indonesia that officially "confronted" Malaysia. The Communists would not have it any other way, for a militarily engaged Army was an Army that was too busy in its primary "patriotic" duty to pursue "national development." As such, *konfrontasi* marked the culmination of the PKI's efforts on this front: it was "the first time [that] a Communist-initiated tactics with its attendant symbols and ideology [had become] an official Indonesian policy norm."[105] In other words, this is what the complete "Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism" meant, in part.

The other major part of the successful "Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism" consisted, of course, of the Party's "complete integration with the peasants." Outwardly and publicly, the Communists proclaimed "anti-feudalism" to be the standard or norm that served as the base for this integration; the land reform campaign was merely its instrument. After December 1963, when Aidit dared to clarify this association between the meaning of land reform and the action of land reform, the Party and its supporting ormas endeavoured at every turn to ensure that the actions they took or directed were demonstrably derived from this standard. To fulfil this objective, the Indonesian Communists proceeded to further adjust the conceptual language they used to describe rural relations, engage in on-the-spot research, and, at the level of the individual peasant, inculcate a sense of self-worth and self-determination in the face of demonstrable oppressiveness. Each of these adjustments was part of a wider mechanism of revolutionary action that at once created a generalized impression of rural injustice stemming from a prevalent "feudalism," then rectified the situation in a local and general way based on criteria of the PKI's own determination. In effect, the PKI and its ormas aimed to school the peasants in what it was to be an Indonesian peasant, then graduate them in a convocating and culturally enriching action of self-awareness and self-assertion unfettered by "feudalism." Consistent with the Four-Year Plan, the Communists supplied all that was necessary for this peculiar form of self-learning, including the facilities, the teachers, the meaning, the proofs, and the encouragement.

After the PKI leadership resolved to make the elimination of "feudalism" its definitive rural objective in December 1963, the Party adjusted the conceptual and analytical language it used to describe rural relations in such a way that the actions of its cadres and members were made interpretable solely in terms of their "anti-feudalism." In this way, the "unilateral actions" being carried out by the Communists were to acquire their significance, informed as they now were by a transcendant Indonesian standard. Despite the fact that rural circumstances did not easily or automatically lend themselves to the kind of decisive interpretation or decisive action the Party now insisted on making and taking, early in 1964 the PKI began to categorize its "feudal" opponents in terms that deliberately invited their isolation and destruction.

Henceforth, the opponents were labelled the "7 village devils." While the plurality of such "devils" was a clear concession to the complexity of rural relations on the PKI's part, the manner in which the Party drew them together ingeniously linked its struggle against "feudalism" with that against the "anti-popular aspect" of "state power." The inclusion of "bureaucratic capitalists" among the "devils" furnished a first link between rural affairs and "state" affairs. Altogether the "devils" included "wicked landlords, the blood-sucking money lenders, the *idjon* lenders, wicked middlemen, the bureaucratic capitalists, wicked authorities and the village bandits."[106] The inclusion of "bureaucratic capitalists" on this hitlist, moreover, was not arbitrary, for the Communists must surely have known that their reference to such individuals represented somewhat of a challenge to one of the main principles of the UUPA, which permitted absentee ownership for "those persons in active state service."[107] By logical extension, this challenge to the letter of the law represented a challenge to the "state," although it would be accurate to say it was premised on the spirit of the law, something which the Communists themselves had imparted! This affront to the law represented a second link between the countryside and the "state." A third link seemed deliberately crafted to be unbreakable and consisted of the Communists' belief that "all these devils were more or less based on the feudal landlords' land."[108] In other words, they all dwelled in the same space, or island of territory, and attacking any one of the "devils" necessarily meant attacking them all. For the Communists, drawing together the "seven devils" meant erasing the distinction they once drew between the "above" and the "below," as in their "front from above" and their "front from below." Now, there was only an incipient unity.

Aside from the ingenious linkages it fostered between affairs in the countryside and affairs of "state," the Communists' conception of the "seven village devils" cleverly rationalized a huge Communist effort to control even more popular and territorial political resources. The key to this massive and totalizing outward and downward impulse lay precisely in the Communists' contention that the "seven village devils" could be found in specific sites. Perhaps the most important aspect to this assertion was the empirical work—work of discovery—that it logically entailed. Ostensibly, the purpose of this empirical work would have been to determine the validity or invalidity of the contention at the general as well as at the local level. At either level, making a determination of this kind compelled a combination of being and thinking, that is, of making sense of local and general circumstances in light of the construct of the "seven village devils."

While the construct furnished the Communists with a reason for why they should be everywhere, it was the conduct of research that seemed to matter most. The activity of performing research was regarded so highly that Aidit himself led a huge effort across Java between the months of February and May 1964. For six-week periods, the Chairman led teams of researchers and research assistants in West Java (February–March) and, nearly simultaneously, in East Java and Central Java (April–May). The separate undertakings in East and Central Java were regarded as follow-up efforts to the work that was conducted on a lesser scale in West Java.[109] Altogether, Aidit conducted research in 130 *kecamatan* (subdistricts): 24 in West Java, 70 in East Java, and 36 in Central Java.[110] In this, the Chairman was assisted by large teams of researchers and research workers who went all the way down to the village level in their pursuits. According to Aidit there were "250 or so cadres . . . who worked directly under my leadership," and "3,000 or so cadres in the villages or ketjamatan who helped me make this research work a success."[111] In addition to its size, these teams was remarkable for their composition, which pointedly brought together the interrelated representatives of an extended family: "CPI leaders, activists of the peasants', workers', women's and youth movement[s], scientists, and [university] students."[112]

Conducting research was an attractive activity to the Communists, not only because a research project would force them into the field, but because the activity of the project would itself become the exemplary blending of being and thinking—of making the Indonesian context in the process of making sense of it. Of course, there was nothing automatic or predestined about the Communists' ability to successfully rendezvous with rural reality, but their decision to deliberately bypass the "state" and its authorities did propel the researchers downward:

> [a]s earlier research attempts had shown that the usual practice of approaching village investigations through the village heads and other prominent locals meant either stonewalling or a strong bias in the information acquired, it was insisted that those visiting the villages must not work through them but must eat and sleep in the houses of ordinary peasants.[113]

Notwithstanding the Communists' awareness that other methods had been used with limited success in the past, or that it would have been impossible for them to have undertaken extensive research at a point earlier in their existence when they had fewer resources, once they identified the bedrock of rural existence this way, through intensive field research, they seemed to recognize how special was this activity.

The Communists' recognition occurred at two levels. The first level was formal and public, the other, implicit and barely contained. At the first level, the research method of sleeping, eating, and working with the peasants was formalized as the "3-Togethers Method" and recognized as a full-fledged "scientific method." This recognition seemed to have been accorded for both negative and positive reasons. On the negative side, the Communists' could be seen as responding to "some reactionary scientists" who did not view this method of field research as scientific. On the positive side, the Communists' insistence on identifying their work as "scientific," and thus modern, was an effort to enhance their credentials as experts and capable leaders in this most important matter.

At the second level, the Communists seemed to have recognized that their method was not simply a means, an activity leading to something else, it was method-become-content. Each research project, each instance of practising the "3-Togethers," was itself both a moment lived in the Indonesian reality and a positive contribution to the wider living of that reality. Aidit could barely contain his enthusiasm for the research that emerged from the experience of practising the "3-Togethers." "Within 2 to 4 days," researchers using the "3-Togethers method" were generally able "to open up the hearts of their hosts and to hear about everything in the villages, all the joys and sorrows of the peasants, and the struggle they are waging—to hear all this themselves, directly from the very heart of the revolution, the peasant-labourers and poor peasants, the village proletariat and semi-proletariat."[114] This enthusiasm carried over even into corporate reports on the research, wherein it was asserted that "[r]esearch conducted with the '3 togethers' method is not only of significance in getting to know the situation, but [it] also educates the CPI cadres in character, both those who directly conduct the research as well as those who hear and study the reports."[115] In gaining this down-to-earth experience, even if only for a brief six weeks, individual Party and ormas members began to realize the fundamental objective of the PKI directive to "go down" (*turun ke bawah*)—to live the humble life of the individual peasant and the noble life of the peasant masses. The Communists readily acknowledged how illuminating their experience had been.

Indeed, the brightness of achieving research seemed even to outshine the formal research achievements. That is not to say the research results were unimportant, it is only to say that the Communists seemed overwhelmingly more keen on using the results to sustain further activity, including further research, than in treating them as an end. In light of the communion with the masses that the Communists' experienced in conducting their research, it might well be understood why the abstract component of research would tend to be ignored. As it turned out, not all the research results the Communists had acquired were publicized or published before the PKI and its ormas were thoroughly destroyed beginning in late 1965.[116] Of the results that were publicized, Aidit made those pertaining to West Java the centrepiece of his 1964 work entitled *Peasants Crush the Village Devils.*[117] Despite the fact that these results were from the smallest and earliest field study, and thus the least desirable from a methodologically rigorous viewpoint, Aidit's use of them clearly showed the priority of the revolutionary method over the social scientific method. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results implied overall support for the Communists' working hypothesis that such "devils" existed and exercised demonstrable control over land and peasant lives. More specifically,

> the figures showed that those who maintained that the majority of peasants had little land, but that very few had a lot of land, were wrong. Not even in the villages where communal land ownership had until quite recently dominated did this hold, said Aidit. The feudal landlords did indeed often appear to own only a little land, perhaps only three or four hectares, but surely they owned land in a number of villages and controlled land which others formally owned.
>
> . . . the figures showed that the concentration of land was . . . significant.[118]

The inferences the Communists drew from their research clearly conveyed that their first priority was to advance a standard of "anti-feudalism," that is, to take further meaningful action rather than to perfect their research design, or interpretation, or even to acknowledge any ambiguity in either. For example, the findings on land ownership were interpreted to support the general notion that "there really were feudal landlords to be found who must be combatted." Furthermore, the inference the Communists drew from their findings on the concentration of land ownership was that the concentration was so significant that "the landless and the poor, as well as the middle peasants, must rationally have common interests vis-à-vis the landlords who concentrated that land."[119] On both accounts, the Communists used the findings to surcharge more research and more unilateral actions, not only in West Java, but as a general rule after their publicity, in all rural areas. An outstanding example of this determination was reflected in the Communists' experiences in the Central Java regency of Klaten, where the unilateral action undertaken there "was intended by the BTI as an experiment and if it succeeded it would be launched throughout Java."[120]

Whether the inferences the Communists drew from their research were contrived or not, they were similar to the "seven village devils" construct, with its spatial implications, in that they revealed the PKI's highest regard for the accumulation and control of political resources. For in quickly drawing the inferences they did, the Communists actually drove themselves to acquire and use more popular resources on the premise that actions against the few were necessarily actions by the many. Transparent in this revolutionary truth, the Communists openly stated the implacable nature of their intention to control popular resources:

> Unilateral actions are beneficial both to the Government as well as to the broad mass of village inhabitants; these actions must therefore be capable of winning the sympathy and support of more than 90 per cent of the village inhabitants and the non-reactionary state officials.[121]

It was as much a reflection of Aidit's prescience as it was of his stamina that the injunction to win at least 90 per cent of the popular support had been a maxim of Party work since he made it so in his 1957 work *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution*.

The PKI as an Essentially Indonesian Actor

The PKI's enduring drive to acquire greater and greater popular resources necessarily entailed consequences of a qualitative kind. In specifying a threshold of popular support of 90 per cent, the Communists surely knew that achieving such a level consistently, or even in many instances, would be unlikely on the basis of the kinds of class alliances so favoured by orthodox Marxism. In an "Indonesianized Marxism-Leninism," however, there were no insuperable obstacles to such an achievement, and because of that, the Communists practised their quest for support without being detained by strict class considerations of the individuals on their side. The knowing inclusion in the PKI as well as the BTI of individuals who hailed from a variety of classes (or castes) was not systematically prevented, and as a result "in several villages leaders were courted who, on the basis of their traditional prestige, were expected to bring a broad mass of followers along. In Bali, the party even attracted a few rajas as popular leaders."[122]

At the same time the Communists were experiencing a significant qualitative change in the composition of their popular support, the organization of that support underwent a qualitative change of its own. More specifically, the expansion of the Unra system, which was the major organizational initiative of the Four-Year Plan, began to exhibit what McVey has termed "a greater reliance on communism's aspect as a movement rather than as [an] organization." By this, McVey meant to call attention to the Communists' unprecedented acquiescence in a decentralized style of organizing and organization. For instance,

> When it was decided to embark on a campaign of precipitate expansion it was recognized that the tight national-level supervision that had marked the earlier state would have to be dropped in favour of encouraging local initiatives. A leading body, the "Jajasan Unra," was established at national and local levels; its main purpose was to encourage leftist organizations and individuals within its territory to take the initiative to start schools, and, although in theory it could inspect them, there was in practice no supervision from above or from local party or mass organization units. Indeed, often enough Panpera schools were established quite independently, on the initiative of a local teacher or group, which notified the Unra of the school's existence. The party made a virtue of this: the new slogans were autonomy and local initiative, schools to be shaped according to local abilities and needs.[123]

That priority now attached to local autonomy, initiative, and needs was neither a matter of convenience nor simply a saving virtue for the Communists. Indeed, this style of organizing and organization was not even a matter of choice for the Communists. Since their struggle against "feudalism" possessed an inner and exacting regard for the accumulation and control of political resources, and their "seven village devils" construct and research initiatives directed their revolutionary activity further downward and outward, the spontaneous growth of the Unra system was the best indicator of the fundamental demand for a Communist viewpoint precisely because it was not centrally planned. To the PKI, the spontaneous and loosely guided nature of Unra's growth indicated that the schools were successful at the margin in reconciling the forces of ideological supply and organizational demand that defined the operation of the Four-Year Plan. Had the growth of the Unra system been made to comply strictly with central guidelines, the system itself would likely have stultified given the sheer magnitude of the Communists' rural (and urban) endeavours. In the business of revolutionary creation, the PKI was too busy by 1964 to correct every facet of its work; the undeniable organizational problems that it confronted were the problems of growth, problems other actors would probably have welcomed solving if they were their own.

Both Wertheim and, to a lesser extent, McVey have asserted that the qualitative changes in the composition of the PKI's support and in the Party's management of its educational system reflected a preference for "quantity" over "quality." This assertion is profoundly misleading in that it overlooks a quality that is essential to, and is increasingly depended upon with the quantitative growth of, a creative actor. McVey, for instance, has declared that the "party leadership was willing to concede [the] challenge to democratic centralism for the sake of achieving growth, for at this stage [late in Guided Democracy] the quantity of its support counted more than ever over quality."[124] For Wertheim's part, he has used this same dichotomy, but employs it to draw a contrast between the "quality" of the TNI's strength, which he held to be based on its leaders' transformation "of a people's army . . . into one on a professional basis," and the "quantity" of the PKI's strength, which meant not "paying enough attention both to ideological training and to class composition of members and following." Ironically, he overlooks the fact that at the very moment in time the Communists were busily associating themselves with *rajas* and other notables, the TNI was associating itself with the Murba party, that is, with an entity whose leaders were Trotskyist in orientation! Neither McVey nor Wertheim seem to appreciate completely the wider qualitative significance of either of these phenomena. To perceive the PKI's sudden expansion mainly in quantitative terms or in terms of the qualitative deterioration of its organization would be to impose upon the Party concerns of a dichotomous nature that it itself did not regard as decisively important. Likewise, to perceive the TNI in the same way, given its seemingly nefarious dealings with the Murba party and its determined effort to win popular support "from below," would be to pose a stark choice that the Army leadership itself did not deign to address.

Rather more important than any perceived trade-off between "quantity" and "quality" was the overriding concern, which was shared by the PKI and the TNI, to advance both of these attributes so as to better organize a popular-territorial base in the context of novelty. For both the PKI and the TNI were driven in the breadth of their directing ideas of Indonesia to realize the organizational imperative of accommodating as much popular support as possible, in the most practicable way possible. If this revolutionary practice entailed committing transgressions of a categorical kind, or of a kind that exceeded the limits of a completely centralized organizational scheme, these only confirmed both actors' interest in creating a transcendant and synthetic category of their own: Indonesia.

In the PKI's case, the massive quantitative change and its undeniable negative impact on the centralized quality of its own and ancillary organizations were the necessary informants of further growth, and therefore reflected the articulation and readjustment of increased amounts of political resources to themselves. The PKI's inclusion of members of a social category normally anathema to orthodox Marxism, therefore, was much less a contradiction and much more the compelling testimony of an actor's greater conviction in itself as a self-realizing actor than in prescribed tenets. In point of fact, given the two actors' intolerance for existing particularisms, their political practice generally obliged them to commit such transgressions. Moreover, both actors' inability to use coercive resources to liquidate such theoretically antithetical elements or tendencies constrained each to live with its apparently contradictory achievements, at least for the meantime. To be fair, the PKI's lack of fidelity in particular to pre-existing ideological constructs or categories really only showed up because of its immense success as a new state builder, and it is the quality of oneness associated with the behaviour of such an actor that warrants greater attention than any alleged trade-off between "quantity" and "quality."

As new state builders, the PKI and, to a lesser extent at this point in time, the TNI abided apparent contradictions both in the base of their popular support, and organizational deterioration along the standard of centralization, in the greater interest of achieving and maximizing the quality of organization as common experience. Presumably, achieving this quality would be followed indeterminately by the more thorough-going achievement of the quality of organization as common structure. Thus, the PKI began to respond to the opportunities of its own incredible growth by emphasizing more and more the intangible aspects of its work. The Communists began militantly categorizing their activities in a way that borrowed from the common standard they were in the midst of creating.

Consider, for example, the characterization that Asmu, the BTI leader, gave of the Communists' rural educational initiatives in a speech in February 1964:

> illiterate people will learn to read. Those who feel themselves lowly will be raised from the mud of humility to the conviction that labor is noble and that the working people, including the peasantry, are the creators of this world, that what the landlord does to the peasant is not beneficial but exploitative and evil, that the landlord is not an exalted, saintly person but a dirty and cruel fellow, that his authority is not eternal but can be shaken and in the end overthrown by a broad and courageous united peasant front . . ..[125]

This characterization, which both directed and adumbrated a course of action, relied for its own momentum on the sense of oneness that was the coincident consequence of the Communists' massive outward and downward thrust. Although this sense of oneness may have been barely perceptible at the margins, given the demonstrable thinness there of the Communists' organizational presence, its instantiation in even one Unra school had a profoundly desirable effect, for "if the teacher was at all ideologically informed, [he or she] presented ordinary people with a way of looking at the world that seemed to make sense of their situation."[126] In this way, the Communists' revolutionary activities afforded them a quality—a further resource—that obtained despite the organizational deterioration observed by McVey and the neglect of categorical purity observed by Wertheim. The formal expression of that quality of oneness was not located in any single structure; it inhered both in the comprehensive activity of organizing and the organizing of comprehensive activity.

The great significance of Asmu's statement was that it appealed to normatively correct action and thereby presupposed the existence of a norm. Since a norm is a condition characterizing a circumscribed or consciously circumscribable popular-territorial base, in the context of novelty it is at one and the same time a statement of a creative actor's organizational and organizing success. Indeed, for Asmu to have made the exhortation that he did presupposed an incipient seat or manifestations of Communist power, a discernibly real sphere possessing popular, territorial, and, increasingly, normative dimensions. It was this kind of phenomenon that Lyon seemed to have in mind when she wrote that

> while a local BTI organization might be viewed as cooperative in nature, the fact that it was in practice organized in the interests of its own members meant that it represented, at least in the area of land matters, a polarization of interests in rural society and therefore the introduction of an alternative definition of authority. As political organization tended to foster a division of the village on basic economic lines, not to mention other issues, and village officials were grouped with landlords, the village government could be seen as administering primarily the interests of the landlords and therefore as representing one realm of authority. The BTI cadres and their followers, on the other hand, represented an alternative authority based on different ideas of land distribution, thereby creating a situation in which the more traditional authority could be perceived as no longer legitimately administering the interests of a large portion of the village population. Furthermore, besides being able to represent interests of local members, the BTI . . . had the advantage of national symbols in the form of the land reform program to give its pursuits legitimacy in a broader framework and impart an impression of offering a nationally unified program.[127]

Certainly, given the directed nature of the Communists' actions, this profoundly important outcome stemmed from the localized efforts that attended the identification of the "seven village devils" and their extirpation through unilateral actions. To an even larger extent, though, this outcome derived from the Communists' willingness to direct their organizations and organizing of unilateral actions in such a daringly comprehensive manner as to give rise to unprecedented single local followerships now ordered on the basis of a normative standard.

The New Culture Movement

In achieving this feat, albeit in a spatially diffuse way, the Communists recognized immediately the awesome potential that now existed for them to generalize to the contextual level the implication that unilateral actions involved "radically different notions of legality."[128] The Communists seemed to have surmised that if their combined and mutually reinforcing activities of research, schooling, and unilateral actions made it possible for them to assert their authority locally, engaging in yet further activity of an appropriately general nature could hasten the same achievement—sovereign power—at the highest level. It was for this reason that Aidit inaugurated the New Culture Movement (*Gerakan Kebudayaan Baru*) on 3 June 1964, mere days after he had completed his research in Central Java.

Like the "seven village devils" construct, which was the result of inferences drawn quickly from limited field research, the understanding the Communists showed of "culture" reflected the same earnestness for further activity. Thus, the Communists drew three significant conclusions on the basis of field research they had just completed in East and Central Java. The first conclusion was that the Communists actually possessed an empirical basis for their views. "If we want to know about the conditions and the movement of the 45 million peasants and fishermen of Java," Aidit asserted,

> it is not necessary to carry out research in all the villages, just as it is not necessary to kill and examine all rabbits in order to study the anatomy of a rabbit. Having conducted research in 130 *ketjamatan* (sub-districts) throughout Java which were selected with great care in order to ensure that all types of conditions would be reflected, all this is more than enough to know the conditions of the peasants and the peasants' movement and also the conditions of the fishermen and the fishermen's movement in Java.[129]

A second conclusion was that it was necessary to proceed with more research work:

> in order to become more thoroughly acquainted with the mental life of the people, it is necessary to make a more profound study of the folklore in order to develop the positive aspects which can help in the propaganda of revolutionary policies, and to eradicate the negative aspects which are harmful to the people.

A third conclusion, seemingly at odds with the foregoing, was that the village devils were to be blamed for the poor cultural state of the people:

> the village devils engage in a variety of activities for the purpose of spoiling the morals of the peasants and the fishermen, so that this vast majority of the people should slumber on and should not rise up in opposition . . ..
>
> The research work [shows] that the village devils are doing many things to keep the people in a state of ignorance, to corrupt their morals and preserve their belief in superstition, by obstructing the expansion of general education,

> degenerating the folk art of the people or bringing neo-colonialist culture into the village.[130]

On the basis of these very public statements, it would have seemed that the Communists already had their minds made up to proceed with a cultural offensive against "feudalism" and "neo-colonialism." That the Communist leaders probably did have their minds set on such a course of action, however, does not detract from the significance of the curiously self-effacing manner in which the Movement was launched. When Aidit declared himself in favour of such a Movement before peasant women cadres at the BTI's Peasant School in Jakarta, for instance, he also insisted that the cultural activity he was effectively directing "must be done on the basis of [the] consciousness and auto-activity of the masses." This was a highly revealing statement not only of the Movement at hand, but of the Communists' new state-building venture as such. For Aidit's willingness to presume a popular "consciousness" and "auto-activity" made it appear that the Party, in launching its Movement, was plainly and innocently responding to the higher demands of the "people." However, the still incidental nature of the standard which the PKI was busily authoring left Aidit with no choice but to communicate the actual bases for a New Culture Movement in vague terms, or at least in terms which located its driving dynamic much more broadly than the Party. By contrast, Aidit was quite exacting in his discussion of what the Party could and must do in response to the "need" for such a Movement:

> In the framework of the New Culture Movement we must intensify educational and cultural work as, for example, anti-illiteracy courses, people's courses, People's Sciences Centres, activise people's art and resist [its] degeneration, set up *sanggar* (people's culture centres), choirs, popularise revolutionary and patriotic songs, and so on.[131]

Aidit's use of exacting and ambiguous references was significant because it reflected his appreciation of, and prescription for overcoming, the lingering indeterminacy in which the Communists found themselves. In these respects, the speech was similar to Aidit's lectures in 1963 on the "two aspects of the state," which had a self-fulfilling and self-committing thrust and were thus instantiations of the Chairman's own message. In the current case, Aidit couched the source of the "need" for "cultural" action vaguely, but knew exactly what was appropriate in a Communist response to that demand. Like his theory of "state power," it mattered crucially that Aidit was daring enough to articulate this "need," however indeterminate its underlying allusion to one "people," and however insidious its claim to speak authoritatively. Aidit showed that he was prepared to risk exaggeration while borrowing heavily against the very objective that the Movement was directed to realize. In doing so, Aidit was attempting to make the extraction and application of appropriate "cultural" resources a standard part of the Party's revolutionary activities and a standard part of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution," without either of these seeming manipulative. But in reality, the deliberate search for "cultural" knowledge that could and would be used systematically to catalyze unilateral actions was a matter of creative manipulation and revolutionary synthesis. Masking those qualities, while still carrying out and even diversifying the essential practices of accumulating and controlling political resources, was the challenge that Aidit deftly met in his speech.

To conclude that Aidit was mainly interested in disguising the Party's true intentions would be to miss the larger point about the Party's challenge as a new state builder and the prescription its Chairman began to fulfil. Far from being a feat of semantics, Aidit's speech actually contributed to the realization of its own message, the same message Asmu had expressed when he referred to the peasants and workers as the "creators of this world," the same message publicized in 1963 that "more and more peasants are beginning to see that their destiny lies not in any supernatural force but in their own hands."[132] For in the context of novelty, the activity of disseminating such a message of collective self-creation through organizations and organizing instantiates that very message.

Accordingly, the Communists' success in effecting their directing idea of Indonesia, of giving a tangible base to a popular sense of oneness, was neither greater nor lesser than the extent of their own organizing and organizations. To maximize both, the PKI had to have passed from meaning-creating actions to action-creating meaning, otherwise it would not have been possible to borrow against (in the sense of daring to publicly presume) an incipient standard and meaningfully appeal to apparent generalities, such as "culture." Aidit's prescription for the further accumulation and control of resources consisted exactly of signalling the demand for "culture" and indicating the Party's willingness to supply that demand (which was also the operational principle of the Four-Year Plan), a combination of forces which compelled the Communists to effect their reconciliation within the expanding arenas of their own organizations and organizing. Viewed from this perspective, neither the accumulation and control of resources nor organizations and organizing were significant phenomena in their separateness; it was the combination of the two, coterminous, coincident, and mutually reinforcing, that contributed most to the Communists' fortunes.

If the Communists' promotion of a comprehensive standard necessarily entailed their own comprehensive organization and organizing, it also necessarily entailed the complete reorganization or disorganization of any and all political actors whom the Communists deemed to stand in their way. In his own way, Aidit himself stated that this would be a consequence of the unfolding New Culture Movement:

> The New Culture Movement is not an organisation with a membership; it is a movement which must be launched by the revolutionaries in the villages. These activities are not in the slightest degree reformist activities, they are revolutionary activities, an inseparable part of the struggle of the peasants to crush the anti-revolutionary village devils. Neither are these activities sectarian because the New Culture Movement must be carried out by all Manipolists, including the political parties, mass organisations and Government departments, the National Front and others. There is no reason whatsoever for any Manipolist to reject this movement.[133]

In avoiding the kind of rigidity implied by a settled membership, Aidit underscored that the New Culture Movement's impact was to be felt by way of shared experience, by way of organizing rather than organization. That way, the Party could still make advances against other political actors without necessarily having to destroy them: they would only need to be reorganized in the sense of being made to observe PKI standards, practices, or revolutionary norms. This appears to be what Aidit had in mind when he asserted with emphasis that "*we must launch this New Culture Movement in the spirit of fully developing the active role of the subjective consciousness of the Party members and the masses*." In the case of the other actors Aidit so carefully delineated, the Communists surely hoped that they would employ their own organizational structure to unwittingly instantiate the Communists' message of self-creation.

In this hope, the PKI was greatly encouraged. They were encouraged by their absolutely undeniable success in making and keeping the campaign against Malaysia the definitive issue of Indonesian foreign policy. Moreover, they were encouraged by their success in winning an acknowledgement from the "state" that legislated share-cropping arrangements had been ignored to an intolerable extent:

> on 2nd March 1964, Regulation no. 4 of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs was promulgated, laying down measures against landowners who did not follow up the stipulations of the bupati regarding sharecropping. Landowners could be denounced to the village land reform committee. To punish those found guilty of violating the legal arrangements for division of the proceeds (mostly on a 50:50 basis), the Regulation stipulated that 60 percent of the harvest would be for the tiller, 20 per cent for the landowner and 20 percent for the Ketjamatan Land Reform Committee. This was made retroactive to 1st January 1964.[134]

This measure, which helped to bring the letter of the legislation on share-cropping much closer to its Communist-inspired spirit, was won before the Communists themselves initiated the New Culture Movement or even before they formally endorsed the Unilateral Action Movement (*Gerakan Aksi Sepihak*) at the PKI National Conference on 5 July 1964.

Indonesianizing the "State"

Having committed themselves publicly, the Communists were probably surprised by the sudden and almost shameful extent to which their rural initiatives were accepted by the "state" as essentially legitimate expressions of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution." On August 17, in addition to reaffirming Indonesia's resolve to continue with its confrontation with Malaysia, President Sukarno signalled his endorsement of the unilateral action campaign. Although he took the opportunity to counsel moderation on the part of the participants in these actions, the effect of his support was to publicly encourage a distinction between protagonists and antagonists. In this, the President helped to undo or weaken his own Government's efforts to control a situation that had become both violent and chaotic. Like an exercise in self-flagellation, Sukarno's endorsement struck a blow at the integrity of two measures that had been taken only as recently as June and July, the latter by himself.

In response to "tough actions" undertaken by Communists and their followers, especially in Central Java, the Minister of Agriculture Sadjarwo banned the activities of peasants in that area on 13 June. Two days later, Acting President Leimena reiterated the censure. The condemnations were ineffectual and between July 11-12 Sukarno involved himself in the rural turmoil. It was a measure of his dissatisfaction, and more tellingly of the limits of his power, that he chose to target the national press, banning it from reporting on the events in the countryside.[135] Sukarno passed up the opportunity to censure the Communists, and in particular Lukman, who had remarked at the recently held PKI National Conference that "it was more important to support the peasants and maintain the alliance with them than at all costs to retain the united front" with its Nasakom partners.[136] Perhaps sensing the President's reluctance, the Communists continued their implacable advance; "tough actions" were extended to East Java and their fury intensified.

Confronted with the uncompromising actions of the Communists, and personally convinced that the land reform laws from which the unilateral actions acquired their legal thrust were "necessary in the nationalist and anti-imperialist struggle,"[137] Sukarno appeared to have acceded to the Communist-directed program of revolution and new state building in August 1964. The control that he could subsequently exercise over the "state" and Government would be essentially negative, in the sense that he could take away from but not add to the independence and integrity of their determinations. Events had already shown that neither of these attributes was an accurate reflection of Government or "state" writ. The source of policies and ideas now seemed limited to the Communist categories Sukarno embraced and whose consequences—their own greater self-definition and self-realization—his action of embracing reinforced. To the Communists, who had from the outset reserved for themselves the discretion to characterize the "pro-people" manifestations of "state power," Sukarno's subscription to their categories greatly reduced the possibility that he would declare (on purpose or inadvertently) some official action or pronouncement as being "pro-people" when the Communists had determined otherwise. Henceforth, like an ember caught in the updrafts of a fire, Sukarno would shine more brightly, especially on the world stage. Sukarno seemed content to be carried by the intensity of the combustion taking place below him to the very ether of his own worldview, where New Emerging Forces (Nefos) confronted Old Established Forces (Oldefos) in a titanic version of Indonesia's own confrontation with Malaysia. The aspect of danger in this, the year Sukarno called the "year of living dangerously," was that everything and everyone would be touched by the revolutionary flame, set burning with the spirit of the red *banteng*; the PKI would not have it any other way.

Raising a Cultural Standard-in-the-Making

The expression of the PKI's burning ambition, and its implication that no significant group and no significant organization would be exempt from the fires of revolution, was articulated in a remarkable fashion at the PKI's National Conference of Revolutionary Literature and Art (*Konfernas Sastra dan Seni Revolusioner*—KSSR). This Conference, which was held in grand fashion in Jakarta from August 27 to 2 September 1964, had been anticipated since the outset of the Party's Four-Year Plan, of which it was an integral part. While this aspect of the proceedings lent significance to the event, it was in large part Aidit's determination to explicitly identify the "soldiery" as among the revolutionary forces that gave the KSSR its significance.

Despite Foulcher's misleading allusion to Maoist terminology, his observation stands that the KSSR "was the first time, in any left wing political cultural statement, that the Maoist definition of the revolutionary classes as 'workers, peasants and soldiers' had appeared in Indonesia."[138] As such, Aidit's inclusion of the soldiery marked a significant change in Party terminology and it heralded a momentous and all-inclusive organizing endeavour:

> Previously, it had been common practice to replace "*Rakyat*" with "*Buruh dan Tani*" ("workers and peasants"), but never with the addition of "*Prajurit*" ("soldiers"). Political analysis had always identified all army ranks, under the control of the High Command, as the major domestic bastion of anti-*Rakjat* forces, and in LEKRA literature the heroes of the fighting for national freedom were always described as "*pejuang*" or "*gerilya*", never army soldiers as such. What Aidit was proposing, with the new formula, was the incorporation into cultural ideology of a changed political analysis, one which now identified ordinary soldiers as a target of political consciousness-raising. Through political and cultural activity, soldiers were to be brought to an awareness of their common interests with other exploited classes and social groups.[139]

The PKI's achievement registered at several levels. First, and most obviously, the PKI dared to extend its standard of "culture" to the armed services, and to the Army in particular. Secondly, the PKI and its ormas had delicately (but deliberately) made the point that the resource of arms was the possession of the whole people, of the "Revolution." Thirdly, through a conjunction of the two former factors, the Party positioned itself in such a way as to make its own acquisition of arms a virtually undeniable aspect of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution." Fourthly, and most radically, the extension of the standard of "culture" to the hard core of the Army's popular base entailed subsuming the organization through the saturation of its members with that standard.

In "Serving the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers with an Art and Literature of National Identity," Aidit took his Party down a familiar path of resource accumulation, but the nature of the resource in question—arms—necessarily made the Communists' quest one that challenged the very integrity of the armed services as organizations. Certainly, there was nothing unprecedented in Aidit's intimation that the Communists should bear arms; the call to bear arms had been heard since the 1950s. And the notion of "an art and literature of national unity" was not different in its proximate effect from that of the "seven village devils" construct or the theory of the "two aspects of the state"; all three conceptions promoted the PKI's intensified quest for political resources.

What was profoundly different about Aidit's latest notion was that its disguised quest for arms could only be realized by destroying the integrity of the TNI. It was not simply that the acquisition of arms that Aidit hinted at would allow the PKI to command the same range of political resources as the TNI, it was that the acquisition of any arms of quantitative significance would remove the TNI's claim to coercive competence. For the PKI, equality of standing in terms of political resources was logically excluded by the fact that the TNI's integrity as an organization obtained from its monopoly of arms; the PKI could only ever be inferior or superior to the TNI, but never equal. Given that, it is difficult to conclude which actor faced the more daunting challenge arising from the inclusion of the soldiery among the "revolutionary" forces. The PKI had little choice once its wishes were broached but to proceed with its plans; the TNI had little choice but to resist measures that would eliminate the very basis of its organizational uniqueness.

Given the seriousness of embarking on a course of action that was intended to give the PKI influence over the use of arms, it must have seemed strange that those attending the KSSR appeared to give their consent to the notion rather easily, but then quarrelled over the place of the Javanese shadow-puppet theatre (*wayang purwa*) in their cultural work. This latter debate was no trivial issue for those involved, which included members of the Politburo and senior ormas' leaders. Indeed, the debate that raged at the KSSR over the issue of the *wayang* occasioned "the only major inner-party controversy to be waged publicly during the first half of the 1960s, a time when the PKI otherwise sought to present a monolithic front."[140] Considering the fact that the PKI had not splintered either from the pressures of the Sino-Soviet schism or from its own status as the world's largest non-ruling Communist party, the fact that a debate on the *wayang* could not be contained points to the centrality of the issue in the life of the Party.

In a very real sense, what the PKI's quest for arms was to the TNI, the issue of the *wayang* was to the PKI. Both issues posed challenges to the very integrity of the two organizations. In both cases, the PKI was confronted by the choice of either being in an inferior or a superior position. In the case of the *wayang*, the inferior position was one that entailed the Party's subordination to norms or standards beyond its control. The superior position, like the superior position vis-à-vis the armed services, would deprive the *wayang* of its integrity. As with the issue of arms, some Communist leaders were unprepared to risk the integrity of their organization that was posed by leaving the *wayang* untouched by reform while trying to direct it for the Party's purposes. To their minds, the *wayang* was associated with, and preservative of, a by-gone era and a stultifying epistemological worldview. "Through the *wayang* plays," McVey has observed,

> ideas of royal power, hierarchy, and appropriate behavior have been transmitted from court to village, a process which has continued long after colonialism effectively destroyed their royal source. *Wayang* is par excellence the expression of Javanese "feudal" values, the chains of tradition and subservience which Indonesian Communism was dedicated to break.[141]

Moreover, since the *wayang* had proven resilient in the face of the many changes that had swept through Java over the centuries, some PKI leaders had good reason to believe that this unbending quality threatened the Party's own lively spirit and directing idea. Starkly stated, the vitality of the *wayang* held the potential to subvert as no other particularism could the Communists' separate collective self-consciousness and self-fulfilment. By embracing *wayang*, the fear was that the PKI would inadvertently become captured by it; the Party's creative and synthetic impulses could be slowed and drawn to a still altogether.

As against the foregoing scenario, many Communists valued a wholesale reform of the *wayang* so that it could be used in a directive fashion, to enliven and enrich the Party's own transcendant Indonesian standards. While this suggestion may have been easier for comrades from the Outer Islands (like Aidit) to make than those from Java (like Sudisman), Communists from both areas advocated such a change:

> They were a mere handful and they were far less well-placed in the party than *wayang*'s defenders. But they had one great advantage, which was what caused their opponents to make any concessions at all: they appeared to represent the future.[142]

In other words, the issue of the reform of the *wayang* compelled the Indonesian Communists to recognize, as perhaps no other development in Aidit's leadership did, that their fundamental objective was without prior standards and necessarily defied existing ones: they confronted "the problem of establishing a sense of cultural self that was something more than a hybrid of European and local traits. Hence the great concern—psychological as well as political—for establishing an Indonesian national identity, and the intense ambivalence towards things deemed 'Western' and 'foreign'."[143] In short, the *wayang* controversy reminded the Party and its ormas of their own integrity-in-the-making.

On this score, Aidit was extraordinarily blunt in stating matters in the wider perspective of the PKI's comprehensively creative and synthetic undertaking:

> There are still some of our comrades who pigheadedly reject reform, for example in the matter of *wayang*. They evidently sincerely love and cherish *wayang*. But in fact their old-fashioned [*kolot*] view will kill it off, because without renewal the present generation—not to speak of generations to come—will not be drawn to *wayang*; its audience will dwindle till only the old people are left. And when those oldsters have died, that will be the end of the *wayang* audience. The blind love of these *kolot* comrades must be fought, not by interfering with their pleasure but by adding new *lakon* [plays] to those existing and by attracting them, willy-

> nilly, to the new. Therefore, the new and revised *lakon* must be better, more beautiful, and of a higher artistic standard than the old.[144]

On the general point, Aidit was uncompromising: "*the question is not whether or not there can be reform, but how we will carry it out.* Once again I emphasize, *the reform of all popular folk arts cannot be ignored.*"[145] Aidit was so adamant that some of his comments from the KSSR were not published until February 1965, when the following philippic was at last publicized:

> Our nation consists of many ethnic groups (*suku bangsa*). Every Communist, especially ones elected as national leaders by a congress of the party or a revolutionary mass organization, must strive to appreciate the aesthetic products of all ethnicities. Ethnic culture is the property of the entire nation. Do not, therefore, be like the Javanese comrade who, when he sees comrades from a Sumatran ethnic group watching a *wayang orang* performance, is amused because he thinks it 'odd' for them to do this. Nor should any ethnic group view the culture of another as inferior.[146]

The bitterness of Aidit's remarks, which was rarely a feature of his typically hortatory pronouncements, evidenced the extreme seriousness with which he regarded the Party's new and essentially inseparable challenges. Clearly, the *wayang* controversy had the potential to affect the effort to win over the soldiery.

Ingeniously, Aidit found a way by which he could preserve and enhance the integrity of the PKI as a truly creative actor, while still breaching the organizational integrity of the armed service. True to form, Aidit's was an "in-house" solution. He appealed directly to cultural workers to begin the "integration" of the revolutionary forces and social conditions in which they lived. According to Foulcher, this theme of integration served as the

> framework for the elaboration of the characteristic emphasis of this time on the *Turun ke Bawah* principle. Art forms most closely integrated with community life, such as the various forms of regional drama, [were] singled out for special attention. The 'low cultural level' of the masses, despite their high revolutionary spirit and political awareness [was] seen to demand art works which [were] 'popular, simple and easily understood', a demand which [was] most readily fulfilled by popular drama. Writers [were] urged to adopt the *Turun ke Bawah* principle, to learn to feel with the masses and to study the conditions of their lives with the "tools" of Marxism-Leninism.[147]

Aidit was directing the literary equivalent of the research that he himself conducted among the peasants and fishermen earlier in the year. And like the reports that were generated during the course of that research, the literary and dramatic works he called for were to serve as durable fragments of an increasingly clearer Indonesian reality. They were to be instances of sense having been made of circumstances confronted;

they were also to serve as examples to be emulated of the Communists' ability to make sense of circumstances.

By emphasizing integration as a general practice now, Aidit aimed quite simply to generalize the sense of mastery that cadres had previously exercised on an individual basis when they acted as the arbiters of "success or failure in literary expression." Directing the cadres to pronounce on work that had succeeded in "coming alive" (*berbunyi*), and that which had not (*tidak berbunyi*), was tantamount to making them collectively responsible for the categorization of explicit and replicable standards of Indonesian culture. Effectively, they were given the task of being a collective authority, the magnitude of which would almost certainly keep their energies focused on both clarifying and advancing those standards. In this connection, the activity of studying soldiers would not have made the challenge to the integrity of the armed services seem like anything more than an innocent outgrowth of the "on-going Indonesian Revolution." It was through activity itself that Aidit had found a way to enhance the Communists' organizational self-integrity while attacking that of the armed services, and chiefly of the TNI. It was probably for this reason that Aidit would later deem the KSSR to have been one of the two most important developments for the PKI in 1964; the other one was the research the Party carried out in Java.

If the KSSR was important to the PKI for one set of reasons, it was equally important to the TNI for another, but quite opposite, set of reasons. Whereas Aidit and the rest of the Communist leadership could now look forward to the challenge of crafting a greater sense of revolutionary inclusiveness, the Army was confronted with a chilling and profound sense of isolation. For the PKI, the KSSR was somewhat of a moment of culmination; Aidit acknowledged it as such. For the TNI, the main decision reached at the KSSR to ensure that "art and literature must be integrated with concrete political tasks" threatened its very existence[148]; this was something that the Army could not acknowledge. To a significant extent, the actors' varied perceptions of the KSSR and its probable repercussions were as much a reflection of the pattern of preceding events as they were of this one event.

The PKI's Other Fronts: "Nasakomization", "Retooling", and Incendiary Polemics

In the time since the PKI had first made the issues of Malaysia and land reform definitive Indonesian causes, the Party had made concrete political progress along a variety of fronts, and it was largely this success that gave Indonesian Communists their great expectations vis-à-vis the KSSR. Through "nasakomization," for instance, the Party had tried, with some success, to fashion a place for itself and (for the time being) its nationalist and religious partners. As early as January 1963, both the PNI and its radical offshoot Partindo had voiced their support for PKI representation at the Cabinet level, the latter even expressed it hopes for a "*gotong royong* cabinet with NASAKOM as its core."[149] Later, in September 1963,

> all [ten] parties gave public endorsement through the Front Nasional to a set of proposals including a call for a team of assistants to the President 'with a Nasakom pattern', the 'nasakomization' of regional executive and legislative bodies, the withdrawal of the ban on party membership for high civil servants and reversal of the 1959 anti-party measure on regional heads.[150]

Finally, the Communists had little difficulty in attracting the unconditional support of the other parties in the *konfrontasi* with Malaysia and they even showed themselves capable of attracting real support in the *gerakan aksi sepihak*. It may not have been surprising that the Communists were joined in the cause of the poor peasants by members of the PNI and its peasants' ormas Petani, but it must surely have surprised conservative PNI leaders when Petani members, frustrated by their fellow landowning members, simply left their organization and joined the BTI.[151]

Alongside "nasakomization," the Communists had successfully engaged in "retooling." Unlike "nasakomization," which could be considered a creative practice that aimed to widen the political space and opportunities for the Communists and (for the time being) their nationalist and religious partners, "retooling" was an inherently destructive practice and the success that it yielded was of a grim quality. In the hands of the Communists, "retooling" occurred at two levels. At the individual level, it meant "the removal of 'reactionary' elements from their positions"; at the organizational level, it meant the wholesale purge of cohorts of individuals, and sometimes the complete transformation of the organization, including its dissolution.[152] The Communists used "retooling" widely to attack those it deemed to be its enemies, especially in the fields of education,[153] journalism, Government, and bureaucracy.[154] A compelling aspect of these campaigns was that the Communists showed little hesitation in selecting their targets, which ranged from seniormost individuals, like State Ministers and provincial Governors, to lowly authority figures, like village heads or members of land reform committees. The extraordinary extent to which "retooling" could be carried was shown in May 1964, when the Committee for the Retooling of the State Apparatus (*Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara*—Paran), which Nasution headed, was itself "retooled" to the point of abolishment. Appropriately, the Paran was replaced by the Supreme Operation Command for the Retooling of the Apparatus of the Revolution (*Komando Operasi Tertinggi Retooling Aparatur Revolusi*—Kotrar), which was headed by Sukarno.[155]

While the dual pursuit of "nasakomization" and "retooling" energized and inflated the Communists' sense of daring, in a very short space of time their unchallenged ability to target victims for "retooling" and organizations that needed to be "nasakomized" fostered the growth of the sense that they could pronounce themselves with impunity. With a spirit of steadfastness and confrontation, the Party and its leading figures indulged in a series of outlandish and provocative statements throughout the period from late 1963 right up to the KSSR, which may be perceived as another instance in that series of statements. In December 1963, for instance, Aidit felt at liberty to denounce in an extremely harsh way the advocates of the "May 26 Regulations":

> the conceptors and ministers responsible for the '26th May, 1963' deviation should feel very lucky if they are not hanged, if they are only inflicted bodily punishment and if they are only dismissed from their positions as senior officials or ministers for their unforgivable sin.[156]

Further, on May 23, Aidit was moved to warn the Party's enemies to

> "calm down and think twice," pointing out that if they were unable to smash the Party in 1948 when it had no more than 10,000 members, they would be even less successful now that "the Indonesian Communist Party has a lot of experience, has a total membership of more than 2.5 million, and its cadres have been trained in the theory and practice of the revolutionary struggle."[157]

Lukman, while endorsing the *gerakan aksi sepihak* at the PKI National Conference in July, asserted in the full knowledge of rural conflict that "whatever the reaction, and however great the violence attending the work of the party among the peasants, we cannot be in the least vacillating in our vanguard role of protecting and leading the peasants."[158] Collectively, beginning in early 1964, the Party began to call unabashedly for the dissolution of so formidable an opponent as SOKSI.

These incendiary remarks, which fuelled and were refuelled by instances of "retooling," which kindled and were rekindled by continuous appeals for "nasakomization," created a revolutionary blaze whose heat and light could be sensed across the entire Indonesian landscape. While the Communists' opponents felt (or were made to feel) the heat, it was not lost on the Communists' that the activities of "retooling" and "nasakomization" had positive qualities, the qualities of revolutionary illuminism. In conflict there was rectification; in heat there was passion and ardour; in implacability there was invincibility; in indignation there was justice; and in fearlessness there was victory. These were the positive qualities that the Communists sought to attach to their efforts and, as Sukarno's speech of 17 August 1964 seemed to reveal, these were the qualities—the very traits of "living dangerously"—that the President himself favoured in the Indonesian Revolution. As compelling and as commendable as these qualities were, the light and the promise they threw off, like sparks from a fire, were inseparable manifestations of the friction of the PKI's new state building. Sukarno may have known this and never admitted it, but his behaviour both before and after taking up the Communists' incendiary idiom and causes suggested that he was prepared to play with fire in the course of the "on-going Revolution" and even stoke it uncontrollably.

The first and modest example of this behaviour since the Communists had made Malaysia and land reform burning national issues occurred on 13 November 1963, when Sukarno reshuffled the Cabinet. As if overtaken by vindictiveness, Sukarno took the opportunity to not only weaken Nasution's power by excluding him from the new Cabinet presidium, he detached the Department of the Attorney-General and the Ministry of Veterans' Affairs from Nasution's own Department of Defence and Security.[159] Later, when Sukarno disbanded Paran and cost Nasution his standing entirely, the fire with which he played was not, unlike the Cabinet reshuffle, of his own making. Indeed, as 1963 wore on and passed into 1964, Sukarno had to respond to what Reeve has called "polemics," that is, a series of episodes that had become intolerably heated. The resolution of two such episodes in particular deeply affected all those involved, because Sukarno either formally or effectively acquiesced in the PKI's interpretation of the issue as against that of its opponents, including the TNI, which involved itself to varying extents in both episodes.

The first episode related to the proclamation of a Cultural Manifesto (*Manifes Kebudayaan*—Manikebu) by non- and anti-Communist intellectuals and artists in late 1963. Notwithstanding the aesthetic values and debates that informed the Manifesto,[160] it was essentially a political document. As evidenced by the association between the Manifesto's main "conceptor" and the Army secret service,[161] a key purpose of the document was to reciprocate and oppose the Communists' initiatives in the "cultural" sphere. The Communists sensed the threat and referred to the document pejoratively as the Manikebu, thereby raising the ire of the President who did not fail to see the veiled threat that this new Manifesto posed to his own *Manifesto Politik* (Manipol). The Communists also raised disdain for their cultural opponents by pointing out their hypocrisy. While the adherents of the Cultural Manifesto proclaimed themselves in favour both of individual artistic responsibility and "art for art's sake," and against Lekra's preference for organized art and politically inspired "art for the people," these "proponents of freedom from political considerations" sought the Army's protection.[162] Lekra set the tone for subsequent exchanges when it declared in early November 1963:

> With the aesthetics of the "universal humanism" group, who deny the dividing lines between friend and foe of the revolution, we have no similarity or contact: they are our enemies, whom we will resolutely crush, because they serve the enemies of the revolution . . .[163]

More clearly than ever, the Communists showed they knew what the stakes of this conflict were about, and they exulted in the event of the banning of the Manikebu by Sukarno on 8 May 1964.[164] The President's action burned many individuals and organizations immediately, but it also set off a whole series of subsequent fires in the form of merciless instances of "retooling" which swept through the Indonesian Journalists' Association (*Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia*—PWI), the Islamic University Students' Association (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*—HMI), the *Front Nasional*, and sundry educational and cultural organizations.

The second episode was a direct result of the strife that followed from the first polemic, but, unlike the fires of "retooling" it caused, the issue of American films in Indonesia had the potential to damage the Army proper. Treating American films as subversive of "Indonesian culture" and the "Indonesian national identity," and emboldened by the banning of the Manikebu, the PKI and Lekra especially mounted a fierce campaign to push the Government further than its Trade Minister indicated it would go. Trade Minister Adam Malik initially resisted the twin demands of the Command for the Boycott of American Imperialist Films (*Komando Pemboikotan Film Imperialis Amerika Serikat*) to disband the American Motion Picture Association of

Indonesia (AMPAI) and to cease importing US films altogether. In the face of well-organized and unceasing opposition, the Minister was made to reverse himself and in August 1964 he discontinued AMPAI's operations. Matters may well have ended there, had the Minister not hinted darkly that the Command had undisclosed foreign connections, was potentially "anarchist,"[165] and should, now that AMPAI had ceased its operations, discontinue its activities too.

The Indonesian Communists had won their victory, but now, incensed by Malik's remarks, they pressed their advantage with a new organizational expression of their determination—the Action Committee for the Boycott of American Imperialist Films (*Panitia Aksi Pemboikotan Film Imperialis Amerika Serikat*—Papfias). The Communists seemed to seize on Malik's point about unwanted foreign influence (by which he presumably meant the Communist Chinese) and turned it to the Army's disadvantage by systematically destroying any links Indonesia had with the United States. Accordingly, the library of the United States Information Service (USIS) in Jogjakarta was attacked on August 15; training visits by Indonesian officials, students, scholars, and members of the armed services to the United States were discontinued in September. The latter measure hurt the TNI quite significantly since the United States was by far its favourite destination for training officers.

The latter measure, which was far in excess of the original complaint about the import of US films, suggested that the political fire play Sukarno would indulge, or even participate in, was becoming uncontrollable. This impression was certainly borne out by a series of spectacular measures between August and October 1964 that Sukarno either took personally or oversaw in his capacity as the President. The first of these notable measures was taken on August 17, the day Sukarno endorsed the Communists' initiatives vis-à-vis Malaysia and land reform. On that day, and again on September 2, Sukarno ordered Indonesian troops for the first time to attack peninsular Malaysia. The President's decision to proceed with these two raids "greatly disturbed the army leaders."[166] Later in September, Sukarno took no action after the Justice Coordinating Minister made the spectacular claim that "there were laws that not only could be, but must be, broken in the service of the Revolution."[167]

Adding to the incredible sense of disquiet that such measures and pronouncements aroused, Sukarno then permitted the implementation of additional measures that put into question the existence of golkar and *karyawan* entities in organized political life. Considering the President's central role in advancing both the *golongan fungsionil* and *golongan karya* concepts and consenting to their organizational expression in the structures of Guided Democracy, this was an extraordinary historical reversal. Yet, it was carried out in a very brief period of time, between September and October 1964. The whole episode seemed to have been carried out with deliberate vindictiveness. This was especially apparent in the behaviour of the newly appointed Labour Minister, Sutomo Martoprado (of the Partindo), who realized that the reform and amalgamation of state trading corporations that had been initiated by another minister compelled SOKSI to adjust likewise. Rather than allowing SOKSI to adjust to changing circumstances, Martoprado, who was on record for denouncing "workers organizations that were 'pretence socialists' and influenced by 'bureaucratic-capitalists',"[168] vigorously applied and harshly interpreted Presidential Instruction No. 002/1964. This Instruction forbade "the creation of new labour organizations after 8 September 1964, except those formed by merger of existing ones,"[169] and was used to limit SOKSI's activities in sites which it had counted among its strongholds.

Sensing SOKSI's sudden weakness, the same opponents who had called for its dissolution earlier in the year now directed their energies to ousting SOKSI affiliates from the *Front Nasional*. The argument increasingly heard during the year was that "affiliation to one of the ten 'Nasakom' parties was . . . the only legitimate basis for existence."[170] Since SOKSI was neither in the FN nor a political party, the many golkar and *karyawan* entities already in the Front were in jeopardy. What made matters truly problematic for the representatives and backers of the golkar-*karyawan* entities, however, was the interpretation that was offered of Presidential Decree No. 193/1964, which was promulgated on August 5. The terms of this Decree, which governed the ratification of membership of constituent bodies in the FN, were used as fuel for the argument that "only the party-affiliated ormas had the right to be members"[171] of the Front. Thrust by these extraordinary measures into "mental terror,"[172] SOKSI and its affiliates in the FN, along with the FN central executive, resolved on October 20 to form a Joint Secretariat of Member Golkar Organizations in the National Front (*Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi-organisasi Golongan Karya Anggota Front Nasional*—Sekber Golkar). Pushed into this defensive step, the hard core of opposition to the Communists and their allies now surfaced and manifested itself in the leadership of the new Secretariat. Not surprisingly, the Secretariat was populated by senior Army figures and civilians long and closely associated with the Army's ideological and organizational undertakings of the past years.[173]

Behind the firewall of the Sekber Golkar, the Army's civilian allies huddled against the revolutionary inferno that roared not only through the *Front Nasional* but, as one final development in October 1964 revealed, through the entire "state." On October 31, Law No. 19 of 1964 was promulgated; it dealt with "The Principle Regulations of Judicial Power." Perhaps the most telling feature of the Law, and of the wider environment in which it was conceived and publicized, was its 19th Article. Short, like a fuse, Article 19 lit the entire "state" afire: "For the sake of the Revolution, the reputation of the people and the nation, or an emergency need of the community, the President can involve himself in judicial matters."[174] This Article proclaimed two of the President's apparent beliefs, first, that no revolutionary blaze was too big and, second, that no revolutionary blaze was too big for him to control. The problem with this Article, however, was that the revolutionary fire really was beyond his ability to control. The total identification of the "state," through the President, with the "Revolution" neither enhanced nor preserved its integrity. The effect of the Article was to gut the state, to torch its integrity, and to replace it with the integrity of the revolutionary situation that was now thoroughly directed by the Communists and their allies. Only under such winning circumstances as these could Aidit assert, with sly honesty, that the

> main issue in Indonesia now is *not* to overthrow state power, like in many other countries, but to continue strengthening and consolidating the pro-People segment in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia and continue removing the anti-People segment that is still residing in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia.[175]

Indeed, only under circumstances such as these, where the "state" and the official "Revolution" were now totally, formally, and disarmingly swept up in the real revolutionary fervour, did the Communists dare to take the next step that the KSSR and all the other events not only made possible, but probable.

Arms and Actor Integrity

The next step in the revolutionary march was to publicly demand arms and it was the one step that the Army dreaded most, but probably expected most, from the PKI in the wake of the KSSR. From the Army's perspective, the call by the BTI leader, Asmu, in October to arm the 8.5 million peasant members of his organization to expedite the *konfrontasi* sounded to it more like an appeal for its own destruction than Malaysia's.[176] Considering all the other developments associated with "nasakomization," "retooling," and Sukarno's political fireplay, the PKI knew that it was leaving the Army leadership with no choice but to draw this conclusion, and only this conclusion. To the Communists, the more important aspect of their demand was that they could make it freely, and they could even spare making its details outlandish, in the full knowledge that they could confront the Army without it having recourse to the "state" or to any group of civilian supporters who had yet successfully resisted the tactics of "nasakomization" or "retooling." The Army's political insulation, as it were, had either been burned off, torn away, or badly singed over the previous year. Now, like metal against metal, the Communists brushed against the Army; their friction affected each other's organizational integrity in a completely unmeditated and total way and, as such, was bound to produce the heat uniquely vented in a moment of exception.

While the TNI leadership could not escape the irony of the situation in which the Communists' demand for arms placed it, its own appreciation of that irony strengthened its resolve and led to the reaffirmation of the Army's own directing idea of Indonesia. The ironic aspect of Asmu's demand was that it made full use of the Army's longstanding tradition of erasing distinctions between the military and non-military aspects of collective existence. Conceptually, doctrinally, and more recently, practically (in the form of the *baladhika-karya*), the Army under Nasution aimed to make the TNI inseparable from Indonesia and the directing idea of Indonesia. That it was now the PKI's prerogative to foster the same connection, but in reverse—by enveloping the Army and the other armed services in the flames of a cultural offensive—must have struck the Army leadership as cruelly ironic. The Army was confronted as never before with the inescapable and harrowing conclusion that in the context of novelty the basis for legitimate action against the Communists did not exist, not even on this most vital or fatal of issues.

Now, ironically for the Communists, in being forced to view its predicament clearly, the Army came back to the realization that without sovereignty the success that any one actor may enjoy in the context of novelty can be undone or superseded by the organizational and organizing abilities of other actors bent of acquiring more and more varied political resources. Indeed, the present difficult circumstances obtained precisely because the Communists had managed to organize the accumulation of more and more varied resources while disorganizing other actors, something they now threatened to do to the Army in acquiring its arms. As surely as the Communists' organizing and organization promoted success, the Army undertook to emulate the PKI, to turn irony against irony.

Not surprisingly, the TNI showed its vigorous new regard for the integrity of organization and organizing on the one issue of greatest sensitivity to itself: the use of its weapons, especially in connection with *konfrontasi*. Here, it was self-assurance and the imperative of preserving organizational integrity, as much as it was defiance of the President and the Communists, that informed the Army's scheme to assert control over the conduct of *konfrontasi*. According to Crouch, this scheme was launched directly after Sukarno authorized the bold attacks against peninsular Malaysia in August and September, when Army leaders

> immediately began to consider ways of preventing further provocative attacks in the future. Moves were quickly made to win Sukarno's approval for a reorganization of the Koga that would enable the army to exercise a controlling influence over its operations. The army leaders had to disguise their real intentions by putting their proposals in the form of recommendations designed to improve the efficiency of the command.[177]

The outcome of the Army's efforts was the *Mandala* Alert Command (*Komando Mandala Siaga*—Kolaga), which, although not formally instituted until March 1965, became an operational reality in October 1964. Compared to Koga, Kolaga offered the Army leadership greater control over the use of armed force. This attractive feature was readily apparent in the non-obtrusive but far-reaching organizational implication of the *mandala* concept. While the *mandala* concept implied a geographically limited authority (Kolaga was limited to Sumatra and Kalimantan), it also implied a unified command over troops from all four services. On both counts, this arrangement suited the Army by excluding Java (which obviously had the bulk of troops, including battle-ready troops) and by conferring a higher profile on the TNI vis-à-vis the other services (whose combined contributions of personnel did not match the Army's).

While it may not have been as impressive as the initiative to create the Kolaga, the Army's concurrent efforts to record its own and the other armed services' historical achievements was at least as significant. For in undertaking in a disciplined and structured manner to record these activities, the TNI and, to a lesser extent, the other services were showing their own self-awareness. That was the remarkable quality of the lengthy volume published by the Armed Forces Staff in October 1964 which bore the suggestive title *Concise History of the Armed Struggle of the Indonesian Nation* (*Sedjarah Singkat Perdjuangan Bersendjata Bangsa Indonesia*).[178] To mark the occasion of the publicity of this first ever comprehensive survey of the armed forces' role in the Indonesian context, Nasution created the first Armed Forces History Centre and Special History Bureau within the Armed Forces Staff on October 5.[179] Thereafter, a systematic publication drive was launched by military historians to compile case histories of the most outstanding military operations and biographies of the most notable personalities.[180]

The final initiative in 1964 in which the Army showed its renewed zeal for organization and organizing was as acrimonious as it was disillusioning. Ostensibly, the initiative related to the promotion of "Sukarnoism," that is, to the President's political thinking over the years. In reality, the promotion of "Sukarnoism" was the promotion of a very specific strand of Sukarno's thoughts, namely those that directly or indirectly pertained to the golkar-*karyawan* set of concepts and ideas. Initially, the campaign to disseminate this line of the President's thinking was limited to newspapers, but as the effects of the polemics around the Manikebu and the AMPAI registered, greater and greater interest and significance attached to the cause of "Sukarnoism." Part of the energy for this somewhat toady cause was therefore negative, a response by those individuals and political leaders with golkar-*karyawan* beliefs or affiliations against the advances of "nasakomization" and "retooling." But where there was a gathering of those who carried with them the anxieties of past reversals, there was also a gathering of those who carried with them the self-righteousness of past advances. The promotion of Sukarnoism invited its own opposition as surely as it omitted favourable reference's in Sukarno's thinking to Marxist concepts or the Nasakom idea. Thus, in a very short space of time, the Sukarnoism phenomenon magnified and amplified the political polarization heretofore associated with past polemics, drawing in more and more political forces and actors.

As with its other initiatives, the Army and its civilian allies took action in October. At the end of that month, SOKSI expressed its determination to "press the MPRS to ratify Sukarnoism as the 'Doctrine of the *Pancasila* Revolution' and to provide for it to be taught in all the schools."[181] Sekber Golkar gave its backing to this scheme early in November. With this, the possibility of giving an organizational expression to the movement became a probability. By entertaining the notion of giving an organizational expression to Sukarnoism, its advocates seemed to imply that there was a limit to the extent to which "nasakomization" and "retooling" would be tolerated. An organizational dimension to Sukarnoism, moreover, would give their ideological arguments some staying power, that is, some hint of what the PKI expressed in defence of Nasakom—steadfastness and confrontation. SOKSI officials apparently believed that there was no better place to make such a determination, to take such a stance, than in the highest formal institution of the "state." To that end, the Body for the Support/Spreading of Sukarnoism (*Badan Pendukung/Penyebar Sukarnoisme*—BPS) was created of 9 November 1964. The creation of the BPS almost instantly sharpened the antagonisms between its supporters and opponents.

While this was an unsurprising development, considering the Body was the first permanent and offensive organizational response taken in 1964 by the golkar-*karyawan* bloc, the breadth and depth of support each side won and the acrimony in which they indulged were unprecedented. In the space of a month, the BPS was supported by (or could claim as its associates) senior Army and Police officers, a handful of state ministers, FN executive members, SOKSI, Sekber Golkar, and party and ormas leaders from the NU, PSII, the Catholic Party, IPKI, and Murba.[182] Arrayed against the BPS were the party and ormas leaders from the PKI, Partindo and, eventually, the PNI. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the BPS was the encouragement that its formation gave to both sides to call for the other's destruction. For example, early in the life of the BPS, the SOKSI newspaper *Karyawan* asked about the PKI in its headline of November 12 "Does it still have the right to live?"[183] Early in December, late in the life of the BPS, the PNI central executive called for the Body's dissolution and Aidit ordered his Party to "crush" Sukarnoism.[184] Before the PKI could try to do that, Sukarno heeded the PNI's call and unexpectedly dissolved the BPS on December 17. When BPS activities continued in disregard of the President's decree and other Governmental orders, Nasakom supporters began to take the initiative to enforce them.[185] Sukarno, however, unexpectedly revisited the issue on 6 January 1965 by announcing the complete suspension of activities by Murba, including its members, institutions, and ormas.[186]

From the shared perspective of the members of the BPS alliance, Sukarno's measures were profoundly disillusioning. The Army especially was shaken out of the illusion that it could depend on appeals to ideology or ideological meaning in the Indonesian context. For Sukarno's actions did not show the triumph of Nasakom over golkar, as Reeve has asserted, they showed instead the superiority of the organization and organizing of the Nasakom forces over those who ultimately came together as the BPS alliance. The Army's, or rather more accurately SOKSI's and Sekber Golkar's, mistake was to believe that with a bare minimum of organization ideological appeals to the formally empowered (the President and the MPRS) was all that was required to prevent the continual political advances of the PKI. To suggest this is not to claim that the military and its besieged allies in SOKSI and Sekber Golkar were wrong to organize the BPS, it is simply to point out that there was too little organizational development and too little organizing to support the sweeping ideological claims before matters culminated on December 17 and January 5.

It was precisely because there were the beginnings of both of these vital and vitalizing phenomena that the Nasakom forces attacked the BPS as vigorously as they did. Thus, the demise of the BPS showed decisively that political survival was a matter of organization and organizational integrity, not ideological persuasiveness or verity. Sukarno was really only directing fire from behind Nasakom lines when he dissolved the BPS and immobilized the Murba party. With each successive hit, these lines were extended further outward, pressing that much more firmly against the very organizational—rather than ideological—integrity of the TNI.

Following their collision over the BPS, the TNI and the PKI were paradoxically drawn closer together and forced farther apart. The two actors were drawn together by, and in, the knowledge that the BPS' dissolution reflected the incompatible tightness and contiguity of their separate organizational and organizing endeavours. The two actors were forced apart by, and in, the knowledge that each other's organizational growth threatened the other's survival. Now, more than ever, it was necessary for each actor to enhance its own organizational integrity and organizing, that is, its own control and accumulation of resources. These self-prescriptions, however, inherently drew the two actors back into conflict because of the unique nature of arms identified above. The exclusive nature of each actor's increasingly all-inclusive claims to people and territory could only be enforced by the inclusion of weapons in those claims. And when the claims became totally inclusive with the addition of the demand for arms, such as Asmu's demand in October, and Aidit's demand on 14 January 1965, they also became totally exclusive. Thus, the rising crescendo of destruction (in late 1964 and early 1965) in the larger symphony of construction and destruction momentarily gave way during most of 1965 to a double movement of creation, whose players then discordantly clashed together in an unprecedented movement of destruction in September and October.

The Year of Conflictive Creation

While the TNI was still feeling the effects of the dissolution of the BPS, but even before the Murba party was "frozen" by Presidential decision on 6 January 1965, its leadership renewed its efforts to enhance the Army's organizational integrity. The immediate purpose of all four of the Army's initiatives in 1965 was to better control the resource of weapons while resisting the Communists' efforts to acquire weapons of their own. The first initiative related to the *konfrontasi*; the second to the Army's contacts with the United States; the third to the development of new channels of political communication and extensions in the Army's control of popular resources; and the fourth to opposing the notion of a "Fifth Force" consisting of armed peasants and workers. Each initiative will be briefly examined in turn.

The first Army initiative of 1965 unfolded in the Kolaga. There, in the person of its newly appointed Deputy First Commander, Major-General Suharto, the Army's thinking on preventing the use (or misuse) of arms was taken to its logical conclusion: *konfrontasi* (in actuality) was to be turned into "konfrontasi" (in name). As the Commander of the erstwhile *Komando Mandala Pembebasan Irian Barat*, and thus the individual with the greatest practical familiarity with the *mandala* concept, Suharto was pre-eminently qualified to use the Kolaga as the tool to frustrate, stall, and even obstruct the campaign at its most critical military junctures. To these ends, Suharto and his fellow officers contrived a myriad of ways within and without Kolaga to ensure that the use of arms and battle-ready troops was minimized.

To chronicle the military failures and shortcomings of the Kolaga would be the same as to chronicle the political successes of the TNI in controlling the resource of arms right through September 1965. More than that, evidence suggests that a tiny group of senior Army officers, including Yani and Suharto, was involved in a top-secret effort to reassure the Malaysian side that the TNI was reluctant "to give full support to Sukarno's campaign in the hope of avoiding misunderstandings that could have led to wider warfare."[187] These reassurances allegedly began in September 1964 and later took on a more permanent quality with the dispatch of a liaison group to Bangkok, Thailand in early 1965.[188] In normal circumstances, even with a healthy tolerance for the periodic incoherence of new and large organizations, virtually all of the activities of the Army leadership through or around Kolaga would be considered treasonous. The fact that these activities occurred was the very best confirmation of the indefinite, that is, undefined nature of the Indonesian context.

Similarly, the dealings the TNI had with the United States in 1965, some of which were beyond the knowledge of the "state" leadership, showed a fundamental questioning of, if not outright disregard for, the "state" leadership. In this most sensitive of dialogues, the Americans collaborated to an unprecedented extent by making its "funding of the Indonesian military (unlike aid to any other country). . . a covert matter."[189] Although the secret assistance the United States actually rendered was not quantitatively overwhelming (a secret contract was signed for delivery of 200 light aircraft), it transferred a resource to the TNI that no other actor possessed in the Indonesian context. At a stroke, it gave to the TNI its own modest air force, which was more than it could count on from the official Indonesian Air Force. However, neither the Americans nor the Army leaders confined themselves to a single secret transaction. In the public light, their relations intensified through 1965. As Hilsman has observed:

> While about 250 Indonesian officers had been trained in the United States by 1958, the figure rose in 1962 to 500 and by 1965 had soared to 4,000. This meant that at the time of the 1965 *coup* . . . one-third of the Indonesian general staff had some sort of training from America and almost half of the officer corps.[190]

Around this relationship, the United States provided the armed forces with such strategically useful equipment as a jamproof Tropospheric Scatter Fixed Communications System, which linked all the major military headquarters in the archipelago through radio communications.[191] Incredibly, considering the poor state of official relations between Jakarta and Washington at the time, the number of American military or military-affiliated personnel actually increased in the Military Assistance Program and the MILTAG in early 1965.[192]

On the civilian front, the Army began to develop and organize new channels of political communication, showing in the process its willingness to step in where the BPS had failed, and to fashion or renew extensions in its control of "state" and popular resources. In the field of communications, for instance, the Army reflected its determination to be heard and to be self-aware by beginning its own newspaper, *Berita Yudha*, in February, and its own theoretical journal at Seskoad, *Karya Wira Jati*, in July.[193] Not unimportantly, *Berita Yudha* took over from *Berita Indonesia* just prior to Sukarno's banning of the entire BPS press, of which the latter was a part. In September, the Army formally affiliated itself with the Islamic publication *Gema Islam* (*Islamic Echo*) and authorized the publication of a monthly magazine, entitled *Obedient* (*Patuh*), for all its members, but especially Catholics.[194] During a time when the conditions of economic decline and the official pursuit of "self-sufficiency" heralded very poor prospects for its strategy of "national development," the TNI nevertheless continued to foster close ties with those "state" entities that might, someday, be of real assistance to it. Thus, the TNI formally renewed its links with the Bappenas in April and with the Department of Light Industry in July.[195] Finally, as 1965 wore on, the Army realized a firmer grip on the regions and local populations by having more of its members successfully elected as *bupati*.[196] This endeavour may well have been premised on the hope of linking up at a lower level in rural settings with "traditional" individuals and organizations who, like the Army itself, had begun to respond in kind to the Communists' organizational growth and organizing zeal.[197]

Although the Army's initiative to oppose the notion of a "Fifth Force" consisting of armed peasants and workers may have seemed the most important of the four, drawing this conclusion would be misleading. Such a conclusion contains the faulty assumption that the TNI valued its possession of arms—which the Fifth Force threatened—to an extent far more decisive than any and all of its other resources, qualities, and attributes. The error in this is to believe that the TNI identified itself with its arms, that these were its essence. Clearly, that was not the case. The TNI's essence was its directing idea of Indonesia; its arms were simply in the service of advancing or preserving this directing idea. The integral nature of arms to the Army's very being was the same integrity that the PKI sought to impart to its directing idea via the Fifth Force. In neither actor's case was the possession of arms regarded as the most important objective. Rather, each actor assessed the possession of arms from the standpoint of their contribution to their respective directing ideas. In the Army's case, therefore, when it addressed itself indirectly and directly in 1965 to the proposal for a Fifth Force, it did far more than try to preserve its near monopoly of weapons.

Between April 3-9, at the First Army Seminar on doctrine,[198] the TNI took a stance of historical significance:

> The seminar formally adopted the concept of the dual role, affirming that the armed forces had a dual role [*dwifungsi*] both as a "military force" and as a "social-political force". As a social-political force, the army's activities covered "the ideological, political, social, economic, cultural and religious fields."[199]

In affirming itself as both a military and a social-political force, the TNI also committed itself to a distinctly *karya* sense of mission or style. This step was taken in spite of the fact that as recently as February, a bastion of the organizational expression of the *karya* notion—SOKSI—was barely spared from dissolution itself.[200] However, like the PKI, which had undertaken at the KSSR to rid itself of the potentially subversive high regard many of its members shared for *wayang*, the TNI was in no mood to tolerate abridgements to its creative impulses and thus struck out at the same particularism as the Communists. In an official formulation of the "function of the Armed Forces *golongan karya*" dating from mid-1965, it was declared with uncharacteristic concreteness that the central hierarchical principle of traditional Javanese social order—*kawulo-gusti* (servant-master)[201]—had nothing to do with "Guided Democracy."[202] Finally, the Army addressed head-on the Fifth Force proposal in late September 1965 and said no.[203] In doing so, the Army had made a categorical determination, showing that its own recent subscription to the "spirit of Nasakom" had now run out, and with it, its willingness to consent any longer in the saving pretension of an existing order.

Both the Communists and Sukarno made it easy for the Army to take the stance that it did in late September 1965. For singly and together, the PKI and Sukarno consistently defied reasonable expectations, even to the point (which was logically consistent with their underlying behaviour) of defying each other's reasonable expectations. In behaving this way though, each encouraged in the other greater daring and an ever increasing willingness to challenge circumstances, to set new and higher "revolutionary" standards in the Indonesian context. In what seemed a year of ethereal ideological statements,[204] however, the Communists in 1965 took care that the pursuit of higher "revolutionary" standards was accompanied by or backstopped with enhanced organization and organizing. With regard to Sukarno's behaviour, the Communists could take comfort that while he continued to direct fire against their foes, and even led the way on the most sensitive issue of arms, he neither had the resources nor the inclination to perform the hard work of organizing and building organization. Thus, when the PKI was not in the van of organizing, it was always in waiting, but never at rest.

To its credit as a creative actor, the PKI did not allow the knowledge that only its opponents had suffered damage in the collision over the BPS to interfere with its on-going organizing and organizational work. Moreover, in drawing so close to hurting the Army itself, the PKI did not become consumed by the narrow pursuit of arms. To do so would be to wrongly turn a means into an end. For the PKI in 1965, just like the TNI, the preservation of self-integrity and the advancement of one's own directing idea mattered most. For this reason, Aidit set an optimistically aggressive tone and a quick tempo for the Party's comprehensive work of creation at the very outset of 1965, in his new year's message. Therein, he chose to publicize the operative slogans for the year—"1965, A Year for More Intensive Struggle Against the 'Four Villains' and the Bureaucratic Capitalists" and "Be Progressive and Healthy Political and Cultured Human Beings"—which struck at the familiar targets (twice in the case of the "bureaucratic-capitalists"), while showing how serious cultural work had become.[205] Importantly, Aidit dwelled on the latter point. According to him

> A distinguishing feature of the new year's day celebration this year in comparison with previous years is that people's writers and artists are making a progress report of competitions now taking place among them. This is the beginning of a good tradition. Our writer and artist comrades are actively waging a struggle against liberalism within their ranks, they have voluntarily asked to be controlled by the masses as regards the work they are undertaking. I once again express the hope that comrades who are not writers and artists will stop identifying writers and artists with liberalism. No one should think in such a way any more.[206]

The construction of Aidit's thought is extremely revealing. On one hand, he offers heartfelt encouragement of work along the lines specified at the KSSR. On the other hand, he scolds some of his fellow comrades for their confused thoughts. In passing from encouragement to scolding, though, Aidit makes the stunning assertion that writers and artists have "voluntarily asked to be controlled by the masses." In declaring himself, Aidit actually committed a double dare. The first dare was to presume that the Party (or an important segment of its members) was now a servant of the "masses," and therefore in communion with their wishes and standards; the second dare was to suggest that the only people objecting to this achievement, or at least the presumption of this achievement, were other comrades. In other words, Aidit was suggesting that the real obstacles to the making of such claims—to the declaration of popular, Indonesian, standards—were internal to the Party, not external.

It followed from this analysis that the Party ought properly to concentrate on overcoming such "in-house" limitations to its own self-realization. On behalf of the writers and artists, Aidit therefore appealed for "love from all of us, from the workers, the peasants, the soldiers, the people and the Party, so that they get greater inspiration, more incentive, greater strength to create finer works. Let's give them our hearts, let's give everything we can to our people's artists and writers." Furthermore, Aidit pointed out the mechanism by which this objective could be achieved:

> In order to encourage all this, we are organising literary and art competitions not only at the national level but also at the provincial, district, sub-district and lower levels. Everywhere we are competing with each other; all comrades must take part in competitions. I too am taking part [in] a competition to improve the subsection and resort in the place where I live. The alternative to competition is bureaucracy. By competing with each other we make progress, we stamp [out] bureaucracy.[207]

And enhance organization and organizing! Indeed, to insist on locating both the source of its problems and their solution on its inside kept the PKI (and the TNI for that matter) organizing outward.

Accordingly, the Communists initiated new organizational efforts, intensified their on-going work, and revelled in the achievement of collective work now acquiring mammoth proportions. While all of this work was framed by the demands of the Four-Year Plan, the greater salience that the KSSR gave to cultural work was clearly manifest in the Party's determination to found or plan new organizations early in 1965. For instance, in January the East Java Lekra established its *Lembaga Dalang Karawitan* to advance the reform of the *wayang*,[208] and in February the decision was publicized to establish a Ketoprak Cadre School in Jogjakarta under the PKI's auspices.[209] Beginning in March, the Lekra secretary-general, Joebaar Ajoeb, published a set of six long articles in *Harian Rakjat* that dispensed advice of practical relevance to the KSSR's major resolution on wedding literature and art with concrete political tasks. Entitled "Why and How We Should Make Culture Serve the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers," these articles reflected the "directive and prescriptive character which Aidit's call [at the KSSR] for 'integration' had initiated."[210]

Presumably, this same interest in "integration" also informed the efforts of the Party ormas during 1965. The BTI, for instance, carried on with the ambitious scheme it began in 1964 to improve the literary and political knowledge of its cadres and to expand their operation of educational structures. In 1965, the BTI opened two new institutes that reflected the Communists' willingness and ability to make comprehensive sense of rural circumstances and offer solutions to its problems. The BTI's central cadre school, *Sekolah Tani Egom*, opened in April with Aidit's injunction that it "should raise not only the revolutionary spirit of the peasants but also agricultural production."[211] To that end, the BTI later opened its Jagus Scientific Institute for Agriculture and Seed Selection in the heart of the *gerakan aksi sepihak* in Klaten, Central Java.

For its part, SOBSI, with its modest Harjono Institute of Labour Education (*Institut Pendidikan Buruh "Harjono"*), which was founded in 1964, lagged behind in its efforts to create a nation-wide cadre system akin to that of the BTI.[212] The work of the HSI appeared to proceed more smoothly than that of SOBSI. Having already formed institutes dedicated to Economic Science, Political Science and Law, Pedagogical and Psychological Sciences, and Health and Mental Science by March 1965, the HSI planned the formation of yet more, including an institute of History, Language and Culture and an institute of Agriculture and Agrarian Science.[213] Finally, Gerwani "sponsored the Jajasan Pendidikan Taman Kanak2 [Foundation for Kindergarten Education] to develop preschool programs."[214]

The centrepiece of the Communists' organizational work during this time, of course, was the Unra school system. The Third Unra National Conference in April offered an opportunity for the Communists to show how far they had come with their plans and to reflect on what improvements could be made. The Plan had called for 6,809 primary schools, 1,263 middle schools, and 22 senior high schools by mid-1967; by April 1964, just shy of the half-way mark, there were 1,531 primary schools (22.5 per cent), 463 middle schools (36.7 per cent), and 88 senior high schools (400 percent) in existence.[215] Clearly, the Communists were overachieving in some areas, namely in larger urban centres where the senior high schools were generally located, and underachieving in other areas, specifically in the outlying rural areas. These results were not completely satisfactory, and in some respects they were completely unsatisfactory, revealing as they did unbalanced performance or unreasonable targets, or perhaps both. In all cases, the Conference made it clear that the execution of this most central of the Party's tasks had to be improved. Accordingly, self-criticism was encouraged as a supplement to socialist competition. Thus, Aidit counselled his fellow comrades not to "fall victim to perfectionism," pointing out with a sense of realistic hopefulness that "if no school building could be had use an ordinary house, and if there was no shelter at all teach under a tree."[216]

Taking the criticism to heart, the Unra Central Leadership immediately set about fulfilling their Plan targets by convening an "Action Seminar Advancing Freedom from Illiteracy"[217] in late April. On April 30 it was revealed that Unra Foundations (*Jajasan Unra*), which were the administrative units responsible for funding new schools, now existed in 21 of the country's 27 provinces and that preparations had already been made for the other six provinces.[218] Aidit was able to report on another aspect of the Unra's intensified efforts less than two weeks after the Seminar ended. On May 11, he reported to the PKI Central Committee that there were now more than 2,000 primary schools in existence and that by that measure they represented the largest school system of their type in the entire country.[219] Given that the PKI was to celebrate its 45th birthday in May 1965, it may be supposed that this achievement was literally a gift from the Party to the Party.

It was a real reflection of the Party's desire to become both bigger and better, and not simply older, that Aidit used the grand occasion of the PKI's 45th birthday to call for a "revolutionary offensive in all fields." Aidit's comprehensive and penetrating review of recent events was designed by its very comprehensiveness and its specificity to foster a high sense of self-confidence among Communists that it was within their ability to order the Indonesian context, to master the circumstances they confronted. It was for this overriding reason that Aidit disclosed, for example, that there were 5,000 instances of unilateral action occurring daily in the Javanese countryside.[220] Or that such actions were being taken in a wide band of territory—across Java, Bali, Timor, Lampung, West Sumatra, and North Sumatra.[221]

Such revelations, coupled with a thorough recounting of the national developments already discussed above, allowed Aidit to set new organizational and organizing objectives, the very specification of which took the partial results of previous and on-going work and aimed to turn them into wider, discrete, and probable realities. For instance, Aidit's call for the wider application of the Model Village (*Desa Teladan*) concept turned the singularity of the Party's experiences and research in Central Java into a general and realizable form.[222] Likewise, in his advocacy of such concepts as the "new type woman"[223] and the "revolutionary family,"[224] Aidit pushed the incidental nature of its achievements among women and families into essential attributes of its work. In setting the organization of such villages, women, and families as its objectives, the Communists were really and deliberately setting the organization of Indonesian society as their overarching objective. Aidit's call for a "revolutionary offensive in all fields" was thus a call to define the Indonesian reality as such.

Like a runner taking a slight step backwards before throwing himself into the race, the PKI took steps it deemed necessary to control the "motors" of competition and self-criticism before throwing itself into its all-encompassing "red drive."[225] First, the top leadership echelons were expanded in May in anticipation of greater work and activity. The Politburo was expanded for the first time since February 1963 with the addition of one full member (Rewang) and one candidate member (Peris Pardede). More importantly, the Daily Council was changed for the first time ever with the addition of Rewang.[226] Second, both Aidit and Sudisman directed all cadres to develop a new work style and the latter delineated a list of new skills that would be required in the execution of the pending "revolutionary offensive." "In order to overcome tendencies to self-satisfaction and *arrivisme*," McVey has observed,

> cadres must 1) learn to work towards the goals of the party's development plans; 2) learn to perform work in many spheres; 3) learn to work in a rational, effective, and punctual manner; 4) learn to evaluate their own capacity and that of their environment so as to "reconcile soaring desires with limited capabilities," 5) learn to work diligently, steadily, and submit to periodic controls; 6) learn to organize properly.[227]

To help the cadres better appreciate exactly what the future held for them, when the burden so long wanting to be assumed would be on their shoulders, Sudisman presented poignant negative examples of past Party work.[228] In this way, the ebullience of the celebratory moment was tempered, and the integrity of organization hopefully strengthened and focused for the great integrating task ahead. Certainly, if the PKI could not impart a sense of integrity to the approximately 20 million members believed to belong to its organizational family in August 1965,[229] it could hardly be expected to do the same for the over 100 million people living in the archipelago at the time.

Yet, at that very moment, the PKI and other revolutionary forces were being encouraged by Sukarno in his annual Independence Day speech to go beyond their self-doubts, to "reach for the stars." The President's encouragement that day was hardly idle, and hardly new. Since his dissolution of the BPS in December 1964, Sukarno behaved almost as if he was in (socialist) competition with the Communists, both encouraging them and being encouraged in turn. The effect of this dynamic was to create a revolutionary synergy throughout the Indonesian context, where new revolutionary principles or specifications of principle required their own radical organizational implementation. It was no longer clear who led and who followed in this revolutionary duo, but it was absolutely clear that as they interacted, both the PKI and Sukarno pushed forward with the organizational expression of their "Indonesian Revolution." The Americans certainly found this out in 1965, as did Nasakom's civilian opponents, and, as the Fifth Force neared creation, it looked like the Army would make the same unpleasant discovery.

In 1965, the Americans were among the first to feel the real effects of the promotion of higher standards in the "Indonesian Revolution." Those effects were generated in no small part by Sukarno's decision of January 1 authorizing Indonesia's departure from the United Nations in protest at Malaysia's accession to a seat in the Security Council.[230] Joining with the President "to build the world anew," the Communists struck at US installations and properties throughout the months of February and March. Beginning on February 15, Communist protesters confronted every vestige of American influence in Indonesia, from the properties of its nationals and corporations to USIS offices to the Embassy itself. Properties and plantations were seized,[231] oil installations were stormed,[232] USIS offices across the country were forced to close,[233] and the Peace Corps was made to feel so unwelcome that it had to quit the country in April because both officially and really "the Indonesian government could not guarantee the safety of U.S. personnel and property involved."[234]

The issuance of Presidential Instruction No. 6 of 1965 on April 24, which both pleased and displeased the Communists, brought to end for the time being further attacks on US interests. While the Instruction placed all foreign enterprises under the Government's administration, Aidit still dared point out its "defect" of failing to address the problem of ownership.[235] Nevertheless, Aidit could not have been completely disappointed given that the PKI, in conducting its furious anti-US campaign, received "only a mild repetition of the official resistance it had met in its actions against British enterprises in 1963 and 1964."[236] The Americans perceived this discrepancy more than any other, and in that connection, their decision to have secret dealings with the Army may be understood as being well-informed.

Where the unfolding of the "international" aspects of the "Indonesian Revolution" in 1965 showed clearly how the Communists could set and win the acceptance of a revolutionary standard of conduct through the activity of disorganizing, the unfolding of the "domestic" aspects of the "Revolution" showed clearly how the President's subscription to Communist principles or standards meant the greater disorganization of the PKI's civilian opponents, chiefly through their "nasakomization." Indeed, the first major "domestic" event of the year, the "freezing" of the Murba party, was a manifestation of this pattern of interaction. The President's decision on February 23 to ban the entire BPS press, which had consisted of approximately 30 newspapers, was also part of that pattern.

On April 11, when Sukarno addressed the third general session of the MPRS, he showed in two ways how his accession to an essentially Communist-created revolutionary temperament would manifest itself in the official realm.[237] The first way would be through the new policy of national economic self-sufficiency, which was the concrete effect of his vast revision of "state policy." Sukarno abandoned the Eight-Year Overall Development Plan on the grounds that it was now time to "throw the wheel around" (*banting stir*) and to "stand on one's own feet" (*berdiri diatas kaki sendiri—berdikari*). In this way, Sukarno tried to make a virtue out of the fact that the Overall Development Plan had been inoperative since the beginning of *konfrontasi*.[238] Curiously, or not, both this policy and the slogans of *banting stir* and *berdiri diatas kaki sendiri* could be found in Aidit's political report of December 1963.[239] If it looked like the President was plagiarizing from Aidit, Sukarno tried to show how far ahead of the Communists he was by declaring that the "national democratic" phase of the "Indonesian Revolution" was now complete and that its second phase, "Indonesian Socialism," had begun. In making this claim, Sukarno had surprised the Communists to the point of dismay, for they knew this declaration corresponded neither to objective conditions nor to the level of their own work.[240] Regardless of their theoretical objections, Sukarno showed through his own example how the official realm would be effected in an additional way, and that was by spreading an air of revolutionary unreality.

Neither the practical difficulties of realizing self-sufficiency nor the theoretical difficulties posed by "Indonesian Socialism" prevented Sukarno from taking discrete measures that were consistent with his beliefs on these matters. In the name of military self-sufficiency, for example, he inaugurated a new National Defence Institute (*Lembaga Pertahanan Negara*) in May. The Institute was without doubt perceived by Seskoad as a rival, the more so when Aidit and Njoto were appointed there as professors in Marxism.[241] When a framework for Atomic, Bacteriological, and Chemical Warfare was established between Indonesia and the People's Republic of China, Aidit pointedly declared that "we shall smash Western domination in the scientific and technical field."[242]

In the name of "Indonesian Socialism," and in a spirit of highest regard for Nasakom, Sukarno undertook a number of measures beginning in May that would bend organizational reality to conform to these principles (or at least Sukarno's and the PKI's understanding of them). In a Cabinet reshuffle in May, for instance, Sukarno demoted the two Murba party members and, for the first time ever, permitted a Communist to take control of a Government department.[243] In June, "the minister for internal affairs ordered that the Nasakom concept be applied with the appointment of representatives of the Nasakom forces, including the PKI, to the executive councils of all provincial governors."[244] In the same month, the Department of Education and Culture began to issue bans on books written by authors whom Lekra had long opposed.[245] In July, "Sukarno endorsed the party demands of 1963, withdrawing the ban on party membership for regional heads, separating the functions of regional heads and chairmen of the regional legislatures and approving of 'nasakomization' of the leadership of regional executive bodies."[246] In August, in response to Sukarno's demand for the "retooling" of the PNI, the Party split and expelled the conservative Hardi faction.[247] At the same time, Sukarno declared that he would like to see the NU undergo "nasakomization," by "purifying" its leadership if necessary.[248] In September, he banned the Murba party.

The Finality of the Fifth Force

Given this seemingly unstoppable activity, wherein both the President and the PKI responded to each other with an excess of action or ideology, Sukarno's encouragement of the revolutionary forces on August 17 was completely comprehendible. Likewise, the beguiling claim he made that day, that "people have of late been heatedly discussing the idea I launched about a fifth Armed Service" was presented without regard for the truth. The truth of the matter was Asmu's demand for arming BTI members in October 1964 served as the genesis for the Fifth Force idea. From there, it was Aidit, not Sukarno, who publicly advanced the notion on 14 and 17 January 1965 that "no less than 5 million organized workers and 10 million organized peasants are ready to take up arms."[249] Before a SOBSI rally on February 12, the President could be heard endorsing Aidit's proposal "if necessary," that is, somewhat evasively.[250] Thereafter, Aidit began to call for the "nasakomization" of the Armed Forces. He helpfully suggested the appointment of political commissars to "assist" all units, and later, in mid-May, prescribed attaching Nasakom advisory teams to the Ministry of Defence[251] and the four armed services commanders.[252]

Nasution objected to the scheme on the grounds that it would be impractical to enforce the tripartite nature of Nasakom at the personnel level.[253] According to Crouch,

> Yani then devised the clever verbal formula that enabled the army leaders to pay lip service to the Nasakom concept while sidetracking the proposal. After meeting Sukarno on 24 May, he told reporters that "Nasakom refers to its spirit and not division into compartments."[254]

Unfortunately for Yani and Nasution, their successful sidetracking of "nasakomization" merely returned the President to the essence of Aidit's requests in January and to Asmu's original request in October 1964. On May 31, in an address before the National Defence Institute, Sukarno for the time took up the proposal to create a "Fifth Force" made up of armed peasants and workers. According to the President, it was Chou En-lai (with whom he had conferred in November 1964 in China, and in Indonesia in April) who "had first suggested the idea of a fifth force consisting of the twenty-one million volunteers who had registered themselves during 1964."[255] Interestingly, Chou had even offered 100,000 light arms for this new entity. In light of this evolution of events, the twisted presumptuousness of the President's claim of August 17 raised the troublesome issue of what else, other than the truth, he was prepared to compromise.

Against the backdrop of the Air Force's endorsement of the Fifth Force proposal on June 4, and the initiation of training sessions for "volunteers" at its base outside Jakarta from July 5,[256] Sukarno showed his impatience with his Army opponents on August 17:

> Those who were progressive yesterday are possibly retrogressive, anti-progressive today; those who were revolutionary yesterday are possibly counter-revolutionary today; those who were radical yesterday, are possibly soft and resistless today. Therefore, Sisters and Brothers, let none of us pride ourselves only for our past services. I am disgusted with all that old rubbish! It makes me sick! Even if you were formerly a bald-headed general in 1945, but if you split the revolutionary national unity today, if you create disorder in the NASAKOM front now, if you are an enemy of the main pillars of the revolution today, then you have become a force of reaction! . . . Since the Political Manifesto, *Panca Sila* and NASAKOM have become more and more implanted and since it grows more and more difficult for the reactionaries to oppose all this openly, a symptom which has recently become very conspicuous is the increasing number of hypocrites, imposters, those 'sweet-of-tongue-evil-at-heart' fellows. All claim to agree with the Political Manifesto, all claim to agree with *Panca Sila*, all claim to agree with NASAKOM. This being the case, heed my words when I say that the main criterion for a revolutionary is *oneness between word and deed*. Assess your leaders, assess people, assess everyone first and foremost by their deeds. . . . People have of late been heatedly discussing the idea I launched about a fifth Armed Service. As I said before, every time I propose a new idea there are always a number of

> reactions which, I am sorry to say, are sometimes influenced by Old Established Forces textbooks. . . . The facts are that the defence of the state demands a maximum effort from us all while, according to Article 30 of the Constitution: *Every citizen shall have the right and the duty to participate in the defence of the State*. After an even more thorough consideration of this question, I will take a decision on this matter in my capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.[257]

If the action Sukarno now promised to take was consistent with his many actions over the course of the year, which seemed altogether to reflect the thinking behind the KSSR slogan—"With action, there's creation" (*ada aksi, ada kreasi*)[258]—then the Fifth Force was about to be created.

Until September 30, the only firm public suggestion that developments might unfold differently came from Yani who, it may be recalled, unequivocally stated the Army's opposition to the proposal for a Fifth Force on September 27. After September 30, it no longer mattered what Sukarno's or the PKI's intentions were on this issue, or on any other aspect of the "Indonesian Revolution." For in the murder and attempted murder of the most senior Army leaders and in the proclamations of authority by members of the "30th of September Movement" between September 30 and October 1, the basis was laid for resolute and, above all, meaningful action on the Army's part. On October 1, Major-General Suharto made sense of the situation (in exactly the same directed manner Aidit had perfected where rightness or wrongness were irrelevant qualities in the act of creating) and used the Army's monopoly of arms to impose a monopoly of decision in his interpretation of these events.

On that day, the Army put aside the pretence of there being an Indonesian order or state, a pretence that had both sustained and constrained it politically, but which, by late 1965, was used against it by Sukarno and the PKI to compromise its organizational integrity and thus its distinctiveness as an actor. Suharto's defiance of Sukarno on the appointment of a new Army Commander (Yani had been murdered) marked the beginning of the attempt by the former to impose a monopoly of decision. Accordingly, Sukarno, while not killed by the Army, was the first political fatality in the formation of a new state. There were many more fatalities to follow, both political and physical, before the Army leadership brought the moment of exception to an end on 11 March 1966. On that day, the Army's monopoly of decision was formalized when Suharto was "ordered" by Sukarno to:

> Take all measures deemed necessary to guarantee the security, calm, and stability of the work of the Government and the work of the Revolution, and guarantee the personal safety and authority of the Leadership of the President/Commander in Chief/Great Leader of the Revolution/Mandatory of the MPRS for the sake of the wholeness of the Nation and State of the Republic of Indonesia, and to carry out with certainty the teachings of the Great Leader of the Revolution.[259]

With this Letter of Command, the act of defining Indonesia that had preoccupied the TNI since Nasution's accession as KSAD ended. This Letter, which effectively formalized the unqualified ability of the Army leadership to interpret past and future events as they deemed appropriate, was literally a cheque for sovereignty. Its issuance to Suharto signified the formal beginning of the New Order, that is, the new state of Indonesia.

The first decision Suharto took with his new powers was to formalize what had already been achieved in reality. His decision on March 12 to ban the PKI and its ormas throughout the country showed that the coincidence of the TNI's monopoly of arms and its monopoly of decision allowed it to authoritatively define Indonesia in such a way as to exclude the Communists from being any part of it, or of what it was to be Indonesian, indefinitely. In this categorical achievement, in this assertion of absolute control over the meaning and definition of Indonesia, the TNI showed its sovereignty. However, intrinsic to the TNI's achievement of sovereignty was its absolute inability to speak to this achievement as such. For to acknowledge in the moment of creating sovereignty that that was what was occurring would be to undermine the achievement, to weaken whatever legitimacy it promised. Logically, for an actor to point out its involvement in a moment of creation would be to point out the prior process of creating, and in the Indonesian context, that would require the TNI to accord recognition to the PKI as an equal, as a co-creator of Indonesia. Perhaps it was because the PKI had come so very close to doing to the TNI what the TNI actually did to the PKI between 1 October 1965 and 12 March 1966 that Suharto made his first decision as he did.

The willingness of the Army since then to call their state a New Order is really the closest it can possibly come to acknowledging the novelty, the artificiality, and the orderliness of what it had achieved: Indonesia itself. For the Army, the prize of univocity that is sovereignty compels it to be silent on its exact nature, and on the exact nature of the New Order as a new state. For the Army, there can be no acknowledging that the people and territory circumscribed as Indonesian were brought, in large part, into that division by the Communists. Without the Communists, the likelihood of there being such a real circumscription would have been reduced, because without the Communists there would not have been the same pressure to create sovereignty, to supersede all of the particularisms found in the archipelago. For just as the PKI Headquarters building was carefully emptied of its archives by the Army in early October 1965, before demonstrators burned it to the ground,[260] the TNI took over all of the spaces that had been opened up and sustained by the PKI's organization and organizing since 1951. To a very large extent, the TNI also took over the millions of minds that the Communists had opened up and sustained in the transcendant possibility of being Indonesian. In this connection, the Communist contribution in terms of making people and territory Indonesian can never be officially acknowledged.

CONCLUSION

LIVING AND LANGUAGE IN NEW STATE FORMATION

While sometimes long, definitions always have the quality of abruptness because they have an end; the placement of the period marks the end of the definition as much as the end of the defining compels the placement of the period. In this study, the abrupt and bloody smudge that was the physical obliteration of the PKI and its ormas marked the end of the process of defining Indonesia as much as the defining of Indonesia compelled the TNI and its allies to annihilate the Communists. Both the placement of the period and the assertion of sovereignty and a monopoly of decision entail the achievement of circumscription. The certitude bred of either instance of circumscription is unfortunate in that other considerations in defining in the abstract, or other circumstances in defining in the empirical, could have diminished to the point of exclusion either the possibility or probability of circumscription; the defining could have gone on indefinitely. In this respect, the claim made here that the New Order is a new state may be seen as welcome from a conceptual point of view, and more especially by the proponents of the movement to "bring the state back in."

In making the claim that the New Order is a new state, however, the first conclusion I wish to draw is that there is *not* a positive affinity between this study and those consciously conducted out of a desire to "bring the state back in." Although I am prepared to conclude that the Indonesian case may be regarded as exemplary of the kind of circumscribing of people and territory that informs the formation of a new state, the coincidence between the conceptual demands for circumscription and the conditions of circumscription that obtained in 1965-66 does not substantiate the claim that this is simply another case study that can be added to the effort to bring the "state back in." To a very large extent, I believe that this case study achieves the opposite effect, construing the state (and the concept of the state) as a rare and, in terms of frequency, exceptional achievement.

Perhaps the recognition of the possibilities that still obtained for the TNI and the PKI in Indonesia thirty years ago today weighs too heavily on this view, but we must be open to the proposition that their conflict did not have to end as decisively as it did. The political developments of 30 September—1 October 1965 could have gone to either the PKI's or the TNI's advantage. That matters developed as decisively as they did (over a period of mere hours) to one of the actor's advantage was remarkable, but the remarkableness of this has been eclipsed by the certitude achieved subsequently through the TNI's monopoly of decision. The real and bloody abruptness of the end to the defining of Indonesia, while certainty constitutive of a new state, cannot be supposed to have been pre-determined or certain, like a period is to a definition. Indeed, that we have a definition at all that encompasses as many people and as much territory as in the Indonesian case is frankly surprising. This surprise is in marked contrast to the expectations of those who seek to "bring the state back in," and it is for this reason that it serves as my point of departure from that broad endeavour.

In encouraging her fellow social scientists to collect themselves and march forward under the banner of "bringing the state back in," Skocpol really only succeeds in ripping that banner in two. This occurs because the very achievement of moving intellectually from the recognition of the conceptual and theoretical significance of the "the state," to the creation of a programmatic effort aimed at "bringing the state back in," entails neglecting the definitional and conceptual concerns at the heart of the original concern for the "state" in the name of better technique. This movement changes both the concept and reality of the state from being subjects of study into objects of technique or analytical strategies. In consolidating this transition and the more conscious embrace of technique, it is clear that Skocpol has arbitrarily made the whole world the object of analysis.

As she has declared, "rather then become embroiled in a series of abstruse and conceptual debates" about "the state," as such, it is preferable to "proceed along the lines" of two separate analytical strategies that "bring the state back in."[1] But this achievement of swinging from the vantagepoint of recognizing "the state"—across what its believers can only conceive as a slough of "abstruse and conceptual debates"—to the other side, relies upon the unexamined claim that the world is a world of states. In her presumption of the utility of technique, Skocpol has assumed that the world is amenable to such treatment, indeed, that the world is a world wholly of states. Skocpol's claim is only valid to the degree that the formality of the divisions we call states everyday actually coincides with a division that obtains empirically (territorially), in the minds of the people living in that state (popularly), and in the sense of there being a monopoly of decision.

Now, since getting to the other side depends on taking a leap of faith—of making the intellectual effort to transcend the terrain of "abstruse and abstract debates"—the expectation upon arriving at the other side is to go travelling with the concept of the state already in mind, using the favoured strategies of analysis to push one's way forward. This movement builds upon itself and makes the separation of a now deliberate intellectual effort from the foregoing form of intellectual activity about "the state" its own rationale. In the end, this separation will not have occurred by virtue of its adherents having opened a door through which "the state" (and only the state) might have been brought back in, but rather by their closing the door on a taxonomically-dedicated treatment of "the state." In other words, to the degree that many contemporary discussions of "the state" deliberately avoid the problematic conceptualization of the state, they occur on an intellectual plane where one cannot distinguish states from non-states, sense from nonsense. From the other side, where technique and strategies dominate the exploration of a world presumed to be populated by states, states themselves are viewed either as "organizations through which official collectivities may pursue distinctive goals . . . in relation to social settings," or as "configurations of organization and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and classes in society."[2] To believe that the categories of state and society can be assumed to exist as easily as they are here, is to put too much strain on a banner that is already taut with ambition.

Swinging across the morass of "abstruse and abstract conceptual debates" on the banner of "bringing the state back in" is akin to placing the period at the end of the definition of the state before the defining is itself complete. Thus, in addition to misleadingly treating the whole world as if it was a world wholly made up of states, the movement to bring the state back in abridges the process of defining itself. With that, the movement deprives itself of the capacity to appreciate the singularity or specificity that makes for a plurality of states. In short, the movement ignores the "accumulation of definition"[3] that actually informs completed definitions or achieved categories and which, thereby, makes a popular-territorial division a discrete phenomenon.

Put differently, the race to cross over the morass consciously misses the abstract debate, but unconsciously misses the living and language that actually characterize contexts where state building occurs. Skocpol's perspective misses what gives to a group of people and their territory their togetherness; she takes this attribute of specificity or singularity for granted, when in fact indeterminacy and the ending of that condition are what actors often attempt to achieve through their living and their language (that is if the recourse to coercion does not reduce matters simply to survival). Their efforts may or may not end in a definition, in the creation of a category, or in a division that is a new state. But even where their efforts do result in a definition, a category, or a division of the new state type—as the Indonesian case shows—there had to have been a prior accumulation of definition, a prior pattern of living and of language.

The accumulation of definition entails a progression from the finite, to the definite, to the definitive, to the definition. In this case study, a definition of Indonesia was offered and the TNI ultimately placed the period on its own and the PKI's efforts to define Indonesia as such. As against the easy presumption of the existence of an Indonesian state, the analysis here captured a specific kind of living and language—in the absence of categorization—perhaps best characterized as indeterminate or of a nonjusticiable nature. To say this is not to weaken in the slightest the claim that the New Order is a very clear example of a new state. Indeed, it was precisely because circumstances were so indeterminate in the East Indies archipelago that both the PKI and the TNI (and a host of lesser actors) tried as hard as they did after 1949 to bring that very condition to an end. In a sense, the whole point of the case study turns on how actors lived and communicated under the tyranny of indeterminacy. Clearly, ending that very condition becomes a self-starting proposition. The Indonesian case is special only to the degree to which the main collective actors, the PKI and the TNI, successfully resisted taking up arms against each other. As it was, the competition and conflict between the PKI and the TNI before 30 September 1965 actually fostered only a tentative notion of what was definitive or "Indonesian" in the Indonesian context, but that, too, is part of living in indeterminacy.

For the PKI and the TNI, living in indeterminacy meant communicating using a special kind of political language. That language seemed to be informed by the realization that in their political competition and conflict to define the shape and content of Indonesia, there could be no standard against which to measure the "authentically Indonesian character" of either one's organization, organizational principles, or actions because the outcome of the struggle itself would yield that standard. The language used, therefore, was full of allusions to the historical or future greatness of the subject of the actor's directing idea; that such references have been used as the basis for the historical "explanations" typically found in neo-Weberian analyses of Asian and African "states" seems clearly mistaken. The tendency to arrogate past and future history without substantiation went along with the tendency of both the PKI and the TNI to be arbitrary in their pronouncements; understandably, surprise conferred a tactical advantage in the context of novelty. Finally, the proclivity to be arbitrary carried over into a determination to be daring, at least as far as the PKI was concerned. The PKI's daring disposition entailed borrowing against (or presuming) a definite standard yet to be rendered as definitively Indonesian.

In aiming for the creation of a definitively Indonesian standard, that is, a standard of their own making, the PKI and the TNI communicated and lived in ways that defied other standards, other categories (actor-designations) expected of armies and political parties. Indeed, using other standards or categories by which to approach the PKI or the TNI would be frustrating, but the nature of the actors' deficiency along those measures would be beside the point. The new standard, or new division they pioneered, is really the only standard that is appropriate for understanding either the PKI or the TNI. This is a difficult notion to appreciate since the very achievement of that standard cannot be acknowledged by the TNI, and it certainly cannot be acknowledged by the PKI. Acknowledging that it is an army before it is a new state builder (or a political party before it was a new state builder in the case of the PKI) is simply not possible, since to make such an acknowledgement would be to concede the novelty of the circumstances and the living and language engendered by those circumstances since 1949.

Like the PKI, which can never answer for its living and its language, the TNI cannot disclose the nature of its own achievement in empirically and conceptually circumscribing people and territory as Indonesian. The work of new state builders cannot be acknowledged as such by themselves, for it relates too directly to the beginnings of their own power and authority and what are conveyed as virtually eternal or "reclaimed" social norms and a social identity. As such, the work of new state builders is self-concealing, lost in historical allusions or buried in official historiographies. Sovereign actors simply cannot disclose that novelty knows no standards, or that the ones now in existence (after the category or division has been achieved, after the defining is complete) are the result of a monopoly of decision enforced by a monopoly of arms. More importantly, perhaps, such a concession on the TNI's part would disclose the truth that the "Indonesian" standard of today is itself the outcome of a process of defining Indonesia in which the PKI played an equal role. Finally, sovereign actors can never concede the true challenges of leadership posed to them in the condition of indeterminacy, since to do so would reveal their complicity in pretension, which in the Indonesian case means sustaining the pretension of an order even before it was established in 1965-66.

Although the culmination of the accumulation of definition cannot be disclosed as such, the living and the language not only of the sovereign actor but of politics in the new state afterwards does undergo a profound change. Whereas the living and language in the process of defining was all about actors' affecting consequences that would lead to a category, the actual establishment of the category dictates the consequences which (in case of the category of new state) are decidedly more orderly than what came before. The politics of defining yield in a moment of exception to the politics of perpetuation, which entails the stilling of social life, its stabilization, normalization, and normization. Stabilization, normalization, and normization are the consequences of the category new state. After the defining has been brought to an end, not only are the other actors who sought to define, but so, too, are the kinds of living and language once practised by the sovereign actor itself. In short, categories have consequences for living and language, just as the consequences of the living and language of indeterminacy have their categories.

Since successful new state builders cannot acknowledge their own achievement, there can be no acknowledgement of the exceptional perspective that is oriented to studying the accumulation of definition that informs that achievement. That is not to say that the exceptional perspective is therefore without analytical value, it is merely to suggest that the self-concealing nature of the living and language of new state builders requires a perspective attuned to the quality of self-concealment. The study of the Indonesian case has attuned us to the attributes of the living and language of indeterminacy, and it is from an appreciation of those attributes and what they signify that the exceptional perspective can be applied to understand the politics encountered in other geographical contexts. For indeed, the contemporary politics of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China may be usefully reinterpreted by applying the exceptional perspective; the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists seemed for a period to be swept up in the same conditions of indeterminacy that characterized the interactions of the TNI and the PKI. Similarly, the politics that led to the establishment of the two Koreas seem to be analogous to the substance of the exceptional perspective. One may venture to include as possible subjects of this approach Vietnam, Ethiopia, Algeria, Kampuchea, and even the United States of America up to its civil war. Since novelty knows no standards, and standards continue to come into existence and impart a specificity to people and territory, there is no end to the applicability of the exceptional perspective until there is an end to the high regard that is paid in modern politics to territory as such.

30 September-1 October 1995
Kitchener, Ontario, Canada

ENDNOTES—INTRODUCTION

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2. *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. "define."

3. See generally, Philip Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1 (March 1988):58-89; James Lang, "In Search of the State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (April 1980):227-33; David Easton, "The Political System Besieged by the State," *Political Theory* 9 (August 1981):303-25; Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16 (January 1984):223-46; Howard H. Lentner, "The Concept of the State: A Reply to Stephen Krasner," *Comparative Politics* 16 (April 1984):367-77; Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, D. Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-37; Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, *Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric A. Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously," in *Understanding Political Development*, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 353-90; Gabriel A. Almond, "The Return to the State," *American Political Science Review* 82 (September 1988):853-74; Eric A. Nordlinger, Theodore J. Lowi, and Sergio Fabbrini, "The Return to the State: Critiques," *American Political Science Review* 82 (September 1988):875-901; Paul Cammack, "Bringing the State Back In?" *British Journal of Political Science* 19 (April 1989):261-90; Edward S. Greenberg, "State Change: Approaches and Concepts," in *Changes in the State: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Edward S. Greenberg and Thomas F. Mayer (Newbury Park, MD: SAGE, 1990), pp. 11-38; and Bert A. Rockman, "Minding the State—Or a State of Mind? Issues in the Comparative Conceptualization of the State," *Comparative Political Studies* 23 (April 1990):25-55.

4. See generally, Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1969); Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1973); Nicos Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1975); David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Eric O. Wright, "Recent Development in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," *Monthly Review* 27 (October 1975):29-43; David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Eric O. Wright, "Recent Development in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," *Monthly Review* 27 (November 1975):36-51; Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," *Socialist Revolution* 7 (May-June

1977):6–28; Bob Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 1 (December 1977):353–73; Goran Therborn, *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?* (London: New Left Books, 1978); Fred Block, "Marxist Theories of the State in World System Analysis," in *Social Change in the Capitalist World Economy*, ed. Barbara Kaplan (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1978), pp. 27–37; Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism* (London: New Left Books, 1980); Albert Bergsen, ed., *Studies in the Modern World-System* (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1980); Theda Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal," *Politics and Society* 10 (1980):155–201; Christopher K. Chase-Dunn, "Interstate System and Capitalist World Economy: One Logic or Two?" in *World-System Structure: Community and Change*, ed. W. Ladd Hollist and J. N. Rosenau (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1981), pp. 30–53; Bob Jessop, *The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1982); Rhonda F. Levine, "Marxism, Sociology, and Neo-Marxist Theories of the State," in *Current Perspectives in Social Theory*, vol. 6, ed. Scott G. McNall (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1985), pp. 149–67; Kai Nielsen, "On Marxist Theories of the State," *Indian Political Science Review* 19 (January–December 1985):47–60; and Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

5. See generally, Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960); Neil Smelser, "Toward a Theory of Modernization," in *Essays in Sociological Explanation*, ed. Neil Smelser (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968); and Niklas Luhmann, *The Differentiation of Society*, trans. Stephen Holmes and Charles Larmore (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1982).

6. See generally, Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Studies in Political Development no. 8 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978); Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Modernization from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978); Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); and, more ambiguously, Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

7. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78.

8. José Casanova, "The Spanish State and Its Relations With Society," *State, Culture, and Society* 1 (Winter 1985):109–18. Examples include Nora Hamilton, *The Limits of*

State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982); Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously"; Lewis W. Snider, "Identifying the Elements of State Power: Where Do We Begin?" *Comparative Political Studies* 20 (October 1987):314–56; and Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

9. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," in *The State and Development in the Third World*, ed. Atul Kohli (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 259–82.

10. Tilly's initial list of "the most general conditions which appear, in the European experience, to predict survival and state-making" included "(1) the availability of extricable resources; (2) a relatively protected position in time and space; (3) a continuous supply of political entrepreneurs; (4) success in war; (5) homogeneity (and homogenization) of the subject population; (6) strong coalitions of the central power with major segments of the landed elite," found in "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Studies in Political Development no. 8, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 40. Tilly later added "(7) the high cost of state-building; (8) the intimate connection between the conduct of war, the building of armies, the extension and regularization of taxes and the growth of the state apparatus; (9) the large role of alternating coalitions between the central power and the major social classes within the subject population in determining the broad forms of government; and (10) the further effect of homogenization—or its absence—on the structure and effectiveness of government," in "Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Studies in Political Development no. 8, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 633.

11. Among such efforts include Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, "The Territorial Structuring of Western Europe," in *Economy, Territory, Identity* (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1983), pp. 19–65; and Roy E. H. Mellor, *Nation, State, and Territory: A Political Geography* (London: Routledge, 1989), passim.

12. Karl Dusza, "Max Weber's Conception of the State," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 3 (Fall 1989):79–80.

13. Samuel E. Finer, "State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Studies in Political Development no. 8, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 163.

14. Tilly, "Reflections on the History," p. 24.

15. Ibid., pp. 24–25.

16. Ibid., p. 42.

17. Ibid., p. 32.

18. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), p. 39.

19. S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., "Introduction. Charisma and Institution Building: Max Weber and Modern Sociology," *Max Weber: On Charisma and Institution Building* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. xvi–xviii.

20. A useful study on the creation of national cultures is Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

21. Tilly, "Reflections on the History," p. 40.

22. Ibid., p. 81.

23. Ibid., p. 12.

24. J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (July 1968):562.

25. Finer, p. 85.

26. Dusza, p. 79.

27. One illustration of a study that paradoxically undermines its own claims of a colonial state through its study of imperial rule is Joan Vincent, "Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Power: Prolegomena to the Study of the Colonial State," in *State Formation and Political Legitimacy*, edited by Ronald Cohen and Judith D. Toland (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 137–54.

28. Thomas M. Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1984).

29. Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

30. Robert H. Taylor, *The State in Burma* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).

31. Callaghy, p. 14.

32. Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation*, pp. 277–78.

33. Ibid., p. 23.

34. Taylor, pp. 4-5.

35. Ana Maria Alonso, "The Effects of Truth: Re-Presentations of the Past and the Imagining of Community," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1 (March 1988):34.

36. This particular aspect of the debate about the state includes Hamza Alavi, "The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review* no. 74 (July-August 1972):59-82; David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Rolf Hanisch and Rainer Tetzlaff, "The State in Developing Countries as an Object of Social Science Research," *Law and State* 27 (1983):59-91; Ali Kazancigil, "Paradigms of Modern State Formation in the Periphery," in *The State in Global Perspective*, ed. Ali Kazancigil (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), pp. 119-42; Marcos Kaplan, "The Theory of the State in the Third World," in *The State in Global Perspective*, ed. Ali Kazancigil (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), pp. 276-92; S. N. Sang-Mpam, "The State-Society Relationship in Peripheral Countries: Critical Notes on the Dominant Paradigms," *The Review of Politics* 48 (Fall 1986):596-619; Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Presidential Address: State Formation in Asia—Prolegomenon to a Comparative Study," *Journal of Asian Studies* 46 (November 1987):731-46; Su-Hoon Lee, *State-Building in the Contemporary Third World*, Institute of Far Eastern Studies Third World Series no. 2 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); Kola Olugbade, "State of the State in the Third World," *The Round Table* no. 309 (January 1989):16-32; Robert Fatton Jr., "The State of African Studies and Studies of the African State: The Theoretical Softness of the 'Soft State'," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 24 (July-October 1989):170-87; and Mehran Kamrava, "Conceptualising Third World Politics: The State-Society See-Saw," *Third World Quarterly* 14 (October 1993):703-16.

37. See Clifford Geertz, ed., "Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 105-57.

38. See William H. Alkire, "Concepts of Order in Southeast Asia and Micronesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 14 (September 1972):484-93; Benedict Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. Claire Holt (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 1-69; Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Lorraine Gesick, ed., *Centers, Symbols, and Hierarchies: Essays on the Classical States of Southeast Asia* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1983); Robert Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia," in *Southeast Asia: The Politics of National Integration*, ed. John T. McAlister, Jr. (New York, NY: Random House, 1973), pp. 74-89; Mark Hobart and Robert H. Taylor, eds., *Context, Meaning and Power in Southeast Asia*, Studies on Southeast Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1986); Ward Keeler, "Villagers and the Exemplary Center in Java,"

Indonesia no. 39 (April 1985):111–40; Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century*, Monograph Series no. 43 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968); Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985); and S. J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand Against a Historical Background* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

39. An illustration of the constructive effects of competition in the European context is Aristide R. Zolberg, "Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and England," in *The State in Global Perspective*, ed. Ali Kazancigil (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), pp. 72–106.

40. The concept of the moment of the exception used here is highly circumscribed by a specifically delimited process of political appropriation, thereby freeing it from the criticisms found in Charles E. Frye, "Carl Schmitt's Concept of the Political," *Journal of Politics* 28 (November 1966):826–29.

41. Paul Hirst, "Carl Schmitt—Decisionism and Politics," *Economy and Society* 17 (May 1988):273.

42. Karl Loewenstein, "Crisis Government," *Political Power and the Governmental Process* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 217–27, discusses aspects of this phenomenon.

43. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*; and Rod Aya, "Popular Intervention in Revolutionary Situations," in *Statemaking and Social Movements*, edited by Charles Bright and Susan Harding (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1984), pp. 318–43. Critical discussions of this perspective may be found in J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983):527–53; Lynn Hunt, "Charles Tilly's Collective Action," in *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 244–75; and Stan Taylor, *Social Sciences and Revolution* (London: Macmillan Press, 1984).

44. Aya, p. 322.

45. Taylor, *Social Sciences and Revolution*, p. 115.

46. See George Schwab, *The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970); Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976); Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985); Carl Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*,

trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985); G. L. Ulmen, "The Sociology of the State: Carl Schmitt and Max Weber," *State, Culture, and Society* 1 (Winter 1985):3–57; and Carl Schmitt, *Political Romanticism*, trans. Guy Oakes (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986).

47. William F. Drischler, "Carl Schmitt's Philosophy of Law, 1912–32: Some Introductory Aspects," *Lincoln Law Review* 13 (1982):119; see also Joseph Bendersky, *Carl Schmitt—Theorist for the Reich* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983); and, more critically, Leonard Schapiro, "The Importance of Law in the Study of Politics and History," in *Russian Studies*, ed. Ellen Dahrendorf (London: Collins Harvill, 1986), pp. 29–44.

48. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, p. 5.

49. Ibid., p. 5, n. 1.

50. Poggi, p. 7.

51. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, pp. 6–7.

52. Nettl, p. 563; emphasis in original.

53. Hirst, pp. 274 and 276.

54. Maurice Hauriou, "The Theory of the Institution and the Foundation: A Study in Social Vitalism," in *The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, George Renard, Joseph T. Delos*, ed. Albert Broderick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 93–124.

55. Miriam Theresa Rooney, "Introduction," in *The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, George Renard, Joseph T. Delos*, ed. Albert Broderick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 7.

56. Joseph T. Delos, "The Evolution of the Institutional Conception of Positive Law—A Backward Glance," in *The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, George Renard, Joseph T. Delos*, ed. Albert Broderick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 39.

57. Hauriou, p. 99.

58. Albert Broderick, "Preface," in *The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, George Renard, Joseph T. Delos*, ed. Albert Broderick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. xvii.

59. Hauriou, pp. 101–3.

60. Delos, p. 40. Henry L. Mason, "Implementing the Final Solution: The Ordinary Regulating the Extraordinary," *World Politics* 40 (July 1988):542-69, refers to Mommsen's idea of the process of *umsetzung*, which describes the "transformation of long-range ideological aims into actual political strategy [through] all kinds of interim steps," a conception that has affinities to that being proposed here.

61. Philip Selznick, *TVA and The Grass Roots* (New York, NY: Harper Torchbook, 1966), p. 257, quoted in Clement H. Moore, "The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy," in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*, edited by Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1970), p. 64. Examples of this manner of comprehending ideology include Mary Fulbrook, "The State and the Transformation of Political Legitimacy in East and West Germany since 1945," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29 (April 1987):211-44; and Gene Burns, "The Politics of Ideology: The Papal Struggle with Liberalism," *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (March 1990):1123-52.

62. Robert Wuthnow and Marsha Witten, "New Directions in the Study of Culture," *American Review of Sociology* 14 (1988):55. While this perspective seems to have been informed in part by the institutionalist perspective, perhaps articulated most clearly by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (September 1984):734-49, it is part of a wider intellectual debate embracing revolution, culture, identity and organization and their interrelationships, explored by William H. Sewell, Jr., "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case," *Journal of Modern History* 57 (March 1985):57-85; Theda Skocpol, "Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary Reconstruction of State Power: A Rejoinder to Sewell," *Journal of Modern History* 57 (March 1985):86-96; Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51 (April 1986):273-86; Robert Wuthnow, *Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987); Ann Kane, "Cultural Analysis in Historical Sociology: The Analytic and Concrete Forms of the Autonomy of Culture," *Sociological Theory* 9 (Spring 1991):53-69; and Jack A. Goldstone, "Ideology, Cultural Frameworks, and the Process of Revolution," *Theory and Society* 20 (August 1991):405-53.

63. The hazards of being too powerful have been explored by S. N. Sangmpam, "The Overpoliticized State and Democratization: A Theoretical Model," *Comparative Politics* 24 (July 1992):401-17.

64. Illustrations of this supposition include Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971); Gregory J. Kasza, "Bureaucratic Politics in Radical Military Regimes," *American Political Science Review* 81 (September 1987):851-72; and, more critically, Cal Clark, "The Strong

State and Development: A Growing List of Caveats," *Journal of Developing Societies* 4 (January–April 1988):1–8; Jonathan Lemco, "Economic and Political Development in Modernizing States," *Journal of Developing Societies* 4 (January–April 1988):9–21; and Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, "Mystification and Rationality: Legitimacy and the State in the Third World," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 22 (1992):169–86.

65. See, along similar lines of thinking, Bernard S. Cohn and Nicholas B. Dirks, "Beyond the Fringe: The Nation State, Colonialism, and the Technologies of Power," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1 (June 1988):224–29.

66. Robert Wuthnow, "Rethinking Weber's View of Ideology," *Theory and Society* 16 (January 1987):137.

67. See Gary G. Hamilton, "Patriarchalism in Imperial China and Western Europe: A Revision of Weber's Sociology of Domination," *Theory and Society* 13 (May 1984):393–425.

68. Gary G. Hamilton and John R. Sutton, "The Problem of Control in a Weak State: Domination in the United States, 1880–1920," *Theory and Society* 18 (January 1989):35.

69. The notion that consequences have categories, in addition to categories having consequences, has been suggested by S. D. Berkowitz, *An Introduction to Structural Analysis: The Network Approach to Social Research* (Toronto: Butterworth, 1982), p. 14; a similar notion relating specifically to the process of legitimization, where "legitimacy is a cause that occurs after its effect," and where "the realities of power and inequity once set into place through competition and conflict are a culture-creating force," has been discussed by Ronald Cohen, "Legitimacy, Illegitimacy, and State Formation," in *State Formation and Political Legitimacy*, edited by Ronald Cohen and Judith D. Toland (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 69–83.

ENDNOTES—CHAPTER I

1. See Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) for the former view, and for the latter see Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Journal of Asian Studies* 42 (May 1983):477–96.

2. Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States," in *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, ed. Clifford Geertz (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 1.

3. Anderson, p. 479.

4. Adherents of this line of argumentation recognize that the annexation of Portuguese East Timor in 1976 exceeds the historical pattern of Dutch expansion. The very recognition of this fact, unfortunately, seems to have presented itself as the major obstacle to efforts to explain Indonesia's behaviour. Representative of this line of thinking is Christine Drake, *National Integration in Indonesia: Patterns and Policies* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), p. 24.

5. As a geographical expression, the "East Indies" no more supports the idea of the "natural" territorial limits of Indonesia, which is a political construction, than the "West Indies" sustains arguments about an over-arching political entity in that part of the world.

6. A. D. A. De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*, Volume II, The Dutch East Indies, trans. G. J. Renier (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), p. 4.

7. F. W. Stapel, *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië*, II (Amsterdam, 1928–30), p. 26, quoted in Hans Kähler, "A Short History of Indonesia," trans. F. R. C. Bagley, in *The Muslim World: A Historical Survey*, Part IV, Modern Times (1), gen. ed. Bertold Spuler (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), p. 271.

8. By refraining from occupying the lands of East Indies peoples and destroying the indigenous forms of rulership, the Dutch helped to foster a robust "law of nations" by more nearly approaching them in a spirit of equality. See C. H. Alexandrowicz, *An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (16th, 17th and 18th Centuries)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); and J. C. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955) for discussions of the participants and the terms of their mutual interaction and Clive Parry, ed., *The Consolidated Treaty Series*, Volume 227, Appendix of Dutch Colonial Agreements, Volume I, 1648–1674; Volume 228, Appendix of Dutch Colonial Agreements, Volume II, 1674–1690; Volume 229, Appendix of Dutch Colonial Agreements, Volume I, 1690–1733; Volume 230,

Appendix of Dutch Colonial Agreements, Volume I, 1733–1757; Volume 231, Appendix of Dutch Colonial Agreements, Volume I, 1757–1799 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1981) for the precise texts (in Dutch).

9. M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present* (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 74; Kähler, p. 277.

10. See Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century*, Monograph Series no. 43 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968); B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings*, Part two, *Ruler and Realm in Early Java* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1957); and Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985) for discussions of these aspects of the Javanese conception of politics.

11. G. J. Resink, *Indonesia's History between the Myths: Essays in Legal History and Historical Theory* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Publishers, 1968), p. 344.

12. See Ann Kumar, "Developments in Four Societies over the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries," in *The Development of Indonesian Society: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, ed. Harry Aveling (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1979), pp. 29–41.

13. Ricklefs, p. 98.

14. H. T. Colenbrander, *Koloniale Geschiedenis*, II (The Hague, 1925), p. 170, quoted by De Kat Angelino, p. 4.

15. Kähler, p. 275.

16. Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara: A History of Indonesia*, rev. ed. (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1959), pp. 145–84.

17. J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1944), p. 32.

18. F. de Haan, *Priangan: De Preanger-regentschappen onder het Nederlandsch bestuur tot 1811*, I (Batavia, 1910), p. 74, quoted by De Kat Angelino, p. 5, n. 1.

19. B. Schreike, *Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings*, Part one (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955), p. 202.

20. Drake, p. 27.

21. Ricklefs, p. 102.

22. A. Arthur Schiller, *The Formation of Federal Indonesia, 1945-1949* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955), pp. 14-15.

23. E. B. Kielstra, *Uitbreiding van ons Gezag sinds 1816* (Haarlem: Volksuniversiteits Bibliotheek, 1920), republished in Krom, "Nederlands-Indië," p. 351, quoted in De Kat Angelino, p. 35.

24. Kähler, p. 289.

25. Furnivall, p. 88. The author is mistaken in calling the islands beyond Java "Outer Provinces" at the time the Dutch returned to replace the British; the change of status was officially effected in 1921.

26. See P. B. R. Carey, "Aspects of Javanese History in the Nineteenth Century," in *The Development of Indonesian Society: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, ed. Harry Aveling (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1979), pp. 63-78.

27. De Kat Angelino, p. 37.

28. Furnivall, p. 103.

29. Ibid., p. 177.

30. E. B. Kielstra, *Vestiging*, in H. Colijn and D. G. Stibbe, *Neerlands Indië*, vol. i (1929), p. 375, quoted by Furnivall, p. 178.

31. Quoted in W. Middendorp, "The Administration of the Outer Provinces of the Netherlands Indies," in *The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilisations in the Malay Archipelago*, ed. B. Schrieke (Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1929), p. 44.

32. See C. Fasseur, "Some Remarks on the Cultivation System in Java," *Acta Historiae Neerlandicae: Studies on the History of the Netherlands*, Vol. 10 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), pp. 143-62 for an analysis of the ideological setting within which the System was framed and critiqued.

33. H. T. Colenbrander, *Koloniale Geschiedenis*, III (The Hague, 1925), p. 91, quoted by Furnivall, p. 237.

34. See Vlekke, pp. 308-37 for this view.

35. Resink, p. 269; see also Justus M. van der Kroef, "On the Writing of Indonesian History," *Pacific Affairs* 31 (December 1958):364-70 for a critique of Resink's views.

36. Resink, pp. 82-83.

37. Ibid., p. 333.

38. Ibid., pp. 127 and 288.

39. Ibid., p. 153.

40. See J. R. V. Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 282–89 for detailed discussions of these settlements.

41. Furnivall, p. 237.

42. Harry J. Benda, "The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia," in *Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia*, Monograph Series no. 18 (New Haven, CN: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1972), p. 250.

43. Schiller, p. 200.

44. Anthony Reid and Oki Akira, eds. *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945*, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 72. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986), p. 59.

45. Ibid.

46. George S. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1967), p. 264, n. 6, quoted in Theodore Friend, *The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan against the West in Java and Luzon, 1942–1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 70.

47. Hirano Sakae, "Policy for Sumatra," in *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945*, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 72, edited by Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (Athens: OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986), p. 292.

48. Okada Fumihide, "Civil Administration in Celebes, 1942–1944," in *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945*, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 72, edited by Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986), p. 142.

49. Reid and Oki, p. 2.

50. See M. A. Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 141–93 on the Japanese occupation.

51. Ibid., pp. 208–58 on the Japanese attitude and policy toward Indonesian nationalism.

52. The date when the Investigating Body for Measures for Preparing Indonesian Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*—BPUPKI) was struck.

53. The date of the transfer of sovereignty.

54. Garth N. Jones, "Soekarno's Early Views upon the Territorial Boundaries of Indonesia," *Australian Outlook* 18 (April 1964):30–39; and Jacques Leclerc, "La circonscription: remarques sur l'idéologie du territoire national en Indonésie," *Cultures et Développement* 8 (1975):283-317.

55. Ricklefs, p. 211.

56. These were the States of Eastern Indonesia, Central Sumatra, Madura, Pasundan, South Sumatra, and East Java.

57. Schiller, pp. 91–92.

58. Ricklefs, p. 218.

59. See C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuize, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in Western Java Till 1949," *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 161–79.

60. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia: Centrifugal Economies," in *Foreign Aid Reexamined: A Critical Appraisal*, edited by James W. Wiggins and Helmut Schoeck (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958), p. 202.

61. See Leslie H. Palmier, "The Javanese Nobility under the Dutch," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (January 1960):197–227; and Heather Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979) for overviews of this relationship.

62. See Furnivall, pp. 54–79; Vlekke, pp. 200–54; De Kat Angelino, pp. 26–34; J. W. B. Money, *Java; Or, How to Manage a Colony*, Vol. 1 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1861), pp. 59–71; and Clive Day, *The Dutch in Java*, ed. J. Bastin (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 164–202 for discussions on Daendals' and Raffles' administrative plans.

63. See Furnivall, pp. 191–93; Palmier, pp. 216–20; and Schrieke, Part one, "The Native Rulers," pp. 192–97 for reviews of measures enacted against the Regents and their effects.

64. Furnivall, p. 190.

65. Ibid.

66. Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems, and Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1942), p. 127.

67. Furnivall, p. 295.

68. De Kat Angelino, p. 69.

69. A. D. A. De Kat Angelino, "Evolution in the Colonial World," and "The Directing Lines of the Future," *Colonial Policy*, Volume I, *General Principles*, trans. G. J. Renier (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), pp. 350-521 furnishes the most comprehensive account of official thinking on the anticipated pattern of evolution in the Indies.

70. J. M. van der Kroef, "On the Sovereignty of Indonesian States: A Rejoinder," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* no. 117 (1961):258-59, n. 44 draws attention to the fact that "indirect rule" prevailed over both Government Lands and the Native States.

71. C. L. Temple, *Native Races and Their Rulers* (1918), quoted by De Kat Angelino, II, p. 88; emphasis in the original.

72. B. J. Haga, "Influence of the Western Administration on the Native Community in the Outer Provinces," in *The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilisations in the Malay Archipelago*, ed. B. Schrieke (Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1929), pp. 174-75.

73. Ibid., p. 175.

74. Ibid.

75. De Kat Angelino, II, p. 98.

76. Ibid., p. 100.

77. Furnivall, pp. 300 and 390.

78. Haga points out the existence of a further, fourth division, the so-called Government Provinces, p. 172.

79. A list of the kingdoms that signed Long Contracts but which were annexed by the Dutch during this period is provided by Haga, p. 174.

80. Benda, p. 243.

81. Vandenbosch, p. 150.

82. H. Colijn, "Onze Staatkunde ten Aanzien van de Buitengewesten," in *Neerlands-Indië*, II (1929), p. 23, quoted by De Kat Angelino, II, p. 107.

83. Schiller, pp. 82–83.

84. Haga, p. 198, reports that the financial means of 292 Native States were combined into 75 territorial treasuries.

85. Schiller, p. 84.

86. Program of Principles of the Antirevolutionnaire Party, Art. XVIII, *Schrift en histoire—Gedenkboek Antirevolutionnaire Partij, 1878–1928* (Kampen, 1928), pp. 491–92, quoted in Vandenbosch, p. 66, n. 24.

87. See Eduard J. M. Schmutzer, *Dutch Colonial Policy and the Search for Identity in Indonesia, 1920–1931* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977) for a thorough discussion of the evolution of Dutch policy during this period.

88. *Bijdbladen*, 6576, of 24 November 1906, quoted in Furnivall, p. 294; emphasis in the original.

89. See De Kat Angelino, II, pp. 405 and 409 on the Indigenous Communes (Village) legislation and its application.

90. Debates of the Second Chamber (The Hague), 1921–22, p. 51, quoted by De Kat Angelino, II, pp. 374–75.

91. Furnivall, p. 268.

92. Ibid., p. 293.

93. De Kat Angelino, II, p. 102.

94. Ibid., p. 118.

95. Haga, p. 177.

96. Schiller, p. 83.

97. Ibid., p. 84.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., p. 87.

100. Ibid., p. 360, n. 33.

101. De Kat Angelino, II, p. 128.

102. Governor-General B. C. de Jonge, *Deli Courant*, cited in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* (The Hague), XXV (1936), p. 338, quoted in Benda, p. 238.

103. Schiller, p. 88.

104. Vandenbosch, p. 138.

105. De Kat Angelino, II, p. 355.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid., p. 357.

108. Ibid., p. 359.

109. See Otsuka Tadashi, "Education in Sumatra"; Aoki Eigoro, "Law Reform in Aceh, 1943"; Inoue Tetsuro, "Rural Mobilization in East Sumatra"; and Sakae, in *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942–1945*, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 72, edited by Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986), pp. 173–216 and 289–96.

110. Miyoshi Shunkichiro, "Problems of Administration in Java, 1942–1943," in *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945*, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 72, edited by Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986), pp. 117–18.

111. Soewarno Handayaningrat, *Administrasi Pemerintahan dalam Pembangunan Nasional* (Jakarta: Haji Masagung, 1988), p. 214.

112. See Friend, pp. 94–95; Okada, pp, 153–58; Tadashi, pp. 173–75; and Suzuki Seihei, "Education in Bali, 1943–1944," in *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945*, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 72, edited by Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986), pp. 159–71.

113. Reid and Oki, p. 2.

114. Marsono, *Peranan Pamong Pradja dalam Administrasi Pemerintahan Daerah di Indonesia* (Djakarta: U. P. Praja, 1968), p. 72; and P. J. Suwarno, *Sejarah Birokrasi Pemerintahan Indonesia Dahulu dan Sekarang* (Yogyakarta: Universitas Atma Jaya, 1989), p. 80.

115. *Osamu Seirei* No. 12 and 13 Year 1943 *Kan Po* 18, quoted in Handayaningrat, p. 215.

116. Fumihide, p. 154.

117. Seihei, p. 165.

118. Fumihide, pp. 154, 157, and 158.

119. Ricklefs, p. 188.

120. Fujiwara Iwaichi, "Fifth-column Work in Sumatra," in *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945*, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 72, edited by Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986), p. 26.

121. Friend states that one Japanese list of organizations included "ten different 'suicide corps,' twenty-seven paramilitary youth organizations, and seventy-two 'voluntary' mobilization and defense groups," n. 58, p. 94.

122. Kähler, p. 316.

123. Friend, p. 92.

124. Ibid., p. 70.

125. Ricklefs, p. 196.

126. See A. M. W. Pranarka, *Sejarah Pemikiran tentang Pancasila* (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), pp. 25–57 for a discussion of these activities.

127. Ricklefs, p. 195.

128. See the discussions of *Undang-undang No. 1, 1945* in Handayaningrat, p. 217, and Suwarno, pp. 48–49.

129. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 113–14.

130. Handayaningrat, p. 217.

131. Marsono, p. 74.

132. See George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 351–90; and Yong Mun Cheong, *H. J. van Mook and Indonesian Independence: A Study of His Role in Dutch-Indonesian Relations, 1945–48* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); and Arthur H. Steiner, "Post-War Government of the Netherlands East Indies," *Journal of Politics* 9 (November 1947):624–51.

133. See Audrey R. Kahin, ed., "Introduction" and "Overview," *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity in Diversity* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 1-20 and 265-84, for an analysis of regional variations in and of the Revolution.

134. Schiller, p. 73.

135. Ibid., pp. 96-97.

136. Ibid., p. 210.

137. Ibid., p. 131.

138. See Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, pp. 391-445.

139. Schiller, p. 79.

140. De Kat Angelino, II, p. 111.

141. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Political Transformation in the Nineteenth Century," in *Dynamics of Indonesian History*, edited by Haryati Soebadio and Carine A. du Marchie Sarvaas (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 237-55 for a general sketch of the effects of colonial policy on social relations and interdependencies in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

142. Schiller, p. 81.

143. Vandenbosch, p. 154.

144. De Kat Angelino, II, p. 112.

145. See Jennifer Alexander and Paul Alexander, "Protecting Peasants from Capitalism: The Subordination of Javanese Traders by the Colonial State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 33 (April 1991):370-94 for an account of the constraints imposed by the colonial state on Javanese cultivators.

146. See Peter Boomgaard, "The Javanese Village as a Cheshire Cat: The Java Debate Against a European and Latin American Background," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 18 (January 1991), pp. 292-93 and 296-97.

147. Furnivall, p. 383.

148. Ricklefs, p. 148.

149. Boomgaard, p. 296.

150. Furnivall, p. 387.

151. J. C. Heesterman, "State and Adat," in *Two Colonial Empires*, Vol. 6, *Comparative Studies in Overseas History*, edited by C. A. Bayly and D. H. A. Kolff (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), p. 199.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid., pp. 190-93.

154. M. B. Hooker, *Adat Law in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 16, n. 20.

155. Haga, p. 183.

156. Ibid., p. 187.

157. Robert Van Niel, "From Netherlands East Indies to Republic of Indonesia, 1900-1945," in *The Development of Indonesian Society: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, ed. Harry Aveling (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1979), p. 152.

158. C. van Vollenhoven, *De Ontdekking van het Adatrecht* (1928), p. 114, quoted by Furnivall, p, 295.

159. Benda, p. 249; Haga, p. 179 mentions in this connection the areas of Riau and Djambi.

160. Ricklefs, p. 156.

161. Soeriokoesoemo, "Het Javaansche Vraagstuk," *Wederopbouw* 1 (1918):6, quoted in Anthony Reid, "The Nationalist Quest for an Indonesian Past," in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*. Asian Studies Association of Australia, Southeast Asia Publications Series no. 4, edited by Anthony Reid and David Marr (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), p. 283.

162. Soeriokoesoemo, "Gewijd aan mijn Kameraden in 'Insulinde'," *Wederopbouw* 1 (1918):9, quoted in Reid, p. 283.

163. Ricklefs, p. 170.

164. Ibid.

165. De Kat Angelino, II, p. 113.

166. See J. D. Legge, *Indonesia*, 3rd. ed. (Sydney: Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp. 135-38; and Friend, pp. 34-42 on Dutch reactions toward mounting nationalism and the security steps taken as counter-measures.

167. See Legge, pp. 121-35; Vlekke, pp. 347-78; and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Nationalism Reconsidered," *Pacific Affairs* 45 (Spring 1972):42-59.

168. Ricklefs, p. 175.

169. Deliar Noer, "Yamin and Hamka: Two Routes to an Indonesian Identity," in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, Asian Studies Association of Australia, Southeast Asia Publications Series no. 4, edited by Anthony Reid and David Marr (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), p. 253.

170. *Indonesian Review*, I, No. 3, p. 214, quoted in Kähler, p. 309.

171. W. Fruin-Mees, *Geschiedenis van Java*, Deel I: Het Hindoetijdperk (Weltevreden, Commissie voor de Volkslectuur, 1919), cited in Reid, p. 288.

172. A. J. Eijkman and F. W. Stapel, *Beknopt leerboek der geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië* (Groningen, 1919); W. F. Stapel, *Geschiendenis van Nederlandsch Indië*, 5 vols. (Amsterdam, 1938-40).

173. See S. Supomo, "The Image of Majapahit in Later Javanese and Indonesian Writing," in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, Asian Studies Association of Australia, Southeast Asia Publications Series no. 4, edited by Anthony Reid and David Marr (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), pp. 171-85.

174. N. J. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis* ('s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1931); G. Coedès, "Le Royaume de Crivijaya," *BEFEO* 28 (1918); and G. Ferrand, *L'Empire sumatranais de Crivijaya* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1922), cited in Reid, p. 289.

175. Reid, p. 293.

176. Suwarno, p. 81.

177. See Drake, pp. 36-44; and, at a more theoretical level, Fritjof Tichelman, *The Social Evolution of Indonesia: The Asiatic Mode of Production and Its Legacy*, trans. Jean Sanders (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), pp. 180-90.

ENDNOTES—CHAPTER II

1. This phrase—*symphony besar antara kekuatan destruktif dan konstruktif*—is taken from a commemorative speech made by President Sukarno on 3 July 1957, "Shaping and Re-shaping Indonesia," in Departemen Penerangan-Propaganda, D.P.P. Partai Nasional Indonesia, *Shaping and Re-shaping Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1964), p. 32.

2. G. J. Resink, *Indonesia's History between the Myths: Essays in Legal History and Historical Thought* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Publishers, 1968), pp. 95 and 264.

3. Rupert Emerson, *Representative Government in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 40.

4. See Philip W. Thayer, ed., *Southeast Asia in the Coming World* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1953).

5. See, for example, U.S., Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, *Analysis of Communist Propaganda in Indonesia* (30 May 1952).

6. See Herbert Feith, "History, Theory, and Indonesian Politics: A Reply to Harry J. Benda," and "The Study of Indonesian Politics: A Survey and an Apologia," in *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate*, Interim Reports Series, Publication no. 62, edited by Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982), pp. 22-29 and 41-53 respectively.

7. A. W. Widjaja, *Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 dan UUD Negara Indonesia dalam Lintasan Sejarah Dua Dasawarsa 1945-1965* (Jakarta: Fajar Agung, 1989), p. 12.

8. Ibid., p. 14.

9. Ibid., Tables II, III, and IV, pp. 15-16, 18, and 142-45.

10. Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Changing Pattern of Indonesia's Representative Government," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 26 (May 1960):220.

11. Widjaja, calculated from Table I, p. 14.

12. Van der Kroef, n. 28, p. 222.

13. The new DPR consisted of representatives drawn from four distinct bodies: the RIS Senate, the RIS House of Representatives, the BK-KNIP, and the Republican Supreme Advisory Council (*Dewan Pertimbang Agung*). According to Van der Kroef, p. 221, the membership ceiling on the RIS bicameral legislature was 200, not 182 as George McTurnan Kahin claims in *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca,

NY: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 464, n. 28. Kahin asserts that the authorized memberships of the latter two bodies were 47 and 18, respectively. Widjaja, p. 18, shedding light on the size of the BP-KNIP, claims that its membership, not including its leaders, was 52.

14. See R. William Liddle, "Participation and the Political Parties," in *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*, edited by Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 171–95 for such a view.

15. Van der Kroef, p. 226; such a claim could only be made accurately in hindsight.

16. Kahin, p. 467.

17. George McT. Kahin, "Indonesia's Strengths and Weaknesses," *Far Eastern Survey* 20 (26 September 1951):161; emphasis in the original.

18. Willard A. Hanna, *Bung Karno's Indonesia. Part III: The Politics of Mystification*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 7, No. 18 (12 September 1959), 274.

19. George McT. Kahin, "The New Indonesian Government," *Far Eastern Survey* 19 (22 November 1950):210–11.

20. On 8 December 1950, the PSII Minister of State Harsono Tjokroaminoto resigned because his party declared its objection to the Cabinet, Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 468, n. 43; on 22 January 1951, two government parties—PIR and Parindra—voted against the government and for a PNI-sponsored opposition motion that was successfully carried in the DPR, according to J. D. Legge, *Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950–1960* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 51, n. 37.

21. Boyd R. Compton, *Muslim Radicalism: The Anticommunist Front*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 3, No. 4 (5 March 1955), 38.

22. Ibid., p. 29.

23. Goh Cheng Teik, "Why Indonesia's Attempt at Democracy in the Mid-1950s Failed," *Modern Asia Studies* 6 (April 1972):234.

24. Ibid.; see also Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 414–61, *passim*.

25. See U.S., Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, *The Sukiman Cabinet in the Republic of Indonesia* (24 August 1951), pp. iii–vii and 1–20.

26. Robert C. Bone, Jr., "The Future of Indonesian Political Parties," *Far Eastern Survey* 23 (February 1954):22.

27. Ibid.

28. U.S., Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, *The Nahdatul Ulama: Indonesia's Third Largest Party* (24 April 1956), p. 11.

29. Willard A. Hanna, *Indonesia's Political Parties: II*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 4, No. 25 (29 December 1956), 360.

30. Even the earlier 1952 plan to create a Front for God and Democracy (*Front Ketuhanan dan Demokrasi*) was an outgrowth or reaction to prior Communist organizational activities. See Compton, p. 31 on this matter.

31. Compton, pp. 33-34.

32. Quoted in Louis Fisher, *The Story of Indonesia* (London: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 235, cited in Baladas Ghoshal, *Indonesian Politics 1955-59: The Emergence of Guided Democracy* (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi & Company, 1982), pp. 36-37, n. 29.

33. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Journal of Asian Studies* 42 (May 1983):483.

34. An overview may be found in Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Difficulties," *Far Eastern Survey* 24 (February 1955):19-20.

35. Goh, p. 233.

36. Millidge Walker and Irene Tinker, "Development and Changing Bureaucratic Styles in Indonesia: The Case of the Pamong Praja," *Pacific Affairs* 48 (Spring 1975):63.

37. Bone, p. 21.

38. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia: Centrifugal Economies," in *Foreign Aid Reexamined: A Critical Appraisal*, edited by James W. Wiggins and Helmut Schoeck (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1958), p. 218, n. 46.

39. Clifford Geertz, *The Development of the Javanese Economy: A Socio-Cultural Approach* (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956), p. 72, quoted in Van der Kroef, "Indonesia: Centrifugal Economies," p. 208.

40. Van der Kroef, "Indonesia: Centrifugal Economies," p. 218, n. 46.

41. Boyd R. Compton, *Indonesian Comment on Conditions in Indonesia*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 3, No. 17 (30 June 1955), 208.

42. Hanna, *Indonesia's Political Parties: II*, p. 368.

43. F. J. Goedhart, *Een Revolutie op Drift: Indonesisch Reisjournaal* (Amsterdam, 1955), pp. 199-200, quoted by Van der Kroef, "The Changing Pattern," p. 227.

44. Van der Kroef, "The Changing Pattern," p. 227.

45. Bruce Glassburner, "Economic Policy-Making in Indonesia, 1950-57," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 10 (January 1962):125. See also Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 46-50, for a more detailed discussion of political parties and business during this period.

46. Boyd R. Compton, *President Sukarno Speaks*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 2, No. 2 (20 November 1954), 13.

47. Robison, p. 50.

48. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey* 22 (September 1953):123.

49. Boyd R. Compton, *Indonesian Communism: The Ranks Swell*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 2, No. 3 (23 November 1954), 25.

50. Ibid.

51. *Indonesia Raya* (Djakarta) editorial of January 1953, quoted by Robert C. Bone, Jr., "Organization of the Indonesian Elections," *American Political Science Review* 49 (December 1955):1072.

52. Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, p. 281.

53. Ibid., p. 355.

54. These included NU, PSII, Parkindo, *Partai Katolik*, Perti, PPTI [*Partai Politik Tharikat Islam*], and AKUI [Islamic Victory Force].

55. Most notably Baperki and *Persatuan Dayak*.

56. Successful examples of this organizational principle included PPPRI and the *Partai Buruh*.

57. These were PKI, Permai, *Partai Murba*, Acoma, and Gerinda.

58. These were IPKI, PRIM, GPPS, PRN, *Partai Buruh*, PRI, and *Partai Rakjat Desa*.

59. Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, p. 279.

60. Quoted in Louis Fisher, *The Story of Indonesia* (London: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 235, cited in Ghoshal, pp. 36–37, n. 29.

61. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities," *Australian Outlook* 21 (December 1967):274.

62. See Goh's succinct critique, pp. 225–26, of Feith's exclusion of the principle of representativeness.

63. Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, pp. 449–50.

64. Widjaja, p. 30.

65. Goh, p. 235.

66. *Times of Indonesia* (Djakarta), 21 March 1956; *Abadi* (Djakarta), 7 January 1957, quoted in Ghoshal, p. 50.

67. Goh, pp. 240–41.

68. Ibid., p. 242.

69. Abdul Haris Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 149.

70. Ibid., pp. 149–50.

71. Ibid., p. 151.

72. See Karl Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 1–23 and 317–38 on the chronology, ideology, and main documents of the DI.

73. Todiruan Dydo, *Pergolakan Politik Tentara: Sebelum dan Sesudah G 30 S/PKI* (Jakarta: Golden Terayon Press, 1989), p. 54; Soegiarso Soerojo, *Siapa Mengabur Angin Akan Menuai Badai: G30S-PKI dan Peran Bung Karno* (Jakarta: PT Rola Sinar Perkasa, 1988), pp. 61–62.

74. Boyd R. Compton, *Revolt in Atjeh!*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 1, No. 15 (21 October 1953), 110–15.

75. Willard A. Hanna, *Challenges to Central Government in Indonesia*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 5, No. 2 (28 February 1957), 30.

76. Theodore Friend, *The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan against the West in Java and Luzon, 1942-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 239; Jackson, p. 1, has estimated that the DII's activities cost 40,000 lives between 1948 and 1962.

77. The state of war was terminated throughout Indonesia and in two *afdeling* and six *onderafdeling* in Kalimantan; the state of seige was lifted in one *afdeling* and one Residency in Kalimantan, the provinces of North and Central Sumatra, and the areas of Central and North Sulawesi, Minahasa, Sangir and Talaud, and North and South Maluku.

78. Bone, p. 1080.

79. Ibid., p. 1084.

80. Willard A. Hanna, *Bung Karno: II*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 4, No. 5 (28 April 1956), 81.

81. MacArthur F. Corsino, *A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the PKI-Aidit* (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), p. 68.

82. Legge, p. 12.

83. Ibid., p. 14.

84. Ibid., p. 67.

85. Hanna, *Challenges to Central Government*, p. 34.

86. Ibid.

87. A. Arthur Schiller, *The Formation of Federal Indonesia, 1945-1949* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955), n. 11, p. 432.

88. Hanna, *Challenges to Central Government*, p. 34.

89. Menteri Dalam Negeri, Republik Indonesia, "*Djawaban atas pemandangan Umum I RAB 1958*" Djaya, Tahun ke III, No. 14, 15, 16, 17, 1958, p. 13, cited in Marsono, *Peranan Pamong Pradja dalam Administrasi Pemerintahan Daerah di Indonesia* (Djakarta: U. P. Praja, 1968), pp. 76-77.

90. Legge, p. 27, summarizes their features.

91. Ibid., p. 60.

92. Schiller, p. 315.

93. Ibid., p. 326.

94. Ibid., p. 336.

95. Legge, pp. 102–3.

96. See, generally, Benjamin Higgins, "Indonesia's Development Plans and Problems," *Pacific Affairs* 29 (June 1956):107–25; Everett D. Hawkins, "Prospects for Economic Development in Indonesia," *World Politics* 8 (October 1955):91–111; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Economic Development in Indonesia: Some Social and Cultural Impediments," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 4 (1955/1956):116–33; and Allen M. Sievers, *The Mystical World of Indonesia: Culture and Economic Development in Conflict* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), pp. 190–206.

97. Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Dutch Position in Indonesia Today," *Far Eastern Survey* 23 (June 1954):92.

98. D. W. Fryer, "Indonesia's Economic Prospects," *Far Eastern Survey* 23 (December 1954):178.

99. Ibid., p. 177.

100. See Howard W. Dick, "Interisland Trade, Economic Integration, and the Emergence of the National Economy," in *Indonesian Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era*, Monograph Series no. 35, edited by Anne Booth, W. J. O'Malley, and Anna Weidemann (New Haven, CN: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Center for International Area Studies, 1990), pp. 296–321.

101. Hanna, *Challenges to Central Government*, pp. 32–33.

102. On 16 February 1956, Prime Minister Harahap announced his Cabinet's decision to abrogate the Netherlands-Indonesia Union statute, leaving intact the Financial and Economic Agreements. On 4 August 1956, Indonesia repudiated its debts, assumed under the aforementioned agreements, to the Netherlands, consisting of 650 million guilders or $ 171 million, U.S., Department of State, "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands," *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957*, Vol. 22, *Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 293.

103. According to the United States' "National Intelligence Estimate" of 7 August 1956, found in U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957*, Vol. 22, *Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 290–91.

104. In East Java, Lieutenant-Colonel Sudirman took control of the Brawidjaja Division from Lieutenant-Colonel Suwondho; in Eastern Indonesia, Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Warouw ousted Colonel Gatot Subroto; and in South Sumatra, Colonel Bambang Utojo eventually displaced Lieutenant-Colonel Kosasih.

105. Amrin Imron; Hayun Ugaya; Sri Suko Ba; and Tanu Suherly, *Sedjarah Perkembangan Angkatan-Darat*, Seri Text-Book Sedjarah ABRI, C3 (Djakarta: Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan, Pusat Sedjarah ABRI, 1971), p. 56.

106. Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," *Indonesia* no. 11 (April 1971):141, n. 14.

107. Ibid., p. 142.

108. Ibid., pp. 152–53.

109. Van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Difficulties," p. 18.

110. Willard A. Hanna, *COUPS, "SMUGGLES," DEMONSTRATIONS and KORUPSI: Some Recurring Phenomena of the Year 1956 in Indonesia*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 5, No. 1 (18 January 1957), 12.

111. U.S., Department of State, "Report by the Intelligence Advisory Committee," (5 March 1957), *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. 22, *Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 362.

112. Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, p. 353.

113. Ibid., pp. 356–57.

ENDNOTES—CHAPTER III

1. Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 353 and 356-57. Notable examples of this genre of study include Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Wielders," *World Politics* 16 (October 1963):79-97; Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication," *American Political Science Review* 56 (December 1962):915-26; Jose Arsenio Torres, "The Political Ideology of Guided Democracy," *Review of Politics* 25 (January 1963):34-63; Donald E. Weatherbee, *Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution*, Southeast Asia Series, Monograph Series no. 8 (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1966); Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974); and David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

2. See Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, pp. 32-45, 113-22, and 572-78.

3. Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).

4. Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Military in Research on Indonesian Politics," *Journal of Asian Studies* 31 (February 1972):355-65; Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

5. Included in this group are Baladas Ghoshal, *The Role of the Military in Indonesia* (Madras: Madras University Press, 1980); S. Krishamurthy, "The Political Role of the Army in Burma and Indonesia," *International Studies* 12 (July—September 1973):397-415; Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," 2 pts. *Indonesia* 11 (April 1971):131-76, and 13 (April 1972):147-81; Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 185-230; and C. L. M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography* (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985).

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8. Olle Törnquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia* (London: Zed Press, 1986).

9. Mortimer, p. 400.

10. Françoise Cayrac-Blanchard, *Le parti communiste indonésien* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1973).

11. See Sheldon W. Simon, *The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta and the PKI* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969); and Antonie C. A. Dake, *In the Spirit of the Red Banteng: Indonesian Communists between Moscow and Peking 1959–1965* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).

12. Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia: The PKI's 'Road to Power'," in *The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements*, ed. Robert A. Scalapino (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 256–89.

13. MacArthur F. Corsino, *A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the PKI-Aidit* (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982).

14. See Fritjof Tichelman, "The PKI and the Abangan," in *The Social Evolution of Indonesia: The Asiatic Mode of Production and Its Legacy*, trans. Jean Sanders (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), pp. 230-50.

15. See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, "The Communist Revolt in Java. The Background," *Far Eastern Survey* 17 (17 November 1948):257–60; George McT. Kahin, "The Communist Revolt in Java. The Crisis and Its Aftermath," *Far Eastern Survey* 17 (17 November 1948):261–64; Martin Ebon, "Indonesian Communism: From Failure to Success," *Review of Politics* 25 (January 1963):91–109.

16. Lembaga Studi Ilmu-Ilmu Kemasyarakatan, *Rangkaian Peristiwa Pemberontakan Komunis di Indonesia: 1926-1948-1965* (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Ilmu-Ilmu Kemasyarakatan, 1988), p. 31.

17. *Dwi Windu Orde Baru* (Jakarta: B. P. Alda, 1982), p. 28.

18. M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present* (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 217.

19. Hindley, p. 21.

20. *Dwi Windu Orde Baru*, p. 19.

21. Hindley, p. 22.

22. "*Memasuki Tahun 1951*," *Bintang Merah*, editorial (1–15 January 1951), p. 4, quoted in Hindley, p. 24.

23. See Rex Mortimer, "Class, Social Cleavage and Indonesian Communism," in *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate*, Interim Reports Series, Publication no. 62, edited by Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982), pp. 54-68.

24. *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), 16 August 1951, quoted in Hindley, p. 56.

25. M. H. Lukman, "*Partai dan Organisasi Massa*," *Bintang Merah* (15 February 1951), pp. 104-5, quoted in Hindley, p. 129.

26. Ibid.

27. Partai Komunis Indonesia, *Konstitusi Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1951), p. 21, quoted in Hindley, p. 131.

28. Lukman, "Partai dan Organisasi Massa," quoted in Hindley, p. 129.

29. Hindley, p. 56.

30. The demands consisted of opposing the Japanese peace treaty (of September 1951), the Mutual Security Aid agreement with the United States (which Foreign Minister Subardjo of the Sukiman Cabinet signed in February 1952), the Round Table Agreements, and the *Darul Islam*, and to gain Irian Barat.

31. *Sin Po* (Jakarta), 22 March 1951, quoted in Hindley, p. 51.

32. Boyd R. Compton, *Indonesian Communism: The Ranks Swell*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 2, No. 3 (23 November 1954), 18.

33. Justus M. van der Kroef, "D. N. Aidit—Indonesian Architect of Success and Failure," in *Leaders of the Communist World*, ed. Rodger Swearingen (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1971), p. 60.

34. D. N. Aidit, "*Perkuat Persatuan Nasional dan Perkuat Partai!*" *Pilihan Tulisan*, I, p. 297, quoted by Hindley, p. 80.

35. Cayrac-Blanchard, p. 92, alludes to this aspect of the Party's work.

36. Hindley, p. 78.

37. Ibid., p. 83.

38. *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), 21 January 1956, quoted in Hindley, p. 82.

39. Hindley, p. 77.

40. Ibid., p. 83.

41. Ibid., p. 92.

42. In January 1955, the name was changed to *Kehidupan Partai—Party Life*.

43. In January 1957, the name was changed to *Review of Indonesia*.

44. After the 1957 local elections, this quarterly was retitled *PKI dan Perwakilan-PKI and Representation*.

45. This publication was later renamed *Ilmu Marxis-Marxist Knowledge*.

46. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 221.

47. Hindley, p. 169.

48. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 204. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Labour Movement, Its Developments and Prospects," *United Asia* 5 (August 1953):223-31; and John E. Moes, "Trade Unionism in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey* 28 (February 1959):17-24.

49. Compton, *Indonesian Communism: The Ranks Swell*, p. 21. The Lembaga Studi Ilmu-Ilmu Kemasyarakatan, *Rangkaian Peristiwa Pemberontakan Komunis di Indonesia: 1926-1948-1965* (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Ilmu-Ilmu Kemasyarakatan, 1988), p. 43, has provided the following compilation of SOBSI members and their membership sizes at an unspecified period in time:

SARBUPRI (Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia) +/- 390,000
SBG (Sarekat Buruh Gula) 305,000
SARBUKSI (Sarekat Buruh Kehutanan Seluruh Indonesia) 250,000
SEPDA (Sarekat Pegawai Daerah) 99,000
SBPU (Sarekat Buruh Pekerjaan Umum) 51,000
SBKA (Sarekat Buruh Kereta Api) 70,000
SBPP (Sarekat Buruh Pegawai Pelabuhan) 70,000
SBKB (Sarekat Buruh Kendaraan Bermotor) 40,000
SOBSI, POSTEL (Pos dan Telepon) 50,000
SERBAUD (Sarekat Buruh Angkatan Udara) 3,000
PERBUM (Perserikatan Buruh Minjak) 30,000
BURUH TEKSTIL (batik) 94,000
BURUH KEMENTERIAN PERTAHANAN 80,000
SB KEPENJARAAN 10,000
SARBUFIS (Sarekat Buruh Filem) 8,000

50. Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Dutch Position in Indonesia Today," *Far Eastern Survey* 23 (June 1954):92; emphasis added.

51. Compton, p. 24.

52. Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, pp. 353–54.

53. Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 62.

54. Ibid.

55. Calculated from Table 6 in Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, p. 85.

56. Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957–59*, Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 91, n. 42.

57. Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 223.

58. Ibid., p. 225.

59. Calculated from Table 2, J. D. Legge, *Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950–1960* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 150.

60. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Communist Policy and Tactics in Indonesia," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 5 (November 1959):173.

61. Lev, p. 101.

62. Communist Party of Indonesia, *Programme of the Communist Party of Indonesia [Adopted at the Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia, March 1953]* (Djakarta: Agitprop Department of the Communist Party of Indonesia, 1953), p. 9.

63. Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, p. 53.

64. Amrin Imran; Hayun Ugaya; Sri Suko Ba; and Tanu Suherly, *Sedjarah Perkembangan Angkatan-Darat*, Seri Text-Book Sedjarah ABRI, no. C3 (Djakarta: Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan, Pusat Sedjarah ABRI, 1971), pp. 51–52.

65. Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, p. 60.

66. Ibid., pp. 60–61.

67. Ibid., p. 66.

68. McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," pt. 1, p. 145, n. 7.

69. Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, p. 66.

70. Ibid., p. 75.

71. McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," pt. 1, p. 145, n. 17.

72. Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, p. 75.

73. A. H. Nasution, *Tjatatan² Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia* (Djakarta, n.p., 1955), p. 36, quoted in Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, p. 68.

74. See McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," pt. 1, p. 152, n. 26.

75. A. H. Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 66.

76. Ibid., p. 74.

77. Ibid., pp. 94–95.

78. Ibid., p. 113.

79. Ibid., p. 84.

80. Ibid., pp. 90–91.

81. Ibid., pp. 73 and 74.

82. Ibid., p. 75.

83. Ibid., p. 100.

84. Ibid., p. 101.

85. Ibid., p. 102.

86. Ibid., p. 103.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, p. 81.

90. Ibid., p. 94.

91. Willard A. Hanna, *COUPS, "SMUGGLES," DEMONSTRATIONS AND KORUPSI: Some Recurring Phenomena of the Year 1956 in Indonesia*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 5, No. 1 (18 January 1957), 11.

92. McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," pt. 1, p. 167.

93. Ibid., pp. 172-73.

94. Ibid., p. 155.

95. Baladas Ghoshal, *Indonesian Politics 1955-59: The Emergence of Guided Democracy* (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi & Company, 1982), p. 60.

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98. H. A. Notosoetardjo, ed., *Proses Kembali Djiwa Proklamasi 1945. Apakah Demokrasi Terpimpin Itu?* (Djakarta: Lembaga Penggali dan Penghimpunan Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia-Endang-Pemuda, 1959), p. 90, quoted in Reeve, pp. 117-18.

99. Imam Pratignyo, *Ungkapan Sejarah: Lahirnya Golongan Karya Perjoangan Menegakkan Kembali Negara Proklamasi 17-8-1945* (Jakarta: Yayasan Bhakti, 1982), p. 33.

100. Ibid., p. 37.

101. Reeve, p. 118.

102. Ibid., p. 119.

103. Pratignyo, p. 40.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., p. 39.

106. Lev, p. 33.

107. Hans O. Schmitt, "Foreign Capital and Social Conflict in Indonesia, 1950-1958," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 10 (April 1962):289.

108. J. Leyser, "Indonesia's Nationalization of Dutch Enterprises and International Law," *Australian Outlook* 14 (August 1960):200-10.

109. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Disunited Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey* 27 (April 1958):59.

110. Yong Mun Cheong, "The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-59," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 7 (March 1976):99.

111. Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, p. 131.

112. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Journal of Asian Studies* 42 (May 1983):484; emphasis in the original.

113. Yong, p. 98.

114. Pratignyo, p. 41.

115. Ibid., p. 42.

116. Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey* 27 (September 1958):141.

117. Legge, *Central Authority and Regional Autonomy*, p. 203.

118. Pauker, p. 141.

119. D. N. Aidit, *The Selected Works of D. N. Aidit*, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Joint Publications Research Service 8886), p. 293, quoted in Törnquist, p. 100.

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2. The regulation in question was the "Territoriale Zee en Maritieme Kringen Ordonnantie 1939" (*Staatsblad* 1939 No. 442); it limited Batavia's maritime control to three miles around any given island.

3. U.S., Department of State, "Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State. Djakarta, December 30, 1957," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,* Vol. 22, *Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 578.

4. "Revolt in Indonesia: The Islands and Communism," *The Round Table* no. 190 (March 1958):130–37.

5. See the speech of 22 February 1958 by A. H. Nasution, *Sumpah T.N.I.: Menjalamatkan Negara*, Penerbitan Chusus, no. 6 (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1958).

6. Willard A. Hanna, *Bung Karno's Indonesia Part VII: The Rebel Cause*, AUFS Reports, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 7, No. 22 (9 October 1959), 322.

7. Ibid.

8. Maurice Hauriou, "The Theory of the Institution and the Foundation: A Study in Social Vitalism," in *The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, George Renard, Joseph T. Delos*, ed. Albert Broderick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 103.

9. Republik Indonesia, *Peraturan Penguasa Perang Pusat No. Prt/Peperpu/022/1958 Tentang "Panggilan terhadap orang-orang warga-negara untuk bekerdja dan mendjalankan kewadjiban jang merupakan bantuan kepada alat-alat Negara dalam pendjagaan keamanan, penjelenggaraan pertahan sipil, maupun untuk mendjalankan pekerdjaan jang bersifatkan kemiliteran menurut kemampuan jang dapat mereka lakukan serta keharusan mengikuti latihan-latihan"*, Penerbitan Chusus, no. 13 (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, n.d.).

10. Staf Angkatan Darat, Staf Harian Penguasa Perang Pusat, *Salinan: Pedoman dan Petundjuk Hubungan dengan Instruksi Penguasa Perang Pusat/K.S.A.D. No. INST/PEPERPU/026/1959, Tanggal 28 Mei 1958 Angka 3 H*, in *Djawaban Pemerintah mengenai R.U.U. tentang Perpandjangan Djangka Waktu Keadaan Perang*, Penerbitan Chusus, no. 40 (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan, n.d.), pp. 118–19.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 121.

13. Ibid., p. 124.

14. Kementerian Pertahanan Staf Angkatan Darat, *Instruksi Penguasa Perang Pusat No. Instr/Peperpu/030/1958. tentang Pembentukan Pasukan-Pasukan Territorial*, in *Djawaban Pemerintah mengenai R.U.U. tentang Perpandjangan Djangka Waktu Keadaan Perang*, Penerbitan Chusus, no. 40 (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan, n.d.), pp. 129-133.

15. Kementerian Pertahanan Staf Angkatan Darat, *Salinan Instruksi Penguasa Perang Pusat No. Instr./Peperpu/041/1958 tentang "Pembentukan Regu-Regu Keamanan Didesa-desa, Perusahaan-perusahaan, Perkebunan-perkebunan dan Objek-objek Lain yang Penting"*, in *Djawaban Pemerintah mengenai R.U.U. tentang Perpandjangan Djangka Waktu Keadaan Perang*, Penerbitan Chusus, no. 40 (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan, n.d.), pp. 134-42.

16. Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey* 27 (September 1958):141.

17. Yong Mun Cheong, "The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-59," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 7 (March 1976):98; David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 146, lists ten bodies.

18. Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-59*, Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 65, n. 35.

19. Pauker, p. 141.

20. C. L. M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985), p. 128.

21. Ibid., p. 129.

22. Pauker, p. 141.

23. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 129; see Lev, pp. 187–88, n. 36.

24. Lev, pp. 169–70, n. 102.

25. Yong gives figures for the parties' separate ormas on p. 97.

26. Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), p. 217.

27. David Jenkins, "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of *Dwifungsi*," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 11 (1983):20.

28. *Pos Indonesia* (Djakarta), 13 November 1958, quoted in Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 133–34.

29. Yong, p. 96.

30. Roeslan Abdulgani, "Indonesia's National Council: The First Year," *Far Eastern Survey* 27 (July 1958):100.

31. See H. Djuanda, *Keterangan Pemerintah Mengenai Pelaksanaan Demokrasi Terpimpin dalam Rangka Kembali ke U.U.D. 1945*, Penerbitan Chusus, no. 45 (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1959); and J. K. Tumakaka, *Demokrasi Terpimpin*, Penerbitan Chusus, no. 49 (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1959).

32. See Muhammad Ridhwan Indra, *In the 1945 Constitution the Executive Power is More Pronounced than the Other Powers (Executive Heavy)* (Jakarta: Haji Masagung, 1988); and Muhammad Ridhwan Indra, *The President's Position under the 1945 Constitution* (Jakarta: Haji Masagung, 1989).

33. A. H. Nasution, *Tjatatan^2 Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia* (Djakarta, n.p., 1955), pp. 102-8, quoted in Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 158, n. 48.

34. A. W. Widjaja, *Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 dan UUD Negara Indonesia dalam Lintasan Sejarah Dua Dasawarsa 1945-1965* (Jakarta: Fajar Agung, 1989), pp. 145–46.

35. Reeve, p. 163.

36. Sundhaussen, pp. 145–46; Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," *Indonesia* no. 11 (April 1971):151.

37. Jenkins, p. 21.

38. Ateng Syafrudin, *Pamongpraja Sebagai Golongan Karya Pemerintahan Umum/Jabatan Pamongpraja dalam Penelitian Antropologi Budaya dan Hukum Adat* (Bandung: Singa Marga, n.d), p. 6.

39. Reeve, p. 146.

40. Syafrudin, p. 6.

41. Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program, and Tactics* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1965), p. 224.

42. J. D. Legge, *Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950-1960* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 223.

43. Sundhaussen, p. 146.

44. These were PNI, NU, PKI, PSII, *Partai Katolik*, Parkindo, Perti, and Murba; Partindo, a left-wing splinter of PNI, and IPKI (freshly purged at Nasution's insistence of PRRI sympathizers and collaborators), joined later; Sundhaussen, pp. 146–48.

45. Reeve, p. 165.

46. Hindley, p. 277.

47. Ibid.

48. See B. Glassburner and K. D. Thomas, "The Swing of the Hoe; Retooling Begins in Indonesia," *Asian Survey* 1 (June 1961):3–12; Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia's Eight-Year Development Plan," *Pacific Affairs* 34 (Summer 1961):115–30; and Don D. Humphrey, "Indonesia's National Plan for Economic Development," *Asian Survey* 2 (December 1962):12–21.

49. See. A. H. Nasution, ""The TNI's Task and Position under the Political Manifesto," and "The Armed Forces and the Overall Development," *Towards a People's Army* (Djakarta: Delegasi, 1964), pp. 16–36 and 37–48.

50. Sundhaussen, p. 141.

51. Discussed in A. Yani, "Territorial Warfare Indoctrination Within the Framework of the Development of the Armed Forces," in *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, Memorandum RM-3312-PR, November 1963, ed. Guy J. Pauker (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), pp. 249–51; see A. H. Nasution, "National Defence and Security Policy," and "How to Avert Dangers to Our National Security," *Towards a People's Army* (Djakarta: Delegasi, 1964), pp. 49–60 and 61–69.

52. See A. H. Nasution, "Side by Side with the People," and "The Indonesian National Army and the Revolution," in *Towards a People's Army* (Djakarta: Delegasi, 1964), pp. 87–92 and 93–114.

53. Yani, p. 258.

54. Ibid.

55. Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," *Indonesia* no. 13 (April 1972):176.

56. "Appendix II. Explanation of Defense and Security Policy," in Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine*, p. 225.

57. *Bulletin BKS-Tamil*, no. 1, 1960, pp. 3-4, quoted in Reeve, p. 144.

58. Reeve, p. 176.

59. Ibid., p. 177.

60. Sundhaussen, p. 153.

61. *Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), 13 February 1959, cited in Reeve, p. 146.

62. See Imam Pratignyo, *Ungkapan Sejarah: Lahirnya Golongan Karya Perjoangan Menegakkan Kembali Negara Proklamasi 17-8-1945* (Jakarta: Yayasan Bhakti, 1982), pp. 62-70, for an elliptic discussion of the *Front*.

63. Sundhaussen, p. 152.

64. Ibid.

65. Reeve, p. 181.

66. Ibid., pp. 181-82.

67. Sundhaussen, pp. 141-42.

68. A. H. Nasution, "Our Military Policy," in *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, Memorandum RM-3312-PR, November 1963, ed. Guy J. Pauker (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), p. 275.

69. Guy J. Pauker, ed., "The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management: Its Origins and Functions," in *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, Memorandum RM-3312-PR, November 1963 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), p. 16.

70. McVey, pt. 2, p. 171.

71. Hindley, p. 85.

72. Ibid., p. 86.

73. Reeve, p. 146.

74. Ibid.

75. Hindley, p. 87.

76. Ibid., p. 86.

77. Ibid., p. 166.

78. *Review of Indonesia* (August-September-October 1964), p. 16, quoted in Françoise Cayrac-Blanchard, *Le parti communist indonésien* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1973), p. 89.

79. MacArthur F. Corsino, *A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the PKI-Aidit* (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), p. 99.

80. Ibid.

81. Although not discussed in the literature, this Department certainly existed, as evidenced in passing citation in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 335.

82. Cayrac-Blanchard, pp. 90–91.

83. Corsino, p. 99.

84. Hindley, p. 169.

85. Ibid., p. 191.

86. See D. N. Aidit, "Ideological Work in the Communist Party of Indonesia," *World Marxist Review* 2 (July 1959):24–27; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Agrarian Reform and the Indonesian Communist Party," *Far Eastern Survey* 29 (January 1960):5–13; D. N. Aidit, "Party Building and Mass Work," *World Marxist Review* 5 (September 1962):29–35; and Donald Hindley, "The PKI and the Peasants," *Problems of Communism* 11 (November-December 1962):28–36.

87. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, pp. 200–201.

88. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communist Policy and the Sixth Party Congress," *Pacific Affairs* 33 (September 1960):227–49.

89. Ruth McVey, "Teaching Modernity: The PKI as an Educational Institution," *Indonesia* no. 50 (October 1990):25.

90. Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 90.

91. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 200.

92. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 12.

93. Aidit, "Ideological Work," p. 25.

94. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 13.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid., p. 9.

97. Aidit cited in *Review of Indonesia* (March 1957), p. 3, quoted in Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 30.

98. D. N. Aidit, *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution: Basic Problems of the Indonesian Revolution* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1958).

99. Ruth T. McVey, "The Enchantment of the Revolution: History and Action in an Indonesian Communist Text," in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, Asian Studies Association of Australia, Southeast Asia Publications Series no. 4, edited by Anthony Reid and David Marr (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), p. 348.

100. Ibid., p. 342.

101. Ibid., p. 351.

102. Ibid., p. 349.

103. Ibid., pp. 347–48.

104. Ibid., p. 355.

105. Ibid., p. 357.

106. Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 39.

107. Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, *Dokumen-Dokumen Konferensi Nasional SOBSI (1957)* (Djakarta: n.p., 1958), p. 25, quoted in Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 145.

108. Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 146.

109. *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), 10 July 1956, quoted in Hindley, "The PKI and the Peasants,"p. 30; emphasis in the original.

110. Aidit, *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution*, p. 61.

111. Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 36.

112. D. N. Aidit, *Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Sixth Congress of the PKI*, 1959, quoted in Oey Hong Lee, *Indonesian Government and Press during Guided Democracy*, Hull Monographs on Southeast Asia no. 4 (Hull: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, The University of Hull, 1971), p. 219.

ENDNOTES—CHAPTER V

1. See, for example, Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959–1965* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1974); and Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication," *American Political Science Review* 56 (December 1962):915-26.

2. A. H. Nasution, "Our Military Policy," in *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, Memorandum RM-3312-PR, November 1963, ed. Guy J. Pauker (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), pp. 261-99.

3. Ibid., p. 275.

4. Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program, and Tactics* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1965), p. 248.

5. Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," *Pacific Affairs* 36 (Spring 1963):32–46; Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 36 (Winter 1963–64):349–64.

6. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, pp. 222–23; Njono, "*Terus Perbaiki Pekerdjaan Partai Dikalangan Kaum Buruh*," in *Madju Terus! Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) Partai Komunis Indonesia Djakarta 25–30 April 1962 I* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963), p. 139.

7. See Guy J. Pauker, "General Nasution's Mission to Moscow," *Asian Survey* 1 (March 1961):13–22; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Nasution, Sukarno and the West New Guinea Dispute," *Asian Survey* 1 (August 1961):20–24.

8. See M. Cholil, *Sejarah Operasi^2 Pembebasan Irian-Barat*, Seri Text-Book Sejarah ABRI, no. B6 (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan, 1979).

9. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 165.

10. Imam Pratignyo, *Ungkapan Sejarah: Lahirnya Golongan Karya Perjoangan Menegakkan Kembali Negara Proklamasi 17-8-1945* (Jakarta: Yayasan Bhakti, 1982), pp. 64–65.

11. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, pp. 199–200.

12. There was the League of Islamic Peasants of Indonesia (*Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia*) and the PNI's Petani; Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), p. 179.

13. Comite Central, Partai Komunis Indonesia, *AD—ART (Konstitusi) Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)* (Djakarta: 1962).

14. D. N. Aidit, "*Untuk Demokrasi, Persatuan dan Mobilisasi*," in *Madju Terus! Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) Partai Komunis Indonesia Djakarta 25-30 April 1962 I* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963), p. 11.

15. The former measure defined the conditions for the continued existence of parties, requiring, for example, their commitment to a *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (as defined in the 1945 Constitution); adherence to the *Pancasila*; and dedication to the Manipol. All parties were threatened with dissolution should they or their members be associated with rebellion. See Republik Indonesia, Departemen Penerangan, *Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 7 Tahun 1959 tentang Sjarat-Sjarat dan Penjederhanaan Kepartaian*, Penerbitan Chusus, no. 89 (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan, n.d.), pp. 3-13. The latter measure compelled all parties "to register for official recognition, by reporting by 31 December 1960 their constitution, total of branches and members, the name, age, and occupation of each member, and accounts of their funds, receipts, and expenditures." See David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 165.

16. Aidit, p. 11.

17. Ibid., p. 76; emphasis in the original. The OPPI was the United Organization of Indonesian Workers (*Organisasi Persatuan Pekerja Indonesia*) and the PTKs were the Unions of *Karyawan* Forces (*Persatuan Tenaga Karyawan*), which were located in nationalized industries.

18. Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 98.

19. *Madju Terus Menggempur Imperialisme dan Feodalisme! (Sidang Pleno ke-II CC PKI, Achir Desember 1960)*, (Djakarta, 1961), pp. 37-39, quoted in Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 190.

20. Djokosudjono, "*Kebesaran PKI Berarti Kebesaran Nasakom dan Kekalahan Kaum Imperialis dan Tuantanah*," in *Madju Terus! Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) Partai Komunis Indonesia Djakarta 25-30 April 1962 I* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963), p. 304.

21. Njono, p. 135.

22. Aidit, p. 81.

23. Suharti, "*Meningkatkan Peranan dan Martabat Wanita Komunis untuk Mengibarkan Tinggi^2 Tripandji Partai dan Tripandji Bangsa*," in *Madju Terus!*

Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) Partai Komunis Indonesia Djakarta 25-30 April 1962 I (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963), p. 128.

24. Aidit, p. 77.

25. Djokosudjono, p. 306.

26. Pradigdo, "*Kembangkan Aktivitet Komisi Verifikasi untuk Mentjegah Timbulnja Gedjala Birokrasi*," in *Madju Terus! Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) Partai Komunis Indonesia Djakarta 25-30 April 1962 I* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963), p. 222.

27. P. Perdede, "*Laporan Komisi Mandat kepada Kongres Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) PKI*," in *Madju Terus! Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) Partai Komunis Indonesia Djakarta 25-30 April 1962 I* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963), p. 167.

28. Djokosudjono, p. 305.

29. A. Anwar Sanusi, "*'Front Nasional' jang Diketuai Presiden Sukarno Mulai Bergerak Serempak Keluar dan Kedalam*," in *Madju Terus! Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) Partai Komunis Indonesia Djakarta 25-30 April 1962 I* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963), p. 255.

30. Aidit, p. 28.

31. Niklas Luhmann, *The Differentiation of Society*, trans. Stephen Holmes and Charles Larmore (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 100.

32. Ibid., p. 102.

33. Djokosudjono, p. 308.

34. Aidit, p. 71.

35. B. C. Samah, "*Dengan Lima Lebih Memperbaiki Pekerdjaan Penerbitan dan Pengedaran Literatur Partai*," in *Madju Terus! Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) Partai Komunis Indonesia Djakarta 25-30 April 1962 I* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963), p. 300.

36. Djokosudjono, p. 307.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 309.

39. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 179.

40. Sudisman, "*Berkompetisi Sosialis untuk Mensukseskan 'Gerakan 4 Meningkat'*," in *Madju Terus! Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) Partai Komunis Indonesia Djakarta 25–30 April 1962 I* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963), p. 238.

41. Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 156.

42. Sukarno, *Genap Setahun Trikora dan Dekrit Penghapusan S.O.B.*, Penerbitan Chusus, no. 246 (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1962).

43. See Reeve, p. 195.

44. Sundhaussen, p. 163.

45. According to Hindley, Kotoe was formed in mid-1962 and the Committee of Seventeen on 12 October 1962, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 289. Guy J. Pauker, ed., writes of the Committee of Seventeen as making proposals for the termination of the state of emergency, "The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management: Its Origin and Functions," *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, Memorandum RM-3312-PR, November 1963 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), p. 42. On the MPPR, see Pratignyo, p. 71; Reeve, p. 215; and J. D. Legge, "Indonesia After West Irian," *Australian Outlook* 17 (April 1963):13–14.

46. Reeve, p. 215; Legge indicates the composition of the MPPR to have been the Chairman and three Vice Chairman of the MPRS, the Speaker of the DPRGR, the Minister of Defence and the Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff (Nasution), the three services' Chiefs of Staff, the Minister for External Affairs, the Chief Commissioner of the Police, and the Minister of the Interior, pp. 13-14, n. 11.

47. Pratignyo, p. 71, n. 12.

48. Republik Indonesia, Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara, *Ketetapan Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara Republik Indonesia No. III/MPRS/1963 tentang Pengangkatan Pemimpin Besar Revolusi Indonesia Bung Karno Menjadi Presiden Republik Indonesia Seumur Hidup*, in *Bahan-Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi* (Djakarta: B. P. Prapantja, 1965), pp. 1171–82.

49. The fact that the Consultative Body of State Leadership (*Musjawarah Pimpinan Negara*), consisting of senior Ministers along with eight Deputy Chairmen of the MPRS and DPRGR, was formed in March 1962 seems to test this statement, Reeve, pp. 214–15.

50. Legge, p. 16.

51. Ibid.

52. Herbert Feith, "Politics of Economic Decline," in *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia*, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), p. 52.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 53.

55. Legge, p. 17.

56. T. K. Tan, "Sukarnian Economics," in *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia*, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), pp. 35-36.

57. Sundhaussen, p. 166 and p. 220, n. 11.

58. Article 21 of the Economic Declaration, quoted in Tan, p. 37.

59. Tan, p. 37.

60. Soegiarso Soerojo, *Siapa Menabur Angin Akan Menuai Badai: G30S-PKI dan Peran Bung Karno* (Jakarta: Rola Sinar Perkasa, 1988), p. 114.

61. Tan, p. 38.

62. Soerojo, p. 114.

63. Tan, p. 35.

64. United States Economic Survey Team to Indonesia, *Indonesia: Perspective and Proposals for United States Economic Aid* (New Haven, CN: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1963).

65. Tan, p. 39.

66. Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine*, pp. 140–41.

67. Ibid., p. 164.

68. Sundhaussen, p. 143.

69. Pauker, "The Indonesian Doctrine," pp. 33-34.

70. Ibid., p. 34.

71. Ibid., p. 16.

72. Ibid., p. 38.

73. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 269.

74. Pauker, "The Indonesian Doctrine," pp. 43–44; translation adjusted to accord with original as found in S. Sokowati, *T.N.I. dan Civic-Mission: Suatu Aspek Pembinaan Wilajah*, Penerbitan Chusus, no. 251 (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan, n.d.), pp. 101–5.

75. As outlined by Sokowati and acknowledged by both Nasution and Yani in *T.N.I. dan Civic-Mission*, pp. 9–10 and 11 respectively.

76. Achmad Yani, "Territorial Warfare Indoctrination Within the Framework of the Development of the Armed Forces," in *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, Memorandum RM-3312-PR, November 1963, ed. Guy J. Pauker (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), p. 260.

77. Siliwangi Commander Adjie, *Pikiran Rakjat* (Bandung), 13 August 1962, quoted in Sundhaussen, p. 175.

78. Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," *Indonesia* no. 13 (April 1972):173.

79. Tan, p. 38.

80. Pauker, "The Indonesian Doctrine," p. 42; Reeve states that 30 infantry and 10 support battalions were dedicated to Civic Action schemes, p. 190.

81. Reeve, p. 190.

82. Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, *Bantuan Angkatan Perang dalam Pembangunan* (Bandung: Seskoad, 1964), pp. 4–5.

83. Ibid., pp. 11–12.

84. Ibid., p. 4.

85. Ibid., p. 12.

86. Ibid., p. 14.

87. Ibid., p. 16.

88. Pauker, pp. 30–31.

89. Ibid., p. 30.

90. See *Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 371 Tahun 1962* and *Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 655 Tahun 1961* in Sokowati, pp. 101–5 and 111–12 respectively.

91. Reeve, pp. 181–82.

92. Ibid., p. 182.

93. SOKSI, *SOKSI Menjawab* (Djakarta: n.p., 1964), p. 7.

94. Ibid., p. 9.

95. Ibid.

96. Presidium, Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia, *SOKSI Manunggal dengan Revolusi Pancasila* (Djakarta: n.p., 1965), p. 9.

97. Reeve, p. 220.

98. SOKSI, pp. 27–29.

99. Ibid., p. 27.

100. Ibid., pp. 27–29.

101. Ibid., p. 27.

102. Reeve identifies Suhardiman as the Secretary of BANAS (*Badan Nasionalisasi Perusahaan-Perusahaan Belanda*), the organization charged with supervising these nationalized enterprises, p. 191.

103. Reeve, p. 219.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., p. 221.

107. Dewan Nasional SOBSI, *Peranan dan Tugas Dewan Perusahaan* (Djakarta: n.p., 1963), cited in Reeve, p. 218.

108. Reeve, p. 218.

109. Suhardiman, *Rawe-Rawe Rantas, Malang-Malang Putung* (Djakarta: Biro Penerangan SOKSI, 1963?), pp. 14–15, cited in Reeve, p. 223.

110. Reeve, p. 223.

111. SOKSI, p. 4.

112. Ibid., p. 5.

113. For example, the section entitled "*SOKSI Mendjadi Sasaran Musuh2 Revolusi*," occupies slightly more than seven full pages in *SOKSI Mendjawab* (pp. 16-23); the next largest section, consisting of exhortatory conclusions, occupies half this space (pp. 31-33).

114. Presidium, Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia, *Thesis SOKSI* (Djakarta: n.p., 1965), pp. 53-54; SOKSI, p. 16.

115. SOKSI, pp. 9-11.

116. Ibid., p. 11.

117. *Bendera Buruh*, no. 1 (September 1963):10, quoted in Reeve, p. 223.

118. Reeve, p. 220.

119. See Reeve's report from SOBSI sources on p. 221.

120. Jacques Leclerc, "An Ideological Problem of Indonesian Trade Unionism in the Sixties: 'Karyawan' versus 'Buruh'," *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 6 (January-June 1972):87.

121. See, for example, Uri Ra'anan, "Indonesia 1965," in *The Politics of the Coup D'Etat*, edited by William G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan (New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969), pp. 43-64.

122. See, for example, Olle Törnquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia* (London: Zed Books, 1984); Fritjof Tichelman, "The PKI and the Abangan," *The Social Evolution of Indonesia: The Asiatic Mode of Production and Its Legacy*, trans. Jean Sanders (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), pp. 230-50.

123. This is Reeve's own interpretation.

124. Reeve, p. 220.

125. *Surat Keputusan Kepala Pusat Pertahan Sipil Nomor: PS/B/68/1963*, in *HANSIP: Kumpulan Peraturan/Pedoman Pelaksanaan Organisasi Pertahanan Sipil*, compiled by Kaswadi, Soehartono, Heru Sugiri, and Gunawan (Surabaja: Bulletin Management, 1964), p. 39.

126. Biro Penerangan SOKSI, *Baladhika-Karya* (Djakarta: Biro Penerangan SOKSI, 1963), p. 3.

127. Ibid., pp. 13-14; emphasis in the original.

128. Ibid., p. 14.

ENDNOTES—CHAPTER VI

1. Quoted by Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia: Internal Development or External Expansion?" *Asian Survey* 3 (February 1963):71.

2. Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 163.

3. Ibid., pp. 163–64.

4. Lectures were delivered before Police and Air Force audiences first, probably because the former was the least sensitive among the services and the latter because of the presence of Communist sympathizers in its higher ranks. Aidit addressed the Police four times between May 1962 and March 1963 (24 May 1962; 18 September 1962; 22 February 1963, and; 6 March 1963). See D. N. Aidit, *PKI dan Polisi* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963). On 5 April 1963, Aidit spoke before the Air Force. See D. N. Aidit, *PKI dan AURI* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963). These two publications were published in May 1963, probably to set a standard to which the other services (the Navy and Army) would submit themselves. On 29 June 1963 Aidit addressed the Army Staff and Command School; see D. N. Aidit, *PKI dan Angkatan Darat (SESKOAD)* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1963). On 16 July 1963, he addressed the Navy Staff and Command School (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat*).

5. Sundhaussen, p. 167. See also Herbert Feith, "President Sukarno, The Army and The Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," *Asian Survey* 4 (August 1964):973.

6. Aidit, *PKI dan Polisi*, pp. 12–13.

7. Ibid., pp. 12–15.

8. Ibid., p. 14.

9. Aidit, *PKI dan Angkatan Darat*, p. 7.

10. Ibid., p. 32.

11. Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, *Daily Report, Far East* (24 July 1963), p. rrrl, quoted in Guy J. Pauker, ed., "The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management: Its Origin and Functions," *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, Memorandum RM-3312-PR, November 1963 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), p. 46.

12. H. Yunus, "*Pour le succès du nouveau plan de quartre ans*," *Nouvelle Revue Internationale* 12 (December 1963):121.

13. Ibid., p. 122.

14. Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program, and Tactics* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965), p. 180.

15. Yunus, "*Pour le succès du nouveau plan*," p. 122.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 123.

18. D. N. Aidit, *Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat! Political Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Enlarged with the Members of the Central Auditing Commission and the Central Control Commission (Djakarta, 23rd-26th December, 1963)* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p. 139.

19. Ibid., p. 140.

20. Ruth McVey identified these as the original schools, now renamed the *Mimbar Pengetahuan Rakjat* (Mipera), which offered the equivalent of a senior high school education, "Teaching Modernity: The PKI as an Educational Institution," *Indonesia* no. 50 (October 1990):15.

21. The *Balai Pengetahuan Rakjat* (Bapera) offered the equivalent of a junior high school education.

22. The *Panti Pengetahuan Rakjat* (Panpera) offered the equivalent of a primary school education.

23. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 14.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 15, n. 29.

26. McVey lists the following subjects for the SDS-type schools: "reading, writing, arithmetic, and only later history, geography, and natural science," "Teaching modernity," p. 14, n. 27; for the other type of schools she writes that "The primary schools (Panpera) were to provide courses in 1)Manipol (i.e., the PKI's understanding of official Guided Democracy ideology), 2) Indonesian language and literacy, 3) arithmetic, 4) geography, 5) life sciences, 6) history, 7)nature study, 8) singing, 9) drawing, and 10) introduction to philosophy (i.e., the principles of dialectical and historical materialism). The Bapera was to teach 1) Manipol and civics, 2) Indonesian language, 3) English language, 4) Indonesian and world history, 5) geography, 6) life sciences and health, 7) algebra and geometry, 8) natural sciences, 9) bookkeeping and commercial accounting, 10) philosophy. The Unra proper [Mipera] was to cover 1)

Manipol, 2) economics, 3) government and civics, 4) Indonesian history, 5) world history, 6) geography, 7) Indonesian language and literature, 8) English, 9) cultural anthropology, 10) algebra, 11) physics and chemistry, 12) bookkeeping and commercial accounting, and 13) philosophy," "Teaching Modernity," p. 15, n. 30.

27. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 16.

28. Ibid., p. 21.

29. Ibid., pp. 15–16.

30. "From a mimeographed statement accompanying application for membership, Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakjat, Tjabang Medan (Medan Branch, Lekra), Statement No. 003/ku/Lekra; Lampiran: = 1 =. Dated 15 June 1956," quoted in and translated by Claire Holt, *Art in Indonesia: Continuities and Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 247.

31. Keith Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts: The Indonesian "Institute of People's Culture" 1950-1965* (Clayton: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1986), p. 201.

32. Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 185–86.

33. Ibid., p. 185.

34. Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*, p. 124.

35. Ibid., p. 107.

36. Ibid., p. 110.

37. Ibid., pp. 108–9; Hindley lists institutes of literature, plastic arts, music, dance, drama, film, and science reaching right down to the branch level, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 185.

38. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Cultural Offensive," *Australian Outlook* 18 (April 1964):51.

39. Ibid., p. 48.

40. Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*, p. 112; see also James L. Peacock, *Rites of Modernization: Symbolic and Social Aspects of Indonesian Proletarian Drama* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 24–27 and 40–50.

41. Lekra resolutions of 1959, cited in Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Cultural Offensive," p. 49.

42. See Joebaar Ajoeb, "*Keterangan LEKRA mengenai Wajang dalam Bahasa Indonesia*," in *Laporan Kebudajaan Rakjat II* (Djakarta: Badan Penerbitan, Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat, n.d.), pp. 67–68, and; Sakirman, *Wajang Purwa: Asal-Usul dan Perkembangannja* (Djakarta: Badan Penerbitan, Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat, 1961), where the author inserts his credentials as an engineer ("Ir." = Insinyur).

43. Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*, p. 110.

44. Ibid., p. 124.

45. H. Yunus, "Indonesia: Battle on the Cultural Front," *World Marxist Review* 6 (January 1963):63.

46. Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*, p. 124.

47. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 21.

48. Ibid., p. 21, n. 55.

49. Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 196.

50. Ibid., p. 197.

51. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 20.

52. Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Cultural Offensive," p. 54.

53. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 22.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., p. 22, n. 59.

56. Ibid., p. 23.

57. Peacock, p. 250.

58. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, pp. 267–68.

59. Ibid., p. 268.

60. Ibid.

61. See Justus M. van der Kroef, *Communism in Malaysia and Singapore: A Contemporary Survey* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 193–221.

62. Sukarno, *Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), 28 December 1962, quoted in Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 275.

63. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 279.

64. Ibid., p. 280.

65. The most important regulations were: the December 1960 "Government Regulation in Lieu of Act No. 56 of the Year 1960 Concerning Fixation of the Size of Agricultural Land" (*Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang No. 56 Tahun 1960 Tentang Penetapan Luas Tanah Pertanian*), and "Government Regulation No. 224 of the Year 1961 Regarding the Implementation of Land Distribution and Payment of Indemnification" (*Peraturan Pemerintah No. 224 Tahun 1961 Tentang Pelaksanaan Pembagian Tanah dan Pemberian Ganti Kerugian*).

66. Gerrit Huizer, "Peasant Mobilization and Land Reform in Indonesia," *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 8 (January-June 1974):113.

67. Selo Soemardjan, "Land Reform in Indonesia," *Asian Survey* 2 (February 1962):25.

68. Huizer, p. 122.

69. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Peasant Mobilization and Political Development in Indonesia," *The Indonesian Quarterly* 5 (April 1977):108-9.

70. Huizer expresses ambivalence on this point: "It is difficult to assess whether this movement was instigated by BTI or PKI leadership, or was a spontaneous reaction by the peasants to doubtful practices and unilateral actions by landowners, such as eviction," p. 125.

71. W. F. Wertheim, "From Aliran towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java," in *Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientalism*, edited by Steffen W. Schmidt, Laura Guasti, Carl H. Landé, and James C. Scott (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), p. 464.

72. Olle Törnquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia* (London: Zed Books, 1984).

73. Huizer, p. 120.

74. Ibid., p. 121.

75. The first report delivered by Aidit, containing the discussion of "state power in Indonesia today," was on 2 September 1963 before the Higher Party School of the Cental Committee of the Communist Party of China in Beijing. The second report, which contained a discussion on "the present state power in the Republic of

Indonesia," was delivered at the Party School of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China on 25 September 1963; D. N. Aidit, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964).

76. Aidit, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks*, p. 41; emphasis in the original.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., p. 42.

79. Ibid., pp. 42–43.

80. Ibid., p. 127.

81. Ibid., p. 41.

82. Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 136.

83. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 200.

84. Aidit, *Set Afire the Banteng Spirit!*; *Banteng* is the Indonesian word for wild water buffalo.

85. Ibid., p. 138.

86. Ibid., p. 123.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., pp. 130–31; emphases in the original.

90. Ibid., p. 126.

91. Ibid., p. 128.

92. Ibid., p. 144.

93. Ibid., p. 133.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid., p. 145.

96. Ibid.; emphasis in the original.

97. See Donald E. Weatherbee, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confrontation in Southeast Asia," *Orbis* 7 (Summer 1963):336–51; Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia," *Asian Survey* 4 (June 1964):904–13; and George McT. Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 37 (Fall 1964):253–70.

98. See Pauker, "Indonesia: Internal Development or External Expansion?"; Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities," *Asian Survey* 4 (February 1964):687–94; and B. K. Gordon, "The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism," *Pacific Affairs* 36 (Winter 1963-64):378–93.

99. Reference to *Penetapan Presiden No. 7 tahun 1963 Pencegahan Pemogokan dan atau Penutupan (lock-out) di Perusahaan-perusahaan, Jawatan dan Badan-badan yang Vital*, in Padmo Wahjono, *Penjabaran Pancasila dalam Peraturan Perundangan* (Jakarta: C.V. Niagara, 1988), p. 374.

100. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 281.

101. Ibid., p. 282.

102. Ibid., p. 283.

103. Ibid., pp. 288–89.

104. *New York Times* (New York), 26 March 1964, quoted in Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 285.

105. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power," *Pacific Affairs* 37 (Winter 1964–65):359.

106. "Aidit Completes Research into Conditions of Peasants and Peasants' Movement," *Review of Indonesia* 7 (May-July 1964):28; *idjon* was a "type of usurious pawning of land and harvest," Huizer, p. 128, n. 124.

107. Soemardjan, "Land Reform in Indonesia," p. 25.

108. Törnquist, p. 189.

109. "Aidit Completes Research," p. 27.

110. The source for numbers for West Java is McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 26, n. 73; the source for numbers for East Java is "Aidit Completes Research," p. 27; and the total number given is found in D. N. Aidit, "Launch A New Culture Movement in Our Villages," *Review of Indonesia* 7 (May-June-July 1964):31.

111. Aidit, "Launch a New Culture Movement," p. 31.

112. "Aidit Completes Research," p. 28, describing the work in Central Java specifically.

113. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," pp. 25–26.

114. Aidit, "Launch a New Culture Movement," p, 31.

115. "Aidit completes Research," p. 29.

116. McVey writes that the "intended publication of the [other research results] did not take place before the 1965 coup, but (presumably franker and more detailed) reports of the research results were circulated internally," "Teaching Modernity," pp. 25–26, n. 73.

117. D. N. Aidit, *Kaum Tani Mengganjang Setan-setan Desa* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1964).

118. Törnquist, pp. 188–89.

119. Ibid.

120. Kartodirdjo, "Peasant Mobilization," p. 109.

121. Aidit, *Set Afire the Banteng Spirit!*, p. 135.

122. Wertheim, p. 464.

123. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," pp. 17–18.

124. Ibid., p. 18.

125. Asmu, *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), 22 February 1964, quoted in McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 14.

126. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 18.

127. Margo L. Lyon, *Bases of Conflict in Rural Java*, Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, Research Monograph no. 3 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 48–49.

128. Ibid., p. 56.

129. Aidit, "Launch a New Culture Movement," p. 31.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid., p. 32.

132. Yunus, "Indonesia: Battle on the Cultural Front," p. 64.

133. Aidit, "Launch a New Culture Movement," p. 32.

134. Huizer, p. 127.

135. Törnquist, p. 197.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid., p. 195.

138. Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*, p. 129.

139. Ibid.

140. Ruth McVey, "The *Wayang* Controversy in Indonesian Communism," *Context, Meaning and Power in Southeast Asia*, Studies on Southeast Asia, edited by Mark Hobart and Robert H. Taylor (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1986), pp. 23–24.

141. Ibid., p. 21.

142. Ibid., p. 27.

143. Ibid.

144. D. N. Aidit, *Tentang Sastra dan Seni* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1964), pp. 33–34, quoted in McVey, "The *Wayang* Controversy," p. 30.

145. D. N. Aidit, *Tentang Sastra dan Seni* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1964), p. 45, quoted in McVey, "The *Wayang* Controversy," p. 31; emphasis in the original.

146. *Harian Rakjat Minggu* (Djakarta), 7 February 1965, quoted in McVey, "The *Wayang* Controversy," p. 44, n. 21.

147. Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*, p. 130.

148. *Resolusi KSSR tentang referat D.N. Aidit, "Dengan Sastra dan Seni jang Berkepribadian Nasional Mengabdi Buruh Tani dan Prajurit," Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), 6 September 1964, quoted in Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*, p. 131.

149. *Antara Daily News Bulletin* (Djakarta), 9 January 1963, quoted in Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 277.

150. David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 210.

151. Huizer, p. 130.

152. Reeve, p. 216.

153. See Keith R. Foulcher, "A Survey of Events Surrounding 'Manikebu': The Struggle for Cultural and Intellectual Freedom in Indonesian Literature," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 4 (1969):446–47, on developments in the field of education.

154. Reeve, p. 216.

155. Sundhaussen, p. 164.

156. Aidit, *Set Afire the Banteng Spirit!*, p. 15.

157. Quoted in Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1964: Toward a 'People's Democracy'?" *Asian Survey* 5 (February 1965):90.

158. M. H. Lukman, *Untuk Perbaikan Pekerjaan dalam Front Persatuan Nasional* (Djakarta, n.p., 1964), quoted in Mortimer, p. 315.

159. Sundhaussen, p. 164.

160. See Foulcher, "A Survey of Events," pp. 429–41.

161. Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*, p. 125, n. 170.

162. Reeve, p. 232.

163. In a report of the plenary session of LESTRA/Lekra, Surabaya, 3 November 1963, quoted in Foulcher, "A Survey of Events," p. 441.

164. The official text of the Presidential Decree can be found in Foulcher, "A Survey of Events," pp. 444-45.

165. *Berita Indonesia* (Djakarta), 31 August 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 235.

166. Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 70.

167. *Berita Indonesia* (Djakarta), 12 September 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 248.

168. *Berita Indonesia* (Djakarta), 1 September 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 242.

169. Reeve, p. 243.

170. Ibid., p. 242.

171. Ibid., p. 243.

172. Imam Pratignyo, *Ungkapan Sejarah: Lahirnya Golongan Karya Perjoangan Menegakkan Kembali Negara Proklamasi 17-8-1945* (Jakarta: Yayasan Bhakti, 1982), p. 70.

173. See Reeve, pp. 243–44.

174. Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, *The Coup Attempt of the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Headquarters of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Centre for Armed Forces History and Tradition, 1987), pp. 166–67.

175. D. N. Aidit, *Revolusi Indonesia, Latarbelakang Sedjarah dan Haridepannja* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1964), p. 80; emphasis in the original; see also Robert Cribb, "The Indonesian Marxist Tradition," *Marxism in Asia*, edited by Colin Mackerras and Nick Knight (New York, NY: St. Marin's Press, 1985), pp. 268–69.

176. Sundhaussen, p. 190.

177. Crouch, p. 70.

178. Kelompok-Kerdja SAB, *Sedjarah Singkat Perdjuangan Bersendjata Bangsa Indonesia* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1964).

179. Nugroho Notosusanto, *Sejarah dan Hankam* (Jakarta: Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata, Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 1987), p. 34.

180. Among the works listed by Nugroho, *Sejarah*, pp. 39–40, as being published in 1965 were Nugroho Notosusanto, *Pertempuran Surabaya* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Daska Priyadi, *GOM II: Operasi Penumpasan APRA/Westerling* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Rochmani Santoso, *GOM III: Menumpas Pemberontakan Andi Azis serta KNIL/KL* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Soe Hok Gie, *GOM IV: Kisah Penumpasan "RMS"* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Anne Marie The, *GOM V: Darah Tersimbah di Jawa Barat* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Yusmar Basri, *GOM VI: Untuk Menumpas DI/TII di Jawa Tengah* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Ariwiadi, *GOM VII: Penyelesaian Peristiwa Aceh* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Zanaibun Harahap, *Operasi-operasi Militer Menumpas Kahar Muzakar* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Leirissa R.Z., *Bukan Disiplin Kadaver Melainkan Disiplin Berdjiwa: Operasi-operasi Militer Terhadap "Permesta" 1958* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Onghokham, *Sapta Marga Berkumandang di Sumatra: Operasi-operasi Menumpas Pemberontakan PRRI* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Emilia Musim, *Jenderal Urip Sumohardjo, Perintis Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Lybia Soedjono, *Panglima Besar Sudirman: Pejuang, Pemimpin, Pahlawan* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); Umi Prahastuti

Soemadi, *Laksamana Muda Udara Prof. dr: Abdul-rachman Saleh: Pelopor Kedocteran, Radio dan Penerbangan* (Djakarta: Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965).

181. Reeve, p. 237.

182. Ibid., pp. 238–39.

183. Ibid., p. 238.

184. Ibid., p. 239.

185. A contemporary record can be found in *"BPS" Aksi Reaksi* (Djakarta: P. T. Rakjat, 1965).

186. Reeve, p. 240; see *Keputusan Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi ABRI/KOTI No. 1/KOTI/1965*, in *"BPS" Aksi Reaksi*, pp. 86–87.

187. Crouch, p. 75.

188. Ibid., p. 74.

189. Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967," *Pacific Affairs* 58 (Summer 1985):253.

190. Roger Hilsman, *To Move A Nation* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1967), p. 377, quoted in Baladas Ghoshal, *Indonesian Politics 1955–59: The Emergence of Guided Democracy* (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Company, 1982), p. 303.

191. Dennis Bloodworth, *An Eye for the Dragon: Southeast Asia Observed 1954–1970* (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970), p. 252.

192. Scott, p. 255.

193. See *Surat Keputusan No.: KEP-103/2/1965* on *Berita Yudha* and *Surat Keputusan Nomer: KEP-845/7/1965* on *Karya Wira Jati*, both in *Himpunan Surat2 Keputusan/Perintah dls. dari MEN/PANGAD Tahun-1965* (Djakarta: Sekretariat Umum Angkatan Darat, n.d.), pp. 68–69 and 275–76.

194. *Surat Keputusan Nomer: KEP-1011/9/1965* and *Surat Keputusan Nomer: KEP-1104/9/1965* in *Himpunan Surat2 Keputusan/Perintah dls. dari MEN/PANGAD Tahun-1965* (Djakarta: Sekretariat Umum Angkatan Darat, n.d.), pp. 395–96 and 463–64.

195. *Surat Keputusan Nomer: KEP-423/4/1965* and *Surat Keputusan Nomer: KEP-787/7/1965* in *Himpunan Surat2 Keputusan/Perintah dls. dari MEN/PANGAD Tahun-1965* (Djakarta: Sekretariat Umum Angkatan Darat, n.d.), pp. 140–42 and 247–49.

196. Sundhaussen, pp. 174–75.

197. See Jacob Walkin, "The Muslim-Communist Confrontation in East Java," *Orbis* 13 (Fall 1969):822-47; Ikatan Petani Pantjasila, *Buku Perintis Kader Tani* (Djakarta: n.p., 1963?); Biro Pendidikan SOB Pantjasila, *Membentuk Kader Ikatan Buruh Pantjasila dari Bawah* (Djakarta:, n.p., 1964?).

198. See Sundhaussen for a review of these developments, pp. 190–92.

199. David Jenkins, "The Evolution of the Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of *Dwifungsi*," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 2 (1983):22. See *Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI "Tri Ubaya Cakti" Buku Induk* (Djakarta: Departemen Angkatan Darat, 1965), pp. 10–14, for a summary of this and other official seminar statements.

200. Reeve, p. 245.

201. Ibid., pp. 17–19.

202. Panitya/Team Perumus, *Perumusan: Fungsi Golongan Karya Angkatan Bersendjata* (Djakarta: Rapat Koordinasi Karyawan Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965), p. 11.

203. Mortimer, pp. 384–85.

204. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia: The Mystique of Permanent Revolution," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 64 (1965):1-14.

205. D. N. Aidit, "1965 a Year for More Intensive Struggle Against the 'Four Villains" and the Bureaucratic Capitalists," *Review of Indonesia* 9 (January 1965):5. The "four devils" were "'Malaysia', the seven village devils, modern revisionism, and the devil of the world, US imperialism."

206. Ibid.

207. Ibid., p. 6.

208. McVey, "The *Wayang* Controversy," p. 50, n. 67.

209. Ibid., pp. 46–47, n. 43.

210. Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*, p. 131; these articles were published on 21 March 1965, 28 March 1965, 4 April 1965, 18 April 1965, 25 April 1965, and 2 May 1965.

211. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 19.

212. Ibid., p. 19, n. 48.

213. Ibid., p. 24, n. 68.

214. Ibid., p. 24.

215. Ibid., pp. 16 and 18.

216. Ibid., p. 16.

217. D. N. Aidit, *Perhebat Ofensif Revolusioner Disegala Bidang!* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1965), p. 90.

218. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 18, n. 44.

219. Aidit, *Perhebat Ofensif Revolusioner*, p. 90.

220. Ibid., p. 38.

221. Ibid., p. 10.

222. Ibid., p. 44.

223. Ibid., p. 72.

224. Ibid., p. 74.

225. Sudisman, *Berofensif Dibidang Pelaksanaan Plan 4 Tahun Partai* (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1965), p. 10.

226. See "*Annexe II: Structure et evolution des organismes centraux*," p. 183, in Françoise Cayrac-Blanchard, *Le parti communiste Indonésien* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1973).

227. *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), 3 July 1965, quoted in McVey, "Teaching Modernity," pp. 24–25, n. 69; this set of skills was delineated in Sudisman, *Berofensif Dibidang Pelaksanaan Plan*, pp. 11–12.

228. Sudisman, *Berofensif Dibidang Pelaksanaan Plan*, pp. 15–16 and 19.

229. M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present* (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 267; In August, the PKI issued what were to be its last statements on its membership. From this and earlier disclosures, one can reasonably posit the following: PKI: 3.5 million; *Pemuda Rakjat*: 3 million; SOBSI: 3.5 million; BTI: 9 million; Gerwani: 3 million; and Lekra: 5 million. See Mortimer, p. 367, for these separate figures.

230. "Letter Dated 20 January 1965 from the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Addressed to the Secretary-General," *International Legal Materials* 4 (March 1965):364-366.

231. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's 'Revolutionary Gymnastics'," *Asian Survey* 5 (May 1965):218; Daniel S. Lev, "Indonesia 1965. The Year of the Coup," *Asian Survey* 6 (February 1966):104; O. G. Roeder, "The Turn of the US," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 March 1965, pp. 544–45.

232. Aidit, *Perhebat Ofensif Revolusioner*, pp. 34–35.

233. Ibid., p. 33.

234. MacArthur F. Corsino, *A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the PKI-Aidit* (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), p. 142.

235. Aidit, *Perhebat Ofensif Revolusioner*, p. 35.

236. Mortimer, p. 244.

237. See O. G. Roeder, "Indonesia's Change of Course," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 May 1965, pp. 315–16.

238. J. A. C. Mackie, "Inflation and Confrontation in Indonesia," *Australian Outlook* 18 (December 1964):292.

239. Aidit, *Set Afire the Banteng Spirit!*, p. 20.

240. On PKI reaction, see Mortimer, pp. 169–71; Peter Christian Hauswedell, "Sukarno: Radical or Conservative? Indonesian Politics 1964–65," *Indonesia* no. 15 (April 1973):127–28.

241. Hauswedell, p. 138, n. 113.

242. Quoted in Uri Ra'anan, "The Coup That Failed: A Background Analysis," *Problems of Communism* 15 (March–April 1966):41.

243. This individual was Ir. Setiadi Reksoprodjo, a leader of the *Pemuda Rakjat*; he was appointed Minister of Electricity and Energy, Crouch, p. 77.

244. Crouch, p. 78.

245. Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*, pp. 133–34.

246. Reeve, p. 251.

247. See Lev, "Indonesia 1965," p. 104; J. Eliseo Rocamora, "The *Partai Nasionalis Indonesia*, 1963–1965," *Indonesia* no. 10 (October 1970):143–81; and Angus McIntyre, "Division and Power in the Indonesian National Party, 1965–1966," *Indonesia* no. 13 (April 1972):183–210.

248. Mortimer, p. 379.

249. *Antara* new bulletins (Djakarta), 14 and 17 January 1965, quoted in Sundhaussen, p. 196.

250. *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), 12 February 1965, quoted in Mortimer, pp. 381–82.

251. Sundhaussen, p. 193.

252. Crouch, p. 87.

253. Ibid., p. 88.

254. *Berita Yudha* (Djakarta), 25 May 1965, quoted in Crouch, pp. 88–89.

255. Crouch, p. 89.

256. Ibid., p. 92.

257. Sukarno, *Reach to the Stars. A Year of Self-Reliance* (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1965), pp. 24, 41, and 42, quoted in Sundhaussen, pp. 193–94; the official text can be found as *Tjapailah Bintang-Bintang Dilangit (Tahun Berdikari)*, in *Bahan-Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi* (Djakarta: B. P. Prapantja, 1965), pp. 1297-1348; see O. G. Roeder, "Twenty Years On," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 September 1965, pp. 486–87.

258. Aidit, *Perhebat Ofensif Revolusioner*, pp. 93–94.

259. *21 Tahun Supersemar Surat Perintah 11 Maret 1966* (Jakarta: B.P. Alda, 1987), p. 2.

260. McVey, "Teaching Modernity," p. 5.

ENDNOTES—CONCLUSION

1. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, D. Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 28.

2. Ibid.

3. I wish to gratefully acknowledge Fred Judson's insight on this point.

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